

Intermediate Report No. 4 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections of September 28, 2025

Introduction

This report is prepared by the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova (UJM MO) for the observation of the Parliamentary Elections of September 28, 2025, and is published to inform the public interested in the electoral process. The Union of Jurists of Moldova (UJM) is a non-profit organization committed to analyzing and evaluating the organization and conduct of the electoral process and informing the wider public on this matter.

The report covers the results of the observation of the first two weeks of the electoral campaign, carried out during the period August 29 – September 12, 2025. The document contains the findings and conclusions of the Observation Mission regarding the activity of the electoral bodies (the Central Electoral Commission, district electoral councils, and precinct electoral bureaus), the process of registering electoral contestants, as well as the resolution of complaints and petitions submitted to the electoral authority.

The report also addresses: the approval by the CEC of public interest messages; the degree to which local public authorities have fulfilled their responsibilities in organizing and conducting the elections; and the conduct of the electoral campaign in violation of the provisions of the Electoral Code and related regulations.

In order to ensure an objective assessment of the conduct of the electoral campaign, in addition to information collected in the field and online, reported by long-term observers deployed in each electoral district of the country, the UJM MO also held meetings and collected the viewpoints of 10 of the 23 electoral contestants.

The monitoring of national and regional media, with regard to coverage of the activities of electoral contestants, continued to be supported by Apollo, while the monitoring of their activities on national websites and social media platforms was carried out with the support of Privesc.eu.

The monitoring exercise is aimed at serving the public interest and was conducted in accordance with the national legal framework. The tools used for collecting and analyzing information included: monitoring the meetings of the Central Electoral Commission; discussions with electoral contestants; consultation of publicly available official information; field reports submitted through the online platform www.monitorizez.eu; monitoring of the online environment; as well as qualitative and quantitative analysis of editorial content broadcast or published by a representative sample of national and regional media sources.

The UJM carries out its mission in a fair, transparent, and responsible manner with regard to the information presented to citizens. Therefore, the monitoring report—well-documented and evidence-based, with some of the evidence reflected in footnotes—constitutes an important source of information, and its main findings can contribute to the improvement of the electoral process. The UJM MO assumes full responsibility for the opinions and considerations expressed in this monitoring report. The Romanian version of the document prevails over translations into other languages.

1. Legal and Regulatory Framework Applicable to the Elections

1.1 Complaints and Notification Submitted During the Reporting Period

The UJM MO monitored the information published by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) on its official website, under the section *Complaints/Notifications/Files*. During the reporting period, 22 complaints were submitted. Most of them were filed by the Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” – 9 complaints; 3 complaints each were filed by the Electoral Bloc “*Patriotic Bloc of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova*” (Patriotic Bloc), the Political Party “*Party of Action and Solidarity*” (PAS), and the Political Party “*Moldovan National Party*” (PNM). The Political Party “*Democracy at Home*”, the Political Party “*Our Party*” (PN), an independent candidate, and a private individual each submitted one complaint.

The complaints filed by the Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” concerned possible violations of electoral legislation by certain electoral contestants or public institutions indirectly involved in the electoral process. These complaints referred to the use of administrative resources, electoral campaigning through the distribution of content on the official social media pages of a public authority, non-compliant electoral posters, electoral advertising by entities not registered as electoral contestants, and the use of electoral messages from the presidential campaign.

More specifically, the Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” pointed to the possible involvement of the incumbent Prime Minister, a candidate for Member of Parliament on the PAS list, in an official visit with electoral connotations, qualifying this visit as a potential abuse of administrative resources. Also challenged was the redistribution by the Embassy of the Republic of Moldova in Ireland of a post in video and text format, containing an explicit call to vote in favor of the PAS contestant—an act considered a violation of the neutrality of diplomatic institutions.

Other complaints denounced the placement of multiple electoral posters in locations prohibited by the regulation on the placement of posters and other electoral advertising materials during elections (specifically on private household fences and other unauthorized spaces) in several localities, as well as the appearance of electoral materials containing the slogan “*Maia Sandu for Moldova*”—a message associated with the 2024 presidential campaign—used in favor of the PAS contestant. This raised concerns for the Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” regarding the transparency and financing of the campaign in question. Another complaint by the Bloc referred to campaigning by a political party—namely the Republican Party “*Heart of Moldova*” (PRIM), which, although a component of a registered electoral bloc, was not admitted to participate as a separate contestant, but nevertheless set up tents displaying the name and symbols of PRIM. The Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” expressed suspicions regarding the use of undeclared materials and funds in the Patriotic Bloc’s campaign.

The complaints submitted by PAS signaled the use of administrative resources and the conduct of electoral campaigning contrary to legal norms. These complaints referred to the use of administrative resources by the PN contestant, namely a candidate for Member of Parliament on its list, who, although suspended from his position as mayor, delivered a public message on behalf of the City Hall during a public event. Another case concerned the involvement of the candidate for Member of Parliament from the Bloc “ALTERNATIVA,” for using the position of general mayor in for electoral purposes, including through official communications and public activities carried out during the electoral campaign period.

One complaint filed by the PAS contestant concerned the use of the image of minors in online electoral campaigning by the PN contestant. The latter allegedly published video spots and images with electoral messages involving minors on the social networks Facebook and Instagram.

The complaints submitted by the PNM contest the legality of campaign financing, the respect of transparency principles, and the clear separation between the image of public office and the

electoral campaign. More specifically, one complaint refers to the illegal financing of the campaign by PRIM; the existence of a “camouflaged electoral bloc,” namely between the Political Party “*Dignity and Truth Platform*” (Platforma DA) and PAS; and the abusive use of the image of the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, in the campaign of the PAS contestant.

The complaints filed by the Patriotic Bloc highlighted possible violations of the principles of neutrality, fairness, and legality in the electoral process, through the abusive use of administrative resources, the influence of the electoral process by high-ranking officials, and the use of institutional platforms to promote certain electoral contestants. Similar to the Bloc “ALTERNATIVA,” the Patriotic Bloc also pointed out that the Embassy of the Republic of Moldova in Ireland redistributed electoral content in favor of the PAS contestant.

The UJM MO notes that electoral contestants remain vigilant regarding potential competitive as well as institutional deviations, with their complaints mainly emphasizing the use of administrative resources, the interference of public institutions in the electoral process, and the conduct of the electoral campaign outside the legal framework of transparency.

Out of the total of 22 complaints, 4 were rejected, 10 were redirected by jurisdiction to the Police Inspectorate/General Police Inspectorate (GPI), one was admitted, one was declared inadmissible, one was under the jurisdiction of the courts, while the outcome of another 5 was not published under the mentioned section.

The Observation Mission notes the CEC’s compliance with the procedural deadlines set by the Electoral Code, including in the redirection of complaints to the competent authorities. It also observes the complexity of the issues raised in the complaints, as well as the diversified distribution of responsibilities for examination among the electoral authority, the investigative bodies, and the courts. The application by the electoral authority of the principle of merging complaints with identical or related subject matter is commendable, as is the fact that, in certain cases, the authorities and/or the contestants concerned submitted opinions within the legal deadlines, thereby contributing to clarifying the reported facts and strengthening the transparency of the complaint resolution process.

Also, during the reporting period, the CEC received 13 notifications submitted by 9 political entities—the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), PAS, the “Democracy at Home” Party, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the “Greater Moldova” Party, the League of Cities and Communes Party (LOC), the “Alternativa” Bloc, the New Historical Option Party (NOI)—and by 2 individuals. Their subject matter was diverse, covering both procedural-administrative issues (execution of court rulings and re-examination of registration requests) as well as ethical and legal issues (use of administrative resources, institutional interference, negative campaigning, defamatory advertising, observance of the constitutional framework regarding the state language, and illegal financing of electoral campaigns).

Some of the notifications reveal dysfunctions in inter-institutional communication and in the enforcement of court rulings, as in the case of the notifications from the PLDM and the Political Party “*Greater Moldova*”, which complained about the CEC’s refusal or delay in executing enforceable court decisions. Other notifications referred to potential interference in the activity of electoral contestants by law enforcement bodies or to the alleged passivity of the electoral authority in the process of examining and registering complaints, as signaled by the Bloc “Alternativa.” Moreover, some entities (PAS, PDA, and ALDE) reported both defamatory actions and systemic risks regarding illegal financing and lack of integrity of certain electoral contestants.

The UJM MO emphasizes the active and diverse nature of the petitions submitted by electoral contestants, while also noting that not all the results of the examination of notifications are published under the mentioned section.

2. Electoral organs activity

2.1 The Conduct and Internal Climate of CEC Meetings

During the reporting period, the Commission held 14 public meetings. The UJM MO analyzed the conduct of these meetings and reports the following findings: the communication climate among CEC members was consistently tense. It is worth noting that one of the Commission members accused colleagues of exerting pressure to vote for certain draft decisions, yet the institution's leadership did not issue any public response to these statements.

During this period, attempts to disregard participants in the administrative procedure were also noted, which in some cases generated aggressive and impulsive reactions from these participants toward CEC members. Instances were observed of speakers being interrupted, a superficial attitude by some members in analyzing the materials of a complaint filed by an electoral contestant, subjective interpretations of legal norms, as well as the application of double standards in examining cases involving opponents of the ruling party.

In contrast to the previous monitoring period—when the UJM MO observed effective communication between the CEC and candidates, along with the consistent provision of guidance and advice to ensure the accuracy of documents—the current period revealed a reluctance among Commission members to provide clarifications or support to the parties involved. This attitude was justified by the assertion that the CEC does not have a consultative role. In the view of the UJM MO, for the proper conduct of the elections and to avoid suspicions regarding the institution's independence and impartiality, the CEC should have shown interest in ensuring accurate information for participants in the electoral process and in providing the necessary support. After all, the institution declares itself open to all parties involved in the electoral process.

