

**Intermediate Report No. 3 of the
Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova
for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections
of 28 September 2025**

Introduction

This report has been prepared by the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova (UJM MO) for the observation of the Parliamentary Elections of 28 September 2025 and is published to inform the public interested in the electoral process. The Union of Jurists of Moldova (UJM) is a non-commercial organization that aims to analyze and evaluate the organization and conduct of the electoral process and to inform the wider public on this matter.

The report covers the results of the observation of the electoral period between 12–28 August 2025. The document contains the findings and conclusions of the Observation Mission regarding the activity of the higher electoral authority, the registration process of electoral competitors, the organization of polling stations, the promotional activities of political parties, the media coverage of political subjects, improper involvement in the organization and conduct of the elections, restrictions on freedom of expression, and the transfer of the SIAS “Elections” infrastructure to the Information Technology and Cybersecurity Service.

The monitoring effort is oriented towards serving the public interest and was carried out in accordance with the national legal framework. The tools used for collecting and analyzing information include: monitoring the meetings of the Central Electoral Commission; submitting requests for access to information under Law No. 148/2023 on access to information of public interest; consulting official public information; field reports submitted through the online platform www.monitorizez.eu; and monitoring the online environment.

UJM carries out its mission in a fair, transparent, and responsible manner with regard to the information presented to citizens. Therefore, the monitoring report, well-documented and evidence-based – some of which is reflected in footnotes – represents an important source of information, and the main findings may contribute to the improvement of the electoral process. UJM MO assumes responsibility for the opinions and considerations expressed in this monitoring report. The Romanian version of this document prevails over translations into other languages.

1. Legal and Regulatory Framework Applicable to the Elections

1.1 Complaints and Notifications Submitted During the Reporting Period

The UJM MO monitored the information published by the Commission on its official website, under the Complaints/Notifications/Files section. Thus, we note that five complaints were submitted to the authority: three by the Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” and two by the Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova.” In addition, three notifications were submitted by the Political Party “Gagauz People’s Party,” the Moldovan National Party (PNM), and the Political Party “Socio-Political Movement of the Roma” of the Republic of Moldova.

The complaints submitted by the Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” concerned the distribution of messages with electoral overtones outside the official campaign period and the defamation of Ion Ceban, the Bloc’s lead candidate. These complaints invoked violations of the electoral legislation by the Political Party “PAS,” through the initiation of a disguised electoral campaign prior to the official start of the electoral campaign. They also referred to the dissemination of allegedly defamatory messages against Ion Ceban, the posting of messages on social networks, and the launch of promises with electoral implications, all with the aim of influencing voters’ choices. The complaints referred to violations of Article 70 paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Electoral Code, concerning the conduct of electoral campaigning activities outside the legally established period (29 August 2025).

We note that the CEC responded to the complaints submitted by the Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” within the deadline provided for in Article 74 paragraph (6) of the Electoral Code. Within 24 hours, the CEC forwarded the complaints, for examination by the competent authority, to the General Inspectorate of Police (IGP), in accordance with Article 52 paragraph (1) of the Contravention Code. Regarding the allegations and messages with allegedly defamatory content, the CEC informed the complainant that such matters fall outside its legal mandate and advised the Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” to address the competent courts.

Furthermore, UJM MO notes that the complaints submitted by the Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” reflect legitimate concerns regarding the assurance of balance and the principle of equal opportunities among electoral competitors in the pre-campaign period. The dissemination of allegedly defamatory messages may harm the honor, dignity, and reputation of electoral competitors and constitutes a violation of the provisions of Article 14 paragraph (1) and Article 15 paragraph (1) of Law No. 64/2010 on Freedom of Expression.

The Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova” contested the CEC’s decisions regarding the organization of polling stations abroad and the polling stations for voting by correspondence, as well as the organization of polling stations for voters from the localities on the left bank of the Dniester. The complainant stated that, by reducing the number of polling stations, voters from the localities on the left bank of the Dniester, as well as those located in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Israel, are discriminated against and disproportionately restricted in their access to voting.

In this case as well, the CEC reacted within the legal deadline and informed the complainant of the right to directly address the Chisinau Court of Appeal, without the need to follow the prior procedure, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 paragraph (5) of the Electoral Code No. 325/2022.

The Observation Mission draws attention to the importance of ensuring equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all citizens of the Republic of Moldova abroad and in the Transnistrian region with regard to effective access to the exercise of the right to vote. Although the CEC complied with the legal deadlines for responding to the submitted complaints, it is essential that the electoral authority ensure, beyond procedural compliance, a transparent, reasoned, and fair approach in the process of establishing polling stations, with the aim of strengthening public trust and guaranteeing the broadest possible electoral participation.

The Mission also noted that three notifications were submitted concerning the registration of participants in the electoral race and compliance with the legal framework on the activities of political parties.

Two notifications concerned the registration, as electoral competitors, in the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025, submitted by the Political Party “Gagauz People’s Party” and the

Political Party “Socio-Political Movement of the Roma.” In its response, the CEC informed the complainants that participation in elections by political parties is admissible only after fulfilling the mandatory obligation to submit information regarding the activity and structure of the party to the Public Services Agency (ASP), in accordance with Article 11 paragraphs (5) and (7) of Law No. 294/2007 on Political Parties. Therefore, a political party may be registered as a participant in the elections only if it complies with these legal requirements. In the case of the two parties, the “Gagauz People’s Party” and the “Socio-Political Movement of the Roma,” the required information was not submitted to the ASP, and their names did not appear in the official list transmitted by the ASP to the CEC. Consequently, the electoral authority could not register them in the parliamentary electoral race.

In the notification submitted by the Moldovan National Party (PNM), the dissolution of the political party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) was requested, invoking violations of the legal provisions on political financing. In its response, the CEC informed PNM that the authority competent to bring an action before the Court of Appeal regarding the dissolution of a political party is the Ministry of Justice, after substantiating the proven facts and circumstances.

1.2 Amendment and Approval of the Secondary Regulatory Framework

During the reporting period, the UJM MO noted amendments to secondary normative acts through the adoption and updating of one regulation and two instructions. Thus, the **Regulation on the preparation, administration, dissemination, and updating of electoral lists** was supplemented with a new chapter concerning the electronic electoral list. This regulates the manner of recording and identifying voters by digital means. According to point 63 of the Regulation, *“the electronic electoral list represents the information extracted from the State Register of Voters and stored on an electronic device about the voters who appeared at the polling station, received the ballot paper, and signed on the electronic device. It is used for the purpose of identifying and recording voter participation. The electronic electoral list, by content and manner of preparation, is assimilated with the supplementary electoral list.”*

The Mission welcomes the digitalization of the electoral process; however, it emphasizes that the decision or regulation does not explicitly define the authority responsible for storing and protecting this data, nor the liability in the event of technical or security incidents. To prevent possible ambiguities, it is recommended that the CEC clarify, through an official communication, the responsibilities regarding the management and security of the data.

For the proper conduct of the electoral process, the Commission approved two instructions: one concerning the method of systematizing, packaging, sealing, and transmitting documents, electoral materials, and electoral equipment after the closing of polling stations; and another concerning the procedure for voting with the mobile ballot box.

The Mission considers the adoption of these instructions by the CEC to be a positive step, aimed at improving the organization and conduct of the electoral process. Their implementation will contribute to strengthening the procedural and logistical framework applicable on election day, as well as in the post-electoral stage. The UJM MO notes that the new provisions provide useful procedural clarifications and will reduce the risk of errors in the management of electoral materials.

2. Activity of Electoral Bodies in Organizing the Elections

2.1. Transparency of CEC Meetings

The analysis of the meetings held by the Commission during the period 12–28 August 2025 highlighted several aspects that, in the opinion of the UJM Observation Mission, require attention and remediation. These include: the lack of opinions from the Legal Directorate for some draft decisions; failure to follow the protocol regarding the announcement of the Commission's composition; consistently negative interpersonal communication between members, and between members and participants; personal attacks and threats by some participants directed at CEC members, including unfounded accusations against authorities, the police, and banking institutions; attempts to provoke CEC members through confrontational questions; submission of documents related to draft decisions too shortly before meetings; and the high volume of responsibilities assigned to Commission members, which may, in some cases, affect their capacity to analyze the presented materials in depth.

On the other hand, a positive aspect noted by the Observation Mission is the effective communication of the CEC with candidates, as well as the consistent provision of guidance and consultations to ensure the accuracy of documents and actions undertaken.

The UJM MO also notes and expresses concern about the practice of some Commission members abstaining from voting on draft decisions or proposals without providing a reasoned justification for their abstention.

According to the CEC's decision-voting procedure, decisions are adopted by an absolute majority of its members. The Regulation provides only two voting options, expressed publicly by raising hands during an open vote: "for" or "against" the adoption of the draft decision or approval of the submitted proposal. A member has the right to justify a vote "against," and any abstention is considered equivalent to a vote "against." The Regulation also stipulates that the proceedings of public meetings are recorded in minutes, which contain a brief description of all speeches, questions, proposals of CEC members and participants in the administrative procedure, as well as other matters discussed, including, if applicable, announcements regarding the submission of separate opinions.

Since the beginning of the electoral period, the Commission has held 25 public meetings. We draw attention to the fact that, on the authority's website, only 9 minutes corresponding to the period 14 July – 3 August 2025 were published. These documents were consulted, and the analysis reveals the following:

- In 6 out of the 9 meetings, at least two CEC members abstained from voting on the adoption of draft decisions or approval of submitted proposals.
- Only one case was identified in which a CEC member provided a justification for their abstention from voting on a draft decision.
- In total, certain CEC members abstained from voting on the adoption of 8 draft decisions and 3 submitted proposals.

2.2 Completion and Amendment of the Nominal Composition of Lower Electoral Bodies

According to the CEC decisions regarding the electoral district councils (CECE) of Level II, during the monitored period, the Commission completed and/or amended the nominal composition and

staffing status of the working apparatus for six councils (CECE No. 1, 2, 7, 27, 36, and 38). Thus, at the time of drafting this report, all 37 electoral councils had a full nominal composition. The designating authorities (local public authorities – APL, courts, and parties represented in Parliament) exercised this right differently, as follows: APL designated members in 31 councils; the courts – in 36 councils; PAS and PSRM – in all 37 councils; and PCRM – in only 31 of them. The composition of all electoral councils was supplemented by the CEC with persons included in the Register of Electoral Officials, in numbers ranging from at least one to a maximum of eight.

2.3. Organization of Polling Stations Abroad

On 14 August, the pre-registration procedure for voters residing abroad was completed. According to the final data, 16,142 voters from 58 countries registered in advance. The majority of pre-registrations were carried out by Moldovan citizens in the Russian Federation – 13,039 voters, representing 80.77% of the total.

According to Article 39 of the Electoral Code, the number of pre-registrations is one of the criteria considered when determining the number of polling stations established abroad, as well as their locations. Additionally, according to point 4 of the Regulation on Pre-Registration, the purpose of pre-registration is to establish an estimated number of voters abroad to organize polling stations where they can exercise their right to vote.

On 24 August 2025, the CEC decided on the organization of polling stations abroad and the postal voting stations for the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025. According to the decision, the number and geographical locations of polling stations were established, to be subsequently formalized by the act of the electoral council of Electoral District No. 38. From the decision, it appears that a total of 301 polling stations are planned, including 4 stations that will process votes collected by correspondence. Geographically, the 297 remaining polling stations will be located in 41 countries. It should be noted that the CEC decision was not adopted by consensus or with a large majority of votes; a separate opinion was issued regarding its adoption.

Analyzing the reasoning section of the decision, the following observations emerge. The CEC analyzed pre-registration data and compared it with information from previous elections. The Commission expressed doubts about the accuracy of the pre-registration data obtained from citizens in the Russian Federation. At the same time, the CEC analyzed the trend of increasing voter numbers in previous elections (where 3–4 thousand voters were registered per polling station) in several European countries and geographic regions, justifying the need to increase the number of polling stations in the current election. However, the Commission did not apply the same reasoning regarding the overcrowding of the 2 polling stations in Moscow, Russia (where 5,000 voters were registered per station). This indicates a selective treatment of the issue.

Furthermore, according to the decision, the CEC received both individual requests from countries such as Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic, as well as collective requests from several diaspora organizations, especially from Russia, requesting the establishment of polling stations in multiple localities. Nevertheless, the CEC rejected these requests, citing the lack of digital signatures, as they were submitted electronically.

Given that, according to data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), over 200,000 Moldovan citizens reside in the Russian Federation, and the two polling stations at the Moldovan diplomatic mission in Moscow were overwhelmed by 10,000 voters (maximum capacity: 5,000 ballots × 2 stations = 10,000), the CEC's decision to maintain the same number of polling stations in the

current election may give the impression of political influence. The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which did not propose increasing the number of polling stations in Russia, is equally inexplicable. According to the decision, the MAE, after analyzing voter participation dynamics in polling stations abroad during previous elections, informed the Commission to maintain the list of polling stations established in 2024, supplementing it to 294 stations, and also provided recommendations for relocating some of them. The largest increase in polling stations was proposed for Italy – from 31 in 2021, 60 in 2024, to 75 in 2025. According to CEC statistics, only 484 citizens registered for the current election in Italy. In total, 23,182 pre-registrations had been recorded in Italy over all previous years. In contrast, Russia recorded 26,067 pre-registrations, yet the number of polling stations decreased over the last elections: 17 in 2021 and only 2 in 2024 and 2025.

