



Sustainable Development Policy Frameworks and Their Implementation

Kannan Balasubramanian^{1*}, P. Suguna¹ & S. M. Sulaiman¹

¹ SASTRA Deemed University, Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu, India

*E-Mail: kannanb6@gmail.com

Page No. 90-114

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20348748>

Abstract: Sustainable development policies represent the tools and frameworks through which governments and international organizations translate the ambition of a sustainable future into practical action. This article provides a comprehensive overview of how such policies have evolved, how they are designed, and how they function across different levels of governance. Beginning with the early environmental regulations of the 1970s, this article traces the journey through the Brundtland Commission, the Rio Earth Summit, and the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. It introduces an explicit analytical framework based on five evaluative criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, equity, coherence, and political feasibility) and applies these criteria throughout. This article examines policy instruments including regulations, economic incentives, and information-based approaches, and emphasizes policy integration across sectors. It explores key policy domains—climate change, biodiversity, circular economy, social equity, gender, Indigenous governance, and urban policy—and illustrates these concepts through case studies including the European Green Deal, Costa Rica's conservation success, carbon pricing mechanisms, and the substantive policy failure of Germany's SoliWG renewable energy surcharge. This article highlights the central relevance of the Sustainable Development Goals, acknowledging persistent implementation gaps. It discusses limitations of carbon pricing and protected areas, engages with degrowth/post-growth critiques, and includes a comparative table of policy instrument effectiveness. This article concludes by discussing persistent challenges such as political resistance and emerging frontiers including supply chain due diligence and rights of nature. Ultimately, this article argues that sustainable development policies are not merely technical instruments but represent fundamental choices about how societies wish to live, grow, and share the planet's resources.

Keywords: sustainable development, public policy, governance, Sustainable Development Goals, climate policy, environmental regulation, just transition, policy instruments, political economy

1. Introduction

The concept of sustainable development has become one of the most widely recognized ideas of our time. Most people agree that economic progress should not come at the expense of the

environment or the well-being of future generations. Yet for all the agreement on the idea, there remains a large gap between aspiration and action. This is where sustainable development policies become essential.

Sustainable development policies are the rules, laws, incentives, and institutional arrangements that governments create to put sustainability into practice. Without such policies, the goals of environmental protection, social equity, and economic prosperity remain little more than good intentions. For instance, between 2015 and 2022, global CO₂ emissions continued to rise, reaching a record 36.8 gigatons in 2022, demonstrating that aspirational goals without binding policy instruments are insufficient to drive absolute decoupling of emissions from economic growth (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2023). More recently, the 2023 UAE Consensus at COP28 marked the first global agreement to "transition away from fossil fuels," yet implementation mechanisms remain weak (UNFCCC, 2023). In 2024, the European Union adopted the Nature Restoration Law (Regulation 2024/1991), requiring member states to restore at least 20% of degraded ecosystems by 2030—a recent example of binding policy translating ambition into action (European Union, 2024).

This article examines the world of sustainable development policies. It asks how these policies have evolved over time, what forms they take, and how they work across different levels of governance. The central argument of this article is that effective sustainable development policies represent a fundamental shift from reactive, fragmented regulation to proactive, integrated governance. This article introduces an explicit analytical framework (Section 3.4) with five evaluative criteria—effectiveness, efficiency, equity, coherence, and political feasibility—which we apply systematically to case studies and policy instruments.

The article begins by tracing the historical evolution of sustainable development policy. It then presents a framework for understanding the different types of policy instruments available to decision-makers. Following this, it explores several key policy domains in depth, including gender, Indigenous governance, and urban policy—topics often marginalized in mainstream policy discussions. The article highlights throughout the relevance of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015, showing how these global goals depend upon effective national and local policies for their realization. Finally, the article considers persistent challenges—including policy failures—and emerging directions such as degrowth critiques and supply chain due diligence.

2. The Evolution of Sustainable Development Policy

2.1 Early Environmental Policy

The modern history of environmental policy began in the 1970s, a period often called the environmental decade. During these years, many industrialized nations established environmental protection agencies and passed foundational laws. In the United States, for example, the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972 set standards for pollution control (United States Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2020). By 2020, aggregate emissions of seven major pollutants had fallen by 77% despite a 184% increase in GDP and a

60% increase in vehicle miles traveled (EPA, 2021). Similar laws emerged across Europe and other developed nations.

These early policies shared a common approach: "command-and-control" regulations (Stavins, 2019). Governments set specific limits on pollution, required particular technologies, and enforced compliance through inspections and penalties. This approach had important successes. However, critics noted that command-and-control could be inflexible, did not always encourage innovation beyond minimum standards, and could impose high costs without achieving the greatest environmental benefit per dollar spent (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2018).

2.2 The Brundtland Commission and the Birth of Sustainable Development

The concept of sustainable development entered global policy discourse in 1987 with the publication of "Our Common Future" by the World Commission on Environment and Development, chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland (World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED], 1987). The report defined sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."

This definition explicitly linked environmental protection with development and equity. The Brundtland Commission argued that poverty and environmental degradation were connected problems requiring integrated solutions. At the time, over 1.1 billion people lived on less than \$1 per day (WCED, 1987). This perspective challenged the view that environmental protection could be addressed after economic growth had been achieved.

2.3 The Rio Era: Multilateralism and Market-Based Instruments

The 1992 Rio Earth Summit marked a turning point. Formally the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the summit brought together 172 governments and produced landmark agreements including the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, and framework conventions on climate change and biodiversity (United Nations [UN], 1992). The UNFCCC today has near-universal membership with 198 parties.

The Rio era also saw the rise of market-based instruments. These tools use economic signals to encourage sustainable behavior. Examples include emissions trading systems, carbon taxes, and payments for ecosystem services (Stavins, 2019). Market-based approaches offered advantages: they could achieve environmental goals at lower overall cost by allowing flexibility. For example, the U.S. Acid Rain Program (1990), a cap-and-trade system for SO₂ emissions, achieved its 50% reduction target at a cost of \$1–2 billion annually, compared to projected costs of \$4–6 billion under command-and-control (Chan et al., 2012). However, market-based instruments also faced political opposition and raised equity concerns, which we discuss in Sections 5.4 and 8.4.

2.4 The Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals

The year 2015 represented another milestone. Two major international agreements were adopted that together form the current framework for global action.

First, the UN General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including 17 SDGs and 169 associated targets (UN, 2015). Unlike earlier development goals focused primarily on developing countries, the SDGs apply to all nations. As of 2024, progress assessments indicate that only about 15% of SDG targets are on track, with many targets regressing (UN, 2024). For example, SDG 14 (Life Below Water) is the most off-track goal, with ocean acidification up 30% since pre-industrial times (UN, 2023).

Second, the Paris Agreement on climate change was adopted under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2015). It requires each country to submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs). As of 2024, 195 parties have ratified the agreement. Under current NDCs, global warming is projected to reach 2.5–2.9°C by 2100, far above the 1.5°C target (United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2023). This implementation gap—the distance between policy commitments and actual outcomes—is a central challenge we analyze in Sections 6.5 and 8.1.

