

## 2. Methodology

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This report is grounded in a multi-source, cross-verified investigative approach. It draws on in-depth interviews with the survivors of enforced disappearance and, where needed, their families, as well as conversations with officers and rank-and-file of the security forces. Sometimes interviews have lasted over five hours at a stretch; they are seldom less than an hour in length. Many people have been interviewed multiple times when needed, the highest one person was interviewed was six times.

The Commission has reviewed thousands of legal documents, including charge sheets and confessional statements, and conducted detailed analysis of institutional behaviour through internal records and documents obtained from a range of sources. Intelligence shared by various actors was assessed and corroborated across multiple channels. Field visits were carried out at key sites, during which physical evidence, such as photographs and location data, was collected and cross-checked against written and verbal records.

This layered methodology aimed to ensure both factual accuracy and analytical integrity throughout the inquiry. However, the sheer scale of the work, along with the obstacles detailed over the next few pages, has made the task particularly challenging and daunting.

### 2.1 Documentation

We have adopted a multi-format documentation strategy to ensure the resilience, accessibility, and long-term integrity of the collated materials. Wherever appropriate, data were collected not only in writing but also through audio and video recordings, depending on the nature of the data and context of collection. Physical copies were generated and maintained for archival purposes; however, all such materials were systematically digitised to create mirrored electronic records.

From the outset, a guiding principle of our information management strategy was that, should any part of our physical infrastructure be compromised or destroyed, the evidentiary corpus could be reconstructed from digital sources alone.

To that end, all digitised data are securely hosted on commercial servers located outside the jurisdiction of Bangladesh. These primary repositories are supplemented by a structured system of iterative backups, enabling us to restore not just the most recent version of a file, but also earlier states, should corruption or tampering be detected. The geographic locations and access credentials of these backups are deliberately compartmentalised and kept strictly confidential to protect the data from both physical and cyber threats. Within the practical constraints of our resources, we have prioritised continuity, redundancy, and discretion at every stage of evidence preservation, to ensure that no single point of failure can compromise the integrity of the record.

One of the earliest operational challenges we faced was transcription. A core component of our work involves collecting long-form interviews, often running between 60 to 90 minutes or more, with both survivors and implicated individuals. It quickly became clear that the volume of material requiring transcription far exceeded our available human resources. While English language transcription tools are widely available, no reliable or accurate solution existed for Bangla. This limitation was compounded by additional challenges, including regional accents, overlapping dialogues, background noise, the need for inserting punctuation, and the separation of multiple speakers.

Outsourcing transcription to external vendors was not always a viable option, given the classified and highly sensitive nature of the materials. In response to this constraint, our in-house technical team took the initiative to develop a proprietary Bangla transcription tool. This was done without external prompting or prior instruction – a true testament to the zeal that has engulfed our small team in this extraordinary battle amongst unequals.

The software has since gone through multiple iterations and is now used routinely to generate relatively accurate transcriptions of recorded testimony. Once the initial transcription is produced, trained human operators carefully review the output, correct residual errors, and ensure fidelity to the original audio. As a result, transcription time has been reduced from an average of three working days to approximately three hours per interview. The tool has become indispensable to our workflow. Its development reflects the initiative, discretion, and technical ingenuity that have shaped our operational approach from the very inception.

In parallel with transcription innovations, we have also developed secure, in-house databases tailored to the specific needs of our inquiry. These databases have enabled us to systematically organise and categorise incoming information, including testimonies, case records, and metadata. As a result, we have been able to conduct preliminary forms of quantitative analysis on key patterns within the data. This capacity has proved essential in identifying trends, corroborating narratives, and generating data-driven insights to inform both our investigative and reporting strategies.

