

# TRUMP'S RETURN & EU STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

---



EU ANALYSIS



SUMATRA

I N N O V A T I O N



# TABLE OF CONTENT

<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>History of the Transatlantic Alliance.....</b>	<b>5</b>
Aftermath of WWII: The Birth of the Alliance.....	5
Cold War: USA as Europe’s Security Guarantor.....	7
Post-Cold War: New Purposes for the Alliance.....	9
9/11: Counterterrorism and Disagreements.....	10
Obama’s Decade: Reaffirming Transatlantic Ties.....	13
Trump’s First Presidency: “Make America Great Again”.....	14
Biden’s Administration: Trying to get Back to Normal.....	17
<b>Trump’s Impact on EU Strategic Autonomy in Key Areas of Cooperation.....</b>	<b>19</b>
Security & Defense.....	19
Technology & Digital.....	25
Climate Change & Environmental Policy.....	29
Trade & Economic Policy.....	32
Foreign Policy Alignment & Diplomatic Coordination.....	36
<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>41</b>



## Introduction

The strategic autonomy of the European Union (EU-SA) became increasingly important for the European Union (EU) when the 2016 EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy emphasized the importance of Europe's autonomy of action and decision-making. Initially, European leaders recognized the need for the EU to act more autonomously and independently from non-EU countries, including key partners such as the United States (US; USA), in the areas of security and defense <sup>1</sup>. Over the years, the EU-SA was then seen as a way to defend Europe's economic and political interests against Brexit (e.g. integrity of the single market, peace at the Irish borders), Trump's first presidency (e.g. climate action, multilateralism, NATO, trade), China's growth (e.g. trade and economic balance, human rights, technology), Covid-19 (e.g. economic recovery, supply chain resilience) or the war in Ukraine (e.g. energy security) <sup>2</sup>. Yet, the European

Union's quest for strategic autonomy appears to be a difficult task given the geopolitical and globalized context of today's world, which makes it almost impossible to completely move away from dependency. Accordingly, a more realistic approach is to strengthen and create inevitable interdependencies with relevant and strategic actors, while reducing interdependencies imposed by invisible hands or directly by rivals. However, with the recent re-election of Republican Donald J. Trump on November 6, 2024, and his “America First” doctrine, friction and tensions could (re)emerge within the long-standing transatlantic alliance, due to the unpredictability and uncertainty surrounding his foreign policy. The US Congress is becoming increasingly polarized, with the Democrats moving ideologically to the left and the Republicans ideologically to the right, leading to different views on climate policy, strategic alliances such as NATO or defense spending <sup>3</sup>. Furthermore - and both agree on this - China is the

(1) Council of the European Union. (2016). Council conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/14/conclusions-eu-global-strategy-security-defence/>

(2) European Parliament. (2022). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS\\_BRI\(2022\)733589](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733589)

(3) Kleinfled, R. (2023). Polarization, Democracy, and Political Violence in the United States: What the Research Says. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/09/polarization-democracy-and-political-violence-in-the-united-states-what-the-research-says?lang=en>





main rival of the United States, motivating the US to focus on the Indo-Pacific region and de-prioritize European interests.

The aim of this article is to understand the implications of the US presidential election results for the EU's pursuit of strategic autonomy, by looking at the impacts Trump's return to the White House might have on transatlantic cooperation in key sectors. First, the history of the transatlantic alliance will be summarized to provide a clearer understanding of the depth of the EU-US alliance and the reasons behind the EU's growing emphasis on strategic autonomy. The historical context establishes the foundations of mutual dependence, while more

recent developments reveal the changing dynamics that are driving Europe to assert greater independence in the face of potential changes in US foreign policy. Secondly, the most relevant key areas of EU-US cooperation in recent decades will be covered. That includes security & defense, technology & digital cooperation, climate change & environmental policy, trade & economic policy, and foreign policy & diplomatic coordination. This will provide a basis to analyze the impact of Trump's first term (2017-2021) on these sectors, which will then be contrasted with the current geopolitical landscape to predict the future impacts of Trump's return on the EU's strategic autonomy.



## History of the Transatlantic Alliance

### Aftermath of WWII: The Birth of the Alliance

After the Second World War, Europe found itself in a critical state of destruction, while the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world's leading economic, military and political powers. Within the scope of this article's research area, we will focus solely on the role played by the USA on the European continent, economically, politically, and militarily. Almost immediately after the Second World War, the United States provided military assistance to European countries. Faced with the growing influence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the spread of communism in Europe, the United States felt the need to secure the countries of Western Europe. These tensions, between economic liberalism versus communism, West versus East, or the USA versus the Soviet Union, gave rise to the Cold War, which lasted from the post-war years in 1947 to the collapse of the

Soviet Union in 1991. This gave rise to security concerns that drove the United States and the United Kingdom to advocate for a collective security arrangement in Europe. Aware of their weak military capabilities, the five members of the Brussels Pact (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) sought US involvement, and signed the treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949, joined by the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal <sup>4</sup>. Since then, this military alliance has been the cornerstone of transatlantic security, initially created to contain Soviet expansion, but whose roles and objectives have evolved over time. A few months later, U.S. President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which completed the NATO framework and made the U.S. the main security provider for Europe during the Cold War. Concerning economic support, in view of the enormous task of reconstruction on the continent and the rapid deterioration of European economies in the winter of

(4) Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). L'OTAN. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/654f1fb4-2df6-43d5-9872-f022cb6d1ffa>



1946-1947, the United States developed one of its oldest and most important financial aid instruments, the Marshall Plan. Worth around \$12 billion (\$130 billion in today's dollars), the financial aid was approved by Congress in March 1948 through the Economic Cooperation Act, from which eighteen European countries benefited between April 1948 and June 1951 <sup>5</sup>. At the same time, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was created after the United States passed the Foreign Assistance Act in April 1948, which allowed permanent representatives to be sent to European recipient countries to oversee the funds and set up bilateral agreements with the United States <sup>5</sup>.



Source: [Leonardo.ai](#)

Image 1: Photography showing the devastating aftermath of war

With the aim of improving the management of the Marshall Plan funds, promoting European cooperation, fostering mutual interests and coordinating economic policies between European powers and the United States, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which became the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) in 1960, was set up after the Paris Convention of 16 April 1948 <sup>6</sup>. The USA, which already provided direct military assistance and financial aid, and promoted European economic collaboration, also backed political cooperation. In May 1948, at the Congress of The Hague, the USA supported the federalist idea of establishing a political structure between the states of Western Europe . A year later, on May 5, 1949, ten states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) signed the Statute of the Council of Europe (CoE) in London <sup>6</sup> . Composed of a Consultative Assembly and a Committee of of Ministers, which

(5) Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). Le plan Marshall et la création de l'OECE. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/84c940fe-a82b-4fe8-ad53-63144bfe30b1>

(6) Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). La coopération politique. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/304a94a5-251d-414a-93d0-f71c4a78118c>



decides unanimously and has the final say, the CoE was the first international parliamentary assembly in history.

## Cold War: USA as Europe's Security Guarantor

For over four decades, during the Cold War, the United States has been the sole guarantor of Europe's security, through NATO, justifying American military presence and intervention in military policy. All NATO decisions served the objective of “keeping the Russians out, Americans in, and Germans down”, as expressed by Hastings Ismay in 1949, Nato's first Secretary General<sup>7</sup>. Namely, this implied to maintain a secure buffer zone against Soviet influence and Communist expansion in Western Europe, rebuild Germany within a controlled framework to prevent a potential resurgence as a military power and ensure that it remains a peaceful and cooperative part of Europe, allowing the USA to establish itself in Europe through NATO to provide protection in times of crisis and ensure the stability of Western democracies. This security



Source: [Leonardo.ai](#)

Image 2: Image illustrating the triumvirate purpose of NATO during the Cold War

“guarantee” enabled Western Europe to focus on economic recovery and integration, laying the foundations for the future European Union. Accordingly, on May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman declared his support for the creation of an organization pooling the coal and steel resources of France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which would be open to the other countries of Europe<sup>8</sup>. Robert Schuman's declaration was well

(7) Maunders, J. (2016). 'Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down': a potted and bloody history of Nato. Counterfire. <https://www.counterfire.org/article/keep-the-russians-out-the-americans-in-and-the-germans-down-a-potted-and-bloody-history-of-nato/>

(8) Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). 1950-1054: La formation de l'Europe communautaire. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/8f43262b-cbe0-422f-afec-9b28a5ee451d>





received in France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries, as the six foreign ministers of these countries began negotiations on the principles set out. On April 18, 1951, in Paris, the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which is widely considered as the first clear and concrete step toward the creation of the EU as we know it today <sup>9</sup>. It was inspired by Monnet's project to establish an independent supranational institution that would guarantee free competition, oppose the emergence of cartels, eliminate discrimination, ensure equal consumer access to production and direct investment in a coordinated manner <sup>10,11</sup>. Such an institution came into being after years of work, when the treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) was created in 1957 <sup>12</sup>. The United States supported both initiatives as they saw them as a way to promote stability by decreasing risks of conflict between historical European rivals (i.e, France, United Kingdom and Germany), a counterweight to the Soviet Union

and the eastern bloc, and an economic opportunity by rebuilding European markets for American goods and making of Europe a viable trading partner. The US mainly provided diplomatic support to EU leaders advocating for European integration, such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. The U.S. Embassy in Paris and U.S. diplomats throughout Europe lobbied skeptical governments to support the treaty creating the ECSC, seen as an important step in the construction of a united Europe, in the interests of both Europe and the United States. There was also economic support provided by the USA. The privileged relations between Jean Monnet and Americans allowed the ECSC to borrow \$100 million in 1954 from the United States, whose capital market remained virtually closed to European companies. In fact, the United States recognized the ECSC as an independent, sovereign entity and authorized it to sign a tariff agreement with the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

(9) Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). Les débuts de la CECA. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/86c3edd9-af8b-47e6-92b5-0ffb2fc44f06>

(10) Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). Le projet de Jean Monnet. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/873d140d-4bf0-4a30-b087-4b52fd0ab81b>

(11) Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). Le rôle économique et social. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/cab38ff6-63dc-491e-879e-67e2b4ae40a>

(12) Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). 1955-1957: La relance européenne et les traités de Rome. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/c4d6b088-d168-44b7-9b35-ceaf1aac485a>





## Post-Cold War: New Purposes for the Alliance

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 undoubtedly raised questions about the future of transatlantic relations. But US Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton silenced isolationist voices and brought about changes that transformed the purpose of the NATO alliance and altered the political, security and economic dynamic between the USA and Europe. The first change was to redefine NATO's role. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its original purpose of containing Soviet expansion disappeared, leading it to focus on crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. For example, NATO first intervened beyond its borders in the Balkans in 1993, conducting operations in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) to prevent ethnic conflicts and humanitarian crises. The second change concerned the members of the military alliance. In 1990, NATO's role in Eastern Europe was discussed between the US and the USSR, as Mikhail Gorbachev was

concerned about NATO's presence moving closer to Soviet borders. US Secretary of State James Baker assured the Soviet leader that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward”<sup>13</sup>, but there was no formal or written agreement. NATO, however, maintained its “open door” policy, based on Article 10 of the NATO Treaty, which made it clear that any democracies that could strengthen Euro-Atlantic security could apply for membership<sup>14</sup>. This policy led to three successive enlargements, in 1999 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic), 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and 2009 (Albania, Croatia), allowing former Soviet and Eastern European countries to join the alliance. Former Soviet states also began talks with the European Union, after it was formally established with the Maastricht treaty in 1992. In the long-term, the idea was to expand the EU's reach and influence by bringing in those countries in order to further integrate Europe economically and politically.