The MAE's invocation of security concerns and armed hostilities in Israel, Ukraine, and Russia as justification for limiting the number of polling stations to two in each of these countries appears weakly argued. While the justification may have some basis in Kyiv, which is frequently subjected to bombings and drone attacks, there is no such rationale for Moscow, let alone other regions of the Russian Federation not affected by hostilities.

From the text of the decision, the CEC issued address No. CEC-8/7649 on 7 May 2025, requesting that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Information and Security Service (SIS), the Diaspora Relations Office within the State Chancellery, the Continuous Electoral Training Center, and the Supreme Security Council each designate a representative to be included in the interinstitutional working group tasked with coordinating and implementing actions necessary for organizing polling stations abroad for the 28 September 2025 parliamentary elections. However, no legal basis for establishing such an "interinstitutional working group" is identified.

Other points are also noted. First, the Supreme Security Council is not a state institution but a consultative body created under the President of the Republic of Moldova. Second, this structure, together with the SIS, does not have legal competencies related to the establishment of polling stations. Third, according to Article 28 of the Electoral Code, central or local public authorities cooperate with the CEC within their competencies. The SIS's additional electoral competencies under Article 28(1)(5) do not include activities related to organizing polling stations, either domestically or abroad.

The lack of solid arguments in the authorities' reasoning regarding the geographical allocation of the 297 polling stations, ignoring the proportions of Moldovan communities in the respective countries, casts doubt on the proportionality of these decisions and establishes unequal treatment of citizens abroad depending on their country of residence. Considering the geopolitical disputes in Chisinau's political class, which remain on the election campaign agenda, we conclude that the authorities' decision regarding the map of polling stations abroad reflects the political interests of the party currently in government.

2.4. Establishment of Polling Stations for Voters from Localities on the Left Bank of the Dniester

On 24 August 2025, the CEC approved the list of polling stations to be established for voters from localities on the left bank of the Dniester. Contrary to expectations, only 12 polling stations were organized, compared to 30 polling stations set up during the 2024 presidential elections. We note a continuing trend of reducing the number of polling stations for this category of voters (2019 – 47 stations; 2020 – 42; 2021 – 41), despite the fact that the number of persons from the Transnistrian

region acquiring Moldovan citizenship and, consequently, the right to vote, is continuously increasing.

The CEC decision did not reach a consensus. Three members of the Commission issued a separate opinion regarding the decision to organize only 12 polling stations for Moldovan citizens from Transnistria. According to the separate opinion, the adopted decision limits the voting rights of over 278,000 citizens residing on the left bank of the Dniester and violates the principles of equality and non-discrimination.

The MO UJM had already expressed concern regarding this decision when it was merely an intention. The Mission reiterates the criticisms previously stated:

- The right to vote is a fundamental right and must be ensured equally for all citizens.
- Polling stations for citizens residing in localities on the left bank of the Dniester are established on territory under the control of constitutional authorities and do not pose a security risk.
- Authorities are fully aware of the number of voters and should not limit themselves solely to the criterion of participation in previous elections. Based on publicly available information, access to polling stations and the activities of the electoral offices in these stations have been obstructed in previous elections, and voters did not have unhindered access to exercise their rights.
- The Constitutional Court has established in its practice: “[...] public authorities cannot undertake actions that could affect definitive legal situations or acquired rights, except under the law and if absolutely necessary for public interest. In this context, the Court observes common elements between 'res judicata' and the principle of legal certainty, as interpreted in the Court's previous jurisprudence. For example, in Decision No. 58/2018, §33, the Court emphasized that the principle of legal certainty applies both to fundamental human rights and to the general interest of the community.” (see Constitutional Court Decision No. 160/2021).

The Monitoring Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova finds that the reduction in the number of polling stations was not justified by a genuine public interest. Consequently, this measure represents a direct restriction of the voting rights of a specific category of citizens—over 270,000 voters.

We also note that, as with polling stations abroad, the CEC established an “interinstitutional working group” composed of representatives from the State Chancellery, the Reintegration Policy Bureau (within the State Chancellery), the Information and Security Service, the General Police Inspectorate, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Supreme Security Council. According to the CEC decision, on 7 May 2025 (CEC letter no. CEC-8/7648), the mentioned entities were requested to “delegate one representative from the institution to be included in the interinstitutional working group created to coordinate and carry out the actions necessary to organize polling stations for voters from localities on the left bank of the Dniester for the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025,” and subsequently, on 26 May 2025, the “interinstitutional working group” was established.

We emphasize that there is no legal basis for the creation of such an “interinstitutional working group.” From the CEC decision, it is not possible to deduce either the legal foundation for constituting this organizational structure or the authority act by which it was established. Furthermore, we reiterate that the Supreme Security Council is not a state institution, but a consultative body established under the President of the Republic of Moldova. This entity, along with the Information and Security Service (SIS), does not have legal competencies related to the establishment of polling stations. We recall that, according to Article 28 of the Electoral Code, central or local public authorities, within their competence, cooperate with the CEC according to additional powers granted by law. SIS’s additional electoral powers are established in Article 28(1)(5), but these do not include activities related to the organization of polling stations.

Following the text of the decision, it appears that the entire process of preparing the CEC act, which ordered the organization of 12 polling stations for voters in the Transnistrian region, was carried out by the aforementioned “interinstitutional working group.” We stress that, according to Article 40 of the Electoral Code, the responsibility for organizing polling stations for voters from localities on the left bank of the Dniester belongs exclusively to the CEC, which may use information and proposals from the Reintegration Policy Bureau and local public authorities in this process.

2.5. Accreditations, Confirmations, and Authorizations Issued by the CEC

During the monitored period, the electoral authority accredited and confirmed almost 1,200 persons authorized to assist in electoral operations, of which 1,181 are observers (96% national and 4% international) and 6 are journalists.

By consulting the incoming correspondence published by the Commission on its website, the UJM Mission observed that at least 15 letters of intent expressing interest, either individually or collectively, to monitor as international observers the autumn parliamentary elections, were received by the electoral authority.

According to the Regulation on the Status of Observers and the Procedure for Their Accreditation, international observers can be foreign citizens who have reached the age of 18, representatives of electoral authorities abroad, and of training and research institutions in the electoral field, of international organizations, governments of foreign states, and non-governmental organizations abroad, as well as international experts in the electoral field. Furthermore, the document establishes that the request for accreditation of international observers may be submitted if the entity has received an invitation from the Central Electoral Commission to participate in election monitoring. This invitation may be made by the Commission on its own initiative or at the request of entities with the right to accredit observers.

By consulting the outgoing correspondence published by the Commission, we note the absence of a response, either in the form of an invitation or a refusal, from the CEC to these 15 requesting entities. At the same time, we note that the electoral authority sent three invitations to participate in monitoring the parliamentary elections to specialized international electoral institutions, the Funky Citizens Association, and the International Republican Institute.

At present, a total of 1,339 persons, from 14 subjects with the right of accreditation/confirmation, can monitor the electoral process across the entire country, including all polling stations abroad. They can assist in all electoral operations and at the meetings of electoral bodies, having access to electoral information. National observers (94%) also have the right to submit complaints regarding any irregularities observed. It is noted that 61% of national observers were accredited by the

Promo-LEX Association, and 33% by the Union of Jurists of Moldova, both organizations carrying out national observation missions for the September 28, 2025, elections. It is noted that at the level of constituency electoral councils, no observers were accredited.

Furthermore, for each electoral contestant, the Commission confirmed a representative in the CEC, as well as a treasurer for the electoral campaign period for the parliamentary elections.

No registered electoral contestant (political party, electoral bloc, or independent candidate) has, so far, submitted requests to lower-level bodies for confirmation of their representatives. It is reminded that each electoral contestant has the right to designate one representative in the CEC, as well as in the lower-level electoral bodies operating within the constituency in which the respective electoral body functions.

At the same time, it is noted that the electoral authority has established, for each electoral contestant, a maximum number of 2,150 trusted persons, allocated for each electoral constituency. We observe that this number slightly exceeds (+7) the number provided for the presidential and referendum elections of October 20, 2024.

At the time of drafting this report, no requests had been submitted for the confirmation of trusted persons who can participate in the electoral campaign and conduct electoral agitation in favor of the electoral contestants.

According to legal provisions, documents regarding the confirmation of trusted persons may be submitted no later than 7 days before election day.

At the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Youth Council, and Practic Media Group, the CEC approved 14 public interest messages for the parliamentary elections, of which 7 were prepared in coordination with the Commission. In total, during the electoral period, the electoral authority approved 32 public interest messages, of which 38% were prepared by the Commission, as a specialized body in the electoral field.

Furthermore, the CEC authorized the conduct of 6 opinion polls regarding voters' political preferences, by 4 specialized institutions: "MLD MEDIA" S.R.L. (3 polls), AO Institute of Public Policies, "SIMPALS" S.R.L., and S.C. MAGENTA CONSULTING S.R.L. (one each). It is noted that, although CEC decisions regarding the authorization of polls specify concrete deadlines for their submission, information about the poll conducted by "MLD MEDIA" S.R.L. was observed on the NOI.md platform.

At the same time, it is emphasized that, even during the monitored period, the UJM Mission identified at least three cases of opinion polls regarding voters' political preferences conducted without the Commission's authorization.

2.6. Candidate Registration

During the reference period of the report, the CEC approved the registration requests of three independent female candidates: Olesea Stamate with 1,112 supporting signatures, Victoria Sanduța with 1,066 signatures, and Tatiana Crețu with 1,107 signatures. The electoral authority rejected the registration requests of Dina Carpinschi, Natalia Clevadi, and Igor Ianac. The reason for the refusal was an insufficient number of valid supporting signatures presented by the applicants: 908, 66, and 1,816, respectively. We recall that, exceptionally, for independent female candidates, the electoral law provides a minimum threshold of 1,000 supporting signatures, compared to 2,000 signatures required for male candidates.

Additionally, the CEC registered the electoral bloc "Blocul Unirea Națiunii," consisting of two political formations: the National Reunification Party "ACASĂ" and the National Liberal Party. From the reasoning of the decision, we deduce the following: the set of documents was submitted with certain nonconformities, which were later corrected during the administrative procedure

through official correspondence with the applicants. At the same time, we note that, similar to the case of the electoral bloc “Împreună,” the registration decision for this electoral competitor lacks the mention regarding “notifying the constituent political parties about the obligation to submit, together with the registration request, the decisions regarding the designation of their candidates, confirmed by the minutes of the responsible body of each constituent party of the electoral bloc.” We recall that such a mention was included in the case of BEPSIVM, and this omission leads us to conclude that the CEC does not apply a uniform approach in identical cases and therefore treats electoral subjects differently.

The 55-candidate list of the National Moldovan Party (PNM) was also registered. According to the submitted documents, all candidates belong to the PNM. The list was prepared in compliance with the minimum 40% gender representation quota (at least four candidates of the same gender per ten positions): 45.45% or 25 women, and 54.55% or 30 men. As in other cases, participants in the administrative procedure corresponded officially with the CEC for clarifications, completions, corrections, or removal of omissions or nonconformities.

The European Social Democrat Party (PSDE) was registered with a list of 64 candidates, respecting the minimum 40% gender representation quota: 54.7% men (35) and 45.3% women (29). Out of the 64 candidates, only one was not a party member. We note that the CEC impeccably exercised its legal powers to ensure equitable representation of both genders on this electoral competitor’s candidate list. To respect gender quotas, the authority issued several objections, requests for clarification, and requests for repositioning candidates on the list.

We also note that the decision text includes a reference to the submission, by the party president, of a declaration on their own responsibility regarding the free use of the PSDE electoral symbol for the September 28, 2025 parliamentary elections. We emphasize that such mentions do not appear in other CEC registration decisions. Both the Electoral Code and the Regulation on the particularities of designating and registering candidates in parliamentary elections establish the right of political parties to choose and use any graphic image as an electoral symbol, provided it differs from other competitors’ symbols. The only provision requiring formal agreement of the party for the symbol’s use is found in point 36 of the mentioned regulation. According to this rule: “The permanent symbol of a political party not participating in the elections may be used by independent candidates as an electoral symbol only with the consent of the respective party.”

Thus, political parties participating in elections have full freedom to use their permanent symbols. Therefore, we note that the PSDE demonstrated excessive caution by submitting a declaration regarding the free use of its symbol during the parliamentary elections. We assume this caution is based on an ambiguous interpretation of point 34 of the cited regulation: “If applicable, together with the description of the symbol, the act confirming the right to use copyrighted objects listed in the symbol description or a declaration on one’s own responsibility regarding their free use is submitted.”