2.2 Registration of Candidates

During the period corresponding to the nomination procedure of candidates in the elections, 46 entities announced their intention to participate in the contest as electoral competitors: 21 individuals intending to run as independents, 21 political parties, and 4 electoral blocs.

Of the 21 aspiring independent candidates, 4 registration applications were admitted, 3 were rejected, 13 individuals withdrew from the process — either by returning the collected subscription lists or without doing so — and one person did not collect the subscription list forms after the registration of the initiative group.

Of the 21 registration applications submitted by political parties as electoral competitors, 15 were admitted and 6 were rejected. In the case of electoral blocs, all 4 applications were admitted.

From the 21 political parties admitted into the electoral race, two cases stand out: the political party “*Moldova Mare*” (PPMM) and the political party “*Noua Opțiune Istorică*” (PPNOI). In MO UJM's Report No. 2 (pp. 19–20), it was noted that the CEC had rejected the applications of these two political parties based on the exclusion of certain candidates from their lists, which distorted the gender balance ratio required by law. The CEC's decisions were challenged before the Chișinău Court of Appeal (Centru seat), which ruled in favor of both parties: annulling the unfavorable acts issued by the Commission and obliging it to re-examine the registration applications of the candidates submitted by the two political parties.

In particular, in the case of PPNOI, the CEC questioned the eligibility of one candidate based on the party's statutory provisions, which prohibit persons with prior criminal convictions from being members. In the case of another candidate from the party's list, the CEC determined that there were suspicions of past connections with a political party declared unconstitutional and therefore excluded him from the eligibility examination procedure. As for a third candidate excluded by the CEC on the grounds of legal restrictions under Article 16(2) of the Electoral Code, no final conviction had in fact been issued. Consequently, by excluding these candidates, the CEC altered the gender balance on the list, which led to the refusal to register all the remaining candidates.

The Chişinău Court of Appeal (CAC), examining PPNOI's claim against the CEC's decision, upheld the action, annulled the contested act, and obliged the administrative body to re-examine the registration request. The CEC filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). The SCJ declared the appeal inadmissible, leaving the appellate ruling in force. The court held that the electoral authority had exercised its discretionary power arbitrarily, without observing the principle of decision-making transparency in conjunction with the principle of proportionality of measures. According to the court, the CEC should have expressly indicated the deficiencies identified during the administrative procedure and given the party the possibility to withdraw the candidates who did not meet the admissibility conditions.

The court also emphasized that in circumstances where the public authority failed to ensure transparency and predictability by not communicating the identified shortcomings, the sanction of denying registration to the political party was excessively severe and disproportionate, especially as no restrictions applied to the remaining candidates. The individual uncertainties regarding two candidates — not fully clarified by the CEC, which failed to provide the party an opportunity to remedy the issues — led to the sanctioning and exclusion of the entire party from the electoral race.

Furthermore, the court held that “the procedure of inclusion or exclusion from party membership is a matter of the party's organizational autonomy,” thereby establishing that the CEC had interfered in the party's functional autonomy. This critical observation had also been highlighted by MO UJM in its Report No. 3 (p. 20). The SCJ, when declaring the CEC's appeal inadmissible, further underlined that “the provisions of a political party's statute are inapplicable in situations where they impose stricter standards than those established by law” regarding eligibility for party membership or inclusion on candidate lists. In this case, the only restriction applicable to candidacy was that stipulated in Article 16(2)(c) of the Electoral Code No. 325/2022.

Additionally, the CAC observed that the CEC had applied differential treatment toward PPNOI compared with another electoral competitor, who had been given the opportunity to reposition candidates on its list in order to meet the 40% minimum gender representation quota. To execute the court's decision, the CEC re-examined PPNOI's candidate file, ultimately registering the party's list of 55 candidates. The list complied with the 40% gender representation quota (minimum four candidates of the same gender in every ten places): 45.5% women (25) and 54.5% men (30). All candidates were party members.

In the case of PPMM, similarly to PPNOI, the CEC excluded one candidate for not meeting the restrictions under Article 16(2) of the Electoral Code, and as a result invalidated the entire candidate list, citing failure to comply with the 40% gender balance requirement. The CAC found that the CEC had applied discriminatory treatment against PPMM compared with other competitors. The court obliged the CEC to re-examine the case, emphasizing that the electoral

authority must notify the petitioner of identified irregularities, clearly indicate them, and provide the opportunity for remedy.

The court also held that the CEC must assess whether the notified deficiencies were corrected, ensure continued notification of further deficiencies, verify only the actual eligibility conditions, and avoid disproportionate measures. The court stressed that the CEC “cannot adopt a collective unfavorable solution with regard to the entire candidate list of PPMM, as long as the alleged non-compliances concerned only specific individuals and had not been notified to the claimant.” The court also noted that the CEC failed to justify the differential treatment applied to PPMM compared with other competitors who had been allowed to adjust their lists.

The electoral authority appealed the CAC’s decision. Initially, the SCJ admitted the appeal and overturned the appellate ruling. However, PPMM filed a revision request, which was admitted. Upon re-examination, the SCJ changed its verdict and declared the CEC’s appeal inadmissible, thereby upholding the CAC’s ruling. The SCJ underlined the public authority’s positive obligation to cooperate with the petitioner, noting that “the electoral authority should have clarified the issue of the candidate’s eligibility, including by allowing the party to correct its list, which did not occur in this case. Thus, the authority conducted an incomplete examination of the relevant circumstances and failed to fully exercise its legal competencies.”

To execute the judgment, the CEC re-examined PPMM’s application and registered its list of 69 candidates. All candidates were party members; however, the list did not comply with the 40% gender representation quota (minimum four candidates of the same gender in every ten places): 40.6% women (28) and 59.4% men (41). The CEC therefore applied a “reservation of revocation” should the list fail to meet the requirements of Articles 68(3), 111(5), and 112 of the Electoral Code No. 325/2022.

Subsequently, PPMM submitted a request to the CEC to amend its registered list by excluding 13 candidates and repositioning the remaining ones. On September 10, the Commission approved the modifications, resulting in a revised list of 56 candidates. The finalized list complied with the 40% gender representation quota: 44.6% women (25) and 55.4% men (31).

2.3 Accreditations, Confirmations, and Authorizations Issued by the CEC

Confirmation of Persons Authorized to Participate in Electoral Procedures
During the reference period of the report, the CEC accredited a total of 844 observers: 747 national observers from the Union of Jurists of Moldova, the Promo-LEX Association, and the Institute for Human Rights in Moldova, and 97 international observers from 15 entities outside the country (see Annex No. 1). For monitoring the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2025, a total of 2,168 observers were accredited from 29 subjects with the right to accreditation. National observers constitute 92% of them, 54% being accredited by the Promo-LEX Association and 44% by the Union of Jurists of Moldova, both organizations carrying out national election observation missions. Coverage of this will be ensured by 53 journalists accredited by the CEC and CECE from eight media institutions (see Annex No. 1).

Additionally, the Commission confirmed a total of 74 trusted persons: 72 from PN and 2 from PRM, as well as one representative in the CEC from PSDE. The MO UJM notes, based on statements by electoral contestants during meetings, a lack of interest in the institution of trusted persons and representatives in lower electoral bodies. While some cited a lack of human and

financial resources, others consider their role limited, and changes to the legal framework have placed trusted persons in a gray area.

MO UJM draws attention to a case of involvement in electoral campaigning in favor of PAS by persons not authorized by the CEC (the case of Minister Alexei Buzu).

Furthermore, the CEC authorized citizen surveys, including regarding their political preferences, as well as the publication of results from one of the two surveys. These will be conducted by “C.B.S.-RESEARCH” S.R.L. and the Civic Association Center for Analysis and Investigations in Sociology, Political Science, and Psychology “CIVIS,” commissioned and funded by the Civic Association “WatchDog.MD” and the Civic Association “Institute for European Policies and Reforms.”

By September 12, 2025, ten sociological companies officially expressed interest in voters’ political preferences. The report highlights the phenomenon of manipulating citizens through opinion polls, including those unauthorized by the Commission. It is suggested that the CEC should make additional efforts to ensure compliance with the regulatory framework regarding the conduct and publication of surveys on citizens’ political preferences.

Between September 2–11, the CEC approved several public interest messages produced by: the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), S.R.L. “Independent Trust Media,” S.R.L. “Bright Communications,” A.O. “Promo-Lex,” S.R.L. “Practic Media Group,” S.R.L. “Paprika Media,” A.O. “Comunitatea Plus,” the General Police Inspectorate (IGP), the Ministry of Justice (MJ), the Office of the Council of Europe, and the I.P. Center for Continuous Training in Electoral Matters.

Regarding the public interest message prepared by MJ, it is noted that it does not contain electoral content. In this context, MO UJM reiterates its position expressed in previous reports regarding the exclusive role of the CEC in approving public interest messages during the electoral period – which is an improper function for the CEC, and the legal provision in Law No. 62/2022 granting this authority should be clarified.

Concerning public interest messages prepared by S.R.L. “Independent Trust Media,” S.R.L. “Bright Communications,” S.R.L. “Practic Media Group,” and S.R.L. “Paprika Media,” it is observed that these legal entities cannot act as providers of public interest messages. As stated in MO UJM Report No. 3 (p. 12), according to point 105 of the Regulation on the Provision, Distribution, and Broadcasting of Political, Electoral, and Public Interest Advertising (HCEC Regulation 1155/2023), providers of public interest messages can only be public sector entities and non-commercial organizations registered in Moldova. According to open data, the four aforementioned entities are commercial companies, organized as limited liability companies.