(13) National Security Archive. (2017). NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early>

(14) Le Chaffotec, B. (2020). Reinventing transatlantic relations. Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe. <https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/europe-europeans-and-world/international-action-and-external-policies-european-union/reinventing-transatlantic-relations>



Source: [Unityschimbam](#)

Image 3: NATO ceremony  
accession of April 02, 2024

The end of the Cold War also led the EU to start discussing its autonomy and play a more assertive role in world affairs, focusing on environmental policy, trade and human rights. This has strengthened EU-US relations and increased the EU's importance in transatlantic dialogues. In addition, the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which evolved into the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) aligned with US interests and foreign policy. For example, the CFSP diplomatic initiatives and CSDP missions focusing on European-led crisis

management in the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East, improving European defense capabilities, strengthening NATO and cooperating on terrorism and transnational threats show how complementary and supportive the EU has been to US foreign policy objectives. Attempts were also made to establish closer economic ties between the two transatlantic allies. In 1998, after eight years of announcement, they began work on the establishment of a Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), an initiative aimed at strengthening economic ties, improving trade and eliminating regulatory barriers between the two economies<sup>14</sup>. It took almost another decade to create the Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007 to coordinate the harmonization of rules and standards. However, the impact has not been great, and challenges have arisen, mainly due to fundamental differences between the regulatory approaches and priorities of the US and the EU.

## 9/11: Counterterrorism and Disagreements

(14) Le Chaffotec, B. (2020). Reinventing transatlantic relations. Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe. <https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/europe-europeans-and-world/international-action-and-external-policies-european-union/reinventing-transatlantic-relations>



The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought the US and EU closer together in the common objective to fight global terrorism, significantly reshaping their cooperation in areas of security, intelligence, foreign policy and military intervention. In 2002, for example, the EU introduced the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) to facilitate the extradition of suspected terrorists in cooperation with the USA. Agreements on the exchange of data on flights and financial transactions have also been concluded, such as the Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement in 2004 and the SWIFT agreement on tracking financial transactions in 2010. Later, in 2016, a Counter-Terrorism Centre was also established within Europol to improve coordination on issues such as radicalization, financing and foreign fighters. However, divergences in the approach to global security and intervention strategies sparked tensions. After 9/11, the US invoked Article 5 of NATO, the clause of "collective defense", forcing all members of the military alliance to consider the attacks as attacks on all of them. The USA's unilateral policies of intervention in the Middle East,

particularly the 2003 Iraq war, caused divisions not only within the EU, but also in relation to the USA. The United States cited several official reasons for going to war, such as Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), his links with al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, and the duty to establish democracy in Iraq and free the Iraqi people from Hussein's dictatorship. However, these assertions have been challenged, the real motivations being more strategic and ideological. For example, by eliminating Saddam Hussein, the United States aimed to weaken Iraq and secure influence over Iraqi oil in order to reduce its dependence on Saudi Arabia. The war, part of a post-9/11 doctrine of preventive war, was also a means of diverting American attention from domestic problems. In Europe, while some countries supported the US-led invasion, others were strongly opposed. Some opponents argued that military intervention lacked a clear mandate from the United Nations and urged for more time to allow weapons inspectors to confirm the presence of WMDs. Others wanted to prioritize a





multilateralism approach based on international law, as well as diplomacy and non-military methods. This disagreement has led the EU to debate the desire to develop its own foreign policy identity that is distinct and unified from other powers, including the United States. Another important aspect of disagreement concerned the protection of civil liberties and data privacy. In 2001, the US enacted the Patriot Act, which expanded the government's surveillance and counter-terrorism powers. But it also came with many concerns about the excessiveness of the measures, the impact on privacy rights and the dilemma of sacrificing privacy for security. As such, the law allowed law enforcement agencies (e.g. the FBI) to conduct searches (e.g. searches of homes, offices, telephone and internet records, financial records) without immediately notifying the target (secret search warrants and gag orders) and without a court order (National Security Letters), allowed surveillance of a target's devices and locations without specifying them in advance (roving wiretaps), or expanded the National

Security Agency's (NSA) programs to collect metadata on millions of Americans. Privacy concerns were further heightened when, in 2013, Edward Snowden revealed the monitoring of EU leaders' communications by the NSA, which was interpreted as a breach of trust and created diplomatic tensions. In response, relations between the US and the EU became more strained, following the example of relations between US President George W. Bush and French President Jacques Chirac, which became increasingly tense. In January 2003, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld openly criticized France and Germany, describing them as part of "old Europe"<sup>15</sup>. France, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, repeatedly threatened to use its veto to block any resolution authorizing military action against Iraq, and some American commentators disparagingly referred to France, Germany and Belgium as the "Axis of Weasels".

---

(15) Baker, Mayfield. (2003). U.S.: Rumsfeld's 'Old' And 'New' Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1102012.html>



## Obama's Reaffirming Ties Decade: Transatlantic

After the Bush era of unilateralism, President Obama's tenure (2009-2017) aligned US foreign policy with multilateral diplomacy and cooperation, giving new impetus to EU-US relations. This allowed the transatlantic allies to share leadership on certain global challenges, such as climate change, the rise of China or sanctions against Russia. Indeed, Obama's commitment to climate goals led to the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, which was warmly supported by the EU and marked a high point in EU-US cooperation. As for NATO, Obama's call for members to spend more money to meet the goal of devoting 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, raised public awareness rather than demonstrating commitment and meaningful progress. The US continued to support NATO deterrence measures after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, sending troops to Eastern European countries and coordinating sanctions against Russia with the EU. Other actions reflecting a diplomatic and

multilateral approach include the US and Russia signing the New START Treaty in 2011, which aims to limit and reduce intercontinental-range nuclear weapons<sup>16</sup>, and the Iran nuclear Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was concluded in 2015. But tensions remain over economic policies and geopolitical interests.



Source: [Obamawhitehouse.archive](https://obamawhitehouse.archive)

Image 4: US President Barack Obama delivering remarks on January 17, 2014

Building on the work of the Transatlantic Economic Council, Obama and European leaders launched negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in 2013, with the aim of creating a vast free trade zone

(15) Baker, Mayfield. (2003). U.S.: Rumsfeld's 'Old' And 'New' Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1102012.html>



between the EU and the US. Talks failed, however, due to a number of obstacles. The EU's precautionary principle tends to be too restrictive to establish regulatory standards with the EU, which has a “burden of proof to prove harm” approach. The two allies also have different positions on environmental protection, which led the EU to fear compromising on its environmental standards (e.g. renewable energy targets, emission standards, restrictions on industrial practices) in order to accommodate US goods and services. Another major obstacle was limiting corporate influence. The proposed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism would have allowed companies to bypass national courts and sue governments in arbitration tribunals, raising fears in the EU that powerful US companies would push for deregulation in key sectors such as food, chemicals, pharmaceuticals or digital. Another source of disagreement arose when Americans and Europeans jointly intervened in Libya in 2011 under the aegis of NATO to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. While they both identified the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as a major threat

they shared different geopolitical interests regarding the level of engagement in Syria. As Europe has been more directly affected by the refugee crisis, the EU has focused on refugee flows, humanitarian concerns and peace talks, although some EU countries have taken a proactive role in the fight against ISIS by conducting airstrikes. In contrast, the US has been more actively engaged in the military confrontation, with the deployment of US troops, airstrikes, special operations and military support for Syrian opposition groups.

### **Trump's First Presidency: “Make America Great Again”**

Trump's arrival in the White House in 2017 profoundly challenged the transatlantic alliance. The United States rebalanced towards unilateralism, in addition to Trump's isolationist and transactional approach, creating a period of significant evolution towards divergence of global priorities and approaches with the European Union. The Trump administration, and Trump himself, have criticized multilateral institutions such as the





UN and the World Trade Organization, but also the EU itself, and have not shied away from turning on certain European figures.



Source: [Thyblackman](#)

Image 5: Slogan MAGA (Make America Great Again) from Trump's 2017 campaign

America's disengagement from a number of international agreements and organizations has had a major impact on von der Leyen's goal of reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO). Trump's unilateral behavior also explains the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, despite strong opposition from European allies who supported the agreement as a means of containing Iran's nuclear ambitions through diplomacy. As a result, and in a rare

case of EU defiance of US policy, the INSTEX mechanism was developed to keep the agreement alive and ensure trade with Iran despite US sanctions, although it was subsequently discontinued in March 2023<sup>17,18</sup>. President Trump also decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2017, just two years after it was signed. This marked another schism with Europe, as the EU is committed to fighting climate change. While this decision created a political rift between the US and the EU on environmental issues, it also forced European countries to take responsibility and show the way to other powers. As for military partnership, Trump did not withdraw from NATO, but did threaten not to intervene in the event of conflict. He also pointed the finger at countries like Germany for not contributing enough, and even talked about withdrawing US troops from Germany, which ultimately did not happen. As a result of these comments questioning the automatic application of Article 5, and despite his reaffirmation of the US commitment, EU leaders feared for

(13) National Security Archive. (2017). NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early>

(14) Le Chaffotec, B. (2020). Reinventing transatlantic relations. Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe. <https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/europe-europeans-and-world/international-action-and-external-policies-european-union/reinventing-transatlantic-relations>



the long-term stability of NATO and the reliability of the US as a guarantor of security. Another major withdrawal under Trump's first presidency was from the TTIP due to his skepticism of multilateral agreements. Instead, his approach focused on concluding bilateral agreements that were protectionist in nature, protecting and serving American interests first. In 2018, he also imposed tariffs on European steel and aluminum, leading the EU to adopt retaliatory tariffs, creating one of the most significant trade conflicts in recent transatlantic relations. The problem is that all these measures not only affect economic ties, but also deeply damage trust between the two allies. Simultaneously, the EU launched several proceedings against GAFAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft), due to breaches of European legislation. Examples include Google's antitrust cases in 2017 (Google Shopping case) or 2018 (Android case), Apple's tax dispute in 2016, or Facebook's privacy and data breach issues (Cambridge Analytica scandal). But this was seen as unfair and targeted at US tech giants, leading to threats of additional tariffs

on European products.