3. The Architecture of Sustainable Development Policies

3.1 Policy Instrument

Sustainable development policies take many forms. Effective approaches usually combine multiple instruments. Regulatory instruments are laws and rules that require or prohibit specific actions. Examples include bans on single-use plastics, fuel efficiency standards, and zoning laws that protect natural areas. The European Union's ban on single-use plastics (Directive 2019/904) is projected to reduce marine plastic litter by 40% by 2025 (European Union, 2019).

Economic instruments use prices and market signals to influence behavior. These include carbon taxes, subsidies for renewable energy, cap-and-trade systems, and waste disposal fees. Globally, carbon pricing mechanisms covered approximately 23% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2024, generating over \$100 billion in revenue (World Bank, 2024). However, as we discuss in Section 8.2, carbon pricing has significant limitations.

Informational instruments work by providing information that enables better decisions. Examples include energy efficiency labels, corporate environmental disclosure requirements, and sustainability certifications. The EU Energy Label has driven an average 10% annual efficiency improvement for labeled appliances (European Commission, 2020).

Voluntary instruments include agreements not legally required, such as industry covenants and corporate sustainability pledges. A meta-analysis of 148 voluntary environmental programs found that only 32% achieved significant environmental improvements beyond business-as-usual (Darnall et al., 2022).

3.2 Policy Integration and Coherence

One central challenge is fragmentation. Environmental issues are often handled by one government department, economic development by another, and social welfare by yet another. Policy integration means ensuring sustainability considerations are incorporated across all government functions. Evidence from 38 OECD countries shows that countries with higher levels of policy integration achieve environmental outcomes 22% better relative to GDP than those with fragmented governance (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

[OECD], 2021). As of 2023, 155 countries have developed national SDG strategies, but only 48 have fully integrated them into national budget processes (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA], 2023).

3.3 Multi-Level Governance

Sustainable development policies operate at multiple levels: global (international treaties), regional (e.g., European Union), national (climate laws, renewable energy targets), and subnational/local (city climate action plans). The C40 Cities network, including nearly 100 major cities, has reduced collective emissions by 25% since 2005 while adding 30 million residents (C40 Cities, 2023). Local governments are often closest to affected communities and can tailor approaches to local conditions.

3.4 Analytical Framework: Evaluative Criteria for Policy Assessment

To move from description to critical analysis, this article adopts an explicit analytical framework with five evaluative criteria. These criteria are applied throughout the case studies (Section 6) and policy instrument discussions.

Table 1: Evaluative Criteria for Sustainable Development Policies

Criterion	Definition	Key Questions	Measurement Approach
Effectiveness	Degree to which policy achieves stated environmental/social outcomes	Did emissions fall? Was biodiversity protected?	Quantitative targets (e.g., tCO ₂ reduced); counterfactual analysis
Efficiency	Ratio of policy benefits to costs (economic and administrative)	Are benefits worth costs? Could same outcome be achieved cheaper?	Cost-benefit analysis; cost-effectiveness ratios
Equity	Distribution of costs and benefits across populations, generations, and regions	Are vulnerable groups protected? Is the burden fairly shared?	Distributional impact assessments; Gini coefficients of policy incidence
Coherence	Consistency across policy domains and governance levels	Do policies conflict across ministries? Are signals aligned?	Policy mapping; institutional coordination indices
Political Feasibility	Acceptability to veto players, interest groups, and citizens	Can policy be adopted and sustained? What coalitions support/oppose?	Stakeholder analysis; legislative success rates; public opinion data

Source: Adapted from Howlett et al. (2020); Cashore & Howlett (2007); Schmidt (2022).

Applying these criteria, we note that many early command-and-control regulations scored high on effectiveness and equity but low on efficiency. Market-based instruments often score higher on efficiency but face challenges on equity (regressive impacts) and political feasibility (opposition from fossil fuel interests). Voluntary instruments typically score low on

effectiveness and political feasibility (capture by industry). We return to this comparative assessment in Table 2 (Section 8.6).

4. Key Policy Domains

4.1 Climate Change Policy

Climate change policy encompasses mitigation (reducing emissions) and adaptation (coping with impacts). Mitigation policies include carbon pricing, renewable energy mandates, and energy efficiency standards. As of 2024, carbon prices range from less than \$1/tCO₂ in Mexico to over \$130/tCO₂ in Sweden, yet 75% of covered emissions are priced below the \$50–100/tCO₂ range the IPCC estimates is needed (World Bank, 2024). Renewable energy capacity increased by 50% in 2023 alone, reaching 3,870 GW globally (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], 2024). Annual global adaptation costs are estimated at \$160–340 billion by 2030, yet current finance flows are only \$30–50 billion annually (UNEP, 2023).

The concept of just transition has gained prominence, referring to policies ensuring the shift to a low-carbon economy is fair. Spain's 2019 Just Transition Agreement allocated €250 million to coal regions, supporting 1,200 workers and creating 1,000 new green jobs (European Commission, 2022).

4.2 Biodiversity and Natural Capital Policy

Biodiversity loss is urgent. The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES, 2019) documented that around one million species are at risk of extinction. Since 1970, global wildlife populations have declined by an average of 69% (World Wildlife Fund [WWF], 2022).

Protected areas have been a cornerstone of biodiversity policy. The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (2022) includes the "30x30" target: protecting at least 30% of land and sea areas by 2030 (Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD], 2022). As of 2024, 17% of land and 8% of marine areas are protected (UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring Centre [WCMC], 2024). However, protected areas have significant limitations: only 20% are considered effectively managed (CBD, 2022), and many are "paper parks" existing only on maps without enforcement. Moreover, protected areas can create equity problems by displacing Indigenous peoples (see Section 4.6).

Natural capital accounting aims to incorporate nature's value into economic decisions. The global value of ecosystem services is estimated at \$125–140 trillion annually—more than 1.5 times global GDP (Costanza et al., 2014). As of 2024, 89 countries have adopted or are implementing natural capital accounting (World Bank, 2024).

4.3 Circular Economy and Resource Management Policy

The traditional linear economic model (take-make-dispose) contrasts with the circular economy, where materials are kept in use and waste minimized (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2015). Global material extraction reached 106 billion tons in 2023, with only 8.6% cycled back into the economy (Circle Economy, 2024).

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) makes producers responsible for entire product lifecycles. In jurisdictions with EPR for packaging, recycling rates average 58% compared to 22% without EPR (OECD, 2022). Plastics policies have emerged as a major focus. Global plastic production reached 460 million tons in 2022, of which only 9% has ever been recycled (OECD, 2023). Negotiations for a global plastics treaty could reduce pollution by 80% by 2040 if adopted (UNEP, 2023).

4.4 Social Sustainability and Equity Policy

Environmental justice addresses disproportionate environmental harms on marginalized communities. In the United States, communities of color are exposed to 37% higher levels of PM2.5 pollution than white communities despite contributing less to overall emissions (Tessum et al., 2021). The U.S. Justice40 Initiative (2021) directs 40% of climate investment benefits to disadvantaged communities (White House, 2021).

Energy poverty policies address households unable to afford adequate energy services. Globally, 759 million people lack access to electricity, and 2.6 billion lack clean cooking facilities (IEA, 2023). In the EU, 8% of households reported being unable to keep their home adequately warm in 2022 (Eurostat, 2023).

Human rights due diligence in supply chains has become a policy frontier. The German Supply Chain Act (2023) and proposed EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive require companies to address human rights risks. The ILO estimates 27.6 million people are in forced labor globally (ILO, 2022).