MO UJM considers that, to prevent non-uniform practices, the CEC should clarify the application of this regulation or provide further details. We emphasize that, according to point 35 of the regulation, “in the case of political parties, the permanent symbol of the political party requesting registration as an electoral competitor may also be registered as an electoral symbol.”

By adopting Decision no. 3818, the CEC admitted the political party “Mișcarea Respect Moldova” (MRM) into the electoral race, with a list of 101 candidates. We observe compliance with the minimum 40% gender representation quota: 42.6% women (43) and 57.4% men (58). All candidates appointed by MRM are party members. In this case as well, the reasoning of the

decision shows a cooperative manner of interaction among participants in the administrative procedure.

The CEC also registered the electoral competitor BEPSCIVM, with a list of 110 candidates. Initially, the Commission rejected the registration of three designated candidates who did not physically appear to confirm submission with a personal signature. We note that one of these three submitted a notarized and apostilled declaration from the authorities of Israel. Analysis of the texts of the two CEC decisions indicates that the administrative procedure was carried out respecting principles of communication and cooperation. In its updated version, the list respects the minimum 40% gender representation quota (at least four candidates of the same gender per ten positions): 41.8% or 46 women and 58.2% or 64 men.

The electoral bloc “Alternativa,” consisting of three political formations: Mișcarea Alternativa Națională, Partidul Dezvoltării, and Partidul Acțiunii Comune – Congresul Civic, was registered as an electoral competitor, with a list of 103 candidates. The bloc’s list respects the minimum 40% gender representation quota: 47.6% women (49) and 52.4% men (54). The decision text shows that some nonconformities identified during the administrative procedure were subsequently resolved, ensuring cooperative communication among participants.

The parties “Liga Orașelor și Comunelor” (LOC), “Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor” (AUR), “Alianța Moldovenii” (PPAM), and the Liberal Party (PL) were registered with candidate lists of 52, 58, 57, and 56 candidates, respectively. In all cases, the lists were prepared in compliance with the

| | | minimum | 40% | gender | representation | quota: |
|----|------|---------|-------|------------|----------------|--|
| a) | LOC | – | 53.8% | women (28) | and 46.2% | men (24); |
| b) | AUR | – | 43.1% | women (25) | and 56.9% | men (33); |
| c) | PPAM | – | 40.4% | women (23) | and 59.6% | men (34); |
| d) | PL | | | | | – 46.4% women (26) and 53.6% men (30). |

In all four cases, we also note the cooperative nature of the administrative procedure, with nonconformities or ambiguities resolved through correspondence among participants. Regarding LOC’s registration request, similar to PSDE, the formation submitted a declaration on its own responsibility regarding the free use of its electoral symbol, based on the interpretable provision in point 34 of the Regulation on designating and registering candidates for parliamentary elections.

We also note that, while all AUR and PL candidates are party members, in the case of LOC, 29 of 52 candidates, and in PPAM, 34 of 57, do not have political affiliation.

The electoral bloc “Blocul Unirea Națiunii,” consisting of two political formations: PRNA and PNL, was registered on August 24, 2025, with a list of 66 candidates. The list includes 29 candidates without political affiliation to either constituent formation, 22 PRNA members, and 15 PNL members. The list also respects the minimum 40% gender representation quota: 42.4% or 28 women and 57.6% or 38 men.

The electoral authority registered the list of 53 candidates of the “Uniunea Creștin-Socială din Moldova” (UCSM). Of these, 39 are not party members. Regarding gender representation, the list includes 56.6% or 30 men and 43.4% or 23 women. The administrative procedure was carried out cooperatively, with all ambiguities and nonconformities addressed during examination.

On August 26, 2025, the CEC registered the 103-candidate list of “Partidul Nostru” (PPPN). The decision text shows that, during the administrative procedure, the authority raised several objections related to incorrect data, nonconformities, or errors. Following these observations, the petitioning party supplemented the file with new documents and modified the initially submitted candidate list. The CEC invoked Article 85(1) of the Administrative Code, according to which “the participant may modify the initial petition or petitions submitted during the procedure until its

completion, except for its object; in this case, the procedure's completion term is not modified." Thus, we deduce that the CEC handled the case with tolerance and applied the cooperation principle stated in Article 34 of the Administrative Code. The registered candidate list includes 29 persons without affiliation to the party that designated them. Regarding the minimum 40% gender representation quota, the list includes 45.63% women (47) and 54.37% men (56).

The CEC rejected the registration request of the "NOI" party, thus denying the formation's participation as an electoral competitor. From the decision text, the party submitted a list of 53 designated candidates and their individual files. However, only 49 appeared personally at the reception group to sign the special form. Also, the CEC identified nonconformities regarding candidates' documents (mainly missing dates or signatures) and noncompliance with gender quota in candidate placement. The decision does not clarify whether the CEC treated the "NOI" party with the same cooperative openness as in similar cases. In the absence of explicit references to correspondence with "NOI" to resolve deficiencies, we hypothesize that the administrative procedure was applied differently compared to other electoral subjects.

The authority also rejected the registration request of the "Renaștere" party. This case is the first application of amendments to the Law on Political Parties under Law no. 100 of June 13, 2025, effective June 14, 2025. MO UJM reiterates its conclusions from Report no. 1, p. 4. Additionally, we note other effects of this law. Law 100/2025 introduced mechanisms facilitating suspension of political parties' activities, including enforcement regarding the party in question. The CEC decision shows that the new provisions were applied to "Renaștere," and activity suspension was ordered by a court decision, enforced immediately. For execution, ASP modified the State Register of Political Parties, entering the restriction. CEC was immediately informed and considered the new circumstances when examining the registration request.

However, the CEC decision does not clarify the reasons behind the party's suspension or procedural details. The registration request was submitted on August 8, to be examined within 7 days. At the end of this period, on August 15, the CEC examined the issue but did not adopt a decision due to lack of votes. The file was reassigned to another reporting member for reexamination in a subsequent CEC session, without specifying the deadline. The court order on activity limitation dates to August 19, 2025, and the CEC received information on registry changes on August 21, 2025. According to the CEC website, four additional sessions occurred between August 15 and 21: August 17, 18, 19, and 20.

We note that, according to points 100, 136, and 139 of the CEC Regulations, decision adoption is an obligation of the Commission, with two voting options: "for" and "against," and abstention counted as "against." Points 138 and 140 allow members voting "against" to issue separate opinions. The analyzed decision does not show whether votes "against" were explicitly expressed or if separate opinions were presented. We deduce that the CEC (or at least a majority of members) deliberately did not exercise its legal obligation within the statutory term. The CEC also did not justify its inaction (failure to adopt any decision regarding candidate registration) in the August 15 session or in subsequent sessions until August 21. Article 31 of the Administrative Code obliges public authorities to justify administrative acts and operations. Regarding the legal framework, MO UJM considers this case a clear example that the amendments introduced by Law no. 100/2025 affected the principle of legal security stated in Article 30 of the Administrative Code.

The registration request of the political party "For People, Nature, and Animals" was also rejected. From the reasoning provided in the decision, it appears that the requesting party did not submit all the documents from its territorial organizations, which, according to its statutory provisions, were required to propose the candidates to be included on the list. The CEC thus found that, under these

circumstances, the decision of the party's central body approving the candidate list lacked legitimacy, as it was made in violation of the statutory procedure. In addition, the CEC found that the minimum 40% gender representation quota for both sexes was not respected, particularly regarding the positioning of candidates on the list, according to the formula of at least four candidates per ten positions. From the detailed analysis of the decision, it is noted that the administrative procedure itself was conducted correctly, in compliance with the principles set forth in Articles 28–34 of the Administrative Code.

By decision no. 3846, the CEC rejected the registration request of candidates nominated by the political party “Moldova Mare” (PPMM). Analyzing the reasoning section of the decision, it appears that the party submitted a list of 70 candidates along with their individual documents. During the administrative procedure, the CEC identified one individual on the list (position no. 42) who fell under the legal restrictions regarding eligibility to be elected (Art. 16 para. 2 of the Electoral Code) and consequently excluded this person from the admissibility review. As a result, after excluding the candidate in position 42, the placement of candidates from positions 41–50 did not meet the minimum 40% gender representation requirement for both sexes. Given this circumstance, the CEC decided to invalidate the entire list, rejecting PPMM's registration request. The reasoning section of the administrative act contains no reference to any correspondence between the authority and the applicant party requesting clarifications or corrections of deficiencies, as was the case for other registered electoral participants. In this context, the UJM Mission notes that the CEC did not respect the principles set out in Articles 28–34 of the Administrative Code during the administrative procedure.

It should also be noted that, by the decision of the Centru Court of Appeal on August 26, 2025, CEC decision no. 3846 was annulled, and the authority was obliged to re-examine the request. The court cited the inconsistency of the CEC and differential treatment of different actors in identical situations. However, on August 30, the Supreme Court of Justice annulled the Centru Court of Appeal's decision. An analysis of this ruling will be provided in the next report.

Additionally, the CEC rejected the registration request for 55 candidates nominated by the political party “New Historical Option” (PPNOI). The reasoning section indicates that during the administrative procedure, a series of errors were identified in the forms completed by some nominees, which were later corrected. However, the CEC determined that there were doubts regarding the party membership status of one candidate on the list (position no. 42). The CEC's assertion is based on a provision in the PPNOI Statute (p. 3.4 lit. a), which states that anyone who has been convicted by a final court sentence cannot be a party member. Since this candidate had a prior conviction, they could not qualify as a party member. Therefore, the CEC excluded this person from position 42 in the registration process, which in turn altered the gender balance for candidates in positions 51–54 to 25% female / 75% male. For these reasons, the CEC invalidated the entire candidate list. In summary, the UJM Mission notes that the CEC excessively interfered with the functional autonomy of the political party, violating the principle of proportionality set out in Art. 29 of the Administrative Code. In the opinion of UJM, the Commission lacks legal competence to verify a person's party membership, and this is an improper function for an authority established to organize and conduct elections. Moreover, the Court of Appeal also ordered the CEC to re-examine PPNOI's registration request.

The registration request submitted by the Movement of Professionals “Speranța-Nadejda” was rejected by the Commission on the grounds that the candidate list submitted was below the legally required minimum. From the reasoning section, it is not possible to determine exactly how many candidates were included on the party's list. The decision only mentions that, before the document

reception commission, only seven persons appeared to confirm in person the submission of candidacy documents. It is also unclear from the content of the decision whether clarifications, corrections, or additions were made during the administrative procedure. It can be assumed that on August 19, when the registration request was submitted, not all designated candidates could appear at the CEC to sign the documents. In these circumstances, the UJM Mission notes that the decision was not sufficiently motivated to demonstrate that the adopted act was proportionate. In this context, it is recalled that, under Articles 33–34 of Administrative Code no. 116/2018, the administrative procedure must be based on the principles of communication and cooperation.

On August 29, 2025, the CEC rejected the registration request of candidates nominated by the political party “Modern Democratic Party” (PDM). Analysis of the decision indicates that PDM submitted its documents on August 18, 2025, and the matter of candidate registration was examined by the Commission after the 7-day deadline stipulated in Art. 68 para. 5 of the Electoral Code. The draft decision stated that “the submitted documents meet the requirements of the Electoral Code and the Regulation on the particularities of nominating and registering candidates for parliamentary elections.” As with the “Renaștere” party, due to the lack of the required number of votes “for,” the CEC did not adopt the draft decision as an individual administrative act favorable to the applicant.

It is reiterated that, according to point 100 of the CEC Activity Regulation, adopting decisions is an obligation of the Commission. Points 136 and 139 provide only two voting options: “for” or “against,” with abstention being equivalent to a vote against. Under points 138 and 140, a member who votes “against” may provide a separate opinion explaining their reasons. From the analyzed decision, it is not clear whether “against” votes were explicitly cast or whether separate opinions were expressed. Therefore, it can be inferred that the CEC (or at least a majority of members) deliberately failed to exercise its legal obligation within the established timeframe. Furthermore, the CEC did not sufficiently justify its inaction (manifested as failure to adopt a decision regarding candidate registration) either at the August 25 or August 26 meetings. The Commission revisited the case only at the meeting on August 29, following correspondence with the Public Services Agency, which informed the Commission of PDM’s exclusion from the list of political parties eligible to participate in the elections (previously sent to the CEC via letter no. 01/9133 on July 14, 2025).

The UJM Mission reiterates that amendments to the political party law, introduced by Law no. 100/2025, created a situation affecting the principle of legal certainty established in Art. 30 of the Administrative Code. At the start of the electoral campaign, there were 21 registered electoral competitors: 4 electoral blocs, 13 political parties, and 4 independent candidates. Several court cases are pending regarding rejected candidate registration requests or cases where parties were not included in the list of parties eligible to nominate candidates.

Finally, the Central Electoral Commission invited electoral competitors and media representatives to sign the Code of Conduct for conducting and covering the parliamentary election campaign for September 28, 2025. According to public information, only half of the registered competitors and six media institutions signed the document.

2.7. Transfer of the SIAS “Elections” Infrastructure: Suspicions Regarding Institutional Asymmetry in System Administration

In the context of the parliamentary elections on September 28, 2025, the Commission decided to transfer the technical hosting of critical components of the State Automated Information

System “Elections” (SIAS “Elections”) to the Information Technology and Cybersecurity Service (STISC).