Source: [CNN](#)

*Image 6: US President Donald Trump giving a speech on July 22, 2016*

Another important part of Trump's first mandate was the trade war with China, which shaped relations between the US and China. He imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese imports, citing unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft and a major trade imbalance. The US called on the European Union to take a similar stance and pressured it to ban Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from its 5G networks, citing security concerns and the risk of espionage. Trump also criticized China's human rights violations, particularly in relation to the Uyghur



Muslim population in Xinjiang and the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong. Accordingly, the US imposed sanctions on Chinese officials and companies associated with these violations and called on the EU to impose similar sanctions. In general, the Trump administration often used strong, confrontational rhetoric when speaking about China, referring to US-China relations as a “new Cold War”, emphasizing the urgency and importance of the situation and pressuring allies to take a more adversarial stance. All in all, Trump's motto “America First” has clearly marked a shift challenging the traditional American alliance with the EU. Trump's unpredictable approach to NATO and his frequent criticism have prompted the EU to engage more actively in the search for its strategic autonomy, with an urgent need in sectors such as defense, trade, technology and energy.

### **Biden's Administration: Trying to Get Back to Normal**

Throughout all Biden's mandate, the EU has been increasingly aware of the necessity to hedge its security,

economic, and technological interests. This feeling, which can be considered a need, was further reinforced due to the uncertainty over US foreign policy. In fact, while the relations between the EU and US improved under Biden's administration, tensions and policy differences still persisted. Biden, completely different from the confrontational style of Donald Trump, prioritized diplomatic engagement and emphasized the importance of a partnership based on shared values. The two allies met in 2021 and 2023 during the EU-US Summits, launched the Global Methane Pledge to reduce global methane emissions, and established the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) in 2021, to address trade and technology issues, aiming to align on standards for emerging technologies, address supply chain challenges, and tackle digital trade barriers. Under Biden, the US also rejoined the Paris Agreement, a move warmly welcomed by the EU. On the security aspect, the US commitment to NATO and Article 5 was reaffirmed. The US also provided significant military and financial support to Ukraine in 2022, and increased the





number of troops in Europe. The United States also coordinated with the EU to impose sanctions on Russia, targeting Russian banks, companies, and oligarchs. Europe's initiatives for increased defense spending and capabilities, a way to improve EU-SA in the defense sector, has been welcomed by Biden, as long as efforts are complementary to NATO and not a replacement.



Source: [NYTimes](#)

Image 7: US President Joe Biden giving a speech on January 06, 2021

The main remaining tensions concern economic and trade policy, such as digital taxation or the complexity of the EU regulatory framework which continues to create friction. For instance, the regulatory framework which continues to create friction. For instance, the regulatory

gap between the EU and US in regulating big tech companies has created loopholes. The implementation of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital markets Act (DMA) has shown the need on both sides to cooperate on digital standards. The EU also criticized the American Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) because of the “Made in America” provisions and the significant subsidies for green technologies which could divert crucial resources and technologies from the EU to the U.S., therefore impacting the EU's ability to reach its targets set in the European Green Deal and Fit for 55 package. According to some, this could disadvantage European companies and distort trade, which would violate WTO rules. Differences in geopolitical strategies also remain concerning China. While the US has adopted a more confrontational stance, such as with the implementation of export controls and strengthening alliances in the Indo-Pacific, Americans would like to see their European allies act in a similar way. However, the EU, who sees China as both a partner and a competitor, has been quite reluctant in taking a strong stance.



## Trump's Impact on EU Strategic Autonomy in Key Areas of Cooperation

### Security & Defence

The EU and the United States have a strong and long-standing partnership in the areas of defense and security. NATO has been a cornerstone of transatlantic security since its founding in 1949 and has been committed to stability in Europe for decades. For long, NATO's presence has acted as an efficient deterrence measure against a potential aggression on the European continent. As the guarantor of peace, security and stability in Europe, NATO is committed to ensuring a unified response to crises and enhancing operational effectiveness. To this end, NATO's integrated command structure, the Supreme Allied Commanders, facilitates streamlined decision-making and military coordination between member states, conducting joint operations ranging from air defense exercises to large-scale military deployments, and promoting interoperability through the use of standardized equipment

and protocols. NATO is also proving invaluable in intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism, such as with its Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) and Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) System, which were very effective during missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, enabling the exchange of information in real time. NATO has also developed its capabilities to deal with cyber and hybrid warfare. For example, through NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), allies can address cyber security, disinformation and digital resilience to protect critical infrastructure and collaborate on internet governance principles. The organization actively supports joint projects to develop advanced military technologies and capabilities, such as the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) and the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) programme, which strengthen the European defense industry by encouraging innovation and the sharing of resources between allies.

It is very important to understand that for the European Union, NATO serves as the primary security framework, and that replacing NATO



with an EU-specific equivalent is out of the question. First, approximately 70% of NATO's total defense spending comes from the United States<sup>19</sup>. Such a replacement will require the EU-27 to substantially increase its defense budgets to compensate. Yet, one of NATO's main problems is the commitment made by its members in 2014 to reach the target of 2% of GDP for defense spending within a decade. In 2021, only six countries (out of 32) respected that commitment<sup>20</sup>. At present, "only" seven countries are still not meeting this target (Croatia, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain)<sup>21</sup>. The slow pace of commitment in seven years can be explained by political reluctance due to public opinion's preference for allocating funds to national programs in the health or education sectors, as well as by the difficulty of balancing increased defense spending without increasing national debts and restricting budgets in other sectors<sup>22, 23</sup>. One example is Italy's

postponement of the increase in its defense spending to meet the NATO target by 2028 instead of 2024, and its request to the EU to support the issue of bonds to help it meet this target<sup>23, 24</sup>. While there has been a significant increase in defense spending over the last three years, explained by the resurgence of security threats on the European continent, notably following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 48.3% of the EU's total defense expenditure is used to cover personnel costs<sup>25</sup> (e.g. salaries, social security costs, pensions), which considerably reduces the funds available for research and development (R&D), defense procurement, as well as operations and maintenance. Secondly, the EU is heavily dependent on the United States for defense equipment and military advanced technologies, providing around 63% of the EU's total defense capabilities<sup>26</sup>. For example, the US supplies Europe with advanced combat aircraft (e.g., F-35 Lightning

(19) NATO. (2024). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024). <https://www.nato.int/natostaticf2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf>

(20) NATO. (2022). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2021). <https://www.nato.int/natostaticf2014/assets/pdf/2022/3/pdf/220331-def-exp-2021-en.pdf>

(21) Dorn, F. (2024). Defence Spending for Europe's Security – How Much Is Enough? *Intereconomics*, 59(4), 204-209. <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2024/number/4/article/defence-spending-for-europe-s-security-how-much-is-enough.html>

(22) Dorn, F. et al. (2024). European Defence Spending in 2024 and Beyond: How to Provide Security in an Economically Challenging Environment. *Econpol*, 45(8). [https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/EconPol-PolicyReport\\_45\\_0.pdf](https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/EconPol-PolicyReport_45_0.pdf)

(23) Amante, A., Fonte, G. (2024). Italy calls for EU support to meet NATO spending target. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-urges-eu-guarantee-bonds-raise-defence-spending-2024-11-07/>

(24) Kington, T. (2022). Italy aims to reach NATO defense-spending target by 2028, four years late. *Defence News*. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/01/italy-aims-to-reach-nato-defense-spending-target-by-2028-four-years-late/>

(25) Cepparulo, A., Pasimeni, P. (2024). Defence Spending in the European Union. European Commission. <https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f5827354-8501-49cb-bf2d-13f2fa9444fen?filename=dpi199en.pdf>

(26) Rizzo, R. (2024). Unleashing US-EU defense cooperation. Atlantic Council. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/unleashing-us-eu-defense-cooperation/>



II), armored vehicles and artillery systems (e.g., M1 Abrams tank, M109 Paladin self-propelled howitzer), naval technologies (e.g., Aegis combat system), and air defense systems (e.g., Patriot missiles)<sup>27</sup>. The United States is also working with European countries to share information and best practices, as well as threat intelligence, to counter cyber threats and improve collective cybersecurity resilience. This is done not only through joint NATO cyber defense exercises, such as the Cyber Coalition, but also through platforms such as the EU-US Cyber Dialogue. This is particularly relevant as many US companies provide much of the cybersecurity services in the European Union. For example, for intrusion and threat detection systems, many European organizations and government agencies use CrowdStrike Falcon, a US cloud-based company that provides threat hunting services using artificial intelligence (AI) to detect and prevent cyber threats in real time. Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR is used by many European enterprises and critical

infrastructures for threat detection across the entire IT ecosystem. Other US companies provide cybersecurity solutions for encryption and data protection (e.g. Microsoft Azure Key Vault, IBM Guardium), incident response and forensics tools (e.g. Splunk, FireEye), endpoint protection and threat intelligence (e.g. McAfee), or control systems for industrial networks (e.g. Dragos). Therefore, in addition to investing much more in an alternative to NATO, the EU should, at the same time, invest massively in strengthening its own military capabilities, developing its own logistics, and modernizing and expanding its military hardware. Thirdly, the EU has no legal powers to act on behalf of member states in defense matters, but mainly coordinates member states through intergovernmental agreements. With a European Commission acting in an advisory capacity, and the requirement for the Council to act unanimously on decisions relating to the Common Security and Defense Policy, there will be decision-making challenges, such as certain countries

---

(27) US Department of State. (2022). Press Release: Fact Sheet - U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/article/3078056/fact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-to-europe/>





delaying or blocking negotiations. Fourthly, recalling Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's 'three Ds' speech in 1998, there should be no discrimination, no reduction and no duplication of NATO's activities<sup>28</sup>. The EU would never abandon its sole guarantor of security. Consequently, replacing NATO is absolutely not an option at present, or for years to come, due to geopolitical realities, political challenges, institutional complexities, as well as historical and resource constraints. The European Union will focus on strengthening the NATO framework rather than duplicating it, which then allows the EU-27 to focus on supplementary capabilities and regional crisis management, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