Regarding the public interest message prepared by the Office of the Council of Europe in Chişinău, this entity also does not qualify as a provider. Point 106 of HCEC Regulation 1155/2023 explicitly lists public sector entities eligible to provide public interest messages in the electoral context: the Central Electoral Commission, the Center for Continuous Training in Electoral Matters, the Gagauzia Central Electoral Council, the Office for Relations with the Diaspora, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of Reintegration Policies, and the Office for European Integration. Similarly, the IGP is not explicitly listed. Although IGP is under

the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it remains an administrative authority with the status of a legal entity under public law.

Regarding the content of the materials used in approved public interest messages, the following observations are made: Most materials promote two types of messages: 1) the importance of participating in the electoral exercise on September 28, and 2) the seriousness and consequences of vote trading. While some messages are presented neutrally and informatively, others exhibit ostentation, bias, and even affronts to certain citizens.

These findings highlight that, according to Article 38 of the Constitution, voting rights consist of five essential elements: universality, equality, directness, secrecy, and freedom of expression. Free expression of the vote entails exercising the right to vote without coercion, pressure, or illegitimate influence, allowing each voter to express their will and personal opinions autonomously. This involves two volitional options: 1) the voter's choice to decide freely whether or not to participate, and 2) if participating, the freedom to choose among candidates. The persistent promotion of voter participation in the analyzed messages indicates a form of pressure on citizens to vote, even if a citizen traditionally abstains (e.g., for religious reasons) or lacks personal motivation, for instance, if their preferred party or candidate is not admitted as an electoral contestant, or if the voter distrusts all contestants.

According to the CEC decision approving public interest messages prepared by the IGP, the declared purpose of these materials is to combat voter bribery in the September 28 parliamentary elections. Materials included posters, informational leaflets, and video spots. Analysis of printed texts shows that the content exceeds the declared purpose and refers to participation in protests in exchange for money or other undue benefits.

According to the CEC decision approving the message produced by A.O. "Comunitatea Plus" in the form of an informational leaflet, the intended purpose is to inform citizens about the values promoted by the European Union. From the technical section of the material, it is clear that it was produced and distributed by the "Moldova Decide" initiative as part of an electoral information campaign. While the declared purpose relates to informing voters about rights and electoral procedures, the campaign's general title and included narratives contain political slogans, making it a political/electoral advertisement. None of the statements relate to exercising electoral rights, but rather to political messages promoted by specific electoral actors, particularly the ruling party. Under Article 13(4)(c) of Law No. 62/2022, public interest messages cannot contain political advertising.

The message produced by S.R.L. "Practic Media Group" is offensive to voters who do not intend to vote or are undecided. For example, the phrase in the video spot, "only a pig is content with what is put in its trough, but a human – chooses," is a direct affront to absentee or undecided voters and constitutes a reprehensible act by the authors and producers. According to Article 13(4)(f),(h) of the Advertising Law, public interest messages cannot include information that harms human dignity or makes dissenters feel guilty or obligated.

MO UJM notes the questionable nature of the public interest message prepared by A.O. "Media Alternativă" titled "Don't sell your vote! Choose freely": Electoral spot with Vania Băţ against electoral corruption," whose content is disturbing. In the video, authors trivialize voters as domestic birds. The personification of a chicken named Raia, combined with expressions such as "where the little chick is, there she is too," "eat, eat little chick," followed by a scene implying the

chicken's slaughter and the protagonist's comment, "a full chicken makes better broth," and the epilogue, "electoral grains put you in the pot," suggests targeting a citizen category previously associated with a declared unconstitutional political party allegedly involved in voter bribery. Although intended as satire, the video is abhorrent and fails to meet the criteria for a public interest message in the electoral domain established in point 103 of HCEC Regulation 1155/2023: "promoting democratic values, participatory democracy, informing citizens about elections and/or referenda during electoral periods, in accordance with electoral legislation, and regarding the exercise of citizens' political and electoral rights." Article 13(4)(h) of Law No. 62/2022 prohibits shocking content in public interest messages.

It is also noted that while the message's provider is a civic association, it also operates as a media service provider, holding a broadcast license for TV 8, focusing on television program distribution. According to point 107(3) of HCEC Regulation 1155/2023, public interest messages can only be provided by non-commercial organizations concerned with promoting and defending human rights, participatory democracy, civic education, and election observation.

Analysis of CEC decisions approving public interest messages by civic associations shows no evidence that their statutes were verified to ensure compliance with point 107(3) of HCEC Regulation 1155/2023.

2.4 Activity of the Constituency Electoral Councils

During the reference period of the report, MO UJM observers conducted 125 visits to the constituency electoral councils. According to their observations, in 99% of cases, members of the electoral bodies were open toward the observers. Only in 1% of visits did the electoral officials show some reservation, possibly because this is the first election observation mission conducted by the Union of Jurists of Moldova. In most cases, the observers received answers to all questions asked and had access to all electoral materials. Only in one case did the electoral official present fail to provide the requested information, citing that it was held by the council chair. According to the observers, the councils are adequately equipped for organizing and conducting electoral activities. MO UJM notes that at least five electoral councils (No. 8 Cantemir, No. 12 Criuleni, No. 15 Dubăsari, No. 23 Nisporeni, No. 25 Orhei) did not publicly communicate the decisions adopted by posting them at the headquarters within a maximum of 24 hours from adoption, contrary to the provisions of the Regulation on the activity of constituency electoral councils during the electoral period. The formation of polling station electoral offices was carried out according to the deadlines established in the Electoral Calendar Program. Thus, the CEC and CECE established a total of 2,230 polling station electoral offices (BESV). For the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2025, the highest number of offices was opened compared to national elections organized between 2016–2025. MO UJM consulted all decisions of the electoral bodies regarding the formation of BESV and notes that at the time of analyzing the decisions, 18,425 Moldovan citizens were confirmed as electoral officials in the BESV. Although composed of an odd number of members, at least 5 and at most 11 persons (15 members for BESV abroad), the nominal composition of some offices is incomplete. At least 27 CECE (73%) later modified the nominal composition of the offices. Most offices were formed with 7 members (701 BESV – 31%) and 9 members (659 BESV – 30%), followed by offices with 11 members (515 BESV – 23%), 5 members (236 BESV – 11%), 13 members (61 BESV – 3%) and 15 members (58 BESV – 3%). Offices with 13 and 15 members are exclusively those established abroad. None of the political parties entitled to designate one member in each BESV fully exercised this right. The overall designation of members in the formed offices is as follows: PAS – 2,138 members (96%), PSRM

– 1,848 members (83%), PCRM – 945 members (42%). In four electoral constituencies (Cantemir, Hâncești, Ialoveni, and Telenești), PCRM did not designate any members in the polling station electoral offices. Regarding offices formed for localities on the left bank of the Dniester (12) and for Moldovan citizens in Israel and Ukraine (two in each state), whose number was contested by BEPSIVM, PCRM designated only one member, in an office formed for localities on the left bank of the Dniester. For the same 16 BESV, PSRM, part of the BEPSIVM bloc, designated 11 members in offices formed for localities on the left bank of the Dniester. Regarding offices formed abroad (301), the designation of members is as follows: PAS – 268 members (89%), PSRM – 88 members (29%), PCRM – 15 members (5%). At least 43 persons proposed by political parties for designation were not confirmed by the electoral body due to the lack of mandatory certification. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), as the body entitled to designate members, was to propose two members serving ex officio as president and secretary of each BESV. If, after the presentation of candidates by all entitled subjects, the number was insufficient or the office composition was even, candidates were proposed by the constituency electoral council at MAE's suggestion. According to CECE Decision No. 12 of CECE No. 38, in addition to the 602 members (3012=602), *the Ministry managed to fill all remaining vacancies. In total, 2,716 electoral officials were designated and confirmed by the institution. This figure is considered concerning by MO UJM, given that MAE, with a structure of slightly over 200 employees, does not have the capacity to cover even the minimum number of two members (3012=602) in each office.* It can therefore be inferred that MAE resorted to recruiting members from other sources, such as Moldovan diaspora associations. Consequently, in key roles such as president and secretary of the electoral office—responsible for receiving and maintaining electoral lists, ensuring their integrity and access to data, safeguarding ballots and other electoral documents, stamps, and equipment—persons from outside diplomatic missions were appointed, without a formal legal relationship with MAE, creating certain obligations. While employees of diplomatic missions are under clear hierarchical and disciplinary authority, are required to be impartial, maintain confidentiality, and ensure the proper organization of the electoral process, no such guarantees exist for external persons. The absence of regulated employment relationships leads to a lack of direct institutional responsibility, which may favor the risk of political affiliation or partisanship and raises concerns regarding the security and integrity of elections conducted abroad. Polling station electoral offices established domestically must include three members designated by the local council. Analyzing the decisions regarding the formation of BESV, it was found that, in each electoral constituency, local public authorities (APL) exercised this right in 70% of cases. If political parties do not present candidates, the required number of candidates is completed by the local council. Thus, out of the total number of electoral officials designated by APL, a relatively small number (379 members) supplemented the composition of the electoral bodies as needed. If, after the presentation of candidates by all entitled subjects, the number of members is insufficient, vacancies are completed by the electoral body from the Register of Electoral Officials (RFE). At least 4,612 persons were confirmed from the RFE as electoral officials. During the reference period, at the CECE level, a total of 478 persons were confirmed/accredited: 459 representatives of the “ALTERNATIVA” bloc (336) and PN (123) in BESV formed abroad and in the Chisinau municipal constituency, as well as 17 journalists and two observers. Accreditation was refused for one person due to the lack of legally required documents. MO UJM notes that none of the 23 electoral contestants exercised the right to register a representative in a lower-level electoral body, as confirmed in meetings with MO UJM.