The work described above has been carried out by an exceptionally small team operating out of a small office, where the scale of the task has repeatedly outstripped the resources available to us. Entire corridors have been converted into makeshift workstations to accommodate the growing demands of documentation, analysis, and field coordination. The logistical and operational difficulties of managing a nationwide inquiry of this magnitude with such limited infrastructure and manpower have been extraordinary by any measure. That this work has progressed as far as it has is a testament to the perseverance, ingenuity, and deep personal commitment of all involved.

At various points throughout this process, we have been fortunate to receive support from individuals and groups outside the Commission who have been very generous with their time and efforts. The illustrations featured in this report, for instance, were created entirely pro bono by a team that responded at short notice and with remarkable commitment. This spirit of solidarity and civic responsibility has guided many of those who have come forward to assist us in performing this monumental task.

We are especially grateful to the UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights for providing crucial staffing and equipment support, and to other friends who stepped in with additional resources when they were most needed. These acts of quiet generosity have had a lasting impact on our capacity to continue this work.

In the preparation of this report, there have been weeks when the team worked well into the night, often past midnight, driven not by obligation but by conviction. This sustained effort, frequently undertaken without complaint and sometimes even without access to basic comforts, like tea or coffee, speaks about their extraordinary dedication.

The work of the Commission has been profoundly meaningful. It has offered a glimpse of what is possible when even a small group of people come together in pursuit of justice, determined to confront a much greater wrong. At its heart, this effort has been guided by the sacrifices of victims

and their families. To them, and the principles they represent, we remain unwaveringly committed, regardless of the challenges placed before us.

## **2.2 Challenges**

The challenges faced by the Commission have been multifaceted and, at times, deeply obstructive. In the early days of our work, the Commission was not perceived as particularly threatening, and was therefore largely ignored. There was perhaps a prevailing notion in the security forces that we lacked the capacity or the mandate to deliver meaningful results. However, as time progressed and the integrity and determination of the Commission became more apparent, the atmosphere began to shift. Disquiet grew across various quarters, and resistance became more pronounced.

### **2.2.1 Intimidation**

The Commission members have faced sustained intimidation, both directly and indirectly. Threats have been issued in person, by phone, and through online communication channels. They have been subjected to systematic harassment, slander, and public disinformation campaigns. Accusations have ranged from being agents of foreign intelligence services, such as ISI, RAW and CIA, to being religious or political extremists. During some interviews, the alleged perpetrators have explicitly stated that they were monitoring the families of the Commission members. These efforts at intimidation, however, have not affected the direction or pace of our work. We have treated such provocations with the disregard they deserve and continued our efforts in full commitment to the victims and our mandate.

### **2.2.2 Procedural obstruction**

Beyond intimidation, the Commission has also faced persistent procedural obstruction. In one instance, a secret detention facility that we had visited and documented with photographic evidence was later denied in writing by the concerned agency. It was only after direct follow-up communication, and the presentation of incontrovertible evidence, that the agency retracted its position and acknowledged the existence of the site.

One of the most consistent procedural difficulties has been obtaining timely responses to official letters. Many institutions have shown clear reluctance to put sensitive information in writing. In some cases, it has taken weeks, even months, to receive answers to basic questions. For example,

a letter sent in December 2024 did not receive a reply until nearly a month later, despite the fact that the requested information was already in the public domain.

Requests for personnel rosters, vehicle logs, deployment histories, or custodianship details, such as who was responsible for a particular facility or who served as its warden, have been met with prolonged silence, delay, or ambiguity. Multiple follow-ups, both written and in person, have often been required to extract even the most routine information. In some cases, senior officers, including at the director general level, have informed us that they were actively discouraged by other agencies from cooperating with the Commission – suggesting an alarmingly coordinated, though ultimately unsuccessful, effort to suppress institutional transparency.

### **2.2.3 Missing records**

The passage of time has also worked against us. Many of the cases under inquiry are more than a decade old. As a result, key official records, such as call detail records (CDR), are no longer available. Telecommunications companies typically retain such data for only one to two years.