Under a second Trump administration, there are concerns that US involvement in NATO will diminish. During his first term, he has already made statements that cast uncertainty over the

organization. In 2017, in an interview with the Times of London and the German newspaper Bild, Trump said that NATO was obsolete because it had been conceived many years ago<sup>29</sup>. A year later, the US president told a press conference at the NATO summit that many countries owed the US a huge amount of money because they were paying for it, and branded allies who failed to meet the 2% GDP target as 'delinquents'<sup>30</sup>. He also threatened to withdraw from NATO and warned allies that the US could go it alone if they failed to meet their defense spending commitments. A few days later, in an interview with Fox News, he questioned the US obligation to defend Montenegro under Article 5 of NATO, solely because 'they are aggressive people'<sup>31</sup>. More recently, in February 2023, at a rally in South Carolina, Trump reiterated his position that allies had to pay up to meet their financial obligations, otherwise the US would not protect them<sup>32</sup>. As a result, and as outlined in the July 2024 Republican Policy

---

(28) US Department of State. (1998). Statement of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to the North Atlantic Council. Archive of the US Department of State. <https://1997-2001state.gov/statements/1998/981208.html>

(29) Hunt, K. (2017). Trump rattles NATO with 'obsolete' blast. CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/16/politics/donald-trump-times-bild-interview-takeaways/index.html>

(30) Hennigan, W.J., (2018). President Trump Says NATO Allies Owe the U.S. Money, He's Wrong. Time. <https://time.com/5335111/donald-trump-nato-spending-facts/>

(31) Smith, A. (2018). Trump calls out 'very aggressive' Montenegro in latest NATO jibe. NBC News. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-calls-out-very-aggressive-montenegro-latest-nato-jibe-n892311>

(32) Sullivan, K. (2024). Trump says he would encourage Russia to 'do whatever the hell they want' to any NATO country that doesn't pay enough. CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html>



Guidelines, US commitments within NATO, described as 'dormant NATO', will be reduced<sup>15</sup>. Another possibility is that the Trump administration will push for reform by supporting the 'Two-Tier' proposal, which would distinguish between members who meet the 2% target (Tier 1) and those who do not (Tier 2)<sup>33</sup>. Tier 2 members, which would be Croatia, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain, would receive limited or conditional security guarantees and support, which would need a treaty change to reduce their protection under Article 5. Another major uncertainty concerns the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. So far, Donald Trump's position on Ukraine has been ambiguous. While he has claimed that he could end the war in 24 hours, he has also been skeptical of US aid to Ukraine and hesitant about military support<sup>34</sup>. This could suggest that he would push for negotiations favorable to Russia. This view, which differs from that of the EU, could create friction between the transatlantic allies, fuelled by the

security concerns of NATO members in Eastern Europe and the EU countries which are expected to increase their support.



Source: [CNN](#)

Image 8: US President Trump with NATO's S-G Stoltenberg on April 12, 2017

In response to Trump's approach and the potential gaps left by a diminished US role in Europe, the EU must continue to work on its defense autonomy by strengthening its own defense initiatives. In fact, the EU needs to build on the momentum it has created over the last two years to diversify and consolidate strategic interdependencies with its key allies and partners<sup>35</sup>. As the European

(15) Baker, Mayfield. (2003). U.S.: Rumsfeld's 'Old' And 'New' Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1102012.html>  
(33) Bergmann, M., Martinez, S. (2024). After the Ballots: What the U.S. Elections Mean for NATO. In Cha, V., Szechenyi, N (Eds.), The Global Impact of the 2024 US Presidential Election. Center for Strategic and International Studies. [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240926\\_Cha\\_Global\\_Impact.pdf?VersionId=lgqOdZLFxo2YIcraos\\_a3519LRyxfOZH](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240926_Cha_Global_Impact.pdf?VersionId=lgqOdZLFxo2YIcraos_a3519LRyxfOZH)  
(34) Ellison, D., van Hooft, P. (2024). Twilight of Atlanticism? America's shifting approaches to Europe. The Hague Center for Strategic Studies. <https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Twilight-of-Atlanticism-HCSS-2024.pdf>  
(35) Torreblanca, J. (2023). Onwards and outwards: Why the EU needs to move from strategic autonomy to strategic interdependence. European Council on Foreign Relations. <https://ecfr.eu/article/onwards-and-outwards-why-the-eu-needs-to-move-from-strategic-autonomy-to-strategic-interdependence/>



Defense Agency (EDA) reports for 2022 and 2023 indicate, defense spending reached €240 billion in 2022, growing for eight consecutive years, and is expected to increase by a further €70 billion by 2025. Initiatives include the introduction of a joint procurement program for ammunition, the set up of the Computer Emergency Response Team Operational Network (MICNET) to facilitate information sharing, and cyber defense exercises and training events have become a key element in strengthening the EU's resilience to cyber threats. The EU also plans to establish a rapid deployment capability by 2025 that would enable a military response without US support. These recent developments reflect the EU's ambition to reduce dependence on non-EU suppliers in order to strengthen resilience to geopolitical challenges. However, as the US has traditionally provided key capabilities for European defense, this could be perceived by the Americans as a decoupling strategy, which could lead to tensions in trade of goods and services in the defense sector or even backlash. Indeed, the current US contribution of 63% to total EU

defense capabilities will reduce the US share of the EU defense market if EDIS is applied correctly. However, given the heavy reliance on US technology, and the highly fragmented nature of the European defense industry, it will take years to achieve the necessary scale and interoperability to match that of the USA. Responding to that issue, the EU has presented its European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) in March 2024, a €1.5 billion plan which aims to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by encouraging EU governments to buy jointly from European defense companies, and encouraging industry to increase its capabilities. In EDIS, the Commission also proposed the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP), which serves as a means of implementing EDIS. In fact, EDIS defines a long-term vision for the defense sector, which is to become a “European pillar”, and sets a number of objectives. For example, by 2030, intra-EU defense trade should account for at least 35% of the value of the EU defense market, rising to 50-60% by 2035. By 2030, the EDTIB



should provide 50% of Member States' defense procurement (60% by 2035), with Member States buying at least 40% of their defense equipment collaboratively. But as EDIS is currently under discussion in Parliament and the Council, and EDIP has yet to be presented, it is estimated that the €1.5 billion budget may not be enough to support a sufficient number of projects to have a measurable impact at EU level<sup>36</sup>. Trump, and his transactional ideology, could actually be part of the solution if the EU can convince the US that participation in joint projects, while promoting European defense autonomy, could be a strategic advantage for the alliance. In addition, for the first time, there will be a Commissioner for Defense and Space who can act as the main point of contact between the US, NATO and the EU. Trump will therefore have the choice to focus either on EU-US defense cooperation or on EU-US competition.

## Technology & Digital Cooperation

The EU-US relationship in the areas of technology and digital cooperation is very important as it includes extensive trade in digital goods and services, important technology partnerships, regulatory alignment efforts and a shared commitment to innovation. Together, they are investing heavily in global R&D, particularly in sectors such as artificial intelligence, 5G and cybersecurity, with the aim of influencing technological progress and economic growth through joint efforts. In 2021, the US spent 3.5% of its GDP on R&D (€826 billion), while the EU spent 2.27% of its GDP on R&D (€363 billion)<sup>37,38</sup>. In 2022, the EU, with its 367 companies, ranked third in global corporate R&D investment (17.5%), behind the United States (42.1%) and China (17.8%)<sup>39</sup>. With a total of €219.2 billion for the EU, this is less than half the amount spent by the US, which amounted to €526.5 billion<sup>39</sup>. In terms of practical cooperation, the EU and the US are closely linked. For example, major US companies such as Microsoft, Google, Amazon and Oracle provide cloud computing, AI

(36) European Court of Auditors. (2024). Opinion 02/2024 concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defense products (EDIP). <https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/OP-2024-02>

(37) Eurostat. (2024). R&D Expenditure. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=551418>

(38) OECD. (2024). Gross domestic spending on R&D. <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.html>

(39) Nindl, E., et al. (2023). The 2023 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, doi:10.2760/506189, JRC135576.





and software solutions to European businesses and governments, while European software companies such as SAP and Dassault Systèmes also serve significant markets in the US. In terms of cybersecurity, both deal in cybersecurity solutions and services, with US companies such as Palo Alto Networks and CrowdStrike and European companies such as Avast and F-Secure. They have also initiated many projects, such as the 6G-XCEL project, which aims to improve telecommunications systems by integrating AI into 6G networks and avoiding the use of Chinese telecommunications<sup>40</sup>. Another example of collaboration is the partnership between US-based Purdue University and Belgian research center IMEC to promote research and innovation in semiconductor technologies to support the establishment of a large semiconductor manufacturing facility in Purdue's Discovery Park District<sup>41</sup>. Indeed, cooperation and trade in semiconductors, electronics and telecommunications equipment is significant, with the EU being a leading supplier of semiconductor machinery with companies such as

ASML, while US companies such as Intel and AMD focus on chip production. Other platforms like Netflix, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube demonstrate the US presence on the EU markets for digital trade, valued in hundreds of billions euros. Despite strong ties in the technology and digital sectors, they adopt different economic and regulatory approaches. The US is market-oriented and has generally given its technology sector more freedom to innovate, prioritizing innovation and economic growth. The US regulatory approach focuses on fostering a competitive market without heavy intervention and too many restrictions, which has fostered an environment for the rapid growth of US tech giants. In contrast, the EU has taken a more regulation-oriented approach, focusing on issues such as data protection, consumer protection and the competitiveness of the digital market. Ultimately, these divergences have led to tensions and divisions in EU-US relations because the US views some of these regulations as potentially discriminatory towards American companies, such as the DSA and

(40) Greenacre, M. (2023). EU and US researchers to collaborate on integrating AI into 6G networks. Science Business. <https://sciencebusiness.net/news/ai/eu-and-us-researchers-collaborate-integrating-ai-6g-networks>

(41) EE Journal. (2023). US-EU semiconductors collaboration milestone as Purdue-imec announce partnership. [https://www.eejournal.com/industry\\_news/us-eu-semiconductors-collaboration-milestone-as-purdue-imec-announce-partnership/](https://www.eejournal.com/industry_news/us-eu-semiconductors-collaboration-milestone-as-purdue-imec-announce-partnership/)



the DMA, which introduce strict rules on content moderation, competition and data use and target large online platforms, most of which are American companies. Despite these two differing views, the transatlantic allies have launched the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) in 2021, with the objective promoting collaboration and a common stance on emerging technologies, such as AI, cybersecurity, digital standards and infrastructure, and supply chain security, through dialogue and shared values, like fair competition and democratic accountability<sup>42</sup>. For example, their collaboration on resilient semiconductor supply chains led to the introduction of the Chip Act in both the US and the EU. The TTC has also played an important role in responding to legal concerns and uncertainties, as in the case of the EU AI Act, with questions about the balance between ethical considerations and the promotion of innovation, or the stringent requirements imposed on AI systems considered high risk. This provides an opportunity to develop common digital standards, for the Internet of

Things (IoT), AI and blockchain, with a view to reducing regulatory burdens and improving interoperability, which will at long last make it easier for technology companies to operate across the Atlantic. The forum was also useful in terms of cross-border data flows, as it must be brought in line with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the European regulation that imposes numerous obligations on data controllers and processors. The previous EU-US Privacy Shield was deemed invalid due to EU concerns about US surveillance, which clearly undermined the data protection standards set by the EU. To address these concerns and create a legally compliant mechanism for data flows, the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework was introduced in July 2023.