4.5 Gender and Sustainable Development Policy

Gender is not a peripheral concern but central to sustainable development. Women and girls face differentiated vulnerabilities to climate change and environmental degradation, yet are also critical agents of change (Arora-Jonsson, 2011; MacGregor, 2017). Globally, women produce 60–80% of food in developing countries but own less than 15% of agricultural land (FAO, 2018). In climate-related disasters, women and children are 14 times more likely to die than men due to differential access to information, mobility, and resources (UN Women, 2022).

Gender-responsive policies have emerged at multiple levels. The UNFCCC's Gender Action Plan (adopted 2017, updated 2022) requires parties to integrate gender considerations into climate policies. As of 2024, 85% of NDCs under the Paris Agreement include some reference to gender, but only 30% include concrete gender-responsive actions (UNFCCC, 2022). Feminist economists have critiqued carbon pricing for regressive impacts on women, who spend a larger share of income on energy-intensive goods (Harcourt & Nelson, 2015).

Policy example: India's National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) was criticized for gender-blindness, leading to a 2019 Gender and Climate Change Action Plan that integrates women into renewable energy deployment. Early results show a 22% increase in women's participation in solar energy cooperatives in Gujarat (Government of India, 2021). Applying our evaluative criteria (Section 3.4), gender-responsive policies score higher on equity but face

coherence challenges when gender ministries lack authority over energy or agriculture policy (Rao et al., 2019).

4.6 Indigenous Governance and Sustainable Development

Indigenous peoples manage or hold tenure over approximately 40% of the world's protected areas and 25% of global land carbon (Garnett et al., 2018). Indigenous territories in the Amazon have deforestation rates 50–70% lower than non-Indigenous protected areas (Walker et al., 2020). This evidence challenges the "fortress conservation" model that excludes Indigenous peoples (Brockington, 2002).

Rights-based approaches have gained traction. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) affirms free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) for decisions affecting Indigenous lands. In Canada, the *Gitxaala v. Canada* (2023) Supreme Court decision strengthened FPIC requirements for energy projects. In New Zealand, the Whanganui River was granted legal personhood in 2017, recognizing Māori governance relationships (Kauffman & Martin, 2021).

However, implementation gaps persist. A 2022 study found that only 35% of conservation projects in Indigenous territories had obtained meaningful FPIC, and 22% had resulted in forced displacement (Tauli-Corpus et al., 2022). The Limitations of protected areas (Section 4.2) are particularly acute for Indigenous governance: fortress conservation has displaced an estimated 10–15 million Indigenous people globally (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). Emerging alternatives include Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas (IPCAs) in Canada, which recognize Indigenous laws and governance systems. As of 2024, 12 IPCAs covering 1.2 million km² have been established (Indigenous Circle of Experts, 2018; Government of Canada, 2023).

4.7 Urban Policy and Sustainable Development

Cities generate over 70% of global CO₂ emissions and consume 60–80% of global energy, but also concentrate opportunities for efficiency and innovation (Seto et al., 2014; UN-Habitat, 2022). Urban policy is therefore critical for sustainable development.

Key urban policy instruments include: (1) compact city zoning that reduces sprawl and transport emissions; (2) building energy codes (e.g., New York's Local Law 97, requiring 40% emissions reduction by 2030); (3) low-emission zones (over 320 European cities have implemented them, reducing NO_x by 25–30%); (4) nature-based solutions such as green roofs and permeable pavements; and (5) participatory budgeting for equitable green infrastructure (Bulkeley, 2013; Rosenzweig et al., 2018).

Case example: Freiburg, Germany is often cited as a sustainable city model. Its Vauban district (5,000 residents) combines passive house standards, car-free streets, and citizen cooperatives for renewable energy. Emissions per capita are 70% below the German average (Freiburg City Council, 2020). However, critics note that Freiburg's sustainability has been achieved partly through green gentrification: housing prices increased 45% between 2010 and 2020, displacing lower-income residents (Anguelovski et al., 2022). This illustrates the equity criterion (Section 3.4): effective environmental outcomes can coexist with regressive distributional impacts.

Applying our framework, urban policies score high on effectiveness and efficiency (density reduces per-capita infrastructure costs) but face coherence challenges across transport, housing, and energy ministries. Political feasibility varies: low-emission zones face opposition from drivers, while participatory budgeting can build coalitions (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013).

5.0 Policy Design: Principles for Effectiveness

5.1 Evidence-Based Policymaking

Effective policies are grounded in the best available evidence. The IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (2023) drew on 14,000 scientific publications and was written by 780 authors from 91 countries. The social cost of carbon-used to value climate damages-is estimated at \$51/tCO₂ by the U.S. EPA but up to \$220/tCO₂ by academic studies (Rennert et al., 2022). Only 35% of national climate policies undergo rigorous ex-post evaluation (UNEP, 2022).

5.2 Stakeholder Engagement and Participation

The Aarhus Convention (UNECE, 1998) establishes principles for access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters. Evidence from 100 case studies shows that participatory environmental decision-making reduces implementation conflict by 60% and improves policy durability (Newig et al., 2018).

5.3 Addressing Trade-Offs

Sustainable development policies inevitably involve trade-offs. Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) evaluates environmental implications of major policies before adoption. Over 100 countries have adopted SEA legislation, with studies showing SEA reduces environmental conflicts and project delays by an average of 40% (OECD, 2019).

5.4 Political Economy Analysis

Sustainable development policies face resistance from interests that benefit from the status quo. Understanding political economy-who wins, who loses, and how coalitions for change can be built-is essential.

Interest group politics: Between 2000 and 2019, the fossil fuel industry spent \$3.5 billion on lobbying in the U.S. alone (Brulle, 2021). In the EU, fossil fuel interests outspent renewable energy advocates by a factor of 4:1 on key climate legislation (LobbyControl, 2022). These lobbying shapes policy outcomes: analysis of 1,200 proposed climate policies across 156 countries found that policy ambition was inversely correlated with fossil fuel production share (Mildenberger, 2020).

Carbon lock-in refers to path dependencies that perpetuate fossil fuel systems: infrastructure investments (power plants, pipelines, factories), institutional arrangements (regulatory agencies captured by industry), and behavioral habits (commuting patterns, heating systems) (Seto et al., 2016; Unruh, 2000). Overcoming lock-in requires "policy shocks"-external events that destabilize existing coalitions. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example, accelerated EU renewable energy policy (REPowerEU) but also triggered temporary coal plant reactivations, illustrating lock-in's persistence.

Distributional coalitions: Mancur Olson's (1965) logic of collective action explains why polluting industries are often better organized than diffuse beneficiaries of environmental protection (e.g., citizens who benefit from clean air). Policy entrepreneurs can overcome this through compensation side-payments to losers. The German coal phase-out agreement (2020) allocated €40 billion in compensation to coal regions and workers, securing legislative passage (Rentier et al., 2023).

Varieties of capitalism literature shows that coordinated market economies (Germany, Scandinavia) with strong labor unions and employer associations adopt more ambitious environmental policies than liberal market economies (US, UK) due to different institutional capacities for long-term coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Koch & Fritz, 2014). This explains why carbon pricing in Sweden (\$130/tCO₂) coexists with industrial competitiveness, while similar pricing failed in Australia (repealed 2014 after two years).