According to official statements, operational control over SIAS “Elections” remains exclusively with the CEC, while STISC provides strictly hosting and technical support services, without direct access to electoral data. However, this situation raises major governance and transparency concerns, since the CEC is an independent institution, whereas STISC is subordinated to the Government.

This institutional asymmetry creates a perception of potential administrative interference—whether real or perceived—in the organization and conduct of the election. Lack of clarity regarding technical protocols, transfer agreements, and monitoring mechanisms amplifies public suspicions.

It is noteworthy that several extra-parliamentary political parties (CUB, People’s Will, National Moldovan Party) publicly criticized the decision, citing the risk of indirect subordination of the electoral process to the executive. In response, the Government rejected the allegations, insisting that electoral data remain fully under the CEC’s control.

The situation was further complicated by a major cybersecurity incident reported by STISC on August 11, 2025, attributed to a “foreign actor.” According to the official statement, the attack targeted government infrastructure and involved attempted sabotage. Following the investigation, several STISC employees were suspended due to suspected complicity, and an internal inquiry was launched.

This development increases risks for SIAS “Elections,” now hosted in the same data center. Transferring electoral infrastructure to an institution under an active security investigation not only heightens operational risks but also erodes public trust in the electoral process.

The transfer decision affects essential SIAS “Elections” modules, all of which directly impact the integrity of the electoral process:

- **State Voter Register** – a unique, integrated information system for recording, storing, updating, and analyzing information about Moldovan citizens, including those abroad who are of voting age and legally eligible. Any breach could generate suspicions of electoral list manipulation.
- **Pre-registration** – a web application available to Moldovan citizens intending to vote abroad. Through this system, voters declare in advance their intention and voting location, giving electoral authorities a clearer picture of diaspora distribution on election day. This information is critical for planning polling stations abroad, ensuring adequate resources, and reducing risks of overcrowding or underutilization.
- **Voter turnout monitoring** – verifies voters at polling stations and monitors participation in real time. As a central tool for transparency, its continuous and correct functioning is essential. Any technical disruption could undermine visibility of the process and raise suspicions of fraud or data manipulation. Interference before publication could influence

voter behavior and allow differential mobilization strategies on election day. Security, integrity, and availability of this module are critical for public confidence.

- **Preliminary results** – centralizes electronic protocols from polling stations and provides an initial aggregated picture of the election outcome. Integrity of this module is essential for transparency, accuracy, and credibility. Main risks include manipulation at the source or during central processing. Without strong audit and control mechanisms, STISC administrators could alter numerical values or redistribute votes before publication, seriously compromising election legitimacy and potentially triggering mass contestation.
- **Electronic subscription lists** – a digital platform allowing individuals to support a candidate or initiate a referendum via electronic or mobile signatures. As this system is hosted by STISC, which also manages the national electronic signature infrastructure (MSign), its functionality directly depends on the stability and security of government systems.

The UJM Mission identified the following general risks:

- **MSign service unavailability** – any interruption or malfunction could block candidate support processes, limit some participants' access, and create inequalities potentially leading to legal challenges.
- **Deliberate operational blockages (DoS/DDoS)** – cyberattacks could cause temporary unavailability during critical periods of signature collection, delaying registration and affecting fairness.
- **Uncontrolled privileged access** – administrators with extended rights over application databases, without robust auditing, logging, or segregation of duties, could alter the number or identity of validated signatures, undermining electoral legitimacy and public trust.

These components form the “backbone” of the digital electoral process. Any failure or compromise could generate mass contestations and affect the legitimacy of results.

To clarify aspects of the transfer, security measures, and system auditing, on August 14, 2025, the UJM Mission sent requests to the CEC and STISC for access to public information (see Annex 1). The questions focused on fundamental aspects of security, governance, and the integrity of the digital electoral process. The fact that these questions remained unanswered implicitly leaves these areas as ongoing risk factors.

According to Law no. 148 on Access to Public Information, public information must be provided once available, no later than 10 days after the request (with a justified extension of up to 7 days). As of August 28, 2025, neither institution had responded nor notified of an extended deadline. This constitutes a serious violation of legal norms and limits civic oversight in a matter of critical importance.

3. Cases of Undermining Freedom of Expression and (Non-)Ensuring Pluralism of Opinion

The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, through Articles 32 and 34, guarantees citizens the freedom of thought, opinion, and expression in public through words, images, or any other possible means, as well as access to any information of public interest.

Due to the continuous evolution of the online environment, it has become increasingly attractive and accessible to the general public, taking precedence over offline media. Audiences have gradually shifted from television and radio to platforms such as YouTube and Telegram. According to the most recent electoral barometer, social media—particularly Facebook and Telegram—represent the primary source of information about politics and elections for 41.6% of respondents. During the monitored period, MO UJM observed actions that can be interpreted both as violations of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and as forms of censorship targeting civil society. Several active and critical Telegram and YouTube channels reported cases of intimidation, attempted attacks, and disruptions to their activity. At least four channels were targeted, some while publishing disclosures regarding alleged acts of corruption by representatives of state institutions. These channels' activities were disrupted through coordinated attacks using bot farms, which simultaneously subscribed to the channels (up to 21,000 subscriptions within a few hours), disseminated illegal content, and subsequently reported the channels to the chat administrators. Thus, although state institutions appeal to European values and democratic principles and declare that they fight to guarantee citizens' rights, we observe in Moldova the use of tactics applied globally to suppress critical voices—those who dare to think differently, investigate, speak out, provide detailed information, and present alternative perspectives on reality. The lack of response from authorities fuels suspicions that the blocking of these information resources is not coincidental, and that, in the run-up to elections, pluralism of opinion is severely affected. Moreover, indications of the existence of a list of Telegram channels to be blocked immediately before the elections are increasingly credible.

MO UJM expresses its disagreement with any actions of disinformation or manipulation of public opinion, including through fake or non-transparently sponsored accounts, regardless of the authors or sponsors. Considering that these elections are regarded by multiple actors as the most important in the history of the Republic of Moldova, and noting that the CEC received 50 requests to register candidates for parliamentary positions, we believe that voters—encouraged to participate in informed and responsible voting—have the right to access multiple, clear, alternative, and independent sources of information. This is essential for a conscious and responsible choice of those who will represent their interests in the future Parliament.

We also note that, according to Article 34, paragraph (5) of the Constitution, public media are not subject to censorship. Telegram channels that engage in critical discourse are public, accessible, viewable, and allow free subscription. MO UJM emphasizes that while freedom of expression is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and may be subject to legal limitations. However, we note the absence of evidence or communications from state institutions indicating that the content of these posts aimed to defame the state or the people, incite aggression, national, racial, or religious hatred, discrimination, territorial separatism, public violence, or other acts that undermine the constitutional order (Article 32, paragraph (3) of the Constitution). Furthermore, there is a lack of official statements from the relevant public institutions denying the content of posts on these Telegram channels.

We recall that, in a letter dated August 11, 2025, the Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation—which was designated as a focal point for liaising with Meta Platforms Inc. and Google LLC—informed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI) that MAI reports considered as disinformation, information manipulation, or foreign interference would be forwarded to moderators of international platforms: Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Google (Play, Ads).

4. Cases of Using the Images of Public Officials, Including Foreign Officials, for Electoral Promotion

MO UJM notes that, contrary to the provisions of Article 70(4) of the Electoral Code, representatives of political parties registered in the upcoming autumn electoral race (PAS and PSRM) are using and benefiting from image transfers from foreign officials.

Specifically, we highlight the promotion of Igor Dodon's meeting with the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Moldova, as well as Igor Grosu's meetings with the Prime Minister of Romania and the Ambassador of the European Union to Chișinău. Additionally, the presence of officials from France, Germany, Poland, and subsequently Romania in Chișinău is noted.

We consider that the messages delivered by these officials during press statements on 27 August 2025, regarding upcoming European assistance and funding, as well as Moldova's integration into the European Union, constitute electoral messages favoring a specific electoral competitor (PAS). Furthermore, we consider that the presence of European officials in Chișinău, under the auspices of the President of the Republic of Moldova, represents an interference in the electoral campaign of the party whose informal leader she is. Moreover, the methods and promotion tools used indirectly favored the ruling party – a competing electoral actor – and influenced the opinion of at least 90,000 citizens present at the event.

We also emphasize the direct and indirect involvement of President Maia Sandu in PAS's electoral activities, as well as the frequent use of her image for electoral promotion purposes by this electoral competitor.

5. Cases of Electoral Propaganda by Religious Figures

Both the Electoral Code and the Contraventional Code prohibit the involvement and use of religious institutions' images in electoral campaigning and advertising. Nevertheless, during the monitoring period, MO UJM identified a case on social media of propaganda conducted inside a church, in front of parishioners, through the dissemination and promotion of political topics that could distort reality, undermine citizens' trust, and divide society. It is worth noting that, according to the most recent electoral barometer, citizens' trust in the Church stands at 42%, exceeding the level of trust in the Presidency, Parliament, Government, judiciary, mass media, police, and the army.

In this context, we commend the joint efforts of CECE No. 10 and the Căușeni Police Inspectorate in training and informing local priests about the illegal support of the Church in electoral campaigns and the sanctions applicable for political propaganda within places of worship.

Subsequently, according to information in the "Outgoing Documents" section, the electoral authority contacted the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, requesting it to discourage and sanction political or electoral promotion activities. Since two Orthodox metropolises operate in Moldova—the Metropolis of Moldova, under the jurisdiction of the Russian Patriarchate, and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, subordinated to the Romanian Patriarchate—we consider that, to prevent any political or electoral promotion, the Commission should have addressed both metropolises equally. Prohibited actions under electoral and contraventional legislation could potentially be carried out by representatives of either metropolis, regardless of the final beneficiary.

6 . Cases of Intimidation of Election Participants

Despite the declared efforts of public institutions to create optimal conditions for the unhindered exercise of the constitutional right to vote and to stand for election in a free and fair competition, MO UJM observed cases of intimidation and violence directed against some electoral competitors. For example, a PSDE candidate was physically assaulted by a district councilor representing PAS, while Vasile Costiuc (PDA) and PRIM campaigners were intimidated by staff from the Buiucani Police Inspectorate..

7. Monitoring the Mass Media in Terms of Political Party Activity Coverage

And for the period 12–28 August 2025, MO UJM analyzed the frequency and the way in which the 35 political parties with the right to participate in the autumn elections were reflected in the national media (4 television channels: PRO TV, Jurnal TV, TV8, Moldova 1; 3 radio stations: Radio Moldova, Radio Chișinău, Radio Europa Liberă; 10 online portals: realitatea.md, stiri.md, zdg.md, newsmaker.md, noi.md, unimedia.md, deschide.md, agora.md, nordnews.md, nokta.md; 3 news agencies: IPN, INFOTAG, MOLDPRES).

Thus, we observe a significant increase in the share of coverage of political parties' activities by the monitored TV channels, from 15 to 33 political parties (+51% compared to the previous monitoring period). The most frequently mentioned was PSRM (21 appearances), followed by PCRM (18) and PDMM (17). On the opposite end, the least covered were CUB, PAM, and PDA (one appearance each). For the monitored period, we observe that the share of neutral mentions remained 80%, and negative mentions – 20% of cases. Most frequently, PSRM's activity was covered neutrally (16 appearances), followed by PCRM (13 appearances) and PDMM (12 appearances).

Similarly, for radio stations, we observe a significant increase in the share of coverage of political parties' activities, from 11 to 32 political formations (+60% compared to the previous monitoring period). The most frequently covered was PCRM (16 appearances), followed by PSRM, PRIM, and PVM (14 appearances each). On the opposite end, the least mentioned were LOC, CUB, PN, UCSM, and UCM (2 appearances each). Mentions were predominantly neutral (85%), and negative – 15%.

In the monitored online press, a slight increase in coverage of political parties' activities was also observed, from 26 to 32 formations (+17% compared to the previous period). The most frequently mentioned remained PAS (109 appearances), followed by PSRM (80) and PRIM (78). The least covered formations were PONA (4 mentions) and ALDE (5 mentions). The share of coverage tone remained generally the same: neutral – 75% of cases, negative – 17%, positive – only 8%. However, the number of political formations reflected positively increased from eight to 15. We note that, among the monitored national media institutions, only the online press reflected the activity of certain political parties positively.

Compared to the previous monitoring period, when news agencies covered the activities of only 40% of political parties, in the period 12–28 August 2025, they reflected the activities of all 35 political parties with the right to participate in the autumn 2025 elections. The most frequently covered was PAS (10 appearances), followed by PDMM (6). On the opposite end, six political formations – ALDE, PRM, PN, UCSM, PPM, and PDA – were mentioned only once. The share of neutral mentions slightly increased from 89% to 93%, while negative mentions decreased from 11% to 7%.