In one case, we possessed a photograph of a uniformed RAB member from whose phone a victim who never returned made contact with his family several times from within an unknown detention centre (Code BCJ<sup>2</sup>). The photo had appeared on his then Viber profile. The family received ransom calls from the same number, and made payment to it.

Yet we have been unable to confirm the ownership of the number at that time, as the CDR data no longer exist, the number has since been reassigned, and the original registration data appear to be misleading. These are undoubtedly frustrating roadblocks to victim families but an unavoidable challenge of dealing with unresolved cases sometimes a decade or older.

In the wake of 5 August 2024 transition, a new challenge has emerged: several police stations have begun reporting that their archival records have been destroyed by fires. In some instances, we suspect that such claims may not be entirely truthful. Nevertheless, this has made it particularly difficult for the victims seeking documentation of earlier complaints or proceedings.

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<sup>2</sup> 27 year old male; abducted by RAB in 2015; still missing

## **2.2.4 Climate of fear**

Surviving victims face an entirely separate set of obstacles. If we bring them under the public gaze, for instance, during high-profile visits, such as those of the Chief Adviser to the secret detention centres in February 2025, we take care to ensure that they are prepared for the subsequent pressure they may face. And victims have indeed demonstrated resilience. However, the sustained public attacks and online harassment from political actors, particularly affiliates of Awami League, have exacted a psychological toll on them. Even those victims who appeared ready to face scrutiny, later reported significant mental distress following such targeted backlash. Conversely, when we do not bring some victims in the public eye, sometimes they feel as if they are being sidelined. The balance is a tricky one.

Fear remains pervasive, particularly among those who have not yet come forward. Tears are a frequent and expected part of our interviews. Victims often request that we turn off the audio recorder while they recount their ordeals, and at times their voices fall to a whisper – so low that we must strain to hear them. One survivor, who finally approached us in mid-2025, was asked why he had waited so long to establish contact. His answer was candid: he had not been certain whether the Commission itself was affiliated with RAW! This deep climate of mistrust and fear is one of the primary reasons, we believe, a significant number of cases remain unreported.

In one instance, the Commission members visited a remote village in Barishal to inquire into the provenance of some unidentified bodies buried there. Local accounts had initially suggested one or two possible cases of enforced disappearance in the locality. However, once the Commissioners arrived and engaged with the community, five to seven new cases were brought to our attention at the same village, most of which had not been reported to us previously. The presence of the Commission and the visible seriousness of its work gave the families the much-needed confidence to step forward.

However, this was just one village out of thousands across the country. Due to time and resource limitations, we have not been able to replicate such field visits on a wide scale. Still, experiences like this confirm our belief that many more victims remain uncouned, silenced by fear or isolation.

## **2.2.5 Evidence destruction**

We have previously reported in our first interim report, the destruction of evidence that took place across various forces, including at DGFI's JIC, following 5 August 2024. As our work has

progressed, we have uncovered further instances of evidence destruction. In this report, we present two such cases. The first concerns the facility known as the Task Force for Interrogation (TFI) cell, also referred to within RAB Intelligence Wing as the “hospital”. The second facility, also operated by RAB Intelligence Wing, was the “clinic”.

In the following sections, we will walk the reader through the painstaking process by which these discoveries were made, in order to demonstrate the scale of damage inflicted on the evidence and how it complicates our task by misleading inquiries, prolonging timelines, and erasing key traces of events.

**The hospital:** Despite early reports that Barrister Mir Ahmad Bin Quasem Arman had been held at Aynaghar, the first indication that he had not been detained at DGFI’s JIC came from his own testimony. Over the course of our inquiry, we came to understand that each detention facility bore its own operational signature – a distinct pattern of details by which it could be identified. These included how guards behaved, bathroom schedules, the type of food served, ambient sounds, and other such sensory cues. In Barrister Arman’s account, several of these details did not align with what we knew of JIC, where Brigadier General Abdullahil Aman Azmi had been held.