Political feasibility (our criterion in Section 3.4) varies systematically: policies that concentrate costs on organized interests (e.g., coal phase-out) face higher opposition than those that diffuse costs (e.g., carbon tax with revenue rebate). The Jevons paradox (rebound effect) can undermine political narratives: efficiency improvements may increase total consumption, leading to accusations that policies are ineffective (York & McGee, 2016).

Recent example: The 2023 French carbon tax *gilets jaunes* (yellow vests) protests demonstrated the political explosiveness of regressive climate policy. Fuel tax increases (€0.04/liter) triggered mass protests that forced policy reversal. Post-hoc analysis showed the tax would have imposed a burden 2.5x higher on the poorest 20% of households than the richest 20% (Douenne & Fabre, 2022). This underscores the equity criterion's political importance.

6. Case Studies

6.1 The European Green Deal

The European Green Deal (European Commission, 2019) aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050. It includes the European Climate Law (binding 55% emissions reduction by 2030), the Fit for 55 packages, the Biodiversity Strategy, the Circular Economy Action Plan, and the Just Transition Mechanism (€55 billion mobilized). The EU has already reduced emissions by 32% from 1990 levels as of 2022 (European Environment Agency [EEA], 2023). Applying our criteria: Effectiveness is high (emissions falling); Efficiency is moderate (costs are significant but declining); Equity is addressed via Just Transition but critics note Southern EU states bear higher adjustment costs (Claeys & Tagliapietra, 2020); Coherence is high (policy integration across sectors); Political feasibility was initially strong but faces backlash from agricultural interests (2023–2024 farmer protests across 10 EU states).

6.2 Costa Rica: Conservation and Decarbonization

Costa Rica reversed one of the highest deforestation rates (3.6% per year in the 1980s) to achieve 59% forest cover by 2023 (MINAE, 2023). The Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) program (1996) paid over \$500 million to 18,000 landowners, protecting 1.3 million hectares (FONAFIFO, 2021). Costa Rica generates over 98% renewable electricity. Between

1990 and 2023, GDP per capita tripled while forest cover doubled (World Bank, 2024). Effectiveness is high; Efficiency is debated (PES cost per hectare ranges \$50–200, which some economists find high compared to regulation); Equity concerns: early PES excluded smallholders without formal land titles, though later reforms addressed this (Pagiola, 2008); Coherence is strong; Political feasibility benefited from abolition of the military (1949), freeing budget for environment.

6.3 Carbon Pricing in Practice

British Columbia's carbon tax (2008, started at C\$10/tCO₂, rose to C\$50 by 2022) reduced emissions by 5–15% with minimal economic impacts (Murray & Rivers, 2015). Revenue neutrality (tax cuts elsewhere) built public acceptance. EU Emissions Trading System (2005) covers 36% of EU emissions; after reforms, allowance prices reached €80–100/tCO₂ in 2023, and covered emissions fell 37% (European Commission, 2023). Auction revenues exceeded €175 billion (2005–2022). Effectiveness is moderate to high; Efficiency is high (lowest-cost abatement); Equity is problematic (regressive impacts; see Section 5.4); Political feasibility is challenging but improved with revenue recycling.

6.4 Just Transition in Canada

Canada's coal phase-out (2030 target) affected 3,500 direct coal workers and 6,000 indirect jobs in Alberta (Government of Canada, 2018). The Just Transition Task Force (2019) recommended retraining (C\$45 million), early retirement (pension bridging), and economic diversification (C\$185 million). By 2023, 90% of displaced workers had found new employment, and 12 of 17 communities had returned to pre-transition employment levels (Government of Canada, 2023). This scores high on equity but efficiency is debated: cost per job saved was approximately C\$150,000, above average wages.

6.5 Policy Failure Case Study: Germany's SoliWG Renewable Energy Surcharge (EEG Surcharge) 2010–2022

This section provides a substantive policy failure case study, applying our analytical framework to understand why a well-intentioned policy produced regressive outcomes and political backlash.

Context: Germany's Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG, 2000) established feed-in tariffs for renewables, driving massive solar and wind deployment. By 2014, renewables supplied 27% of electricity (up from 6% in 2000). However, the EEG surcharge—a levy on electricity bills to finance the feed-in tariffs—was structured regressively. Large industrial users were largely exempt (95% exemption for energy-intensive industries), while households and small businesses bore the full cost (Bardt et al., 2016).

Outcomes: By 2018, the surcharge reached €0.068/kWh, adding €300/year to average household bills. Meanwhile, industrial electricity prices in Germany became among the highest in Europe for small users but among the lowest for large industrial users. This created a cross-subsidy: households effectively subsidized industrial electricity consumption. Public dissatisfaction grew; by 2019, 62% of Germans supported reforming or abolishing the

surcharge (Agora Energiewende, 2019). The surcharge was eliminated in July 2022, replaced by general budget funding (€11 billion/year).

Applying evaluative criteria

- Effectiveness (moderate-high): The surcharge successfully financed renewable deployment (Germany reached 46% renewable electricity by 2022). However, it did not reduce total electricity consumption; in fact, industrial exemptions encouraged energy-intensive production.
- Efficiency (low): The policy was highly inefficient. The household-to-industry cross-subsidy distorted prices; economists estimated the welfare loss at €2.5–4 billion annually (Fronzel et al., 2015). Administrative costs were also high (€0.5 billion/year).
- Equity (very low): The surcharge was strongly regressive. The poorest 20% of households spent 8.2% of income on electricity, compared to 2.1% for the richest 20% (Rausch & Schwarz, 2016). Industrial exemptions benefited large corporations at household expense—the opposite of a just transition.
- Coherence (low): The surcharge conflicted with energy poverty policies, carbon pricing (which also raised electricity prices), and social welfare goals. Different ministries (Economy, Environment, Social Affairs) pursued contradictory objectives.
- Political feasibility (initially high, collapsed): The surcharge was politically feasible when passed due to strong green movement support and industrial lobbying for exemptions. However, as costs mounted, feasibility collapsed. The policy was repealed in 2022 with minimal opposition, replaced by budget financing.

Lessons: The EEG surcharge shows that financing mechanisms matter as much as environmental targets. A policy that is effective at deploying renewables can still fail if it violates equity and coherence criteria. Alternative designs (e.g., progressive electricity tariffs, carbon tax with equal per-capita rebate) would have achieved similar environmental outcomes with better distributional impacts (Pahle et al., 2019). This case underscores the need for integrated policy design that simultaneously considers all five evaluative criteria.

7. Relevance to the Sustainable Development Goals

The SDGs provide a framework connecting sustainable development policies across all domains. SDG 7 (Clean Energy) and SDG 13 (Climate Action) are addressed by climate policies; SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption) by circular economy; SDG 14 (Life Below Water) and SDG 15 (Life on Land) by biodiversity policies; SDG 5 (Gender Equality) by gender-responsive policies; SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, Strong Institutions) by governance dimensions; and SDG 17 (Partnerships) by multi-level governance.

The SDGs are "integrated and indivisible." Yet the implementation deficit persists. For SDG 14, only 7% of ocean fish stocks are underfished; for SDG 15, deforestation continues at 10 million hectares per year (UN, 2023). Policy failures like Germany's EEG surcharge (Section 6.5) illustrate that even progress on SDG 13 can undermine SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities).