Trump's second term could significantly alter technological and digital cooperation. During his first term, he adopted a laissez-faire approach, favoring market interests, and US technological dominance was prioritized at the expense of data privacy. However, the EU has since

---

(42) European Commission. (2024). EU-US Trade and Technology Council (2021-2024). <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/eu-us-trade-and-technology-council-2021-2024>



doubled down on data sovereignty, strengthening data protection and data privacy, but also regulating AI ethics and digital marketplaces. As a result, the European and US approaches could create friction, with the European Commission (EC) imposing stricter rules on data transfers and digital regulation on the one hand, and Trump challenging these policies on the other. What's more, if the Commission were to investigate and to fine the tech giants, it's more than likely that Trump would oppose such sanctions. In fact, he clearly opposed the EU's decision requiring Apple to pay €13 billion in unpaid taxes to Ireland, and has promised to tackle such biased decisions <sup>43,44</sup>. This could also lead the US to take reciprocal action, which could exacerbate regulatory disputes. With the TTC's legislative cycle coming to an end in 2024, it is unlikely that a new cycle will be renewed. Given that the TTC's continuity depends on the political will of the EU and US administrations, and given Trump's preference for unilateral action over multilateral dialogue, the TTC's

future as a possible buffer is quite uncertain.



Source: [Defesanet](https://www.defesanet.com)

Image 9: EU-US TTC meeting of May 31, 2023

At the same time, this vacuum of political leadership left by Trump in other cooperation platforms, such as the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC), the Four Country Leaders Meetings (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) or the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), could give the EU the opportunity to lead international discussions on digital sovereignty, innovation or AI ethics. By playing a more active role on the international

(43) McMahon, L. (2024). Trump says Apple boss called him to complain about EU. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj4d75z212o>

(44) Tiwary, S. (2024). Trump says Apple CEO Cook called him with concerns about EU penalties. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-apple-ceo-cook-called-him-with-concerns-about-eu-penalties-2024-10-17/>



stage, the EU could use its regulatory power, known as the “Brussels effect”, to increase its influence in setting global standards in line with EU values and existing European regulations on technology, digital trade and green technologies. Meanwhile, given the potential disagreements, disputes and misalignments in EU and US technology policy, it is crucial for the EU to advance its own technological independence and digital sovereignty. However, European leaders will need to strike a balance between, on the one hand, promoting the EU and the US by emphasizing local data storage, tighter controls on data transfers, investment in European companies in key technologies such as semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity, and promoting EU-based cloud computing, and, on the other, not damaging transatlantic relations “too much”. It is essential that the EU continues to build its network of “friendships”, involving trusted nations outside the transatlantic sphere to reduce dependence on the USA and China,

diversifying imports and exports of essential goods such as rare earth minerals, pharmaceuticals and technological components. The “Alliance of Democracies”, which includes Japan, Canada, Australia and South Korea, could offer such an alternative. The EU should also continue to support African countries and extend its partnerships with Latin America and other Asian countries.

## **Climate Change and Environmental Policy**

The EU and the US are the world's two largest economies and carbon emitters, with 2.76 billion and 5.06 billion tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions respectively <sup>45</sup>. If we add China (11.40 billion tonnes), the three economies account for nearly half of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions <sup>46</sup>. This gives the transatlantic alliance an important role in international climate policy, as their cooperation, or lack of it, directly affects global efforts to reduce emissions and tackle climate change. Traditionally, because of their shared global responsibility, they have both committed to

(45) Ritchie, H. Roser, M. (2024). CO<sub>2</sub> emission: How much CO<sub>2</sub> does the world emit? Which countries emit the most? Our World in Data. <https://ourworldindata.org/co2-emissions>

(46) Bown, C., Causing, K. (2023). Together, China, the US, and the EU emit nearly half of the world's greenhouse gases. Peterson Institute for International Economics. <https://www.piie.com/research/piiecharts/together-china-us-and-eu-emit-nearly-half-worlds-greenhouse-gases>





reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For instance, in ten years, the EU has doubled its climate finance, becoming a major contributing, mobilizing €28.5 billion in 2022 and €28.6 in 2023 <sup>47</sup>. This is in line with the commitment in the Paris Agreement, which encourages developed countries to mobilize €100 billion per year to help developing countries reduce emissions, build resilience to climate change and adapt to climate impacts. However, it is very important to note that the EU has been longer than the US at the forefront of climate policy and has been pushing for tougher environmental standards, while the US approach has varied depending on the administration in the White House. For example, after Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, which his predecessor Barack Obama had initially supported, the US reinstated it under President Biden in 2021. In 2022, the Biden administration introduced the Inflation Reduction Act, which was seen as a shift in US climate policy. The IRA, providing around \$369 billion in incentives for green technologies, electric vehicles (EVs),

renewables and decarbonization projects, is a landmark in US climate policy. With the goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below 2005 levels by 2030, the IRA is expected to reduce the cumulative CO2 emissions of one of the world's largest emitters by 1 billion metric tons by 2030. The EU, on the other hand, is not only making a financial contribution, but is also at the forefront of regulatory action, with the European Green Deal and Fit for 55. Through a number of initiatives and policies, the EU aims to reduce emissions by 55% by 2030 and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. More concretely, the EU has set up the Emissions Trading System (ETS), a key instrument for encouraging emissions reductions, as well as a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which imposes carbon tariffs on imports from countries with less stringent climate policies. In addition, the EU and the USA trade massively in green technology products, including water treatment and waste management technologies, wind turbines, solar panels and battery storage systems. For example, US-based General

---

(47) Council of the European Union. (2024). Europe's contribution to climate finance (in €bn). <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/climate-finance/>



Electric and European-based Siemens Gamesa are major exporters of wind turbines worldwide. Trade in EVs is also growing, with European carmakers such as BMW and Volkswagen present on the US market, and US manufacturers such as Tesla present on the European market.

Trump's return to the White House will challenge transatlantic cooperation on climate change. During his presidential campaign, he promised to unleash fossil fuel development to increase oil and gas production. "We're gonna drill, baby, drill!" he said at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee in July 2024. This rollback of green incentives will be very different from the EU's renewable energy agenda. And while this may benefit some EU countries that rely heavily on energy imports, it will undeniably undermine the EU's long-term investment in renewable energy. Trump also wants to dismantle IRA subsidies, which would significantly reduce opportunities for cooperation between EU and US companies in common areas such as EV infrastructure and green tech

innovation. The 27 countries need to come up with a joint response to protect European companies from a subsidy gap. For example, the EU could propose to carefully increase its own subsidies and incentives for green technologies to prevent a subsidy race. At the same time, the CBAM could have a direct impact on US exports, which would further exacerbate trade tensions. While it may serve as a safeguard against the rise in US fossil fuel exports, it could also lead to retaliation or legal challenges given Trump's resistance to aligning with EU climate policy. Trump has also pledged to pull the US out of the Paris Agreement again, giving him the leeway to pursue his strategy of returning to traditional energy sources, which will be counterproductive to global climate goals. However, without US contributions, other countries may be reluctant to increase their funding, making deeper emission cuts more difficult to achieve. This would give the EU an independent leadership role in global efforts to limit global warming and strengthen its influence in international bodies such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate



Change (UNFCCC). However, positioning itself as the primary global leader in climate policy will force the EU to increase its climate commitments to compensate for the lack of action by the US. Another problem the EU will face in tackling climate change is Trump's appointment of climate change skeptics to key positions in agencies responsible for climate research and the pursuit of budget cuts for climate science. In the American system of governance, the key heads of federal agencies are often appointed by the President himself, ensuring alignment with the administration's political priorities, which reflect electoral outcomes. In the US system of governance, key officials in federal agencies are often appointed by the President himself, arguing that it ensures alignment with the administration's policy priorities, which reflects electoral outcomes. Specifically, he is expected to follow the same pattern of changing top positions at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and NASA and cutting climate science

initiatives. This will be very problematic as these institutions play a key role in collecting climate data used by international bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), just as NASA and NOAA provide invaluable satellite data on global temperature, sea level rise, greenhouse gas concentrations and more. Climate monitoring programs could be delayed or even canceled, depriving the international community of accurate and up-to-date climate data.

### **Trade & Economic Policy**

EU-US trade and economic relations are among the largest and most integrated in the world, covering trade in goods and services, extensive political cooperation and significant investment flows. The transatlantic economy accounts for around a third of world gross domestic product (GDP) and almost half of world trade, making it a pillar of the global economic system. In 2022, total trade in goods and services between the allies amounted to €1.2 trillion, up €0.1 trillion from 2021. Moreover, the EU and US economies are highly interdependent, sharing a large share



of imports and exports and receiving large inflows of foreign direct investment. In 2023, the USA was the EU's leading partner for goods exports (19.7%), with €502 billion worth of European goods, and the EU's second largest partner for goods imports (13.7%), after China (20.5%), with €344 billion worth of goods <sup>48</sup>. As observed, the USA imported more from the EU than it exported to it, resulting in a trade surplus of €158 billion for the US <sup>48</sup>. The goods that the EU imported the most from the USA were oil (€42.4 billion), medicines and pharmaceuticals (€32.5 billion), gas (€26.9 billion) and engines (just under €10 billion) <sup>49</sup>. The goods that the EU exported the most to the US in 2022 were pharmaceuticals (\$91.6 billion), machinery (€83.92 billion), electrical and electronic equipment (€37.39 billion), organic chemicals (€31.62 billion) and plastics (€11.88 billion) <sup>50</sup>. For services, in 2023 the EU exported €292.4 billion worth of EU services and imported €396.4 billion worth of US services, leading to a trade deficit of €104 billion <sup>48</sup>. Most services come from the financial,

travel, ICT and technology sectors. For example, major US banks such as JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs have significant operations across the EU, providing investment banking, wealth management and consumer banking services. European banks such as BNP Paribas Fortis or Deutsche Bank also have significant operations in the US, e.g. by servicing corporate and retail clients, participating in capital markets and offering investment banking and wealth management services. In the tourism sector, major companies such as Lufthansa, Air France-KLM, American Airlines and Delta offer numerous daily flights between EU and US cities, enabling millions of European citizens to travel to the US and vice versa. In the ICT and technology sector, SAP and Spotify are important European service providers, while GAFAM, IBM, Netflix or Oracle are important American service providers. Although transatlantic trade and economies have one of the lowest average tariffs (below 3%), typically between 1% and 2%, there are no real trade agreements in place, with the TTIP

(48) Eurostat. (2024). USA-EU - international trade in goods statistics. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=USA-EU\\_-\\_international\\_trade\\_in\\_goods\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=USA-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics)

(49) Eurostat. (2024). €502 billion exports to USA & €344 billion imports. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240311-1>

(50) Trading Economics. (2024). European Union Exports to United States. <https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/exports/united-states>





formally expiring in 2019. This close economic interdependence makes the EU and the US the largest sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing between them, with US companies investing heavily in Europe and vice versa<sup>51</sup>. In 2023, European direct investment in the United States amounted to around €3.246 trillion, out of a total volume of €5.39 trillion<sup>52</sup>. US FDI in the EU amounted to around EUR 3.95 trillion in 2023, with a total volume of EUR 6.58 trillion<sup>53</sup>. Taken



Source: CBS

Image 10: US President Trump at the World Economic Forum, on January 26, 2018

together, transatlantic trade and investment also support over 16 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.