This prompted us to conduct a prolonged interview with Barrister Arman, attempting to determine the actual location of his detention. Over time, specific features in his testimony began to suggest that he had in fact been held at the TFI centre, a facility located within RAB 1 compound but operated by RAB Headquarters. We first visited the TFI on 16 October 2024. At that time, officials informed us that the site had been abandoned for at least two years. Upon inspection, this appeared plausible: the facility was in disrepair, its infrastructure broken, and the entire area gave the appearance of long-term neglect.

The TFI site was divided into three distinct sections: an administrative area, a larger space used to hold captives, and a smaller zone comprising interrogation and torture rooms. Barrister Arman’s description of his conditions closely matched the features of the torture section. It became clear that a small area within the torture wing had also been used to house long-term detainees, contrary to what we had previously understood.

Early in the inquiry, Barrister Arman mentioned that the floor beneath his feet had been tiled and cold – a tactile memory from the occasions he had been allowed to walk there. However, when we visited the site, the floor was a coarse, uneven slab of cement, clearly unfinished and seemingly long abandoned. This discrepancy was striking and prompted further scrutiny. Upon closer

inspection, we noticed square markings—grid-like impressions—on portions of the floor, which resembled the remnants of tiling. This led us to begin inquiring about the missing tiles during our interviews with officers who had served at the facility during July and August.

Around this time, we asked Barrister Arman to draw a map of his path of movement. Although blindfolded for most of his captivity, like many other captives he retained a sense of his orientation, whether he had turned, descended steps, or walked straight. In his drawing, he described climbing down a short flight of stairs, then walking straight before making a single left turn to reach his cell. However, when we traced the route ourselves, this path did not align with the existing layout. To reach the cell he described, one would have to turn right, then left, then left again. The mismatch raised further doubts.

Then Barrister Arman noticed something subtle in one of the photographs sent to him. The way light reflected off a section of the wall appeared slightly different from the rest. He suggested that this might be where his cell door had once been, and that it could have been sealed up. This observation shifted the course of the inquiry.

Acting on Barrister Arman's insight, we contacted our colleagues at the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), who have been consistently supportive. We shared a diagram of the space (Fig 2A) and asked them to compare the internal and external measurements of the wall in question. Our hypothesis was straightforward: if there was a significant discrepancy—greater than seven feet—it could indicate the presence of a concealed chamber behind a false wall.

ICT colleagues carried out the measurements and found a significant difference of more than ten feet, confirming our suspicion. The wall was subsequently broken open. Behind it, we discovered a concealed cell, nearly intact, that matched Barrister Arman's description in every detail. This, along with various other evidence, confirmed he had spent most of his eight years in captivity in that space.

It was evident that the room had been sealed off after Barrister Arman's release on 5 August 2024. By the time we visited the site in mid-October, the cell had been entirely hidden from view. Therefore, the concealment must have taken place sometime between August and our visit in mid-October. This constitutes a clear instance of deliberate evidence destruction intended to obstruct accountability, even after the fall of the Hasina regime.






Fig 2A: Diagram sent to an ICT prosecutor on 22 Jan 2025

Since that discovery, we have pursued further inquiries into the timeline of evidence destruction. We now understand that the dismantling and concealment activities at this location began right after Hasina fled in August 2024 and continued well into September.

Although the Director of the Intelligence Wing continued in his post from before the 5 August changeover through our visit on 16 October 2024, the ADG (Operations) had been replaced by the first week of September. Nevertheless, the destruction of evidence continued even under the new ADG (Operations). Subsequently, although the Director of the Intelligence Wing was replaced by an Acting Director, access to information remained obstructed. For example, letters sent in April 2025 requesting some basic information—such as a list of personnel serving in RAB Intelligence—had still not received a proper response by end May 2025.