8.0 Challenges and Future Directions

8.1 Persistent Challenges

The implementation deficit remains central. While 92% of countries have ratified the Paris Agreement, current policies put the world on track for 2.7°C warming (Climate Action Tracker, 2024). Policy fragmentation persists: the average country has 14 different ministries involved in climate policy, but only 3 have formal coordination mechanisms (OECD, 2022). Enforcement gaps: environmental compliance rates in low-income countries average 45% compared to 85% in high-income countries (Interpol, 2022). Political polarization on climate issues has widened: in the U.S., the partisan divide on climate change grew from 12 percentage points in 2000 to 45 points in 2023 (Pew Research Center, 2023).

8.2 Limitations of Carbon Pricing (Critical Discussion)

While carbon pricing is widely advocated by economists, it has significant limitations:

1. Equity problems: As seen in France and Germany, carbon pricing is regressive unless revenues are redistributed progressively (e.g., equal per-capita rebate). Most carbon pricing regimes do not do this (Ohlendorf et al., 2021).
2. Political feasibility constraints: Carbon pricing faces intense opposition from fossil fuel interests and citizens who perceive it as a tax. The Australian carbon price (2012–2014) was repealed after two years. British Columbia's revenue-neutral carbon tax survived but has not increased beyond C\$50/tCO₂ since 2018, far below the \$100+ needed (Murray & Rivers, 2015; Elgie & McClay, 2017).
3. Insufficient price levels: As noted, 75% of covered emissions are priced below the \$50–100/tCO₂ range the IPCC estimates is needed. Many prices are tokenistic (e.g., Mexico <\$1/tCO₂) (World Bank, 2024).
4. Leakage and competitiveness concerns: Carbon pricing can lead to emissions leakage-production moving to unregulated jurisdictions. Border carbon adjustments (BCA), such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (2023), attempt to address this but face WTO legality questions and implementation complexity (Mehling et al., 2019).
5. Behavioral limitations: Carbon pricing assumes rational economic actors respond to price signals. In practice, households have limited price elasticity for energy (short-term elasticity ~ -0.2), meaning large price increases are needed for modest behavioral change (Hausman & Kellogg, 2015). Complementary regulations (efficiency standards, bans) are often more effective for deep decarbonization.

The conclusion is Carbon pricing is a useful tool but not a silver bullet. Effective climate policy requires a portfolio of instruments, with carbon pricing playing a supporting rather than leading role (Rosenbloom et al., 2020; van den Bergh, 2017).

8.3 Limitations of Protected Areas (Critical Discussion)

Protected areas (PAs) face four major limitations:

1. Ineffectiveness ("paper parks"): As noted, only 20% of PAs are effectively managed. Many lack budgets, staff, or enforcement. In the Congo Basin, deforestation rates inside PAs are only 12% lower than outside (IUCN, 2020). PAs are often located in "rock and ice"-areas already unthreatened-rather than high-biodiversity, high-threat areas (Joppa & Pfaff, 2009).

2. Displacement and human rights abuses: Fortress conservation has displaced an estimated 10–15 million Indigenous people, often without compensation or alternative livelihoods (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). The Maasai in Tanzania and Ogiek in Kenya have ongoing legal battles for return to ancestral lands (Tauli-Corpuz et al., 2022).

3. Perverse incentives: PAs can create "leakage"-deforestation shifted to adjacent unprotected areas. In the Brazilian Amazon, PA establishment reduced deforestation inside but increased it within a 10km buffer by up to 30% (Wittman et al., 2017).

4. Climate vulnerability: PAs are not static; climate change shifts species ranges. Many PAs will no longer contain the species they were designed to protect by 2050 (Hannah et al., 2020). Dynamic conservation approaches (corridors, assisted migration) are needed.

Alternatives: Indigenous and community conserved areas (ICCAs) and other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs) show promise. ICCAs in Nepal have achieved lower deforestation rates than government-managed PAs (Garnett et al., 2018). The 30x30 target explicitly recognizes OECMs, but implementation remains weak.

8.4 Expanded Political Economy Analysis of Policy Resistance

Building on Section 5.4, we further analyze structural barriers to sustainable development policy.

Incumbent-industry veto power: In liberal market economies (US, Canada, Australia), fossil fuel industries exercise veto power through campaign finance, lobbying, and regulatory capture. The US Supreme Court's *West Virginia v. EPA* (2022) ruling limited EPA's authority to regulate power sector emissions, illustrating judicial capture (Mayer, 2022).

Carbon lock-in dynamics: Beyond industry power, carbon lock-in operates through infrastructure (pipelines, power plants, refineries with 30-50 year lifetimes), institutions (energy ministries staffed by fossil fuel engineers), and behaviors (commuting patterns, suburban housing) (Seto et al., 2016). Overcoming lock-in requires policy shocks-e.g., the 1970s oil shocks triggered efficiency standards; the 2011 Fukushima disaster triggered German nuclear phase-out.

Coalitions for change: Policy change requires counter-mobilization. The climate justice movement, building on earlier environmental justice and Indigenous rights movements, has shifted policy discourse. The Fridays for Future movement (2018–present) mobilized millions, contributing to the EU Green Deal's ambition (de Moor et al., 2021). However, movement success depends on "political opportunity structures": strong movements in weak institutional settings (e.g., Russia) have little impact.

Degrowth critique: The degrowth movement argues that sustainable development policies fail because they assume continued GDP growth is compatible with environmental sustainability.

Hickel (2020) argues that even with rapid decarbonization, continued growth would exceed planetary boundaries for materials, land, and biodiversity. Degrowth proposes planned reduction of energy and resource use in wealthy countries, with redistribution to the Global South. While politically radical, degrowth has entered mainstream policy discourse: the 2023 European Environment Agency report included degrowth scenarios for the first time (EEA, 2023).

Post-growth policy proposals: Alternatives to GDP growth include: (1) working time reduction (shorter workweeks reduce emissions by 20-30% in modeling studies); (2) universal basic services (guaranteed housing, healthcare, transport); (3) progressive consumption taxes on luxury goods; (4) maximum income ratios (Kallis et al., 2020; Raworth, 2017). While not yet adopted at scale, Barcelona's "Barcelona En Comú" (2015–2023) implemented participatory budgeting and public housing, reducing emissions while maintaining living standards (Blanco et al., 2020).

8.5 Degrowth and Post-Growth Critiques

The degrowth literature offers three substantive critiques of mainstream sustainable development policy:

1. Relative decoupling is insufficient: While GDP has grown 200% since 1970, global material extraction has grown 300%. Absolute decoupling (emissions falling while GDP rises) has been observed only in short periods or narrow sectors, never globally (Parrique et al., 2019; Haberl et al., 2020).
2. Rebound effects: Efficiency improvements reduce costs, stimulating increased consumption—the Jevons paradox. Energy efficiency improvements of 30% have resulted in net energy savings of only 5-10% after rebound (York & McGee, 2016).
3. Growth dependency: Capitalist economies require growth to maintain employment and debt servicing. Policies that reduce environmental impact without addressing growth dependency will face political resistance from finance and labor (Jackson, 2017).