2.5 Activity of the Polling Station Electoral Offices

Between 5 and 12 September 2025, MO UJM observers conducted 125 visits to 99 electoral offices. According to the reported data, in 99% of cases, members of the electoral offices were open toward the observers. Only in 1% of visits did the electoral officials show some reservation, as in the case of CECE, possibly because this is the first election observation mission conducted by the Union of Jurists of Moldova. The observers received answers to all questions asked, but had access to the electoral materials in only 98% of cases, as these were kept by the office president. MO UJM notes that, of the 99 offices visited, 23 did not publicly communicate the adopted decisions, and 61 BESV did not post the full list of registered candidates at the headquarters, contrary to the provisions of the Regulation on the activity of polling station electoral offices. MO UJM draws the attention of electoral officials and the leadership of electoral bodies at all levels to the practice of involving electoral officials in campaign activities. For instance, a member of BESV 14/4 was observed at a meeting with citizens conducted by the Minister of Labor and Social Protection, Alexei Buzu, wearing a T-shirt with the inscription “PAS.” According to the CECE Drochia decision, the electoral official was warned about the strict observance of Article 42 of the Electoral Code. It is emphasized that, in exercising their duties, an electoral official has no right to carry out any other activity as a participant involved in the electoral process, cannot make statements or engage in agitation in favor of or against electoral contestants, and cannot support any electoral contestant financially or by any other means, directly or indirectly. It is considered that, by expressing consent and committing to serve as an electoral official, the individual must demonstrate a high degree of integrity, impartiality, and professionalism.

3. Conduct of the Electoral Campaign

MO UJM reiterates that, contrary to the provisions of the Electoral Code, which state that the electoral campaign begins on the date of registration of the electoral contestant but no earlier than 30 days before the voting day, the majority of registered electoral contestants began their campaigns before the established date (29 August 2025). In order to provide an objective assessment of the conduct of the electoral campaign, in addition to information collected from the field and online, reported by long-term observers deployed in each electoral constituency across the country, MO UJM held meetings and collected the viewpoints of 10 out of the 23 electoral contestants. Systematizing the collected information, MO UJM notes the aggressive nature of the electoral campaign, marked by disinformation, manipulation, hate, exploitation of fears, intimidation, abuses, pressure, and personal attacks. Although the purpose of the campaign is to encourage voters to cast their votes in favor of one of the contestants, during the first two weeks it focused less on presenting achievements or pending issues, as well as on debating ideas and electoral programs. Instead, attempts were observed to blame and divide voters into opposing categories: “you are with me” or “you are against me,” “good” and “bad,” “pro-European” and “pro-Russian.” An exceptional case is the mobilization message delivered by Minister Alexei Buzu during a meeting with voters in the village of Pelenia (Drochia district), stating that on 28 September 2025, we will see who we are: “people” or “bâdle.” MO UJM strongly condemns the lack of respect from representatives of power and actions that humiliate citizens of the Republic of Moldova, emphasizing that participation in elections is free and voluntary. No one has the right to exert pressure on voters with the purpose of forcing them to participate or not participate in elections. Voting must be universal, equal, direct, secret, and freely expressed. Regarding the same subject, it is noted that the minister’s message provoked a wave of negative reactions from several electoral contestants, and the Ombudsman issued an appeal to these contestants and their representatives to avoid hate speech and discriminatory language during the parliamentary election campaign. According to the Ombudsman, future deputies must serve as examples of integrity and respect for international human rights standards. Both MO UJM observers and some electoral

contestants reported aggressive and violent behaviors and the use of hate speech by PAS supporters, both during their own campaign activities and during meetings of other contestants with voters or during electoral debates held in the field. For example, MO UJM was notified by an electoral contestant that, during an electoral debate organized by the “Contact” Center in the village of Răzeni (Ialoveni district), PAS supporters were present in an organized manner and disrupted the messages of other contestants with noise. The mission was also presented with some questions prepared in advance for the citizens attending the debate. It is noted that most electoral contestants declared that, as far as possible, they would attend invitations to electoral debates, but their priority remained direct meetings with voters. According to data reported by observers, meetings with voters accounted for only 39% (199) of at least 513 campaign activities carried out by contestants during the monitored period. Most activities, 55% (280), involved the distribution of electoral materials, and 6% (34) consisted of other types of activities, such as debates, campaign launches, or discussions at tents. In descending order, the majority of campaign activities observed were carried out by PAS, BEPSCIVM, the “ALTERNATIVA” bloc, PN, and PRM. Sequences of political confrontation between representatives and supporters of the “Șansă” and “Acțiune și Solidaritate” parties were observed in the village of Peresecina.

Involvement of unauthorized persons in electoral campaigning. According to Article 70 of the Electoral Code, the right to freely discuss and fully address the electoral programs of candidates, as well as their political, professional, and personal qualities, and to conduct electoral campaigning during assemblies, rallies, meetings with voters, through mass media, posters, or other forms of communication, belongs to the following categories: citizens of the Republic of Moldova, political parties, electoral blocs, candidates, and trusted representatives of candidates. MO UJM draws attention to a case of unhindered involvement of an unauthorized person in electoral campaigning, contrary to the aforementioned provision. Specifically, this concerns the organization by the Minister of Labor and Social Protection of meetings with voters and the distribution of campaign materials in several localities. Although, according to public information, the minister took personal leave for eight calendar days (4, 9, 11, 15, 16, 22, 23, and 25 September) to participate in the electoral campaign, MO UJM emphasizes that on 7 September, Alexei Buzu carried out campaigning activities in favor of PAS in the city of Orhei. In light of these facts, it is observed that the PAS party, as an electoral contestant, does not fully respect its obligations during the electoral campaign according to the Electoral Code. Alexei Buzu is not listed as a candidate on the PAS list, and the party has not confirmed to the CEC or CECE any trusted person authorized to publicly present the electoral program, organize meetings with voters, or distribute campaign materials.

Additionally, MO UJM has identified at least two cases of government representatives being involved in the electoral campaign in the field, specifically from the territorial offices of Comrat and Șoldănești of the State Chancellery. In both situations, representatives of the State Chancellery exerted pressure either on voters or on an electoral contestant during their meetings with citizens. MO UJM emphasizes that in a democratic society, protecting citizens’ constitutional right to vote and be elected must be a priority for state institutions. Cases of unauthorized persons engaging in electoral campaigning should be sanctioned according to the law.

Involvement of mass media institutions in campaigning and promoting specific electoral contestants. The parliamentary elections of September 2025 were covered by 33 media outlets that, by submitting declarations to the Audiovisual Council, committed to reporting on the elections in accordance with the principles of fairness, balance, and impartiality. Thus, media institutions were obliged to provide equal and fair treatment to all contestants, to distribute airtime or newspaper space equally, and to approach all participants in the same manner without prejudice, bias, or favoritism. Contrary to these provisions, MO UJM has found that some media outlets campaign in

favor of the ruling party and do not reflect the positions and activities of other electoral contestants correctly and impartially. Moreover, some contestants reported limited access to media institutions, ranging from moderate to low. Relatedly, public conversations from the PoIE Communication Group revealed discussions about how the statements of President Maia Sandu should be perceived and covered by the media, highlighting how some media institutions collectively reflect certain official positions.

Involvement of law enforcement institutions in the electoral campaign (raids, intimidation, incrimination). The first week of the electoral campaign was marked by a series of raids and searches conducted by law enforcement in several localities across the country. According to various public sources, including press releases from investigative authorities, these measures were carried out in connection with a criminal case concerning illegal funding of political parties and campaigns, voter bribery, and money laundering, targeting a political formation registered in the electoral race. Considering that the investigation was accompanied by press releases generating breaking news coverage, including video footage of masked and armed law enforcement officers conducting raids and audio recordings from surveillance operations, it can be concluded that these actions exceeded the scope of the investigation itself. The targeted party claims to be a victim of government retribution, accusing authorities of pressure and abuse, with the aim of discrediting the party in front of voters. Given that these actions took place during the electoral process, it is plausible that they could affect voters' choices, as the overall electoral climate is impacted.

According to the Minister of Internal Affairs, during the electoral period, the police conducted approximately 200 raids and initiated multiple criminal proceedings related to corruption at public gatherings. Daniella Misail-Nichitin stated that these coordinated actions have a direct political purpose, orchestrated by the fugitive politician Ilan Șor. "The aim is to destabilize the situation. The aim is to use all possible resources, including intermediaries, to shift the pro-European direction to a pro-Russian one in the next Parliament." She added that state institutions do not limit themselves to sanctions but also emphasize prevention. The political statements of the Minister of Internal Affairs confirm the hypothesis that the ongoing investigations, conducted on a massive scale during the electoral period, also serve to send warning messages to voters and can induce fear or intimidation.

The "Democrația Acasă" party reported a case of police abuse against its candidates, who were intimidated and humiliated. The bus carrying the party's candidates and supporters was stopped in traffic, the driver was prohibited from continuing, and the license plates were confiscated. Regardless of the formal reasons for these actions, MO UJM considers that this case negatively affects the electoral climate and the competitive activities of the contestant.