This pattern suggests a deeper institutional problem: officers, such as the new ADG (Operations), who were not originally involved in specific crimes are becoming newly complicit in crimes through a culture of impunity that incentivises concealment over accountability. As a result, they too are now entangled in the very crimes they inherited. This phenomenon—where successive officers become interested in covering up the misconduct and misdoing of their predecessors—

has, we believe, significantly contributed to the difficulties we have faced in obtaining information from RAB's Intelligence Wing. The legal consequences can only be very harmful to these officers, as we understand.

**The clinic:** RAB Intelligence Wing also operated another secret detention site up until 5 August 2024. This facility was located within the premises of RAB Headquarters itself and was colloquially referred to as the "clinic". It was housed in a structure known informally as the "glass house", due to its glass-panelled exterior. Inside, the site had reportedly once contained approximately six small detention cells on the third floor.

We discovered the glass house site in April 2025, based on analysis of victim and witness statements. Prior to that, we suspected there was an as yet unidentified RAB Intelligence Wing-run detention site somewhere near the airport but could not be certain of its location. Upon inspection, it became apparent that significant structural changes had already taken place. The internal layout no longer fully matched with the descriptions the survivors had provided in their testimonies. However, based on the alignment of ceiling beams, traces of partition walls, and residual wall markings, it was clear that the space had originally been configured into six separate cells. At the time of our visit, only four rooms remained. Two of the dividing walls had been removed entirely, and the altered spaces had been retiled to resemble bathroom interiors. The overall modifications, including the removal of original cell doors, gave the impression of complete repurposing.

The removal of the cell walls, along with the nature of the renovations, indicated that this was not an improvised effort. Even if some materials had been reused from existing stock, the work would still have required a degree of coordination and access to construction supplies. Cement, tiles, tools, and personnel had to be made available. The execution and timing suggest that this process involved some level of logistical planning and budgetary support. While the full extent of these arrangements remains unclear, the renovations were evidently systematic.

We understand that this phase of evidence destruction coincided with the dismantling of torture instruments previously reported at the TFI cell. Our inquiry has established that many of these implements were broken down and removed during the same period. These included rotating chairs, devices used to administer electric shocks, and a particularly painful instrument used to apply thermal torture. In this device, a detainee would sit in a chair chained by his legs. Reaching up to just below the knee, approximately ten inches above the ankle, the legs would be submerged in water which would be heated gradually to an excruciating temperature. Other torture

implements mentioned in survivor testimony, including those that adorned the walls, such as whips, sharp instruments like knives, etc., along with sound proofing equipment were also destroyed. The dismantling of both detention infrastructure and torture equipment appears to have occurred as part of a broader effort to eliminate physical evidence in the weeks following the political transition of 5 August.

Separately, two other RAB Intelligence Wing-operated safe houses—one in Uttara and another in Mirpur—were no longer operational as part of the network of active detention locations for quite some time before 5 August. To the best of our knowledge, and based on site visits, it is our understanding that both these sites had been broken down well before that date.

## **2.3 Strategy**

In a context marked by large-scale evidence destruction and inconsistent institutional cooperation, the Commission has had to make careful strategic decisions about how to approach its caseload of nearly 1800 enforced disappearances. From the outset, we encountered procedural obstruction and active interference, making it clear that conventional inquiry methods would not be adequate. However, within weeks of beginning our work, recurring patterns began to emerge from the data that have since informed the direction of our work.

### **2.3.1 Prioritizing swiftly solvable cases to prevent flight**

Specifically, we began noticing a subset of cases in which the victims could provide some form of contemporaneous documentation from the time of their disappearance. These included general diaries (GDs) filed with the police or media coverage shortly after the abduction. In many of these cases, the victims had also subsequently been shown arrested in formal cases initiated by law enforcement agencies. This meant that, at a minimum, their custodial link to law enforcement was officially acknowledged. Additionally, these victims were alive and capable of identifying the location, conditions, and sometimes even the specific perpetrators involved in their disappearance and detention.