Mainstream responses: Proponents of green growth argue that technological innovation (renewables, circular economy, carbon removal) can achieve absolute decoupling. The IEA's Net Zero scenario shows global emissions falling 40% by 2030 while GDP grows 40% (IEA, 2023). Critics respond that such scenarios rely on unproven technologies (carbon capture at scale) and ignore political economy constraints.

Policy implications: Degrowth implies shifting policy focus from efficiency to sufficiency: (1) caps on resource use (e.g., carbon budgets, material footprint limits); (2) progressive luxury taxes; (3) public provision of basic goods to reduce consumption pressure; (4) democratic economic planning for strategic sectors (Kallis et al., 2022). While politically challenging, sufficiency policies are emerging: France's 2021 Climate and Resilience Law bans short-haul flights where train alternatives exist; Scotland's 2021 Wellbeing and Sustainable Development Bill embeds post-growth indicators.

8.6 Comparative Policy Instrument Effectiveness

Table 2 synthesizes the evidence across case studies and policy domains, applying our five evaluative criteria.

Table 2: Comparative Effectiveness of Sustainable Development Policy Instruments

Instrument Type	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Equity	Coherence	Political Feasibility	Example
Command-and-control regulation	High (when enforced)	Low-medium	Medium (uniform standards)	Low (siloes)	Medium (industry opposition)	US Clean Air Act
Carbon tax (with rebate)	Medium-high	High	Low-high (depends on rebate)	Medium	Low (tax opposition)	British Columbia
Cap-and-trade	Medium-high	High	Low (regressive)	Medium	Medium (industry support if free allowances)	EU ETS
Renewable energy subsidy (FIT)	High	Medium	Medium (costs diffuse)	Low-medium	High (popular)	Germany EEG (pre-2014)
Energy efficiency standard	High	High	Medium	High (complements others)	High (popular)	EU Ecodesign
Extended Producer Responsibility	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium (industry initially opposes)	EU Packaging Directive
Protected area (fortress)	Medium-low	Low	Very low (displacement)	Low	Low (local opposition)	Colonial-era parks
Indigenous & community conserved area	High	Medium	High	High	Medium (state recognition needed)	Canadian IPCAs
Information/labelling	Low-medium	High	Medium	High	High	EU Energy Label
Voluntary agreement	Low	Low	Low	Low	High (industry capture)	Industry covenants

Just transition package	Medium (dependent on funding)	Low-medium	High	High	High (if well-designed)	Canada coal
Canada coal	Medium-high	Medium	Medium	Medium (regressive if no exemptions)	Medium Low (driver opposition)	London ULEZ

Sources: Author synthesis based on Stavins (2019), Gunningham & Sinclair (2017), Rosenbloom et al. (2020), and case study evidence in Section 6.

Key insights from Table 2:

- No single instrument scores high on all criteria. Policy portfolios combining instruments are superior.
- Equity is the most frequently violated criterion, explaining political backlash (Germany, France).
- Political feasibility often trades off against effectiveness (voluntary agreements are feasible but ineffective).
- Indigenous and community-based approaches score better on equity and coherence than fortress conservation.

8.7 Emerging Frontiers

Supply chain due diligence legislation represents a significant expansion of policy reach. By 2024, 12 countries had adopted mandatory human rights due diligence laws, covering 40% of global GDP (OECD, 2024). The EU's Deforestation Regulation (2023) requires companies to prove products are not linked to deforestation.

Rights of nature is an emerging legal concept. Ecuador incorporated rights of nature in its 2008 constitution; courts in New Zealand (Whanganui River), Colombia (Amazon), and India (Ganges) have recognized natural entities as legal persons. As of 2024, over 30 countries have recognized rights of nature in law or jurisprudence (Earth Law Center, 2024).

Regulating emerging technologies: Geoengineering, AI, and synthetic biology have sustainability applications but pose risks. Global investment in climate tech reached \$87 billion in 2023, but governance frameworks for technologies like solar radiation management remain largely absent (PwC, 2024).

Beyond GDP: New Zealand's Wellbeing Budget (2019), Scotland's National Performance Framework, and Finland's Beyond GDP indicators reorient policy around well-being. New Zealand allocated 67% of new spending to mental health, child welfare, and climate rather than traditional economic priorities (New Zealand Treasury, 2019).

8.8 The Role of Non-State Actors

The most effective approaches combine government mandates with private sector innovation and civil society accountability. The Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) has validated net-zero targets for 2,600 companies representing 35% of global market capitalization (SBTi, 2024). At the same time, government policy creates enabling conditions and prevents a race to the bottom.

9. Conclusion

This article has examined the evolution, design, and practice of sustainable development policies. It has introduced an explicit analytical framework with five evaluative criteria-effectiveness, efficiency, equity, coherence, and political feasibility-and applied these criteria to case studies including a substantive policy failure (Germany's EEG surcharge). It has expanded political economy analysis to understand why well-designed policies sometimes fail and why poorly designed policies persist. It has incorporated missing topics: gender-responsive policy, Indigenous governance, and urban policy. It has critically discussed limitations of carbon pricing and protected areas, and engaged with degrowth and post-growth critiques.

Sustainable development policies are not merely technical instruments. They embody fundamental choices about values, priorities, and the distribution of costs and benefits. They determine who bears the burdens of environmental protection and who shares in the benefits of sustainable development. They shape the incentives that guide investment, innovation, and consumption.

The SDGs provide a framework for these choices. Yet the goals themselves are aspirations. It is through policies-the laws, regulations, investments, and institutions that governments create-that these aspirations are translated into action. The implementation deficit, policy failures, and political resistance documented in this article are sobering. Yet there are also reasons for optimism. The past several decades have seen remarkable innovation in policy design. The European Green Deal, Costa Rica's PES program, and Canada's just transition demonstrate that ambitious policies can be effective when carefully designed, build broad coalitions, and are sustained over time.

The transition to sustainable development is fundamentally a governance challenge. Policies are the architecture that makes this possible. The question is not whether to have policies, but how to design them to be effective, equitable, and durable. Sustainable development policies, at their best, do not simply constrain-they enable. They represent "the architecture of possibility" (Kanie & Biermann, 2017). The task for policymakers, citizens, and all those concerned with sustainable development is to build this architecture well, knowing that the structures we build today will shape the possibilities for generations to come.