A particularly scandalous case occurred in Găgăuzia. The State Chancellery representative in Comrat, Serghei Cernev, urged citizens not to participate in the parliamentary elections to avoid being accused of vote-selling. According to the official, there would be amnesty for those previously fined for alleged "vote-selling," and if citizens from Găgăuzia voted in the parliamentary elections, "they would no longer be able to prove they did not sell their votes." These statements are entirely contrary to the efforts of central authorities aimed at increasing voter participation. MO UJM considers that urging voters to abstain from voting to avoid suspicions of electoral corruption constitutes a form of pressure. Such actions, especially when carried out by public authorities, can severely compromise the free exercise of voting rights.

Cases of external interference. MO UJM notes that, although external interference represents a risk associated with the autumn elections, certain European officials carried out working visits to the Republic of Moldova during the electoral campaign. Specifically, from 3 to 5 September 2025, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, visited Chișinău, which, according to a

press release from the Delegation of the European Union to Chişinău, reaffirmed the EU's support for the Republic of Moldova and brought the country closer to its European future.

Publicly available information shows that the official met with government representatives, journalists and influencers, investors and entrepreneurs, media representatives, and religious leaders. MO UJM observes that, although the Commissioner expressed her opinion on the best response to Russian interference—namely, the victory of pro-European forces in the parliamentary elections—she did not meet with any pro-European electoral contestant supporting Moldova's European integration. It is also emphasized that, through the resolution adopted on 10 September 2025, the European Parliament reaffirmed its firm support for Moldova's European path. Therefore, this support is aimed at any pro-European political force that wins the parliamentary elections and is not exclusively contingent on PAS's electoral success.

Moreover, the Commissioner held a press conference, gave interviews, and delivered messages that could easily be interpreted as direct electoral promotion in favor of the ruling party. Among these statements were: "I congratulate the Republic of Moldova on the rapid progress toward EU accession; the reforms and investments achieved today are the foundations of a prosperous, stable, and European future for the country; the EU firmly supports Moldova's integration into the European family; the completion of EU accession negotiations by 2028 is possible if Moldovans elect a trustworthy Parliament."

Furthermore, MO UJM highlights that the statement regarding the potential completion of EU accession negotiations by 2028, as well as the areas covered by the 1.9 billion euro Growth Plan mentioned by the Commissioner—roads, railways, sewerage systems, and potable water supply—fully correspond to the objectives assumed by PAS for the next four years. In MO UJM's opinion, since authorities declared that they had mobilized better than in previous elections to prevent foreign interference, and the Commissioner's visit was known and coordinated in advance, her presence in Chişinău can only be interpreted as an action with an electoral effect favoring PAS. MO UJM considers that, to avoid compromising the credibility of efforts to counter external interference, it would have been appropriate to postpone the visit until after 28 September 2025.

The use of foreign officials' images was also noted in the case of the League of Cities and Communes (LOC). Specifically, this concerns the media coverage of the meeting between LOC leaders and U.S. Congressman Mike Lawler. In MO UJM's opinion, even if LOC representatives did not promote this visit on social media, the news available online constitutes a form of electoral publicity for the contestant.

Cases of use of administrative resources. On 27 August, the Minister of Labor and Social Protection, Alexei Buzu, announced that he would not suspend his government duties during the electoral campaign but stated that he would not use administrative resources, committing to respect the rules and not involve his institution in electoral activities. Subsequently, on 2 September, Minister Buzu participated in a "donation event of a minibus for children in the village of Talmaza, Ştefan Vodă district." According to a press release from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, "Minister Alexei Buzu participated in the event donating a minibus for children in Talmaza, provided by the Government of the Republic of Moldova, which will contribute to the safe transport of approximately 100 children to kindergartens." Although Alexei Buzu is not a candidate on PAS's list, it is observed that he acts in favor of and to the benefit of the respective electoral contestant, using the material resources of the institution he leads.

Another case of using public assets for electoral purposes was noted in the village of Boldureşti, Nisporeni district, where a plaque reading "Renovated with Government funds" was installed on a recently renovated building. PAS confirmed on its website that it claimed credit as the governing

party, thus appropriating public authorities' achievements for electoral purposes. Similarly, based on posts on PAS's campaign page, this contestant claims all local infrastructure projects realized by public authorities, including those funded with external support, as its own. Some of these projects were completed by previous governments but were appropriated by PAS, such as the renovation of the Art School in Varnița, Anenii Noi district, which took place in 2016.

In the case of the electoral bloc "Alternativa," the same practice of appropriating local public administration achievements and converting them into electoral campaigning is observed. Candidate Ion Ceban makes public appearances online in front of rehabilitated infrastructure projects in Chișinău, claiming that such projects (realized during his tenure as mayor) can be multiplied across the country.

MO UJM also notes occurrences of "merit theft." Some electoral contestants claim that opponents unjustly appropriated achievements that do not belong to them. For instance, the mayor of Drochia, representing the political party "Partidul Nostru" (PN) and a candidate on its list, accuses a PAS deputy and candidate of claiming credit for the renovation of the kindergarten in Drochia, even though this social facility was repaired in 2018 as part of a UNDP-funded project. Another PN candidate, the mayor of Râșcani, similarly accuses PAS of "merit theft" concerning several key city projects. The LOC candidate, mayor of Edineț, accused PAS of "merit theft" for the renovation and expansion of the Cultural Center in Gordinești Noi, a project realized by the Edineț municipality.

Although the CEC announced on 22 July that the "Moldova Can" campaign messages could no longer be displayed during the electoral period, the government continues to show them. Even on the homepage of the official government website (www.gov.md), the banner of the prohibited campaign is still displayed.

There were also cases of using classrooms during lessons for electoral campaigning and forcing students to participate. At the Technical University of Moldova (UTM) and the State University of Medicine and Pharmacy "N. Testemițanu" (USMF), students reported being pressured to attend electoral meetings during class with PAS representatives. At the National Institute of Physical Education and Sport (INEFS), students reported that a representative of "Mișcarea Respect Moldova" (MRM) gave electoral speeches during lessons. It is noted that the rectors of UTM and USMF are candidates on PAS's list, while the rector of INEFS is a candidate on MRM's list. The National Youth Council of Moldova (CNTM), through a public statement, condemned reported cases of students and pupils pressured by teachers or school leadership to attend electoral meetings, denouncing political pressure on youth during the electoral campaign.

Furthermore, some electoral contestants reported to MO UJM cases of blackmail directed at school heads and mayors regarding the fate of schools and the implementation of projects initiated by local authorities, as well as the obligation for employees to vote in favor of the PAS electoral contestant.

MO UJM notes that, in its jurisprudence, the CEC has ruled: ".../ the abusive use of administrative resources also occurs around elections through the dissemination of favorable information that could influence voters' preferences using public resources to which other potential electoral contestants do not have access, placing candidates in unequal conditions, contrary to the principle of equal opportunities or equal treatment in the electoral process as established in Article 50(b) of the Electoral Code No. 325/2022. In light of these legal references, the Central Electoral Commission highlights the responsibilities of authorities and public institutions during the electoral period. In this regard, officials, public servants, and personnel of public authorities and institutions are obliged to exercise their duties within the limits of legally established competences,

without using their status, being responsible for the efficient and fair use of administrative resources and for preventing favors or abuses toward participants in the electoral process /.../.”

Cases of unauthorized electoral advertising. Special locations for electoral advertising are established and arranged by local public administration authorities no later than 3 days before the start of the electoral campaign. These authorities are also responsible for the weekly cleaning of the advertising boards. Electoral advertising is permitted only on designated boards and on tents or kiosks whose placement has been coordinated with local authorities. Additionally, the CEC Regulation on the provision, distribution, and dissemination of political and electoral advertising and public interest messages establishes a series of locations where electoral display is prohibited.

MO UJM notes that some electoral contestants violate the rules established by the Electoral Code and related regulatory framework. Several cases were observed of electoral advertising on private property fences, as well as on the building of a local public administration. According to UJM observers, local police conduct multiple checks on the placement of electoral advertisements and posters in unauthorized locations. It should be noted that, as of the time of this report, there has been no centralized information from the General Inspectorate of Police (IGP), via a press release, regarding the results of these inspections or, depending on these results, any requests to contestants to comply with the established rules.

In MO UJM’s opinion, by analogy with efforts to prevent voter corruption, actions could have been taken to prevent the placement of electoral advertising in unauthorized locations by contestants.

It is also noted that to support law enforcement efforts in preventing, documenting, investigating, and sanctioning cases of electoral corruption, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and the National Anticorruption Center (CNA) launched a hotline for reporting cases of illegal financial influence on voters. According to public data, this hotline is managed by the CNA and operates 24/7, both for calls from within and outside the Republic of Moldova.

Reflection of meetings with electoral contestants. With the launch of the electoral campaign, MO UJM sent official invitations to all registered contestants at that stage in the ballot to organize meetings. Some contestants were open and accepted the invitation, while others have not yet responded. In total, MO UJM sent 21 invitations for meetings. During the reporting period, meetings were held with 10 contestants: 7 political parties and 3 independent candidates. MO UJM met with representatives of PAS, LOC, Alliance “Moldovenii,” ALDE, PN, MAN (representing Blocul “Alternativa”), PSRM (representing Blocul Patriotic), and independent candidates Andrei Năstase, Olesea Stamate, and Victoria Sanduța.

The purpose of these meetings was to understand the electoral climate from the perspective of each contestant, including challenges faced and perceptions of the electoral process. The observation mission developed a questionnaire, distributed to all contestants met, and collected their opinions regarding the electoral climate, administrative process, access to media, campaign conditions, and other aspects relevant to evaluating the fairness and transparency of the elections.