Under Trump, the trade and economic policy situation could change, and it probably will. As outlined in the July 2024 US Republican Policy Guidelines, the Trump administration will focus on an “America First” approach to trade and economic policy, calling for “fair” trade deals that favor American producers and protect and shift key supply chains back to the US, as well as deregulating the energy sector to make the US a dominant energy producer. Because of the US trade deficits with the EU (-€158 billion) and China (-€279 billion)<sup>54</sup>, Trump promised tariffs of 10% on all imports, including European goods, as he mentioned Germany’s car industry at a Pennsylvania rally on October 29, 2024<sup>55, 56</sup>. Two scenarios are envisaged in response to this. In the first scenario, the EU could take

(51) Eurostat. (2024). US remains top EU foreign ultimate investment partner. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240129-3>

(52) Statista. (2024). Foreign direct investment from Europe into the United States from 2000 to 2023. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/188884/foreign-direct-investment-from-europe-in-the-us-since-1990/>

(53) Statista. (2024). Foreign direct investment position of the United States in Europe from 2000 to 2023. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/188579/united-states-direct-investments-in-europe-since-2000/>

(54) Census. (2024). Trade in goods with China. <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>

(55) Prakash, P. (2024). Donald Trump threatens to make trade more expensive for ‘all the nice European little countries’. Fortune. <https://fortune.com/europe/2024/10/30/donald-trump-europe-tariffs-trade-election/>

(56) Brady, K., Faiola, A., Francis, E. (2024). How Europe is preparing for a possible second Trump presidency. Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/02/trump-europe-trade-war-nato-ukraine/>



retaliatory measures in the form of tariffs of 10% on US imports. This would lead to a drop in EU GDP of up to 0.9% by 2028, as well as a significant decline in private investment and a one-third drop in net exports<sup>57,58</sup>. Sectors such as the automotive and manufacturing industries, which are dependent on exports, would be severely affected. In the second scenario, the EU would raise tariffs to 20% in response to the trade conflict it has triggered. This would lead to a decline in EU GDP of up to 1.3% by 2028, equivalent to a cumulative loss of €420 to 619 billion over four years, as well as lower investment and exports, which would lead to an increase in unemployment<sup>57,58</sup>. In any case, this will result in losses of hundreds of billions of euros to EU GDP, but will cost the US, only benefitting China<sup>59</sup>. In reaction, the EU is likely to resort to retaliatory tariffs, as they did back during Trump's first term with Harley-Davidson motorcycles and American whiskey. Indeed, the Commission and EU member states

are working on the “Trump Task Force”, a two-stage carrot-and-stick strategy to convince Trump to exempt the bloc from the 10%, but also to draw up a list of US products on which the EU is willing to impose tariffs<sup>60</sup>.

As this new trade war will contribute to inflationary pressures at a time when both economies are trying to bring rising prices under control, it is very important for the EU to find the right response while maintaining its strategic autonomy. In response to volatile trade relations with the US over the next four years, the EU must focus on diversifying its supply chains to diversify its sources of supply and reduce its dependence on the US, particularly in the technology and defense sectors, but also in all other areas, such as raw materials. The EU also needs to strengthen its trade agreements with other reliable partners such as India, Mercosur (i.e., the South American trade bloc made of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela), Japan,

(57) Diviney, B. (2024). What Trump tariffs would mean for Europe. ABN Amro. [https://assets.ctfassets.net/1u811bveythc/6lWBH5gkZwzW9a2\(Caj\)hQ/f13a0846337d23187516f8612d5ff311/2024-08-GM-What-Trump-tariffs-would-mean-for-Europe2.pdf](https://assets.ctfassets.net/1u811bveythc/6lWBH5gkZwzW9a2(Caj)hQ/f13a0846337d23187516f8612d5ff311/2024-08-GM-What-Trump-tariffs-would-mean-for-Europe2.pdf)

(58) Obst, T., Sultan, S., Matthes, J. (2024). Was droht den transatlantischen Handelsbeziehungen unter Trump 2.0? Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft. [https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Studien/Report/PDF/2024/IW-Report\\_2024-US-Wahl.pdf](https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Report/PDF/2024/IW-Report_2024-US-Wahl.pdf)

(59) Bergmann, M., Svendsen, O. (2024). The World's Largest Trade and Investment Relationship Hangs in the Balance. In Cha, V., Szechenyi, N (Eds.), The Global Impact of the 2024 US Presidential Election. Center for Strategic and International Studies. [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240926\\_Cha\\_Global\\_Impact.pdf?VersionId=jgqQdzLFxo2Ylcraos\\_a35j9LRyxfoZH](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240926_Cha_Global_Impact.pdf?VersionId=jgqQdzLFxo2Ylcraos_a35j9LRyxfoZH)

(60) Daalder, I. (2024). What a Trump victory would really mean for Europe. Politico. [https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-us-election-europe-national-policies-populism/?utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_source=LinkedIn](https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-us-election-europe-national-policies-populism/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=LinkedIn)



Canada and the Indo-Pacific region. To attract more investment into its industrial base and thus protect itself from potential US tariffs, the EU needs to coordinate the 27 Member States in lowering their own corporate tax rates - something Trump has promised to do in the US to attract more business and investment. For the EU, however, this carries the risk of a drop in tax revenues. The EU should also pay attention to how Trump will act on key exemptions in the US tax code for European electric vehicle exporters, or whether he might even reverse the law completely. Either way, this will have a negative impact on the EU, as the current exemptions allow European EV exporters such as Volkswagen, BMW and Mercedes-Benz to benefit from tax credits. Without them, European manufacturers will be more expensive than e-vehicles produced in the US. The loss of the IRA tax credits could lead to a decline in EU exports of EVs to the US, which, given the importance of the US market to the European automotive industry, would reduce revenues for European automakers and hurt the EU economy.

## **Foreign Policy Alignment & Diplomatic Coordination**

Alignment of foreign policy and diplomatic coordination is an essential feature of transatlantic relations. The allies have traditionally shared common values and interests, promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As a result, they have both aligned these principles in their foreign policies to tackle a wide range of global issues, set international standards and launch human rights initiatives. Both the EU and the USA support democratic movements and civil society organizations in countries experiencing democratic backsliding or under authoritarian regimes, mainly financially and militarily, for example by providing funds, education programs or military training. To defend these values, the EU and the USA have traditionally jointly used economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, in particular against countries such as Iran, Belarus, North Korea and Russia, serving as a deterrent and a signal of transatlantic solidarity on human rights issues. Sanctions imposed on China following the treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang and the



erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy are a good example, as is the coordination of international investigations into these violations, although they are very difficult to carry out. They also include clauses on human rights, labor and environmental standards in their trade agreements, to encourage their trading partners to respect these principles. Transatlantic allies actively engage with the United Nations and other multilateral organizations and forums, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as the G7 and G20. Their foreign policy coordination is also particularly strong in areas such as counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and crisis management. For example, the SWIFT data-sharing framework enables them to track terrorist financing, as part of broader counter-terrorism strategies which they can discuss via platforms such as the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs ministerial meetings. However, their work in dismantling terrorist networks has been criticized

for the scale and motives of its military interventions, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, based on controversial claims that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction, the EU has been criticized for its double standards and its inability to present a unified response on joint intervention and the refugee issue. While the EU contributes directly or indirectly to the war and destruction of certain regions, it also invests massively in peace-building and reconstruction efforts, which is controversial. They work closely with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Carter Center and Mercy Corps, as well as through NATO and EU civilian missions. These coordinated efforts serve several objectives, such as financing reconstruction, supporting the rule of law, strengthening local security forces and promoting social cohesion. At the same time, the EU and the USA are the world's largest donors of humanitarian and development aid, providing over €2 billion and over \$9 billion respectively in foreign aid in 2024<sup>61</sup>. This amount is intended to support

---

(61) Financial Tracking Service. (2024). Total Reported Funding 2024. [https://fts.unocha.org/global-funding/donors/2024?order=total\\_funding&sort=desc](https://fts.unocha.org/global-funding/donors/2024?order=total_funding&sort=desc)





the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other NGOs, such as Médecins sans Frontières and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). In concrete terms, it enables these organizations to promote education, support governance reforms, tackle the root causes of migration, address health crises and fund shelters, all over the world, including in Jordan, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Africa.



Source: [NYTimes](#)

Image 11: US President Trump at the 73rd General Assembly Session on September 26, 2018

Under a second Trump administration, transatlantic diplomatic coordination is likely to face challenges and changes. Trump's deprioritization of human rights as a central pillar of US foreign policy and preference for transactional relationships rather than traditional alliances could already be observed during his first presidency. For example, Trump maintained close ties with Saudi Arabia, despite the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, emphasizing arms sales and the importance of Saudi Arabia as an ally against Iran. He also expressed admiration for authoritarian leaders criticized for human rights violations, political repression and suppression of free speech, including Russia's Vladimir Putin, North Korea's Kim Jong-un and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The U.S. also reduced its support for the UN through a variety of means. In October 2017, Trump announced that the US would withdraw from UNESCO, which became a reality in 2018, due to anti-Israeli bias and the urgent need to reform the organization. He also called the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) a “cesspool of political bias” and




the US from the UNHRC. In 2018, the UN budget was cut by \$285 million, on the grounds that other countries should contribute more to the financial burden. The US has also cut funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), reducing it by around \$300 million a year. These actions underline Trump's disinterest in multilateral organizations and the priority he gives to American interests and bilateralism, which will create tensions with an EU committed to multilateralism, but could also present the opportunity for the EU to play a greater role in promoting democratic values. Another potential source of disagreement between the transatlantic allies is China's concerns. Over the past few years, the EU and the US have coordinated closely to counter China's influence, focusing on issues such as unfair trade practices, regional security in the Indo-Pacific region and intellectual property rights. As a result, they have taken measures to protect their infrastructure and technology from China, such as the EU's framework for controlling foreign investment in critical sectors,

the US' restriction of Chinese companies' access to certain technologies, or their joint “Clean Network Program” initiative to further limit the influence of Chinese technology companies on critical infrastructure. But while both sides see China as a strategic competitor and systemic rival, the EU has sought a more balanced approach, emphasizing “risk reduction” rather than “decoupling” from China. With Trump's return, one question arises, “How long will the United States allow Europe to stick to both horses at the same time?” Trump's confrontational stance contrasts sharply with that of the EU. If Trump takes a tough stance on China and its state subsidies, the EU may have to recalibrate to avoid economic consequences and conflicts of interest with the US.