References

- Agora Energiewende. (2019). The German coal compromise. *Agora*.
- Anguelovski, I., Connolly, J. J. T., Cole, H., Garcia-Lamarca, M., Triguero-Mas, M., Baró, F., ... & Shokry, G. (2022). Green gentrification in European and North American cities. *Nature Sustainability*, 5, 293–302.
- Arora-Jonsson, S. (2011). Virtue and vulnerability: Discourses on women, gender and climate change. *Global Environmental Change*, 21(2), 744–751.
- Bardt, H., Dullien, S., & Kemfert, C. (2016). The German EEG levy: A regressive surcharge. DIW Berlin.
- Blanco, I., Salazar, Y., & Bianchi, I. (2020). Urban governance and the politics of the common good: The case of Barcelona En Comú. *Urban Studies*, 57(9), 1871–1888.
- Bouzarovski, S., & Petrova, S. (2015). A global perspective on domestic energy deprivation. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 10, 31–40.
- Brockington, D. (2002). *Fortress conservation*. James Currey.
- Brockington, D., & Igoe, J. (2006). Eviction for conservation. *Conservation and Society*, 4(3), 424–470.
- Brulle, R. J. (2021). The climate lobby: A sectoral analysis of lobbying spending on climate change in the USA. *Climatic Change*, 169(1), 1–20.
- Bulkeley, H. (2013). *Cities and climate change*. Routledge.
- Bulkeley, H., & Castán Broto, V. (2013). Government by experiment? Global cities and the governing of climate change. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 38(3), 361–375.
- C40 Cities. (2023). *C40 Cities annual report 2023*. C40 Climate Leadership Group.
- Cairney, P. (2016). *The politics of evidence-based policy making*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cashore, B., & Howlett, M. (2007). Punctuated equilibrium and policy change. *Policy Studies Journal*, 35(1), 49–73.
- Chan, G., Stavins, R. N., & Stowe, R. C. (2012). The SO₂ allowance trading system. In R. N. Stavins (Ed.), *Economics of the environment* (7th ed.). W. W. Norton.
- Circle Economy. (2024). *The Circularity Gap Report 2024*. Circle Economy.
- Claeys, G., & Tagliapietra, S. (2020). *The European Green Deal*. Bruegel.
- Climate Action Tracker. (2024). *Warming projections global update*. Climate Analytics.
- Convention on Biological Diversity. (2022). *Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (CBD/COP/15/L.25)*.
- Costa Rican Institute of Electricity. (2023). *National electric system generation report 2023*. ICE.

-
- Costanza, R., de Groot, R., Sutton, P., van der Ploeg, S., Anderson, S. J., Kubiszewski, I., ... & Turner, R. K. (2014). Changes in the global value of ecosystem services. *Global Environmental Change*, 26, 152–158.
- Darnall, N., Potoski, M., & Prakash, A. (2022). Voluntary environmental programs: A meta-analysis. *Regulation & Governance*, 16(4), 1120–1140.
- de Moor, J., De Vydt, M., Uba, K., & Wahlström, M. (2021). New kids on the block: Taking stock of the Fridays for Future movement. *Social Movement Studies*, 20(5), 625–640.
- Douenne, T., & Fabre, A. (2022). Yellow vests, carbon tax aversion, and regressive effects. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 111, 102583.
- Earth Law Center. (2024). Rights of nature: Global status report. ELC.
- Elgie, S., & McClay, J. (2017). BC's carbon tax shift is working. *Sustainable Prosperity*.
- Ellen MacArthur Foundation. (2015). *Towards a circular economy*. Ellen MacArthur Foundation.
- European Commission. (2019). *The European Green Deal (COM/2019/640 final)*.
- European Commission. (2020). *Fit for 55 packages (COM/2020/562 final)*.
- European Commission. (2022). *Just Transition Mechanism: Implementation report*. European Commission.
- European Commission. (2023). *EU Emissions Trading System: 2023 report*. European Commission.
- European Environment Agency. (2023). *Trends and projections in Europe 2023*. EEA.
- European Union. (2019). Directive (EU) 2019/904 on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products. *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 155, 1–19.
- European Union. (2023). Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 on deforestation-free products. *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 150, 1–48.
- European Union. (2024). Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 on nature restoration. *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 1991, 1–56.
- Eurostat. (2023). *Energy poverty statistics*. Publications Office of the EU.
- Food and Agriculture Organization. (2018). *The gender gap in land rights*. FAO.
- FONAFIFO. (2021). *Payments for ecosystem services: 25 years of impact*. FONAFIFO.
- Freiburg City Council. (2020). *Freiburg sustainability report 2020*. City of Freiburg.
- Frondel, M., Schmidt, C. M., & Vance, C. (2015). The German energy transition: A regressive levy. *Energy Policy*, 85, 350–358.
- Garnett, S. T., Burgess, N. D., Fa, J. E., Fernández-Llamazares, Á., Molnár, Z., Robinson, C. J., ... & Leiper, I. (2018). A spatial overview of the global importance of Indigenous lands for conservation. *Nature Sustainability*, 1, 369–374.

-
- Government of Canada. (2018). Just transition task force background report. Environment and Climate Change Canada.
- Government of Canada. (2019). Just transition task force final report. Environment and Climate Change Canada.
- Government of Canada. (2023). Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas: 2023 progress report. Crown-Indigenous Relations.
- Government of India. (2021). Gender and Climate Change Action Plan: Progress report. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
- Gunningham, N., & Sinclair, D. (2017). Smart regulation. In P. Drahos (Ed.), *Regulatory theory: Foundations and applications*. ANU Press.
- Haberl, H., Wiedenhofer, D., Virág, D., Kalt, G., Plank, B., Brockway, P., ... & Creutzig, F. (2020). A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling of GDP from resource use and emissions. *Environmental Research Letters*, 15(10), 103003.
- Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). *Varieties of capitalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Hannah, L., Roehrdanz, P. R., Marquet, P. A., Enquist, B. J., Midgley, G., Foden, W., & Lovett, J. C. (2020). 30% land conservation and climate change. *Science*, 368(6492), 838–839.
- Harcourt, W., & Nelson, I. L. (Eds.). (2015). *Practising feminist political ecologies*. Zed Books.
- Hausman, C., & Kellogg, R. (2015). Welfare and distributional implications of shale gas. *American Economic Review*, 105(5), 120–125.
- Hickel, J. (2020). *Less is more: How degrowth will save the world*. Random House.
- Howlett, M., Ramesh, M., & Perl, A. (2020). *Studying public policy* (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.
- Indigenous Circle of Experts. (2018). *We rise together: Report on Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas*. Government of Canada.
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2023). *Climate change 2023: Synthesis report*. Cambridge University Press.
- Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. (2019). *Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services*. IPBES.
- International Energy Agency. (2023). *World Energy Outlook 2023*. IEA.
- International Labour Organization. (2015). *Guidelines for a just transition*. ILO.
- International Labour Organization. (2022). *Global estimates of modern slavery*. ILO.
- International Renewable Energy Agency. (2024). *Renewable capacity statistics 2024*. IRENA.
- Interpol. (2022). *Environmental compliance and enforcement report*. INTERPOL.
- IUCN. (2020). *Protected area management effectiveness*. World Commission on Protected Areas.