The questionnaire covered topics such as: impact of recent amendments to the Law on Political Parties, perception of electoral legislation fairness, organization of CEC activities regarding document submission and review, media coverage, quality of training for BESV members, difficulties in organizing public events, electoral advertising, or direct voter contact. Questions also addressed perceptions of diaspora vote security, intimidation, informational manipulation, and pressures during the campaign, as well as monitoring electoral incidents, participation in debates, and analysis of other parties’ programs.

Through these questions, MO UJM aims to create a realistic picture of the direct experience of contestants, contributing to a better understanding of challenges in the electoral process.

Key findings from the 10 meetings conducted by the Observation Mission:

- **Impact of legislative changes on parties:** Amendments to the Law on Political Parties close to the elections caused significant difficulties, complicating procedures, presenting personal information, and providing no reasonable adaptation period. While the stated intention was to improve transparency and efficiency, immediate application created pressure on contestants, affecting logistical planning and administrative compliance.
- **CEC document reception:** Contestants had varied experiences with the CEC. Some (e.g., PAS, PN, Victoria Sanduța) evaluated the relationship positively, while others (e.g., Blocul Patriotic, Blocul Alternativa, LOC) reported lack of objectivity, partisanship, or even hostility. Double standards and biased attitudes were mentioned. Document submission procedures were sometimes cumbersome, with difficulties related to office hours, the requirement for physical presence, unclear information from ASP, and contradictory document format requirements. Some contestants (e.g., LOC, Blocul Alternativa) had to exclude candidates due to inability to attend in person.
- **Changes to the schedule for document reception:** Some contestants complained about the lack of clarity and predictability of the schedule (Blocul Alternativa, Blocul Patriotic). Inability to submit documents on weekends forced exclusions from candidate lists (ALDE). Last-minute changes caused logistical difficulties and confusion (LOC) and created perceptions of inequality, favoring well-resourced contestants over less organized ones, such as diaspora or independent candidates. Positive feedback noted adjustments were reasonable and procedurally justified (PAS, Alianța Moldovenii).
- **Media coverage:** Some contestants (PAS, Victoria Sanduța) reported relatively good access to debates and media, though news coverage was limited. Others (PN, Blocul Patriotic, Blocul Alternativa) complained of unequal treatment, rare invitations, exclusion from programs, and low visibility. Biases, omission of critical views, and favorable coverage of the ruling party were reported. Some contestants were denied the right of reply (Victoria Sanduța) or deliberately ignored (Alianța Moldovenii, Andrei Năstase).
- **Representation in electoral bodies and diaspora:** Most parties planned to appoint representatives in electoral offices, though fewer trustworthy persons were assigned abroad. Some contestants noted that this imbalance could affect monitoring in the diaspora, where the number of polling stations and voter participation is increasing. PAS, PN, and Blocul Alternativa intended to have representatives in all polling stations. Blocul Alternativa noted that valid ID requirements limited coverage abroad.
- **Electoral confidence:** Contestants believe that electoral participants contribute to voter confidence through proper financial reporting (PAS), designating representatives at polling stations, publicly reporting violations (Blocul Alternativa), avoiding online falsehoods (PN), focusing on debate of programs and ideas (LOC), performance of contestants (ALDE), and public education (Victoria Sanduța). Some faced technical or bureaucratic challenges (Olesea Stamate) or lack of transparency regarding donor information.
- **BESV training quality:** PAS and PSRM (Blocul Patriotic) commented on training and certification. Blocul Patriotic reported serious difficulties accessing CICDE trainings, technical issues, and short training times for diaspora members. PAS reported reluctance among some trained diaspora members, affecting participation, and recommended avoiding overlap with candidate submission deadlines.
- **Campaign conduct:** Campaigning occurred in a relatively open climate, but cases of electoral corruption, illegal funding, intimidation, manipulative messages, and misogynistic messaging were reported. UJM monitorizez.eu reported 7 cases of electoral

corruption. Access to public spaces for advertising remained challenging in some districts (PSRM). Direct voter contact is generally possible but requires sustained effort.

- **Voting confidence and election observation:** Contestants expressed concerns about diaspora vote security, manipulation, and lack of transparency. Observation missions are seen as additional guarantees of fairness. Most contestants plan to establish their own incident-monitoring mechanisms, including online reporting and appointing representatives.

Conclusion: MO UJM found that most contestants perceived the electoral process as generally well-organized administratively. However, there were reported ambiguities regarding recent legal changes and inconsistencies in the uniform application of electoral rules. A significant number of contestants expressed concern over the use of administrative resources by opponents in public office, which they believe undermines equal opportunities in the campaign.

4. Involvement of Local Public Administration in the Organization and Conduct of the Electoral Process

Stabilirea numărului minim de locuri pentru afişajul electoral şi a numărului minim de localuri pentru desfăşurarea întâlnirilor cu alegătorii trebuia realizată de către administraţia publică locală cel târziu până la data de 26 august 2025 (cu 3 zile înainte de începerea campaniei electorale). În cadrul vizitelor efectuate la primăriile în a cărei rază teritorială se află consiliul electoral, observatorii UJM au colectat informaţii privind respectarea de către APL a obligaţiei respective. Potrivit datelor raportate, toate primăriile au aprobat o decizie sau dispoziţie în acest sens. Dintre acestea, 34 au făcut-o în termenul stabilit, iar una - cu o întârziere de opt zile. MO UJM remarcă, totuşi, că APL nu asigură efectiv existenţa fizică a panourilor pentru afişaj electoral. A fost constatat, de exemplu, cel puţin un caz în oraşul Leova, unde spaţiul indicat în dispoziţia primăriei (str. Tighiceanului, intersecţie cu str. Valul lui Traian) lipsea în teren.

În ceea ce priveşte punerea la dispoziţia concurenţilor electorali a spaţiilor stabilite pentru întâlnirile cu alegătorii, menţionăm că unii concurenţi electorali cu care MO UJM a avut întrevederi au semnalat un comportament inechitabil din partea autorităţilor, întrucât, sub diverse pretexte, li s-a refuzat accesul la spaţiul respectiv.

MO UJM atrage atenţia autorităţilor administraţiei publice locale despre obligaţia lor legală de a garanta tuturor concurenţilor electorali acel minim de locuri speciale de afişaj electoral şi localuri pentru desfăşurarea întâlnirilor cu alegătorii. Este de datoria autorităţilor publice locale să asigure informarea completă, corectă şi echitabilă a cetăţenilor cu privire la procesul electoral şi la programele electorale ale concurenţilor. Prin respectarea obligaţiei legale şi prin deschiderea faţă de necesitatea alegătorului de a fi informat pe deplin, APL sprijină exercitarea conştiinţei a dreptului de vot şi contribuie la desfăşurarea unor alegeri libere, corecte şi transparente.

Prezentarea candidaturilor pentru constituirea birourilor electorale ale secţiilor de votare trebuia realizată de către consiliile locale de nivelul I şi, după caz, de nivelul II (mun. Chişinău şi Bălţi), până la data de 29 august 2025. Analiza hotărârilor organelor electorale cu privire la constituirea şi confirmarea componenţei nominale a BESV relevă că, din partea autorităţilor administraţiei publice locale, au fost prezentate şi confirmate, în calitate de funcţionari electorali, 6.166 de persoane. Constatăm că, raportat la fiecare circumscripţie electorală, APL a făcut uz de dreptul de

desemnare în proporție de 70%¹. De asemenea, consiliile locale au completat numărul necesar de membri în birourile electorale în care partidele politice nu au prezentat candidaturi.

Declararea locului de ședere reprezintă un drept al alegătorilor care, după ultima participare la alegeri, și-au schimbat locul de ședere și doresc să fie înscrși în lista electorală a secției de votare aferente noului loc de ședere. Potrivit Programului calendaristic, termenul-limită pentru declararea noului loc de ședere de către persoanele cu drept de vot a fost 3 septembrie 2025 (cu 25 de zile înainte de ziua alegerilor).

Pentru a asigura exercitarea acestui drept, în cadrul fiecărei autorități ale administrației publice locale a fost desemnată o persoană responsabilă de actualizarea listelor electorale. Potrivit datelor colectate de observatorii MO UJM, în urma vizitelor efectuate la primăriile în a cărei rază teritorială se află consiliul electoral, 1.959 de cetățeni cu drept de vot au beneficiat de acest drept.

5. Monitoring of Mass Media from the Perspective of Reflecting the Activity of Electoral Contestants

The electoral campaign started on August 29, 2025. MO UJM analyzed the frequency and manner in which the 23 electoral contestants were reflected in the national mass media during the period August 29 – September 12, 2025 (4 television channels: PRO TV, Jurnal TV, TV8, Moldova 1; 3 radio stations: Radio Moldova, Radio Chișinău, Radio Europa Liberă; 10 online portals: realitatea.md, stiri.md, zdg.md, newsmaker.md, noi.md, unimedia.md, deschide.md, agora.md, nordnews.md, nokta.md; 3 news agencies: IPN, INFOTAG, MOLDPRES).

Thus, it is observed that, to a greater or lesser extent, the monitored TV channels reflected the activity of all electoral contestants. BEPSCIVM was mentioned most frequently (42 appearances), followed by the Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (31) and PAS (24). At the opposite end, the least mentioned were UCSM (5 appearances), LOC, and Tatiana Crețu (6 appearances each). The share of neutral mentions was 91%, while negative mentions accounted for 9% of the total. Most frequently, in a neutral manner, BEPSCIVM was reflected (30 appearances), followed by Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (24) and PAS (20). According to the collected data, Moldova 1 TV recorded the highest score in reflecting the activity of electoral contestants (84 mentions), followed by PRO TV (76), Jurnal TV (71), and TV8 (58).