Source: [CNN](#)

*Image 12: Trump and Xi-Jinping at the Mar-a-Lago estate on April 06, 2017*





## Conclusion

Under Trump's second administration, the US could limit support for NATO, neglect cooperation on issues at the top of the EU's agenda, such as climate agreements, human rights and data protection standards, and impose tariffs on European goods, which would force the EU to take retaliatory trade measures. Trump's aggressive approach to China could also force the EU to rebalance its policies to suit US geopolitical and economic interests. Nonetheless, Trump's focus on domestic issues, especially with a potential economic downturn, may make the US less inclined to intervene internationally, thus increasing the EU's international responsibility and leadership. Nevertheless, the task will not be easy, given the growing contestation of the Western-led liberal order, which calls into question the legitimacy of international organizations, as evidenced by the summits of the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) or the

annual ministerial meetings of the G77 and China. Trump's confrontational and nationalist approach may also give a rhetorical and ideological boost to European populist and far-right movements, thus complicating the political dynamic within the EU itself. His narrative of national sovereignty, anti-globalism, anti-elitism and anti-immigration could serve as a model for parties such as the Rassemblement National, the Brothers of Italy or the Alternative für Deutschland. However, the EU cannot afford to be once again susceptible to uncertainty and sudden policy changes from the newly elected 47th US president, Donald J. Trump. On the contrary, his return should be seen as a positive shock that will enable the EU to move forward, as it always does in times of crisis. Faced with prolonged speculation about Trump's return and his "America First" approach, the EU has already taken steps to "Trump-proof" its institutions and policies. European leaders, who have declared that they are better prepared for a second presidency and won't be taken by surprise this time, are focusing on managing the





difficulties that Trump will bring, with an emphasis on strengthening European strategic autonomy. Indeed, the EU is increasingly focused on reducing its dependence on the US by investing in its own arms production and military capabilities, diversifying its trade relations beyond the US and strengthening its domestic industries. Indeed, the Commission has yet to find a way to repay the 800 billion euro loan taken out to finance the EU's post-pandemic recovery plan, and will have to present the EU budget for 2028-2035 in 2025. Furthermore, it will be essential for the Union not to compromise its plan to boost European

competitiveness, which already requires huge sums of money (800 billion euros a year). If the 27 manage to navigate these changes with prudence, unity and foresight, while pursuing their strategic autonomy, the EU could emerge stronger, transforming this period of uncertainty into an opportunity for growth and resilience. "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me". In the context of a second Trump administration, this motto truly sums up the imperative for the EU to learn from its past experience with US protectionist policies during Trump's first term in the White House.



Source: [NYTimes](#)

Image 13: Trump's victory speech on November 06, 2024



# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AGS</b>	Allied Ground Surveillance	<b>EDTIB</b>	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
<b>AI</b>	Artificial Intelligence	<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>CBAM</b>	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism	<b>EPA</b>	Environmental Protection Agency
<b>CCDCOE</b>	Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence	<b>EPCC</b>	Economic Policy Consultative Committee
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy	<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defense Policy
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe	<b>ETS</b>	Emissions Trading System
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defense Policy	<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>DMA</b>	Digital Markets Act	<b>EU-SA</b>	European Union Strategic Autonomy
<b>DSA</b>	Digital Services Act	<b>EV</b>	Electric Vehicle
<b>EAW</b>	European Arrest Warrant	<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>EC</b>	European Commission	<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>ECA</b>	Economic Cooperation Administration	<b>FRG</b>	Federal Republic of Germany
<b>ECHR</b>	European Court of Human Rights	<b>GAFAM</b>	Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft
<b>ECSC</b>	European Coal and Steel Community	<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
<b>EDA</b>	European Defense Agency	<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>EDF</b>	European Defense Fund	<b>GDPR</b>	General Data Protection Regulation
<b>EDIP</b>	European Defense Industry Program	<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>EDIS</b>	European Defence Industrial Strategy	<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross



<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration	<b>PESCO</b>	Permanent Structured Cooperation
<b>IoT</b>	Internet of Things	<b>PNR</b>	Passenger Name Record
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change	<b>R&amp;D</b>	Research and Development
<b>IPEF</b>	Indo-Pacific Economic Framework	<b>SCO</b>	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
<b>IRA</b>	Inflation Reduction Act	<b>SPS</b>	Science for Peace and Security Programme
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee	<b>TEP</b>	Transatlantic Economic Partnership
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria	<b>TTIP</b>	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
<b>ISDS</b>	Investor-State Dispute Settlement	<b>TTC</b>	Trade and Technology Council
<b>JCPOA</b>	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action	<b>TTIU</b>	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Unit
<b>MICNET</b>	Computer Emergency Response Team Operational Network	<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
<b>NAM</b>	Non-Aligned Movement	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>NASA</b>	National Aeronautics and Space Administration	<b>UNHRC</b>	United Nations Human Rights Council
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization	<b>UNRWA</b>	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	<b>US/USA</b>	United States
<b>NSA</b>	National Security Agency	<b>USMCA</b>	United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
<b>NSPA</b>	NATO Support and Procurement Agency	<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>OEEC</b>	Organization for European Economic Cooperation		



**WMD** Weapons of Mass Destruction

**WTO** World Trade Organization





# FIGURES & ILLUSTRATIONS

**Image 1: Photography showing the devastating aftermath of war**

**Image 2: Image illustrating the triumvirate purpose of NATO during the Cold War**

**Image 3: NATO ceremony accession of April 02, 2024**

**Image 4: US President Barack Obama delivering remarks on January 17, 2014**

**Image 5: Slogan MAGA (Make America Great Again) from Trump's 2017 campaign**

**Image 6: US President Donald Trump giving a speech on July 22, 2016**

**Image 7: US President Joe Biden giving a speech on January 06, 2021**

**Image 8: US President Trump with NATO's S-G Stoltenberg on April 12, 2017**

**Image 9: EU-US TTC meeting of May 31, 2023**

**Image 10: US President Trump at the World Economic Forum, on January 26, 2018**

**Image 11: US President Trump at the 73rd General Assembly Session on September 26, 2018**

**Image 12: Trump and Xi-Jinping at the Mar-a-Lago estate on April 06, 2017**

**Image 13: Trump's victory speech on November 06, 2024**



# REFERENCE LIST

Amante, A., Fonte, G. (2024). Italy calls for EU support to meet NATO spending target. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-urges-eu-guarantee-bonds-raise-defence-spending-2024-11-07/>

American Presidency Project. (2024). 2024 Republican Party Platform: 2024 GOP Platform - Make America Great Again. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2024-republican-party-platform>

American Society of International Law. (1950). United States: Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. The American Journal of International Law, 44(1). 29-38. <https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1949mutualdefenseassistanceact.pdf>

Baker, Mayfield. (2003). U.S.: Rumsfeld's 'Old' And 'New' Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1102012.html>

Bergmann, M., Martinez, S. (2024). After the Ballots: What the U.S. Elections Mean for NATO. In Cha, V., Szechenyi, N (Eds.), The Global Impact of the 2024 US Presidential Election. Center for Strategic and International Studies. [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240926\\_Cha\\_Global\\_Impact.pdf?VersionId=lgqOdzLFxo2Ylcraos\\_a35l9LRyxfOZH](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240926_Cha_Global_Impact.pdf?VersionId=lgqOdzLFxo2Ylcraos_a35l9LRyxfOZH)

Bergmann, M., Svendsen, O. (2024). The World's Largest Trade and Investment Relationship Hangs in the Balance. In Cha, V., Szechenyi, N (Eds.), The Global Impact of the 2024 US Presidential Election. Center for Strategic and International Studies. [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240926\\_Cha\\_Global\\_Impact.pdf?VersionId=lgqOdzLFxo2Ylcraos\\_a35l9LRyxfOZH](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240926_Cha_Global_Impact.pdf?VersionId=lgqOdzLFxo2Ylcraos_a35l9LRyxfOZH)

Bown, C., Causing, K. (2023). Together, China, the US, and the EU emit nearly half of the world's greenhouse gases. Peterson Institute for International Economics. <https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/together-china-us-and-eu-emit-nearly-half-worlds-greenhouse-gases>

Brady, K., Faiola, A., Francis, E. (2024). How Europe is preparing for a possible second Trump presidency. Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/02/trump-europe-trade-war-nato-ukraine/>



Census. (2024). Trade in goods with China. <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). La coopération politique. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/304a94a5-251d-414a-93d0-f71c4a78118c>

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). Le plan Marshall et la création de l'OECE. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/84c940fe-a82b-4fe8-ad53-63144bfe30b1>

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). Le projet de Jean Monnet. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/873d140d-4bf0-4a30-b087-4b52fd0ab81b>

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). Le rôle économique et social. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/cab38ff6-63de-491e-879e-67c2b4aef40a>

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). Les débuts de la CECA. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/86c3edd9-af8b-47e6-92b5-0ffb2fc44f06>

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). L'OTAN. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/654f1fb4-2df6-43d5-9872-f022cb6d1ffa>

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). 1950-1954: La formation de l'Europe communautaire. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/8f43262b-ebe0-422f-afee-9b28a5ee451d>

Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. (2024). 1955-1957: La relance européenne et les traités de Rome. <https://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/c4d6b088-d168-44b7-9b35-cea11aac485a>

Cepparulo, A., Pasimeni, P. (2024). Defence Spending in the European Union. European Commission. [https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f5827354-8501-49cb-bf2d-13f2f7a9444f\\_en?filename=dp199\\_en.pdf](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f5827354-8501-49cb-bf2d-13f2f7a9444f_en?filename=dp199_en.pdf)

Congress. (2001, October 26). Patriot Act. <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.htm>



Congress. (2022, August 16). H.R. 5376 - Inflation Reduction Act. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text>

Convention for European Economic Cooperation. (1948, April 16). Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/convention\\_for\\_european\\_economic\\_cooperation\\_paris\\_16\\_april\\_1948-en-769de8b7-fe5a-452c-b418-09b068bd748d.html](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/convention_for_european_economic_cooperation_paris_16_april_1948-en-769de8b7-fe5a-452c-b418-09b068bd748d.html)