-
- Jackson, T. (2017). *Prosperity without growth* (2nd ed.). Routledge.
- Joppa, L. N., & Pfaff, A. (2009). High and far: Biases in the location of protected areas. *PLoS ONE*, 4(12), e8273.
- Jordan, A., & Lenschow, A. (2010). Environmental policy integration: A state of the art review. *Environmental Policy and Governance*, 20(3), 147–158.
- Kallis, G., Paulson, S., D'Alisa, G., & Demaria, F. (2020). *The case for degrowth*. Polity Press.
- Kallis, G., Varvarousis, A., Demaria, F., & Conde, M. (2022). The European Green Deal and degrowth. *Political Geography*, 98, 102733.
- Kanie, N., & Biermann, F. (Eds.). (2017). *Governing through goals: Sustainable Development Goals as governance innovation*. MIT Press.
- Kauffman, C. M., & Martin, P. L. (2021). *The politics of rights of nature*. MIT Press.
- Koch, M., & Fritz, M. (2014). Varieties of capitalism and climate policy. *Environmental Politics*, 23(6), 973–992.
- LobbyControl. (2022). *Fossil fuel lobbying in the EU*. LobbyControl.
- MacGregor, S. (2017). Gender and climate change. In S. MacGregor (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of gender and environment*. Routledge.
- Mayer, A. (2022). *West Virginia v. EPA and the future of climate policy*. *Harvard Environmental Law Review*, 47(1), 1–45.
- Meckling, J., & Nahm, J. (2019). The politics of technology bans. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 49, 196–204.
- Mehling, M. A., van Asselt, H., Das, K., Droege, S., & Verkuyl, C. (2019). Designing border carbon adjustments for enhanced climate action. *American Journal of International Law*, 113(3), 433–481.
- Mildenberger, M. (2020). *Carbon captured: How business and labor control climate politics*. MIT Press.
- MINAE (Costa Rica). (2023). *National forest inventory report*. Ministry of Environment and Energy.
- Murray, B., & Rivers, N. (2015). British Columbia's revenue-neutral carbon tax. *Energy Policy*, 86, 674–683.
- New Zealand Treasury. (2019). *The Wellbeing Budget 2019*. New Zealand Government.
- Newig, J., Challies, E., Jager, N. W., Kochskämper, E., & Adzersen, A. (2018). Participation in environmental governance. *Environmental Policy and Governance*, 28(3), 152–165.
- Ohlendorf, N., Jakob, M., Minx, J. C., Schröder, C., & Steckel, J. C. (2021). Distributional impacts of carbon pricing. *Environmental Research Letters*, 16(5), 053001.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action*. Harvard University Press.

-
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2019). Strategic environmental assessment. OECD Publishing.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2021). Policy coherence for sustainable development. OECD Publishing.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2022). Extended producer responsibility: Global review. OECD Publishing.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). Global plastic outlook. OECD Publishing.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2024). Due diligence legislation around the world. OECD Publishing.
- Pagiola, S. (2008). Payments for environmental services in Costa Rica. *Ecological Economics*, 65(4), 712–724.
- Pahle, M., Pachauri, S., & Steinbacher, K. (2019). The German energy transition as a regime shift. *Ecological Economics*, 159, 234–247.
- Parrique, T., Barth, J., Briens, F., Kerschner, C., Kraus-Polk, A., Kuokkanen, A., & Spangenberg, J. H. (2019). Decoupling debunked. European Environment Bureau.
- Pew Research Center. (2023). Partisan gaps on climate change. Pew Research.
- PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2024). State of Climate Tech 2024. PwC.
- Rao, N., Lawson, E. T., Raditloaneng, W. N., Solomon, D., & Angula, M. N. (2019). Gendered vulnerabilities to climate change. *Climate and Development*, 11(8), 657–668.
- Rausch, S., & Schwarz, G. A. (2016). Distributional effects of the German energy transition. *Energy Economics*, 59, 1–13.
- Raworth, K. (2017). Doughnut economics. Random House.
- Rennert, K., Errickson, F., Prest, B. C., Rennels, L., Newell, R. G., Pizer, W. A., ... & Anthoff, D. (2022). Comprehensive evidence for a higher social cost of carbon. *Nature*, 610, 687–692.
- Rentier, G., Lelieveldt, H., & Kramer, G. J. (2023). The German coal commission: A model for just transitions? *Energy Policy*, 172, 113321.
- Rosenbloom, D., Meadowcroft, J., & Cashore, B. (2020). Carbon pricing vs. technology policy. *Climate Policy*, 20(6), 720–734.
- Rosenzweig, C., Solecki, W., Romero-Lankao, P., Mehrotra, S., Dhakal, S., & Ibrahim, S. A. (Eds.). (2018). *Climate change and cities* (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2022). Theorizing institutional change and governance. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 25, 45–66.
- Science Based Targets initiative. (2024). Science-based targets: Progress report. SBTi.

-
- Seto, K. C., Dhakal, S., Bigio, A., Blanco, H., Delgado, G. C., Dewar, D., ... & Ramaswami, A. (2014). Human settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning. In *Climate change 2014: Mitigation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Seto, K. C., Davis, S. J., Mitchell, R. B., Stokes, E. C., Unruh, G., & Ürge-Vorsatz, D. (2016). Carbon lock-in: Types, causes, and policy implications. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 41, 425–452.
- Stavins, R. N. (2019). *Economics of the environment* (7th ed.). W. W. Norton.
- Sterner, T. (2003). *Policy instruments for environmental and natural resource management*. Resources for the Future Press.
- Tauli-Corpuz, V., Alcorn, J., & Molnar, A. (2022). *Indigenous peoples and conservation. Rights and Resources Initiative*.
- Tessum, C. W., Paoletta, D. A., Hill, J. D., & Marshall, J. D. (2021). PM2.5 pollutants disproportionately affect racial minorities. *Science Advances*, 7(18), eabf4491.
- Tietenberg, T., & Lewis, L. (2018). *Environmental and natural resource economics* (11th ed.). Pearson.
- United Nations. (1992). *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26)*.
- United Nations. (2015). *Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*.
- United Nations. (2023). *The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023*. UN.
- United Nations. (2024). *SDG progress report: Special edition*. UN.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2023). *National SDG strategies: Implementation review*. UNDESA.
- United Nations Development Programme. (2020). *Costa Rica: Development effectiveness review*. UNDP.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (1998). *Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation and access to justice*. UNECE.
- United Nations Environment Programme. (2022). *Emissions gap report 2022*. UNEP.
- United Nations Environment Programme. (2023). *Emissions gap report 2023*. UNEP.
- United Nations Environment Programme-World Conservation Monitoring Centre. (2024). *Protected planet report 2024*. UNEP-WCMC.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2015). *Paris Agreement (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1)*.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2022). *Gender Action Plan: 2022 update*. UNFCCC.

- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2023). UAE Consensus: COP28 outcomes. UNFCCC.
- UN-Habitat. (2022). World cities report 2022. UN-Habitat.
- United Nations Women. (2022). Gender and climate change: A human rights perspective. UN Women.
- United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2020). Overview of the Clean Air Act. EPA.
- United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2021). Air quality trends report. EPA.
- Unruh, G. C. (2000). Understanding carbon lock-in. *Energy Policy*, 28(12), 817–830.
- van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2017). Carbon pricing versus technology policy. In R. C. P. (Ed.), *Handbook on carbon pricing*. Edward Elgar.
- Walker, W. S., Gorelik, S. R., Baccini, A., Aragon-Osejo, J. L., Josse, C., Meyer, C., ... & Schwartz, M. B. (2020). The role of forest conversion in carbon emissions. *Environmental Research Letters*, 15(7), 074015.
- White House. (2021). Justice40 Initiative implementation guidance. Executive Office of the President.
- Wittman, F., Henders, S., & Persson, U. M. (2017). Protected area leakage in the Brazilian Amazon. *Global Environmental Change*, 46, 118–128.
- World Bank. (2024). State and trends of carbon pricing 2024. World Bank.
- World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987). *Our common future*. Oxford University Press.
- World Wildlife Fund. (2022). *Living Planet Report 2022*. WWF.
- York, R., & McGee, J. A. (2016). Understanding the Jevons paradox. *Environmental Sociology*, 2(1), 77–87.