Radio stations reflected only 16 electoral contestants (70%). BEPSCIVM was the most frequently mentioned (11 appearances), followed by PAS (8 appearances). At the opposite end, the least mentioned were AUR and independent candidates Olesea Stamate and Tatiana Crețu (one mention each). Five other contestants – PNM, CUB, PPNOI, and independent candidates Andrei Năstase and Victoria Sanduța – were mentioned twice each. In this category, a high share of neutral mentions (93%) and the absence of positive mentions were also noted.

The monitored online press reflected the activity of 22 electoral contestants. PAS was mentioned most frequently (95 appearances), followed by BEPSCIVM (72) and Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (65). At the opposite end, the least reflected were Bloc “Împreună” (one mention) and Tatiana Crețu (two mentions). Compared to TV and radio stations, even if to a relatively small extent, online portals also recorded positive mentions (11%). Neutral mentions accounted for 64%, and negative mentions – 25%. The activity of PAM (15) and PAS (7) was reflected most frequently in

¹ Pentru 25 dintre cele 36 de circumscripții electorale, autoritățile publice locale au desemnat câte 3 membri în toate birourile electorale constituite.

a positive manner. Neutrally, Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (49), BEPSCIVM (45), and PAS (39) were reflected.

Similarly to TV channels, the monitored news agencies reflected the activity of all electoral contestants. BEPSCIVM was most frequently mentioned (18 appearances), followed by Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (15) and PAS (12). At the opposite end, six electoral contestants – ALDE, UCSM, PAM, LOC, AUR, and independent candidate Tatiana Crețu – were mentioned once. Four other contestants – PRM, PL, PPMM, and independent candidate Victoria Sanduța – were mentioned twice each. A significant share of neutral mentions (95%) and the complete absence of positive mentions were also noted.

In conclusion, it is observed that the reflection of electoral contestants by mass media institutions is unequal. While some recorded a significant number of appearances – BEPSCIVM (143), PAS (139), and Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (117) – others received a minimal number of mentions: UCSM (6), Tatiana Crețu (10), and LOC (13). During discussions with MO UJM, most electoral contestants expressed indignation over the lack of access to the public television channel Moldova 1. They also noted that, although they acquired the status of electoral contestants, this did not increase media interest in their activity. Consequently, the share of invitations to shows is relatively low. Additionally, participants in the electoral race mentioned that, unfortunately, TV channels, radio stations, and online portals do not develop but rather minimize uncomfortable topics. Some even contribute to spreading false news about PAS opponents and creating confusion among citizens. In other words, positive exposure of the ruling party – electoral contestant PAS – is implicitly ensured.

According to aggregated data, neutral mentions had the highest share – 79%. PAS (75 mentions) and BEPSCIVM (55) benefited most frequently. Negative mentions accounted for 16%, mainly targeting PAS (57 mentions), Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (14), and BEPSCIVM (13). Positive mentions were recorded for only six electoral contestants: PAM (15 mentions), PN (6), Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (5), independent candidate Andrei Năstase (3), BEPSCIVM, and PPNOI (one positive mention each) (see Annex No. 2).

6. Reflection of electoral contestants’ narratives on social media

During the reference period, MO UJM continued the analysis of social media pages of political parties involved in the electoral campaign for the September 28, 2025, elections.

The mission notes that online platforms (Facebook, TikTok, Telegram) remain essential communication tools with the electorate, used intensively to disseminate electoral messages, consolidate party identity, and mobilize voters for a specific electoral contestant. Communication is highly personalized and adapted to the specifics of each electoral contestant.

The most frequently encountered narratives in the online discourse of electoral contestants are:

- **Criticism of the government by opposition parties as the main electoral strategy**

Electoral contestants using this rhetoric include the Patriotic Bloc, Alternativa Bloc, AUR, PN, MRM, PPDA, the electoral bloc “ÎMPREUNĂ,” PNM, ALDE, CUB, etc. This theme dominates the electoral campaign and is widely exploited by electoral contestants. Terms such as “social genocide,” “dictatorial regime,” or “yellow plague” are frequently used to portray the PAS government as inefficient, dangerous, or corrupt. The main intention is to demobilize PAS supporters and channel social frustration in favor of a political alternative. Messages are distributed through diverse formats – from memes and short TikTok videos to live

broadcasts and press conferences – and are primarily directed at voters affected by socio-economic crises.

• Approach to economic development and social issues as a line of differentiation between government and opposition

Electoral contestants using this rhetoric include PAS, Alternativa Bloc, Patriotic Bloc, PN, AUR, PSDE, CUB, MRM, Alianța Moldovenii, LOC, and Olesea Stamate. The mission observes that economic themes are approached from opposite angles. Opposition contestants focus on failures – prices, migration, unemployment – while the ruling contestant (PAS) promotes achievements and investments. This thematic line reflects a contrast: some contestants seek empathy and outrage, while the governing contestants promote competence and progress. Both sides aim to mobilize their core electorate and attract undecided voters through messages targeting everyday realities.

• Positioning of electoral contestants in relation to the geopolitical orientation of the Republic of Moldova

Electoral contestants using this rhetoric include PAS, PNM, CUB, AUR, ALDE, PL, PPDA, the electoral bloc “ÎMPREUNĂ,” and MRM. The theme is highly ideologized, being the main demarcation line between camps. Pro-EU parties deliver an optimistic and mobilizing message, presenting integration as a guarantee of stability and prosperity. European imagery, EU symbols, and the rhetoric of a “European Moldova” are omnipresent. Pro-neutrality or pro-East camps use an alarmist and defensive tone, warning about the dangers of involvement in external conflicts and loss of sovereignty. Emphasis is placed on neutrality, peace, and the “Moldovan” development model. Polarization on this topic is high, and discourses target distinct ethnic and geographic segments.

• Instrumentalization of national identity, language, and traditional values in the electoral competition

This theme is used to mobilize specific segments of the electorate according to cultural identity and traditional values. Discourses vary from unionist positions to promoting a separate and conservative national identity, with religious and anti-Western accents. Electoral contestants using this rhetoric include AUR, PNM, Patriotic Bloc, Alianța Moldovenii, PN, PAS, PL, and CUB. The Patriotic Bloc incorporates appeals to traditional values – religion, family, morality – in opposition to what they call “imposed Western values.” Messages are constructed to mobilize a conservative and religious electorate.

• Use of themes related to justice, anti-corruption, and electoral integrity for mobilization

This theme is exploited to build the image of a reformist party, politically persecuted, or defender of a fair electoral process. Forms of expression vary between reformist narratives, accusations of corruption against opponents, or insinuations regarding potential imminent electoral fraud. Electoral contestants using this rhetoric include PPMM, Alternativa Bloc, AUR, PN, CUB, Blocul Împreună, ALDE, and LOC.

The theme of justice is approached on multiple levels: some (CUB, LOC, Blocul Împreună) adopt a reformist and technocratic rhetoric, demanding efficiency and independence of the judiciary, while others (MAN, ALDE) position themselves as victims of a repressive political system. This narrative frequently includes appeals to fight corruption, mutual accusations, and insinuations regarding election fraud. It is a theme used both for mobilization and for preparing potential post-electoral challenges. The tone is often accusatory, emphasizing distrust and the need for “cleaning the system.”

Abbreviations:

MO UJM – Observation Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova

CEC – Central Electoral Commission

CECE – Electoral District Council

BESV – Electoral Section Office

CAC – Court of Appeal Center

CSJ – Supreme Court of Justice

MAE – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

APL – Local Public Authority

ALDE – Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”

BEPSCIVM – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima, and Future of Moldova”

CUB – Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Prosperity”

LOC – Political Party League of Cities and Communes

PAM – Party Alliance “MOLDOVENII”

PAS – Party of Action and Solidarity

PL – Liberal Party

PPDA – Political Party “Democracy at Home”

PPNOI – Political Party “New Historical Option”

PPMM – Political Party “Great Moldova”

PN – Political Party “Our Party”

MRM – Party Movement “Respect Moldova”

RFE – Register of Electoral Officials

UE – European Union

Annex No. 1 Accreditation of Observers and Confirmation of Journalists

Accredited observers by CEC and CECE			
Promo-LEX Association	1082	Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in the Republic of Moldova	7
Union of Jurists of Moldova	870	Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in the Republic of Moldova	2
ADEPT Association	5	Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in the Republic of Moldova	4
Institute for Human Rights in Moldova	36	Embassy of the Italian Republic in the Republic of Moldova	2
“BAȘTINA-NIMORENI” Public Association	2	Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden in the Republic of Moldova	7
Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania	3	Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the Republic of Moldova	19
Central Electoral Commission of Georgia	2	Embassy of the Slovak Republic in the Republic of Moldova	1
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Albania	2	Office of the Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in the Republic of Moldova	5
Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine	2	Parliament of Ukraine	15
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Armenia	2		47
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Latvia	2	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)	8
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan	2	European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO)	3
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania	2	Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation	2
Supreme Electoral Council of the Republic of Turkey	2	Swiss Cooperation Office	3
International Foundation for Electoral Systems	29	International Republican Institute Washington, Chișinău Branch	
Total National Observers	1995	Total International Observers	173

<i>Journalists confirmed by CEC and CECE</i>			
Publicația Periodică „Observatorul de Nord” SRL	7	Asociația Obștească Academia de Creație și Inovații Mediatică	4
Instituția Privată „Radio Orhei”	1	Asociația Obștească Asociația Reporterilor „NORD MEDIA”	20
Asociația Obștească „Nord Press Club”	7	Asociația Obștească „Media Birlii – Uniunia Media”	6
Publicația Periodică „EXCLUSIV MEDIA” S.R.L.	6	Periodică Independentă „Ecoul nostru” SRL	2
SRL „Satelrom-TV”	2	Postul de televiziune OK«G	13