Such cases provided a more stable evidentiary foundation. They were easier to verify, and they allowed us to make quicker progress in identifying potential perpetrators. Strategically, we realized that initiating accountability in these ‘solvable’ cases could serve a broader purpose. Once the process of prosecution or pre-trial investigation begins—and particularly when the alleged perpetrators are incarcerated or suspended—victims and witnesses become significantly more

willing to come forward. This also applies to other witnesses, including law enforcers, who may not be directly implicated but possess valuable information.

### **2.3.2 Shifting the balance of fear**

Additionally, there is always a risk that individuals potentially responsible for enforced disappearances may attempt to flee once they perceive that scrutiny or legal consequences are becoming more likely. Prioritising these more straightforward, well-documented cases allows the broader accountability framework to respond more swiftly. This enables the relevant authorities to take preventative measures, whether by restricting travel or suspending passports, before such individuals are able to leave the country. These opportunities are far more limited in older, unresolved cases involving the victims who have not returned. In such unresolved cases, both the evidentiary threshold and the time required to build a coherent legal pathway are significantly higher, during which time suspects get the opportunity to disappear before any action can be taken.

A clear example is the case of Tareq Syed Mohammad, a prime accused in the Narayanganj seven murder case, who is currently on death row. At the height of his power, he was widely feared and considered untouchable. Yet since his incarceration, we have received several complaints relating to his activities, often from individuals who would previously have been too afraid to speak out. By contrast, fear continues to inhibit disclosure in cases involving officers who remain in service or have not yet been held accountable.

We also came to understand that many of the same officers and units were involved in both categories of enforced disappearances: those where victims returned, and those where victims never resurfaced. The teams deployed to carry out these operations—abduction, detention, and elimination—were often segmented but overlapping. The likelihood that the same personnel were involved in both returned and non-returned cases is therefore high. However, the evidentiary burden in disappearance cases where the victims have not returned is much greater, as the direct testimony of the victim is unavailable. In these cases, the fear of retribution is even more pronounced, particularly when the suspected perpetrators are still in positions of authority.

### **2.3.3 Focusing on detention site identification**

This reality shaped the second dimension of our strategy: focusing on detention site identification. We understood that if a victim could be placed at a particular site—whether through their own testimony or corroborated by architectural features, ambient descriptions, or timelines—then

custodians of that site could be held legally responsible. According to both domestic and international legal norms, individuals in custodial command during periods of unlawful detention carry liability. This approach allowed us to bypass some of the evidentiary limitations inherent in disappearance cases where the victims are still missing.

Over time, we developed a technical skillset around identifying detention sites from even vague or fragmentary descriptions. Having collected hundreds of accounts from the survivors, we built an internal evidentiary corpus that now allows us to match individual testimonies with specific locations based on recurring features. These include layout, sounds, food, physical treatment, verbal interactions, etc. This has become one of the most effective tools at our disposal.

### **2.3.4 Using continuing crime and indirect legal routes**

Another critical legal principle that supports this strategy is the concept of continuing crime in the context of enforced disappearance. An enforced disappearance is not considered a one-time offense but a continuing violation of rights, which remains ongoing until the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person are clarified. This means that even if the custodians or commanders change during a victim's period of secret detention, each successive officer in the chain of custody inherits legal culpability after a threshold—typically after the 24-hour mark—when detention becomes illegal and unreported. This principle has given us additional leverage in identifying liability even in the absence of complete timelines.

We have also learned that, in complex cases involving overlapping chains of command and historical crimes, strategic entry points can be as important as the final charges. In this sense, our approach bears resemblance to how the US law enforcement pursued the case of Al Capone. Although Capone was widely known to be responsible for serious organized crime, including murder, he was ultimately prosecuted and imprisoned for income tax evasion. The lesson is that indirect accountability measures—whether through misuse of office, obstruction, unlawful detention, or falsification of records—can be equally effective in breaking impunity. Old, unresolved cases involving enforced disappearances often require such non-linear routes to justice.