In conclusion, we find that, for the most part, the monitored national media institutions reflected the activities of political parties neutrally, and no preference toward any electoral competitor was identified. For the period covered by the report, PAS is the electoral competitor with the highest media visibility (137 appearances/mentions), followed by three of the four parties in the electoral bloc BEPSIVM: PSRM (119), PRIM (112), and PCRM (109). Additionally, we note a slight increase in the share of negative mentions, from 15% to 17%, as well as positive mentions, from 4% to 5%. The share of neutral mentions remains dominant at 79%. PAS's activity remains the most exposed to criticism, followed by PRIM and PCRM (see Annex no. 2).

8. Reflection of Political Parties' Activities on Social Networks

8.1. Reflection of Political Parties' Activities on Facebook, TikTok, and/or Telegram

During the reference period, MO UJM continued analyzing the social media pages of the 35 political parties eligible to participate in the parliamentary elections on September 28, 2025. It was noted that political parties actively use these platforms to outline thematic agendas, express ideological positioning, and interact with the electorate. Digital communication is characterized by a diversity of styles and intentions, marked by a high degree of polarization and narrative competition.

The most frequently encountered narratives in the online discourse of political parties are:

Direct criticism of the current government and the socio-economic situation – promoted intensively by opposition parties PSRM, PR, PN, NOI, PDA, PMMA, PSDE, AUR, PDMM, PRIMA, PACC, PPFV, MAN, PCRM, VM, MRM. The narrative, emphasizing economic, social, administrative, and institutional issues, is expressed through a wide range of formats and channels – from detailed Facebook and Telegram posts to short video content adapted for TikTok. Messages often contain negative statements about the governing party (PAS) and its leaders, addressing topics such as rising prices, poverty, population exodus, selective justice, or infrastructure degradation. The language used is often forceful, with strong terms, expressing deep dissatisfaction with the current government. Some posts include concrete examples and images from local areas, while others rely on statistical data to support their positions. Communication is mostly bilingual (Romanian and Russian), indicating a strategy targeting a diverse ethnic and linguistic electorate. Messages appear aimed at increasing supporter mobilization and consolidating a position as a political alternative to the current government.

Geopolitical orientation – European integration versus sovereignty and neutrality

The theme of geopolitical orientation is deeply polarized in online political discourse, reflecting major societal divisions regarding the country's strategic future:

- **Pro-EU and pro-West parties**, including PAS, PNM, PSDE, AUR, PL, ALDE, LOC, CUB, and PVE, promote an optimistic narrative. These parties associate European integration with values of peace, progress, security, and economic prosperity. Their messages are delivered through professional video content, campaigns with slogans like #MoldovaEuropeana, and posts highlighting achievements attained with European support. Unionists, especially AUR and PNM, emphasize unification with Romania as the only real

path to EU and NATO membership, framing elections as a crucial civilizational choice for the country's future.

- **Eurosceptic, pro-neutrality, and pro-East parties**, including PSRM, PCRM, PN, NOI, PACC, PMMA, VM, and PR, promote an alarmist and cautionary narrative. They criticize the economic and political risks of closer ties with the EU and NATO, emphasizing loss of national sovereignty and potential involvement in military conflict. These parties seek to mobilize voters concerned about weakening ties with the East, appealing to strong sentiments regarding sovereignty, economic stability, and security.

Polarization is also reflected in communication style: pro-European parties use a positive, modern, and encouraging tone, while Eurosceptic parties adopt a cautious, sometimes alarmist language, emphasizing the protection of Moldova's independence and neutrality.

Promotion of national identity, patriotism, and traditional values

National identity, patriotism, and traditional values are expressed in an emotional and mobilizing tone, with frequent references to historical elements, national symbols, and Orthodox faith. Parties involved in promoting this narrative include MAN, PMMA, PSRM, PCRM, PPFV, PRIMA, AUR, PNM, PL, ALDE, and MRM. Ideological polarization is observed: MAN, PMMA, and PSRM promote a distinct Moldovan identity and support the statehood of the Republic of Moldova, opposing what they describe as "Western globalism." In contrast, AUR, PNM, and PL explicitly support unification with Romania as a fundamental national project. Messages are delivered via video speeches and posts with patriotic slogans, often addressing sensitive issues such as church affiliation. The declared goal is to consolidate a loyal voter base based on identity and create an emotional connection with specific segments of the electorate.

Socio-economic and local development issues

These themes are addressed from two perspectives. Opposition parties – PSRM, PSDE, PN, ALDE, DA, PPFV, PRIMA, PNM, PMMA, PR, CUB, and LOC – use communication focused on empathy and, in some cases, populist rhetoric. They emphasize acute social problems experienced by part of the population, such as poverty, rising living costs, massive labor emigration, low pensions, and difficulties in the agricultural sector. Messages are often illustrated with video materials showing party leaders interacting directly with citizens, creating an apparent personal and authentic connection with community problems. Statistical data and analyses are also used to support these positions. Overall, these messages seem aimed at highlighting the government's perceived inefficiency in addressing everyday citizen concerns.

Conversely, the governing party and those with strong local administrations – PAS, MAN, and LOC – adopt a positive and pragmatic style, oriented toward results. They build an image of competent administrators, highlighting completed or ongoing projects focused on local infrastructure development, such as road rehabilitation, park creation and modernization, water network expansion, and initiatives under the "European Village" program. These achievements are communicated via professional video materials and posts emphasizing commitment to progress and administrative responsibility. The aim is to build a credible and solid image, appealing especially to a pragmatic electorate concerned with concrete improvements in living conditions.

Electoral process, justice, and political persecution

Analysis of political communication shows diverse approaches and tones regarding this topic. Parties such as PR, PSRM, PMMA, PSDE, PNM, ALDE, PDA, PACC, PDM, MAN, and AUR adopted a formal and informative tone, announcing official registration in the electoral race and mobilization of campaign teams.

In contrast, other parties' public discourse is confrontational, with accusations of victimization and defiance toward state institutions. They allege political influence over CEC and the judicial system, claiming unjustified blocking of candidate registrations and politically motivated criminal cases, portraying their leaders as victims of an abusive regime. Communication tools include direct video statements, press releases with legal arguments, and appeals to public protests. These messages appear intended to both consolidate support among their followers by framing a "us versus the system" narrative and to undermine public perception of the electoral process and judicial reforms in the eyes of the public and international observers.

This communicative dynamic reflects a tense political climate surrounding the electoral process and the functioning of institutions responsible for organizing and overseeing elections.

8.2. Observation of Covert Electoral Campaigning

Similar to the monitoring period of Report No. 2, during the reference period, the MO UJM identified cases of disguised electoral campaigning through the organization of events with an electoral character, actions, and messages of an electoral nature before the official campaign period began.

During the reference period, the mission observed various obvious forms of disguised electoral campaigning by several political parties. Although multiple formations and their leaders were active in this regard, during the reference period, the most involved and consistent in promoting disguised electoral messages before the official start of the electoral campaign were PAS, the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, the ALTERNATIVA Bloc, PSDE, Partidul Nostru, ALDE, the political party "Moldova Mare," the "Mișcarea Respect Moldova" Party, PNM, the political party "Democrația Acasă," the "Moldovenii" Alliance, PL, as well as AUR, the Coalition for Unity and Welfare (CUB), the League of Cities and Communes (LOC), the Party of People, Nature, and Animals (PONA), and the Bloc Unirea Națiunii (BUN).

Regarding the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), disguised electoral campaigning was observed through the following actions:

Policy promises and benefits. The promotion of governmental achievements and projects was used as a means of disguised electoral campaigning, presenting them as the party's successes to attract voter support. These posts included themes such as energy independence, local infrastructure development, increases in allowances and pensions, accession to the European Union, and diaspora support. External examples of success were also used to inspire confidence and promote governmental programs as direct benefits provided by PAS. The messages contained both direct electoral promises and subtle appeals aimed at building a positive image of the party before the official campaign.

Events with an electoral character. PAS used various cultural, civic, and social events to promote its messages and candidates before the official campaign period. By participating in festivals, promoting governmental projects, and organizing volunteer actions, the party associates

administrative achievements with its political image, thereby disguising electoral campaigning as civic or cultural activities. This strategy aims to mobilize the electorate and strengthen a positive image among different population segments.

Calls to action and mobilization before the official campaign. Prior to the official campaign period, direct appeals were made to citizens to become volunteers and actively support the party, especially on Facebook and TikTok. These messages, including invitations to events and clear political statements, aimed to mobilize supporters and promote candidacies prematurely, violating the rules of a fair and transparent electoral campaign. Such actions constitute clear disguised electoral campaigning intended to strengthen the party's position with the electorate.

Sponsored posts and promotional content. During the reference period, certain parties, especially PAS, used social networks to make posts that indirectly promoted the electoral campaign before its official start. These included requests for donations, presentation of governmental achievements, criticism of political opponents, and promotion of the party's political messages through videos and live broadcasts. Although they may appear as ordinary actions, they constitute disguised electoral campaigning as they attempt to influence public opinion and mobilize supporters before the legal period.

Use of slogans. Before the official campaign, electoral slogans and hashtags were widely used, such as "Vote PAS," "#UE2028," or "#MoldovaEuropeana," linking the party's image to key promises and achievements like EU accession or governmental projects. These messages were promoted through videos and social media posts, transforming informational content into clearly identified campaign materials, subtly reinforcing electoral presence before the legal campaign period.

Disguised electoral campaigning was also visible in the case of the Patriotic Electoral Bloc (PSRM, PCRM, Viitorul Moldovei, INIMA Moldovei), manifested through the following actions:

Policy promises and benefits. The Patriotic Electoral Bloc systematically uses critical speeches against the current government to introduce electoral promises, often disguised as civic, patriotic, or social statements. These promises address sensitive topics such as the rights of pensioners and youth, access to polling stations for voters from the left bank of the Dniester, minority protection, justice reform, economic growth, and restoration of constitutional order.

The Bloc employs the following strategies: direct criticism of the government followed by implicit recovery promises, region- or ethnicity-specific promises (e.g., special status for Taraclia, minority protection), justice commitments (special commissions for fraud, review of political cases); appeals to traditional and religious values through promises of "responsible and experienced leadership"; defending voting rights of citizens in the Transnistrian region and eastern diaspora, promising expanded polling access.

Events with an electoral character. The Bloc uses religious, commemorative, and cultural events to promote the image of its leaders and party, especially in territories with local leadership affiliated with PSRM. Attendance at services, city celebrations, marches, and flower-laying ceremonies is frequent, used to: associate traditional values with the party via the Orthodox Church and national holidays; consolidate the image of patriotic leaders close to the people, particularly through the presence of Igor Dodon, Irina Vlah, and Vasile Tarlev; mobilize party members through regional meetings and mobilization messages before the official campaign start.

These actions exhibit all the characteristics of a ground electoral campaign: direct meetings with citizens, thematic speeches, mobilizing messages, and distribution of promotional materials.

Calls to action and mobilization. The Bloc addresses its electorate with appeals encouraging voting, mobilization, and protests, promising to defend voting rights. Public messages from leaders

(Dodon, Tarlev), with explicit participation calls for elections, protests, or marches, are frequently presented as patriotic or civic actions, though their content is electoral.

Sponsored content and promotional posts. The Bloc uses sponsored communication channels (Facebook, Telegram, TikTok) to promote:

- Anti-government messages (e.g., “capturing the Constitutional Court,” “election fraud”).
- Thematic campaigns: defending the vote, team professionalism, governance experience.
- Political events presented as administrative (submission of documents to CEC, protests in front of institutions).

These materials aim to reinforce the perception of a united, competent opposition capable of taking over governance.

Use of slogans. The Bloc employs electoral slogans and hashtags to reinforce the message of unity and mobilization, e.g., “The Future of Moldova is in Our Hands,” “United for the Country”; consolidates visual identity through repeated hashtags (#ViitorulMoldovei, #MoldovaLiberă, #БудущееМолдовы); differentiates itself from the government with negative messages (“Down with Maia Sandu,” “Cleaning the country of PAS!”).

Disguised electoral campaigning was also observed at the ALTERNATIVA Bloc (MAN, PDCM, Alexandr Stoianoglo, Civic Congress).

Policy promises/benefits. ALTERNATIVA promotes a political platform based on administrative competence, economic efficiency, digitalization, and social equity, frequently using disguised electoral promises in official communications, media appearances, or technical conferences. Key highlighted elements are municipal programs presented as future national solutions (digitalization, infrastructure, public transport); promises of efficient governance contrasting with the “incompetence” of the current administration (PAS); direct criticism of CEC decisions, positioning the bloc as a defender of fair electoral processes; presentation of Chișinău development platform as a nationally replicable model.

Events with an electoral character. ALTERNATIVA, particularly through Ion Ceban, often uses resources of the Chișinău City Hall to consolidate electoral image. Administrative events are presented as proof of MAN team efficiency, turning them into campaign materials: promotion of infrastructure, transport, and education projects as personal successes of the leader and team; cultural and social events (festivals, fairs, minority meetings) attract different electorate categories; diplomatic meetings and international partnerships (e.g., USA, EBRD) validate the bloc’s political legitimacy; media appearances and interviews transmit disguised electoral messages, consolidating leader recognition.