Annex no. 2 Media Monitoring: August 29 – September 12, 2025

Diagram no. 1: Media Coverage




Table Diagram no. 1 (Media Coverage)

	TV (4)	RADIO (3)	ONLINE (10)	AGENȚIE (3)
POZ	0	0	44	0
NEG	26	4	103	5
N	262	54	274	95

Tabel nr. 1 (Reflectarea concurenților electorali)

Nr	Concurentul electoral	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”	7	57	75
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	1	30
3	National Moldovan Party	1	0	23
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”	0	3	13
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”	0	0	21
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Wellbeing”	0	0	28
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”	6	44	103

8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”	0	10	16
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	6
10	Liberal Party	0	2	17
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	27
12	Political Party Alliance “MOLDOVENII”	15	0	14
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	1	12
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	3	15
15	Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA”	5	19	93
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	17
17	Political Party “Our Party”	6	5	43
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	1	2	20
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”	0	0	34
20	Andrei Năstase	3	0	30
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	22
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	16
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	10

MONITORED MEDIA SOURCES

Television (Buletin de Știri)	Radio post	Online Media	News Agency
PRO TV 20:00	RADIO MOLDOVA	REALITATEA.MD	IPN
JURNAL TV 19:00	RADIO CHIȘINĂU	STIRI.MD	INFOTAG
TV8 19:00	RADIO EUROPA LIBERĂ	ZDG.MD	MOLDPRES
MOLDOVA 1 21:00		NEWSMAKER.MD	
		NOLMD	
		UNIMEDIA.MD	

		DESCHIDE.MD	
		AGORA.MD	
		NORDNEWS.MD	
		NOKTA.MD	
Television (talk-show politic)	Name	Talk-show Guests	Date/Hour
PRO TV	In Depth	1. 2.	21:00
JURNAL TV	Shadow Cabinet		Thursday – 20:00
	Expert Hour		Monday – 20:00
	Secrets of Power		Wednesday – 20:00
TV8	Black Box		Thursday – 19:55
	Ask Ghețu		Friday – 19:55
MOLDOVA 1	Electoral Debates		
CINEMA 1	7 Days		weekend – 22:30
N4	The Fourth Power		19:00
TVC21	Important		Monday-Saturday – 17:00

A. TELEVIZIUNI

A1: Pro TV

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		2	5
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			2
3	National Moldovan Party			2
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”		1	1
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			2
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			2
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		5	10
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			2
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			1

10	Liberal Party			3
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			4
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			2
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			2
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			1
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		2	6
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			3
17	Political Party “Our Party”			3
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			2
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			3
20	Andrei Năstase			3
21	Olesea Stamate			3
22	Victoria Sanduța			2
23	Tatiana Crețu			2

A2: Jurnal TV

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		2	5
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			5
3	National Moldovan Party			4
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			2
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			4
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			2
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		1	6
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			2
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			1
10	Liberal Party			1
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			

12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			4
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			2
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			2
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		1	4
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			2
17	Political Party “Our Party”			5
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			3
20	Andrei Năstase			4
21	Olesea Stamate			3
22	Victoria Sanduța			4
23	Tatiana Crețu			1

A3: TV 8

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”			4
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			2
3	National Moldovan Party			2
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”		1	1
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			2
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			2
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		3	6
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			1
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			1
10	Liberal Party		1	1
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			4
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			1
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			1

14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			1
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		2	7
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			3
17	Political Party “Our Party”			2
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			2
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			2
20	Andrei Năstase			2
21	Olesea Stamate			2
22	Victoria Sanduța			1
23	Tatiana Crețu			1

A4: Moldova 1

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”			6
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			4
3	National Moldovan Party			3
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			2
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			3
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			4
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		3	8
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			2
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			2
10	Liberal Party			3
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			5
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			2

13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			1
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			3
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		2	7
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			4
17	Political Party “Our Party”			4
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			3
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			3
20	Andrei Năstase			3
21	Olesea Stamate			2
22	Victoria Sanduța			3
23	Tatiana Crețu			2

B. RADIO POSTS

B1: Radio Moldova

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”			4
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			1
3	National Moldovan Party			1
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”			4
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			2
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			1
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			

14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			1
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”			1
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”		1	2
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			2
20	Andrei Năstase			1
21	Olesea Stamate			1
22	Victoria Sanduța			2
23	Tatiana Crețu			1

B2: Radio Chișinău

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		1	2
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			1
3	National Moldovan Party			1
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		2	2
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			1
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			1
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”			4

16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”			1
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			2
20	Andrei Năstase			1
21	Olesea Stamate			
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

B3: Radio Europa Liberă

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”			1
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			1
3	National Moldovan Party			
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”			3
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			1
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”			
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”			3

18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			1
20	Andrei Năstase			
21	Olesea Stamate			
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

C. MEDIA ONLINE

C1: Realitatea.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”	1	1	7
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			1
3	National Moldovan Party			1
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			1
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”			4
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”		2	1
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			1
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			1
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”			10
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”	3	1	1
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			

19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			1
20	Andrei Năstase			2
21	Olesea Stamate			3
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

C2: Știri.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”	2	10	6
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			4
3	National Moldovan Party	1		3
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			2
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			1
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”	1	2	6
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”		2	3
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			2
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			2
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	1		
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			1
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians		2	3
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	5	3	6
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”			
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			4
20	Andrei Năstase	1		3

21	Olesea Stamate			
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

C3: Zdg.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”			2
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			2
3	National Moldovan Party			
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		2	5
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			1
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			1
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			1
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		2	6
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”			1
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”		1	
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			2
20	Andrei Năstase			
21	Olesea Stamate			
22	Victoria Sanduța			

23	Tatiana Crețu			
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C4: Newsmaker.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		2	7
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party		1	2
3	National Moldovan Party			1
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			1
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			1
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		3	7
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”		2	
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			1
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			1
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes		1	1
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians		1	
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		3	5
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			1
17	Political Party “Our Party”		2	3
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			
20	Andrei Năstase			1
21	Olesea Stamate			2
22	Victoria Sanduța			1
23	Tatiana Crețu			2

C5: Agora.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party "Party of Action and Solidarity"	2		4
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			1
3	National Moldovan Party			
4	Political Party "Democracy at Home"			
5	Political Party "Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe"			1
6	Political Party "Coalition for Unity and Welfare"			1
7	Electoral Bloc "Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova"		6	4
8	Political Party "Movement Respect Moldova"		1	
9	Political Party "Christian-Social Union of Moldova"			
10	Liberal Party			1
11	Electoral Bloc "Union of the Nation"			1
12	Political Party Alliance "Moldovans"			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			1
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc "Alternative"			6
16	Electoral Bloc "Together"			
17	Political Party "Our Party"			4
18	Political Party "New Historical Option"		1	1
19	Political Party "Great Moldova"			1
20	Andrei Năstase			
21	Olesea Stamate			1
22	Victoria Sanduța			1
23	Tatiana Crețu			

C6: Deschide.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
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1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”	2		1
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			
3	National Moldovan Party			
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”			
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		1	2
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”			
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			1
20	Andrei Năstase			2
21	Olesea Stamate			
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

C7: Noi.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		10	2
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			

3	National Moldovan Party			1
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”		1	
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			1
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		1	4
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”		2	
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			1
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	12		4
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”			3
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”			1
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			2
20	Andrei Năstase			1
21	Olesea Stamate			2
22	Victoria Sanduța			1
23	Tatiana Crețu			

C8: Unimedia.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		25	6
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			
3	National Moldovan Party			
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			1

5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”	5	3	10
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”		1	2
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	2		
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			2
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		1	4
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”	3		5
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	1		1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			2
20	Andrei Năstase	2		3
21	Olesea Stamate			1
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

C9: Nordnews.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		1	3
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			
3	National Moldovan Party			1
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1

7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”			4
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			1
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			1
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”			4
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”		1	1
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			1
20	Andrei Năstase			
21	Olesea Stamate			
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

C10: Nokta.md

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”			1
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			
3	National Moldovan Party			
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”		4	1
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			

9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		1	3
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”			
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			1
20	Andrei Năstase			
21	Olesea Stamate			
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

D: News Agency

D1: IPN

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		1	5
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			2
3	National Moldovan Party			2
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			2
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”			8
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			1

9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party		1	
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			2
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”			9
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			1
17	Political Party “Our Party”			3
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			2
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			
20	Andrei Năstase			2
21	Olesea Stamate			1
22	Victoria Sanduța			
23	Tatiana Crețu			

D2: Infotag

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”		2	3
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			1
3	National Moldovan Party			1
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			1
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			1
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”			8
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			1
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			1
10	Liberal Party			1

11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			3
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			1
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			1
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			1
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”			5
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			3
17	Political Party “Our Party”			3
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			1
20	Andrei Năstase			1
21	Olesea Stamate			1
22	Victoria Sanduța			1
23	Tatiana Crețu			1

D3: Moldpres

Nr	Political Party	Pozitive	Negative	Neutral
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”			1
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party			1
3	National Moldovan Party			
4	Political Party “Democracy at Home”			
5	Political Party “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe”			
6	Political Party “Coalition for Unity and Welfare”			1
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Inima and Future of Moldova”			2
8	Political Party “Movement Respect Moldova”			
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”			
10	Liberal Party			
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”			1
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”			

13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes			
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians			
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”		1	1
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”			
17	Political Party “Our Party”			1
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”			1
19	Political Party “Great Moldova”			1
20	Andrei Năstase			1
21	Olesea Stamate			1
22	Victoria Sanduța			1
23	Tatiana Crețu			