Council of the European Union. (2016). Council conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/14/conclusions-eu-global-strategy-security-defence/>

Council of the European Union. (2017, 11 December). Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PSC) and determining the list of participating Member States. Official Journal of the European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=celex:32017D2315>

Daalder, I. (2024). What a Trump victory would really mean for Europe. Politico. [https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-us-election-europe-national-policies-populism/?utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_source=LinkedIn](https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-us-election-europe-national-policies-populism/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=LinkedIn)

Diviney, B. (2024). What Trump tariffs would mean for Europe. ABN Amro. [https://assets.ctfassets.net/1u811bygvthc/6lWBH5gkZwzW9a2fCqJhlQ/f13a0846337d23187516f8612d5ff311/2024-08\\_-\\_GM\\_-\\_What\\_Trump\\_tariffs\\_would\\_mean\\_for\\_Europe2.pdf](https://assets.ctfassets.net/1u811bygvthc/6lWBH5gkZwzW9a2fCqJhlQ/f13a0846337d23187516f8612d5ff311/2024-08_-_GM_-_What_Trump_tariffs_would_mean_for_Europe2.pdf)

Dorn, F. (2024). Defence Spending for Europe's Security – How Much Is Enough? *Intereconomics*, 59(4), 204-209. <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2024/number/4/article/defence-spending-for-europe-s-security-how-much-is-enough.html>

Dorn, F. et al. (2024). European Defence Spending in 2024 and Beyond: How to Provide Security in an Economically Challenging Environment. *Econpol*, 45(8). [https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/EconPol-PolicyReport\\_45\\_0.pdf](https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/EconPol-PolicyReport_45_0.pdf)

EE Journal. (2023). US-EU semiconductors collaboration milestone as Purdue-imec announce partnership. [https://www.eejournal.com/industry\\_news/us-eu-semiconductors-collaboration-milestone-as-purdue-imec-announce-partnership/](https://www.eejournal.com/industry_news/us-eu-semiconductors-collaboration-milestone-as-purdue-imec-announce-partnership/)

Ellison, D., van Hooft, P. (2024). Twilight of Atlanticism? America's shifting approaches to Europe. The Hague Center for Strategic Studies. <https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Twilight-of-Atlanticism-HCSS-2024.pdf>





European Commission. (2024). EU-US Trade and Technology Council (2021-2024). <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/eu-us-trade-and-technology-council-2021-2024>

European Commission. (2024, March 05). Joint Communication on A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry. Official Journal of the European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN:2024:10:FIN>

European Court of Auditors. (2024). Opinion 02/2024 concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defense products (EDIP). <https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/OP-2024-02>

European Defence Agency. (2023). Annual Report 2022. [https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2022-eda\\_defencedata\\_web.pdf](https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2022-eda_defencedata_web.pdf)

European Defence Agency. (2024). Annual Report 2023. <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/qu-aa-24-001-en-n.pdf>

European External Action Service. (2016). EU Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf)

European Parliament. (2022). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS\\_BRI\(2022\)733589](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733589)

European Parliament. (2023). The collapse of the controversial INSTEX mechanism and the motivations behind the EU's wrong policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2023-001509\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2023-001509_EN.html)

European Parliament & Council of the European Union. (2016, April 27). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Official Journal of the European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj>

European Parliament & Council of the EU. (2021, April 29). Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund. Official Journal of the European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj>



European Parliament & Council of the European Union (2022, September 14). Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector. Official Journal of the European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj>

European Parliament & Council of the European Union. (2022, October 19). Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services. Official Journal of the European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj>.

European Parliament & Council of the European Union. (2024, June 13). Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence. Official Journal of the European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>

European Union & United States (2016, July 12). EU-US Privacy Shield. Privacy Shield Framework. <https://www.privacyshield.gov/ps/eu-us-framework>

European Union & United States. (2023, July 10). EU-US Data Privacy Framework. Data Privacy Framework Program. <https://www.dataprivacyframework.gov/EU-US-Framework>

Eurostat. (2024). R&D Expenditure. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=551418>

Eurostat. (2024). US remains top EU foreign ultimate investment partner. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240129-3>

Eurostat. (2024). USA-EU - international trade in goods statistics. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=USA-EU\\_-\\_international\\_trade\\_in\\_goods\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=USA-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics)

Eurostat. (2024). €502 billion exports to USA & €344 billion imports. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240311-1>

Financial Tracking Service. (2024). Total Reported Funding 2024. [https://fts.unocha.org/global-funding/donors/2024?order=total\\_funding&sort=desc](https://fts.unocha.org/global-funding/donors/2024?order=total_funding&sort=desc)

Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 and Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. (1948, April 3). Marshall Foundation. [https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Foreign\\_Assistance\\_Act\\_of\\_1948.pdf](https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Foreign_Assistance_Act_of_1948.pdf)



Greenacre, M. (2023). EU and US researchers to collaborate on integrating AI into 6G networks. Science Business. <https://sciencebusiness.net/news/ai/eu-and-us-researchers-collaborate-integrating-ai-6g-networks>

Hatzius, J. (2024). Implications of Higher Tariffs for Euro Area and US Monetary Policy. Goldman Sachs. [https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/sintra/ecb.forumcentbankpub2024\\_Hatzius\\_presentation.en.pdf](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/sintra/ecb.forumcentbankpub2024_Hatzius_presentation.en.pdf)

Hennigan, W.J., (2018). President Trump Says NATO Allies Owe the U.S. Money, He's Wrong. Time. <https://time.com/5335111/donald-trump-nato-spending-facts/>

Hunt, K. (2017). Trump rattles NATO with 'obsolete' blast. CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/16/politics/donald-trump-times-bild-interview-takeaways/index.html>

Iran International Newsroom. (2023). Europe Dissolves INSTEX Mechanism For Trade With Iran. <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202303104230>

Kington, T. (2022). Italy aims to reach NATO defense-spending target by 2028, four years late. Defence News. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/01/italy-aims-to-reach-nato-defense-spending-target-by-2028-four-years-late/>

Kleinfled, R. (2023). Polarization, Democracy, and Political Violence in the United States: What the Research Says. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/09/polarization-democracy-and-political-violence-in-the-united-states-what-the-research-says?lang=en>

Le Chaffotec, B. (2020). Reinventing transatlantic relations. Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe. <https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/europe-europeans-and-world/international-action-and-external-policies-european-union/reinventing-transatlantic-relations>

Maunder, J. (2016). 'Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down': a potted and bloody history of Nato. Counterfire. <https://www.counterfire.org/article/keep-the-russians-out-the-americans-in-and-the-germans-down-a-potted-and-bloody-history-of-nato/>

McMahon, L. (2024). Trump says Apple boss called him to complain about EU. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj4d75zl212o>

National Security Archive. (2017). NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early>



NATO. (2022). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2021). [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/3/pdf/220331-def-exp-2021-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/3/pdf/220331-def-exp-2021-en.pdf)

NATO. (2024). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024). [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf)

Nindl, E., et al. (2023). The 2023 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, doi:10.2760/506189, JRC135576.

OECD. (2024). Gross domestic spending on R&D. <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.html>

Obst, T., Sultan, S., Matthes, J. (2024). Was droht den transatlantischen Handelsbeziehungen unter Trump 2.0? Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft. [https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Studien/Report/PDF/2024/IW-Report\\_2024-US-Wahl.pdf](https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Report/PDF/2024/IW-Report_2024-US-Wahl.pdf)

Paris Agreement. (2015, December 12). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english\\_paris\\_agreement.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf)

Prakash, P. (2024). Donald Trump threatens to make trade more expensive for 'all the nice European little countries'. Fortune. <https://fortune.com/europe/2024/10/30/donald-trump-europe-tariffs-trade-election/>

Ritchie, H. Roser, M. (2024). CO<sub>2</sub> emission: How much CO<sub>2</sub> does the world emit? Which countries emit the most? Our World in Data. <https://ourworldindata.org/co2-emissions>

Rizzo, R. (2024). Unleashing US-EU defense cooperation. Atlantic Council. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/unleashing-us-eu-defense-cooperation/>

Smith, A. (2018). Trump calls out 'very aggressive' Montenegro in latest NATO jibe. NBC News. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-calls-out-very-aggressive-montenegro-latest-nato-jibe-n892311>

Statista. (2024). Foreign direct investment from Europe into the United States from 2000 to 2023. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/188884/foreign-direct-investment-from-europe-in-the-us-since-1990/>

Statista. (2024). Foreign direct investment position of the United States in Europe from 2000 to 2023. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/188579/united-states-direct-investments-in-europe-since-2000/>





Sullivan, K. (2024). Trump says he would encourage Russia to 'do whatever the hell they want' to any NATO country that doesn't pay enough. CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html>

The Brussels Treaty. (1948, March 17). Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the\\_brussels\\_treaty\\_17\\_march\\_1948-en-3467de5e-9802-4b65-8076-778bc7d164d3.html](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_brussels_treaty_17_march_1948-en-3467de5e-9802-4b65-8076-778bc7d164d3.html)

The North Atlantic Treaty. (1949, April 4). NATO. [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock\\_publications/20120822\\_nato\\_treaty\\_en\\_light\\_2009.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf)

Tiwary, S. (2024). Trump says Apple CEO Cook called him with concerns about EU penalties. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-apple-ceo-cook-called-him-with-concerns-about-eu-penalties-2024-10-17/>

Torreblancan J. (2023). Onwards and outwards: Why the EU needs to move from strategic autonomy to strategic interdependence. European Council on Foreign Relations. <https://ecfr.eu/article/onwards-and-outwards-why-the-eu-needs-to-move-from-strategic-autonomy-to-strategic-interdependence/>

Trading Economics. (2024). European Union Exports to United States. <https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/exports/united-states>

Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. (1951, April 18). Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty\\_establishing\\_the\\_european\\_coal\\_and\\_steel\\_community\\_paris\\_18\\_april\\_1951-en-11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-ed5be548cd58.html](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_coal_and_steel_community_paris_18_april_1951-en-11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-ed5be548cd58.html)

Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. (1957, March 25). Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe. [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty\\_establishing\\_the\\_european\\_economic\\_community\\_rome\\_25\\_march\\_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html)

US Department of State. (1998). Statement of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to the North Atlantic Council. Archive of the US Department of State. <https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/981208.html>

US Department of State. (2017). New START: Treaty Text. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm>



US Department of State. (2017). Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/>

US Department of State. (2022). Press Release: Fact Sheet - U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/article/3078056/fact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-to-europe/>

US Department of State. (2024) New Start Treaty. <https://www.state.gov/new-start/>



# SUMATRA

I N N O V A T I O N

Azzouzi Noah

November 19, 2024