Sponsored posts/promotional content. ALTERNATIVA actively invests in online sponsored communication (TikTok and Facebook), promoting main leaders’ image (Ion Ceban, Ion Chicu) as competent, with concrete solutions; contrast between “PAS inefficiency” and “bloc professionalism,” highlighted through direct or ironic messages; indirect calls to vote by emphasizing the bloc’s ability to “solve problems” ignored or created by the current administration.

Use of slogans. ALTERNATIVA employs implicit branding strategies using the name “ALTERNATIVA” as a constant political slogan; association of the bloc’s name and the term “team” with Chișinău achievements creates a sense of a functional structure ready to govern; repetition of competence and action – “we act, others only talk” – becomes a recurrent unofficial slogan.

Disguised electoral campaigning was observed at the European Social Democratic Party (PSDE).

Policy promises/benefits. PSDE positions itself as a moderate, professional, social-democratic alternative focused on citizen interests, frequently using disguised electoral promises through

online posts, public appearances, or video messages. Key elements are identifying social, economic, or administrative issues (urban traffic, farmer support, lack of justice reforms) and presenting implicit or vague solutions; direct criticism of PAS, positioning PSDE as a party that would bring “real reforms”; emphasizing “competence” and “professionalism in governance”; using a savior-type discourse (“we stop the destruction of Moldova”), implicitly promising national recovery; promoting PSDE candidates and teams as professionals ready to govern efficiently.

Events with an electoral character. PSDE conducts activities in the field via thematic events, participation in local celebrations, or PR actions. For example, association with local and religious events (feasts, Christian holidays) promotes party values such as family support; presentation of parliamentary candidates through promotional videos, printed materials, and direct interactions; participation in cultural festivals or artistic events strengthens visibility and links the party to tradition, culture, and national identity; media reactions to incidents (e.g., aggression against a candidate) increase political visibility; leveraging international support (e.g., messages from the Socialist International) serves as political legitimacy.

Calls to action and mobilization. PSDE regularly uses direct appeals to vote and mobilizing messages in public communications, particularly promoting candidates. Examples include “Support the team!”, “Support the three roses!”, “Choose the professionals!” integrated into videos, social media posts, and promotional materials with electoral content. Symbolic identifiers (roses – PSDE symbol) create cohesion and loyalty among voters.

Use of slogans. PSDE employs mobilizing and identity slogans in official communications to reinforce electoral messages and party image. The slogan “Let’s build a prosperous future for every citizen, here at home” is used in candidate presentations and video materials to inspire trust and attachment. Slogans were presented repeatedly before the official campaign, consolidating ideological profile and electoral intentions.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in Partidul Nostru (PN) activities.

Policy promises/benefits. PN promotes anti-corruption rhetoric and positions leader Renato Usatîi as the only real option to fight systemic corruption. Political messages focus on a different governance approach, based on “real action” and courage. Speeches and video posts include clear promises regarding parliamentary activities, presented before the official campaign. Recurring themes involve state reform, justice, agriculture, and combatting the current political class.

Events with an electoral character. PN and its leader, Renato Usatîi, frequently conduct electoral activities disguised as participation in local events, symbolic visits, and public celebrations. Attendance at local holidays (e.g., Drochia City Day or Independence Day) includes mobilizing messages and future promises, promoted heavily on social media. Leader visibility is enhanced by participation in private, media-covered events (e.g., weddings), building an image of a leader close to the people. Cultural events, concerts, and official meetings (including with foreign diplomats) serve as proof of political relevance and international legitimacy. Procedural actions, such as submitting documents to the CEC, are turned into media events to mobilize supporters and convey messages of strength and organization.

Sponsored posts/promotional content. PN invests in sponsored online content, especially on Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram, to maintain visibility and promote an image of active opposition. Renato Usatîi and PN representative Denis Șova deliver messages critical of PAS governance, accusing it of propaganda and incompetence. Messages are accompanied by proposed solutions and indirect appeals to support Partidul Nostru as an alternative. Simultaneously, the party promotes a rational image advocating political dialogue and balance, targeting moderate and

disillusioned voters. Posts also aim to mobilize voters through direct registration and participation appeals.

Use of slogans. PN uses slogans and hashtags as political branding tools. Expressions like #DoarPentruMoldova and #ТолькоЗаМолдову are consistently inserted into posts as identity slogans. Promotional videos include hashtags directly linked to the party or leader (#PartidulNostru, #renatousatii), systematically repeated to strengthen online recognition. Even humorous content contains these electoral tags, ensuring constant digital presence and positive public associations.

Manifestări de campanie electorală mascată în activitatea Alianței Liberalilor și Democratilor pentru Europa (ALDE)

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)

Policy promises/benefits. ALDE builds its public identity around a reformist discourse, centered on the courage to change the current political system and pro-European, anti-oligarchic commitments. The party promotes symbolic initiatives with nationalist undertones, such as renaming bridges over the Dniester in memory of the heroes of the 1992 conflict, an action aimed at attracting voters with patriotic views. In parallel, promises related to an independent foreign policy and positioning ALDE as a “courageous alternative” are clearly and repeatedly formulated outside the legal campaign period through constant posts on social media, especially on the personal accounts of the leaders. These messages attempt to offer a solution to dissatisfaction with the current government and position ALDE as a new, active political force ready to act in the interest of citizens.

Electoral events. The party’s public activity is disguised as civic, cultural, or religious actions. Arina Spătaru’s participation in religious celebrations or sending congratulatory messages on traditional events are used as vehicles for conveying the party’s values. Additionally, events such as “Give 5 ALDE,” a fundraising campaign organized before the official electoral campaign, are heavily promoted to mobilize supporters and consolidate the image of an organized and engaged formation. ALDE presents its team and conducts internal trainings, later publicly promoted, to strengthen voter confidence in the administrative and professional capacity of the party.

Call to action and mobilization. The party issues direct appeals for votes and political support through messages published before the official campaign period. These include explicit calls (“Support ALDE on September 28”) and quantifiable electoral objectives (“We need 74,000 votes”), transforming digital content into a full-fledged electoral campaign. Mobilization is reinforced by an energetic discourse focused on the need for change and the values of integrity and courage, cultivated as an essential part of the party’s identity.

Sponsored posts/promotional content. ALDE extensively uses online channels to promote party messages in the form of civic education campaigns, journalistic investigations, or reactions to political attacks. Arina Spătaru’s actions in these areas are frequently publicized and presented as evidence of personal competence and courage. Meanwhile, posts clarifying misinformation or explaining manipulations in the public sphere serve to strengthen trust in the party’s fairness and transparency while projecting the image of a victim of the corrupt political system.

Use of slogans. Electoral slogans and hashtags are central elements of ALDE's campaign. Terms such as “#CourageousAlternative,” “#ALDETeam,” or “#aldevoiceofminorities” are used consistently in posts as political branding and mobilization tools. Through these tags, ALDE seeks to consolidate a distinct political identity and associate the party with courage, transparency, and openness toward all social groups. The party positions itself as a defender of minorities, particularly the Roma community, and declares itself a firm opponent of oligarchy. Pro-European messages and those concerning illegal party financing are accompanied by the same type of disguised electoral discourse delivered before the legal campaign period. This strategy amplifies the party's visibility and consolidates loyalty among the target electorate, relying on recurring themes such as civic courage, integrity, and European affiliation.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the “Mișcarea Respect Moldova” Party

Policy promises/benefits. Mișcarea Respect Moldova constructs its political discourse around competence, balance, and responsibility in governance. Messages communicated through articles and online posts promote the image of a serious party offering “real solutions” for citizens, contrasting with the current government. These promises of efficient and balanced governance are formulated indirectly but recurrently, constituting a pre-electoral strategy. Through this positioning, the party aims to attract a moderate electorate disappointed by political polarization, relying on a pragmatic discourse focused on stability and professionalism.

Electoral events. Mișcarea Respect Moldova actively participates in public and cultural events, using them as platforms to promote its leaders and consolidate a community-centered image. Participation in the “Carpet Festival” in Gagauzia or direct meetings with citizens in Moldovan villages is heavily publicized and presented as authentic contact with the people, although in essence these actions are premature electoral activities. Additionally, leaders' appearances on TV shows or podcasts, where criticisms of the government or the European Union are raised, are distributed and promoted through official party channels to reinforce the image of an articulate and active opposition. The constant public presence of leaders, accompanied by critical messages and reaffirmation of party values, contributes to mobilizing the electorate and increasing the party's visibility before the official campaign begins.

Use of slogans. Mișcarea Respect Moldova turns the party name into a political branding tool. The term “Respect” is used as an electoral message, both visually and in hashtags such as #RespectMoldova, appearing in social media posts and video materials. This communication strategy aims to consolidate a modern, citizen-oriented party identity and traditional values while creating an emotional framework around the idea of respect—for people, culture, and the state. The consistent use of these elements outside the official campaign period indicates a tactic of gradually building electoral recognition and loyalty among an electorate that avoids direct political conflicts but seeks stability and mutual respect in public life.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the “Alianța Moldovenii” Party

Policy promises/benefits. Alianța “Moldovenii” shapes its public presence by promoting policy proposals that go beyond party communication and enter the sphere of electoral campaigning.

These include initiatives related to judicial reform, modernization of public services (e.g., transforming the Post of Moldova), education, national security, and press freedom. Detailed governance plans, proposed laws such as those on fiscal receipts, or critical comments directed at the government accompanied by alternative solutions form an electoral strategy aimed at attracting a pragmatic electorate dissatisfied with the status quo. Additionally, visions regarding national reintegration or positioning Moldova as a regional leader in education are heavily promoted before the official campaign begins, reflecting a well-defined electoral agenda.

Electoral events. Alianța “Moldovenii” frequently organizes public activities presented as civic initiatives, working meetings, or thematic events, which, through content and media coverage, acquire a pronounced electoral character. Interviews with the party leader, Vasile Chirtoca, presentations of the candidate team, and promotion of roundtables are used to build the image of an active, well-organized party connected to citizens’ issues. Filing documents with the CEC is symbolically publicized, and interpretation of ballot numbers is transformed into a mobilization tool. Sharing and distributing press content or favorable articles serve as mechanisms for validation and consolidating notoriety, particularly in the context of an unofficial electoral competition.

Sponsored posts/promotional content. The party heavily uses social media to promote its identity and political messages, employing videos, quotes, and emotional messages. Key figures such as Nicolai Țveatcov, Dumitru Roibu, and Ion Potorac convey messages about the Moldovan language, patriotism, and national unity, often with clear ideological accents. Authority is invoked through statements of public personalities like Dumitru Pulbere or Pavel Midrigan to legitimize the party’s positions. Electoral objectives are presented directly (e.g., “we will pass the threshold”), and calls for participation are frequent, demonstrating an active digital campaign with clear electoral mobilization components.

Use of slogans. Alianța “Moldovenii” uses patriotic and identity-based slogans to consolidate party recognition in the public space. Expressions such as “#Moldovawillalwaysbe” or messages like “we fight for this country” are integrated into video and text content, repeatedly used to create an emotional association between the party and national values. These function as political branding tools intended to mobilize an electorate sensitive to issues such as identity, history, and sovereignty.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the National Moldovan Party (PNM)

Policy promises/benefits. The National Moldovan Party (PNM) builds its electoral profile through concrete proposals in the fields of security, social policy, taxation, education, and the economy. Promises such as creating an internal police department along the Dniester, increasing child allowances, supporting farmers, and reforming education and healthcare are presented directly, with specific and measurable solutions, indicating a campaign strategy focused on public policies. These messages are accompanied by slogans like “PNM close to the people,” aimed at strengthening the emotional connection with voters. At the same time, promoting the unification with Romania as a “pragmatic solution” reflects a clear ideological stance, targeting a well-defined segment of the electorate – the unionist voters. This approach positions PNM as a reformist party

with vision, offering a comprehensive electoral platform launched outside the legal campaign period.

Electoral events. The party's public activity is marked by announcements about the start of the campaign, program presentations, and explicit calls to vote. While some posts are framed as information about electoral registration, their content contains clear messages promoting the party and mobilizing voters. Using platforms like TikTok or Facebook to broadcast such announcements outside the legal period amounts to prematurely launching the electoral campaign. Participation in media events and promotion of the party leader's speeches in these contexts further consolidates the image of an active, prepared political actor oriented toward the electorate.

Call to action and mobilization. Party leader Dragoș Galbur uses digital platforms to send direct mobilization messages. Announcing his candidacy, accompanied by the slogan "We are the generation that unites," constitutes a form of pre-campaign electoral activity, aimed especially at young voters and supporters of the unification idea. Emotional appeals, combined with messages about "the responsibility of the current generation," are designed to create a sense of urgency and involvement, characteristic of pre-campaign political communication.

Sponsored posts/promotional content. The party frequently uses social media to distribute electoral content in the form of political commentary, reactions to international or historical events, and posts about institutional failures. Historical references (e.g., the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) are recontextualized to promote the unification project. At the same time, Dragoș Galbur builds an image of an informed and geopolitically aware leader through comments on international meetings or foreign policy, contributing to the perception of competence. Criticism of the government, judiciary, or negligence toward national issues is paired with positive messages about the party's initiatives, such as promoting the Romanian language or security measures—elements of electoral campaigning disguised as civic activism or political education.