### **2.3.5 Applying the strategy to the case of Barrister Arman**

To illustrate this strategy, we return to the case of Barrister Arman. He was forcibly disappeared from 9 August 2016 to 5 August 2024. Now that we have identified the location of his detention and confirmed that the structure was under the command and control of RAB Intelligence Wing,

the individuals with *prima facie* culpability in his case include: the Director General of RAB, Additional Director General (Operations), the Director (Intelligence), and the TFI Cell Coordinators who served during the period of his disappearance.

- **The DGs in the relevant period are:** the then AIGs Benazir Ahmed, Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun, M Khurshid Hossain, and Md. Harun Or Rashid.
- **The ADGs (Ops) in the relevant period are:** the then Colonels Md. Anwar Latif Khan, Md. Jahangir Alam, Tofayel Mostofa Sorwar, K M Azad, Md. Kamrul Hasan, Md. Mahbub Alam, and Abdullah Al Momen.
- **The Directors (Intelligence) are:** the then Lieutenant Colonels Mohammad Abul Kalam Azad, Md. Mahbub Alam, Md. Sarwar-Bin-Kasem, Muhammad Khairul Islam, Md. Moshir Rahman Jewel, and Saiful Islam Sumon.

Our inquiry has established that RAB maintained a clear and centralised command structure during this entire period. We have received testimony indicating that even minor decisions required clearance from senior command. For example, when captives fell ill at the TFI cell, guards had to seek approval from their superiors before even administering basic medication, such as paracetamol. Such information further demonstrates the extent of control and oversight exercised by senior leadership. It reinforces the view that command and superior responsibility, both operational and moral, can be clearly attributed to specific actors within the institution. As such, targeted investigations and accountability mechanisms can begin from these well-documented cases and expand outward to address the broader system of enforced disappearance.

Over the past few months, the Commission has summoned several officers from the list above, with more to be summoned in the future. Most of them uniformly denied any knowledge of the building or of holding captives there. This, of course, is a pointless exercise in denial, as the ownership of the facility has been confirmed by RAB. During our visit there in October 2024, we were informed—and indeed witnessed—that the then Director of RAB Intelligence Wing held the key to the building. To claim that the building had been abandoned years before and never used for this purpose since then makes no sense, given the entire episode surrounding Barrister Arman’s discovery of the cell and the fact that he was released from there only after 5 August 2024. We have also received additional materials demonstrating active involvement with the TFI cell at the DG and ADG levels that, for the sake of inquiry of the Commission and ongoing investigation of the ICT, will be divulged at a later stage.

Furthermore, we have testimonies from other victims who occupied cells at the TFI centre during the same period, many of whom witnessed each other inside the facility. Several of these victims were underage, and some were held captive there for over two years. We have received witness statements from the personnel who served there, acknowledging that some of these individuals were held at the TFI cell. We may, therefore, conclude that the claim the facility was abandoned years ago is plainly false. These officials, accordingly, bear *prima facie* responsibility for what transpired in this building, including systematic inhuman torture and prolonged enforced disappearances of the victims.

Cases like those of Barrister Arman, where the victims returned and strong evidence exists, thus offer a crucial starting point for holding the perpetrators accountable. Many of the same officers responsible for his disappearance were also in charge of the TFI cell during the same period when other victims were abducted by RAB Intelligence Wing and never seen again. By establishing responsibility in cases like his, we begin to erode the culture of impunity. It demonstrates that justice is possible, and that those in command are not beyond reach. This, in turn, reduces the fear that prevents the victims, witnesses, and even insiders from coming forward. As more people speak out, it becomes easier to uncover the truth behind the more difficult cases, particularly those involving individuals who remain missing.

In this way, the missing are never sidelined, and accountability is not limited to those who have survived. Instead, this targeted approach lays the groundwork for **justice for all**.