Use of slogans. PNM consistently uses emotionally impactful identification phrases such as "PNM close to the people" or "We are the generation that unites." These expressions function as electoral slogans, strategically repeated in videos, posts, and announcements to build voter loyalty. The slogans emphasize the party's main themes—closeness to citizens, reform, and unification—and aim to create a distinct, easily recognizable political identity before the official campaign period.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the "Democrația Acasă" Party

Policy promises/benefits. Democrația Acasă makes specific electoral promises targeting issues with a direct impact on citizens. For example, regarding drivers with foreign license plates, the party leader promises to repeal a controversial law, using a concrete case to highlight systemic injustice. These promises are presented in accessible video formats (e.g., TikTok), adapted for a wide audience, aiming to generate electoral support by positioning the party as a defender of ordinary citizens.

Electoral events. The party and its leader, Vasile Costiuc, capitalize on involvement in local issues, presenting civic activism actions (e.g., combating illegal quarries) as evidence of political

competence and determination. Although framed as citizen initiatives, these actions clearly have an electoral character, promoting the image of the leader as a “fighter for justice” and close to the people. They are strategically disseminated on social media, especially through short, viral video formats.

Call to action and mobilization. Democrația Acasă frequently uses explicit calls to vote, with direct appeals to the electorate, including negative messaging (“no support for PAS”). Such statements, although made before the official campaign, constitute clear pre-campaign electoral agitation. The diaspora is also directly targeted with mobilization messages, reflecting a strategy to expand the party’s support base beyond national borders.

Sponsored posts/promotional content. The party leader uses social media to distribute videos with a strong electoral tone, focusing on recurring themes such as corruption, the current government’s inability, and the need for change. Populist or outrage-inducing topics (e.g., Plahotniuc’s return, lack of water in localities, support for domestic producers) are used to build the image of an authentic, engaged politician “fighting the system.” Although presented as personal opinions or field actions, these materials are disguised forms of political campaigning.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR)

Policy promises/benefits. AUR has criticized the PAS government in sensitive areas such as education, energy, and taxation, presenting itself as an alternative capable of offering more efficient solutions. While not always providing concrete details, the party makes implicit promises regarding superior social and economic policies, constituting a form of disguised electoral campaigning based on dissatisfaction with the current government.

Electoral events. AUR has used press conferences, parliamentary interpellations, and public appearances to attack political opponents, using these official platforms to convey electoral messages. In addition, the party constantly constructs an antagonistic discourse toward the government, which serves to consolidate its political position before the official campaign.

Calls to action and mobilization before the official campaign. Through messages targeting young people and other voter categories, AUR has issued direct appeals to participate and “join” its political project. Although framed as messages of solidarity, these represent attempts at pre-campaign electoral mobilization.

Sponsored posts and promotional content. The party has promoted content highlighting its connections with Romanian branches, reinforcing the idea of a pan-Romanian force. Messages delivered via social media and other channels include criticisms of the government, promotion of its ideology, and consolidation of a shared national identity, all components of a disguised campaign.

Manifestări de campanie electorală mascată în activitatea Coaliției pentru Unitate și Bunăstare (CUB)

Promisiuni de politici și beneficii. CUB a promovat un discurs economic centrat pe reducerea taxelor și sprijinirea mediului de afaceri, chiar în afara perioadei electorale. Acest tip de mesaj, deși prezentat ca viziune de guvernare, reprezintă o promisiune electorală implicită, care urmărește atragerea electoratului din zona antreprenorială.

Evenimente cu caracter electoral. Întâlnirile directe cu cetățenii și alte activități de teren au fost intens promovate online, fiind prezentate ca simple informări. În realitate, aceste evenimente servesc ca precampanie electorală, menită să sporească vizibilitatea partidului și a liderilor săi înainte de startul oficial al campaniei.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the Liberal Party (PL)

Electoral events. Commemoration of historical events, such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, was used as an opportunity to reiterate political positions and criticize ideological opponents. Additionally, submitting party lists to the CEC was accompanied by mobilization messages, turning an administrative act into an event with electoral connotations.

Sponsored posts and promotional content. The party frequently engaged in negative campaigning through attacks on political competitors, accusing them of betrayal or connections with foreign interests. Promotion of unionism and the Romanian language was used as an identity-based strategy to mobilize loyal voters outside the legal campaign framework.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the League of Cities and Communes (LOC)

Electoral events. Submission of electoral lists was publicly presented as a significant political moment, accompanied by messages suggesting the need for a new political force. Administrative actions were thus transformed into electoral campaign events.

Calls to action and mobilization before the official campaign. LOC disseminated videos with messages like “Today I choose LOC...,” which are direct appeals to vote launched before the official campaign period, violating principles of transparency and electoral fairness.

Sponsored posts and promotional content. Achievements of local administrations affiliated with the party were heavily promoted online, presented as justifications for national-level support in a form of disguised electoral campaigning.

Manifestations of disguised electoral campaigning in the activity of the Union of the Nation Bloc (BUN)

Sponsored posts and promotional content. BUN used a rhetoric of victimization following a CEC notification, claiming to be the target of a “hybrid attack.” This approach aims to consolidate the party’s image as a defender of national interests in a context of supposed oppression, helping to mobilize voters outside the legal campaign framework.

ACRONIME

- **ALDE** – Partidul Politic „Alianța Liberalilor și Democraților pentru Europa”
- **ASP** – Agenția Servicii Publice
- **BEPSIVM** – Blocul electoral „Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei”
- **BEPSCIVM** – Blocul electoral „Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei”
- **CA** – Consiliul Audiovizualului
- **CECE** – Consiliul Electoral de Circumscripție Electorală
- **CSJ** – Curtea Supremă de Justiție
- **CUB** – Partidul Politic „Coalitia pentru Unitate și Bunăstare”
- **PCRM** – Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova
- **GMR** – Grupul Media Realitatea
- **LOC** – Partidul Politic Liga Orașelor și Comunelor
- **MAN** – Partidul Mișcarea Alternativă Națională
- **PPNOI** – Partidul Politic „Noua Opțiune Istorică”
- **PAM** – Partidul Alianța „MOLDOVENII”
- **PAS** – Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate
- **PG** – Procuratura Generală
- **PL** – Partidul Liberal
- **PPMM** – Partidul Politic „Moldova Mare”
- **PPPN** – Partidul Politic „Partidul Nostru”
- **PNL** – Partidul Național Liberal
- **PNM** – Partidul Național Moldovenesc
- **PPDA** – Partidul Politic „Democrația Acasă”
- **PPN** – Partidul Politic „NOI”
- **PPPDA** – Partidul Politic Platforma Demnitate și Adevăr
- **PR** – Partidul Renaștere
- **PRIM** – Partidul Republican „Inima Moldovei”
- **PRM** – Partidul Mișcarea „Respect Moldova”
- **PRNA** – Partidul Reîntregirii Naționale „ACASĂ”
- **PS** – Partidul Politic „Partidul Schimbării”
- **PSRM** – Partidul Socialiștilor din Moldova
- **PVE** – Partidul Politic „Partidul Verde Ecologist”
- **PVM** – Partidul „Viitorul Moldovei”
- **UJM** – Uniunea Juriștilor din Moldova

Annex no. 1 Questions formulated by UJM in the requests for access to information addressed to the CEC and STISC

1. The exact date on which the SIAS “Elections” infrastructure was transferred from the CEC data center to the STISC, and what official act justified this transfer?
2. The holder of the right of physical access to the SIAS “Elections” servers hosted in the STISC data center during the electoral period, and the procedural and technical mechanisms through which this access is controlled?
3. The maximum allowable downtime for any critical SIAS “Elections” module on election day, and the technical and operational procedures provided for restoring functionality?
4. The specific cybersecurity measures implemented to protect computers and equipment used in polling stations against unauthorized access, malware infections, and cyberattacks?
5. The formal or operational protocol between the CEC and STISC that clearly established institutional responsibilities and intervention procedures in the event of a cyber incident?
6. The security audits and penetration tests carried out on the SIAS “Elections” infrastructure in the last 12 months; the main vulnerabilities identified and the corrective measures applied?
7. The action plan and established schedule for regaining compliance with international information security standards before the election?
8. The control, monitoring, and audit mechanisms exercised directly by the CEC over SIAS “Elections” critical servers and applications, after the transfer of the infrastructure to the STISC data center.
9. The institution responsible for activating the backup procedure and the maximum interval within which it becomes fully operational in the event of a power outage at the data center.
10. The standard procedures applied for verifying the integrity of applications and files installed on the laptops used in polling stations, before connecting them to the SIAS “Elections” network on election day.
11. The technical and operational intervention plan in case of unavailability of the E-Day Module on election day.
12. The changes made in the last 12 months by accounts with “super administrator” privileges to critical SIAS “Elections” configurations, and the typology of the changes (e.g., configurations, updates, code modifications).
13. The official procedure applicable in the event of the compromise of a “super administrator” account during the electoral period, the person responsible for initiating remediation actions, and the maximum estimated recovery time.
14. The cybersecurity measures implemented to protect peripheral equipment connected to polling station computers against unauthorized access, malware attacks, and manipulation attempts.
15. The technical and security checks performed on laptops after the closing of polling stations, before being stored, reused, or redistributed.
16. The procedure applied for updating SIAS “Elections” modules during the electoral period, and the explicit restrictions regarding code modifications or configuration changes after the opening of the voting process.
17. The maximum tolerated downtime for any critical SIAS “Elections” module on election day, and the procedural steps provided for restoring the service.

18. The methods/means of preventing the risk that, since STISC infrastructure hosts multiple government IT systems in the same environment, a security breach in a parallel system (e.g.: tax system, social allowances, state registers, etc.) could be exploited as an attack vector for privilege escalation and indirect compromise of SIAS “Elections.”
19. The frequency of backups for SIAS “Elections” data and applications, the storage location of these backups, and the physical and cybersecurity measures applied for their protection.
20. The CEC’s control and technical intervention mechanisms over a computer in a polling station, aimed at preventing, detecting, and remedying in real time, on election day, potential technical or cybersecurity incidents.
21. The technical and operational procedures activated in the event that a computer in a polling station performs an unusually high volume of IDNP queries in the E-Day application; the person responsible for monitoring such cases and the maximum intervention time.
22. The technical mechanisms and verification procedures used by the CEC to ensure that the modules displaying voter turnout and preliminary results within SIAS “Elections” have not been donated, modified, or replaced with unauthorized versions.
23. The version control mechanisms implemented for SIAS “Elections” modules, including E-Day, Voter Turnout, and Preliminary Results. The method/tool used to guarantee the integrity and authenticity of the source code and executable files used on election day.
24. The proper licensing of Windows on the computers allocated to polling stations, duly confirmed.
25. The methods by which the CEC ensures that the computers allocated to polling stations a few days before the start of voting have not been infected by third parties or ended up in the possession of persons who, through their actions, could attempt to defraud the elections.

Annex no. 2 Media Monitoring: 12 – 28 August 2025

Diagram no. 1: Media Coverage




Diagram no. 2: Coverage of Political Parties




Table Diagram no. 1 (Media Coverage)

| | | | | |
|--|--------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| | TV (4) | RADIO (3) | ONLINE (10) | AGENCY3) |
|--|--------|-----------|-------------|----------|

| | | | | |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| POZ | 0 | 0 | 67 | 1 |
| NEG | 49 | 28 | 160 | 7 |
| N | 192 | 158 | 688 | 100 |

Tabel diagrama nr. 2 (Reflectarea partidelor politice)

| Nr. | Political Parties | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|------------|---|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. | Party of Action and Solidarity | 1 | 83 | 52 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | 1 | 1 | 22 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | 2 | 15 | 94 |
| 4. | Our Party | 3 | 1 | 43 |
| 5. | Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova | 2 | 19 | 88 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | 2 | 17 | 53 |
| 7. | Republican Party "Heart of Moldova" | 4 | 23 | 86 |
| 8. | Party "Future of Moldova" | 1 | 11 | 77 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | 0 | 0 | 21 |
| 10. | Party "Respect Moldova" | 7 | 0 | 39 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | 0 | 0 | 17 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | 0 | 15 | 32 |
| 13. | Party "Democracy at Home" | 0 | 4 | 10 |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| 15. | Party of Change | 0 | 0 | 27 |
| 16. | Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova | 0 | 15 | 45 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Welfare | 1 | 0 | 17 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|-----------|------------|-------------|
| 18. | Party of Common Actions | 0 | 11 | 32 |
| 19. | Alliance Party “Moldovans” | 29 | 0 | 21 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | 10 | 13 | 74 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22. | Party “US” | 0 | 1 | 10 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| 25. | Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” | 0 | 0 | 17 |
| 26. | Centrist Union Party of Moldova | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 28. | Party “For People, Nature and Animals” | 0 | 1 | 13 |
| 29. | Movement of Professionals “Hope Надежда” | 0 | 1 | 21 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | 0 | 0 | 20 |
| 31. | Green Ecologist Party | 0 | 0 | 26 |
| 32. | New Historical Option Party | 3 | 1 | 20 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | 1 | 5 | 18 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | 0 | 15 | 34 |
| | TOTAL | 64 | 252 | 1118 |

MONITORED MEDIA SOURCES

| Televiziune (Buletin de Știri) | Post de Radio | Media online | Agenție de știri |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| PROTV 20:00 | RADIO MOLDOVA | REALITATEA.MD | IPN |
| JURNALTV 19:00 | RADIO CHIȘINĂU | STIRI.MD | INFOTAG |
| TV8 19:00 | RADIO EUROPA LIBERTY | ZDG.MD | MOLDPRES |
| MOLDOVA1 21:00 | | NEWSMAKER.MD | |
| | | NOL.MD | |
| | | UNIMEDIA.MD | |
| | | DESCHIDE.MD | |
| | | AGORA.MD | |
| | | NORDNEWS.MD | |
| | | NOKTA.MD | |
| Television (Political Talk-Show) | Title | Talk-Show Guests | Date/Time |
| PRO TV | In Depth | 1. 2. | 21:00 |
| JURNAL TV | Shadow Cabinet | | Thursday – 20:00 |
| | Expertise Hour | | Monday – 20:00 |
| | Secrets of Power | | Wednesday – 20:00 |
| TV8 | Black Box | | Thursday – 19:55 |

| | | | |
|-----------|-------------------|--|----------------------------|
| | Ask Ghețu | | Friday – 19:55 |
| MOLDOVA 1 | Electoral Debates | | |
| CINEMA 1 | 7 Days | | Weekend – 22:30 |
| N4 | Fourth Power | | 19:00 |
| TVC21 | Important | | Monday–Saturday – 17:00 |

A. TELEVISION

A1: Pro TV

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 2 | 2 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 2 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 4 |
| 4. | Our Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 3 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 3 | 1 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 1 | 1 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 1 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 1 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | 2 | 1 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 2 | 1 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | 2 | 1 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | 1 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | 1 | 2 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 2 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 2 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | 1 |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 1 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 1 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | 1 | 2 |

A2: TV8

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|----------------------------------|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 1 | 2 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 3 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 1 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 1 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 1 | 3 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 1 | 1 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 1 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | 1 |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 2 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 1 | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | 3 | 2 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 2 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | 1 | |

A3: Jurnal TV

| Nr. | Partid Politic | Pozitiv | Negativ | Neutru |
|-----|---|---------|---------|--------|
| 1. | Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate” | | | 1 |
| 2. | Partidul Social Democrat European | | | |
| 3. | Partidul Socialiștilor din Republica Moldova | | 1 | 3 |
| 4. | Partidul Nostru | | | 2 |
| 5. | Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova | | 1 | 3 |
| 6. | Mișcarea Alternativă Națională | | 1 | 2 |
| 7. | Partidul Republican Inima Moldovei | | 3 | 2 |
| 8. | Partidul „Viitorul Moldovei” | | 1 | 2 |
| 9. | Partidul Național Moldovenesc | | | |
| 10. | Partidul „Respect Moldova” | | | 2 |
| 11. | Liga Orașelor și Comunelor | | | 2 |
| 12. | Partidul Moldova Mare | | 1 | 2 |
| 13. | Partidul Democrația Acasă | | | 1 |
| 14. | Alianța Liberalilor și Democraților pentru Europa | | | 2 |
| 15. | Partidul Schimbării | | | 1 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 16. | Partidul Dezvoltării și Consolidării Moldovei | | | 3 |
| 17. | Coaliția pentru Unitate și Bunăstare | | | |
| 18. | Partidul Acțiuni Comune | | | 2 |
| 19. | Partidul Alianța „Moldovenii | | | |
| 20. | Partidul Democrat Modern din Moldova | | 1 | 4 |
| 21. | Partidul Republican din Moldova | | | |
| 22. | Partidul „NOI” | | | |
| 23. | Partidul Național Liberal | | | 1 |
| 24. | Partidul Reîntregirii Naționale „ACASĂ” | | | 1 |
| 25. | Partidul „Uniunea Creștin-Socială din Moldova” | | | 2 |
| 26. | Partidul Uniunea Centristă din Moldova | | | 1 |
| 27. | Partidul Popular din Moldova | | | |
| 28. | Partidul „Pentru Oamenii, Natură și Animale” | | | |
| 29. | Mișcarea Profesioniștilor „Speranța Надежда” | | | 2 |
| 30. | Partidul Liberal | | | 1 |
| 31. | Partidul VERDE ECOLOGIST | | | 1 |
| 32. | Partidul NOUA OPȚIUNE ISTORICĂ | | | 1 |
| 33. | Platforma Demnitate și Adevăr | | | 1 |
| 34. | Partidul Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor | | | 2 |
| 35. | Partidul Renaștere | | 2 | 1 |

A4: Moldova 1

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | | 3 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 6 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 3 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 6 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 2 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 1 | 5 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 1 | 6 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 1 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 1 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 3 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | 1 |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 3 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 1 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 2 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | 2 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 4 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 2 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 3 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 2 |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 2 |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 2 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 2 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 3 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 2 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | 1 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | 1 | 4 |

B. RADIO POSTS

B1: Radio Moldova

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | | 3 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 3 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 3 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 1 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 4 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 1 | 3 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 1 | 4 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 1 | 4 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 3 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | 2 |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | 3 |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 1 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 2 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | 1 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 2 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 1 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 1 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 1 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 1 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 1 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 1 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 1 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | 1 | |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 1 |

B2: Radio Chişinău

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | | 2 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 4 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 2 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 4 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 1 | 2 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | | 4 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | | 4 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 1 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 1 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 2 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 1 | 1 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | 2 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 5 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 1 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 3 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 3 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 2 |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 2 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | 1 | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 2 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | 4 | |

B3: Radio Free Europe

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|------------|---|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | | 2 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 4 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 2 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 4 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 3 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 1 | 4 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 1 | 4 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 1 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 1 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | 3 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 2 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 2 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 1 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 1 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 1 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 1 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 1 |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 3 |

C. MEDIA ONLINE

C1: Realitatea.md

| Nr. | Political Party | Positive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | 1 | 8 | 2 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | | 6 |
| 4. | Our Party | 1 | | 5 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 6 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 3 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 1 | 6 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | | 6 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 2 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | 2 | | 3 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 2 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | 1 |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 1 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 1 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 2 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | 1 | | 3 |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|---|---|---|
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 1 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 3 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 3 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 2 |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 2 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 1 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | 1 | | 2 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | 2 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 2 |

C2: Știri.md

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 3 | 6 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | 1 | | 2 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 9 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 4 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 8 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|---|
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 4 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 3 | 9 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 1 | 8 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 2 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 4 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 1 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | 3 | 5 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | 1 | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 3 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 1 | 4 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | 1 | | 1 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 2 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | 1 | | 4 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 7 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | 1 | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 3 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 3 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 2 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 2 |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 3 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 1 |

C3: Zdg.md

| Nr. | Political Parties | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 2 | 4 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 2 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 8 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 1 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | | 8 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 4 | 4 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | | 10 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | | 8 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 2 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 3 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 2 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | 1 | 2 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | 2 |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 4 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 2 | 5 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 2 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | 2 | 4 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | 1 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | 1 | 6 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 1 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 2 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | 3 |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 2 |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 1 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 1 |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 4 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 1 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | 2 | 2 |

C4: Newsmaker.md

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 3 | 7 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | | 12 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 3 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 8 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 9 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | | 9 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | | 6 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 2 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 3 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|--|---|
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 3 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | 1 |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 2 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | 6 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 3 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 3 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 7 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 2 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 2 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 2 |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|--|---|
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 2 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 2 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 2 |

C5: Agora.md

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|------------|--|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 6 | 3 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 2 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 9 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 1 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 7 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 1 | 3 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 4 | 5 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 1 | 5 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 2 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 2 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 1 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 4 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 2 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 1 | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 1 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 2 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 5 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 1 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 3 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 3 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 1 |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 1 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|--|---|
| 29. | Professionals' Movement "Hope Надежда" | | | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 2 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 2 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | 2 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 2 |

C6: Deschide.md

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|---|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | "Party of Action and Solidarity" | | | |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | | 1 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | | 1 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 1 | 1 |
| 7. | Republican Party "Heart of Moldova" | | | 1 |
| 8. | "Future of Moldova" Party | | | 1 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|--|---|
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 1 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 1 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 4 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 2 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|--|---|
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 1 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 2 |

C7: Noi.md

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 8 | 1 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | 2 | | 8 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 3 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | 1 | | 7 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 2 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | 1 | | 8 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | 1 | | 7 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|----|--|---|
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 1 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 1 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 2 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | 1 |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 1 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 2 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 1 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | 25 | | |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 6 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 2 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 1 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|--|---|
| 27. | People's Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | "For People, Nature and Animals" Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals' Movement "Hope Надежда" | | | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 1 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 2 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | 1 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 5 |

C8: Unimedia.md

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|------------|--|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. | "Party of Action and Solidarity" | | 42 | 4 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | 8 |
| 4. | Our Party | 2 | | 2 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | 1 | | 4 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 7. | Republican Party "Heart of Moldova" | 3 | | 7 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|----|
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | | 6 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | 2 | | 4 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | 1 |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 1 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 1 | 5 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 2 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | 2 | | 1 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | 8 | 1 | 10 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|---|---|---|
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 1 |
| 27. | People's Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | "For People, Nature and Animals" Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals' Movement "Hope Надежда" | | | |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 1 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | 2 | | 1 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | 1 | | 1 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | 1 | 1 |

C9: Nordnews.md

| Nr. | Partid Politic | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | "Party of Action and Solidarity" | | 2 | 3 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 4 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 6 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 4 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|---|
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 1 | 2 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 1 | 3 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | 3 | | 3 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 1 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 1 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 1 | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 1 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | 1 | 1 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | 2 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | 1 | 2 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|--|---|
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 1 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | 1 |

C10: Nokta.md

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|--|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 1 | 3 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 6 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 3 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 2 | 6 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | 2 | 3 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | 5 | 2 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | 2 | 2 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 1 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | 1 | 2 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | 1 | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | 3 | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | 3 | 1 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 3 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | 1 |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | 2 | 2 |

D: AGENTIE DE ȘTIRI

D1: IPN

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|------------|--|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 1 | |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | | |
| 4. | Our Party | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|---|
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | 1 | |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 2 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | | 1 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 1 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 2 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 1 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | 2 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 2 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 1 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | 2 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 5 |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|--|---|
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 1 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 1 |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 1 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 1 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 1 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | |

D2: Moldpres

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|----------------------------------|----------|----------|---------|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | | 4 |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|--|--|---|
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | | 3 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 2 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | | 3 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 1 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | | | 3 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | 1 |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | 2 |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | 3 |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | 2 |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | 1 |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | 1 |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | 2 |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | 1 |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | 1 |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | 1 |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | 2 |
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | 1 |

| | | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|---|
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | 1 |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | 1 |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | 2 |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | 2 |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | 1 |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | 2 |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | 2 |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | 2 |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | 2 |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | 2 |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | 1 |
| 34 | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | 3 |
| 35 | Renaissance Party | | 1 | 3 |

D3: Infotag

| Nr. | Political Party | Pozitive | Negative | Neutral |
|-----|-----------------|----------|----------|---------|
| | | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|---|
| 1. | “Party of Action and Solidarity” | | 4 | 1 |
| 2. | European Social Democratic Party | | | 1 |
| 3. | Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova | | | 1 |
| 4. | Our Party | | | 1 |
| 5. | Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova | | | 1 |
| 6. | National Alternative Movement | | | 1 |
| 7. | Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” | 1 | | 1 |
| 8. | “Future of Moldova” Party | | | 1 |
| 9. | National Moldovan Party | | | |
| 10. | “Respect Moldova” Party | | | |
| 11. | League of Cities and Communes | | | |
| 12. | Great Moldova Party | | | |
| 13. | Democracy at Home Party | | | 1 |
| 14. | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe | | | |
| 15. | Party of Change | | | |
| 16. | Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova | | | |
| 17. | Coalition for Unity and Prosperity | | | |
| 18. | Common Actions Party | | | |
| 19. | Alliance “Moldovans” Party | | | |

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|-----|---|--|--|--|
| 20. | Modern Democratic Party of Moldova | | | |
| 21. | Republican Party of Moldova | | | |
| 22. | “WE” Party | | | |
| 23. | National Liberal Party | | | |
| 24. | National Reunification Party “HOME” | | | |
| 25. | “Christian-Social Union of Moldova” Party | | | |
| 26. | Centrist Union of Moldova Party | | | |
| 27. | People’s Party of Moldova | | | |
| 28. | “For People, Nature and Animals” Party | | | |
| 29. | Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда” | | | |
| 30. | Liberal Party | | | |
| 31. | GREEN ECOLOGIST Party | | | |
| 32. | NEW HISTORIC OPTION Party | | | |
| 33. | Dignity and Truth Platform | | | |
| 34. | Alliance for the Union of Romanians Party | | | |
| 35. | Renaissance Party | | | |