

Final Report of the
Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the
Observation of the Parliamentary Elections of
September 28, 2025
period: July 14 – September 28

Introduction

The Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, was launched by the Union of Jurists of Moldova on July 16, 2025. The Union of Jurists of Moldova (UJM) is a non-commercial organization that promotes in its activity national, civic, democratic, and rule of law values and interests, partnership, open competition, and respects the ethical norms of the non-commercial sector. The purpose and objective of the mission were the observation and evaluation of the organization and conduct of the electoral process and informing the general public about this subject.

The observation effort was ensured throughout the entire electoral period by the central coordination team; during the electoral campaign by 34 long-term observers, assigned in each electoral district; and on election day by 985 short-term observers, deployed both in polling stations in the country and abroad, including in stations opened in areas affected by military conflicts. Polling stations were selected where, in the second round of the presidential elections of November 3, 2024, at least 500 voters participated.

Through 30 seminars, the UJM EOM offered all accredited observers the necessary training for the efficient conduct of the observation and information collection exercise. The training focused on the organization and conduct of electoral procedures by electoral bodies, the campaign carried out by electoral competitors, as well as the fulfillment of the responsibilities of central and local public authorities. Each UJM EOM observer signed the Declaration of Commitment regarding compliance with the code of conduct throughout the duration of their national observer mandate.

The findings and observations reported by long-term observers during the electoral campaign, and by short-term observers on election day, as well as by citizens, were collected through the platform monitorizez.eu. The information reported from the field was analyzed and processed by the central coordination team, and the findings were reflected in the five interim reports of the Mission, presented every two calendar weeks. The monitoring reports are well-documented and evidence-based, some of them being reflected in footnotes. They represent an important source of information, and the main findings can contribute to improving the electoral process.

The monitoring of national web pages and social networks, with a focus on the activity of political parties and electoral competitors, was carried out with the support of Privesc.eu. The monitoring of the mass media, with the same objective, was carried out with the support of the Association “Apollo”, through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the editorial content broadcast or published by a representative sample of national and regional media sources (4 television stations, 3 radio stations, 10 online portals, and 3 news agencies). The main news bulletins, political debate programs, and articles relevant to the electoral campaign were monitored. For each journalistic material, the way in which political parties and electoral competitors were reflected was evaluated based on the tone used (positive, negative, or neutral) and the following analysis criteria:

presentation of facts – degree of verifiability, distortion, or selectivity of information; language used – presence of appreciative or discrediting terminology; context offered – the way in which statements and actions of political actors were framed; access to media space – balance of opinions and exposure time offered to various parties.

The coding of materials was carried out based on a unified evaluation grid, applied by qualified observers. The obtained data were systematized in tables and annexes corresponding to each monitored source.

In addition to the information collected from the field by observers, the central coordination team also used other tools for data collection and analysis, including: monitoring of the meetings of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), submitting requests for access to information under Law No. 148/2023 on access to public interest information, consulting official public sources, meetings with electoral competitors, the Central Electoral Commission, and international missions for observing the parliamentary elections.

The UJM carried out its observation mission in a fair, transparent, and responsible manner, in relation to the information presented to citizens. This report systematizes the findings formulated by the Mission in the 5 interim monitoring reports, as well as those from election day, and is published with the purpose of informing the public interested in the electoral process. The UJM EOM assumes responsibility for the opinions and conclusions expressed in this monitoring report. The Romanian version of the document prevails over translations into other languages.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGEPI – State Agency on Intellectual Property
ALDE – Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
APL – Local Public Administration
ASP – Public Services Agency
AUR – Alliance for the Union of Romanians
BEA – Electoral Bloc “Alternative”
BEÎ – Electoral Bloc “Together”
BESV – Electoral Bureau of the Voting Section
BEPSCIVM – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”
BRD – Diaspora Relations Bureau
BUN – Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”
CALM – Congress of Local Authorities from Moldova
CEC – Central Electoral Commission
CECE – Electoral Council of the Electoral District
CEDO – European Convention on Human Rights
CICDE – Continuous Training Centre in the Electoral Field
CNTM – National Youth Council of Moldova
CoE – Council of Europe Office
CUB – Coalition for Unity and Well-being
IGP – General Police Inspectorate
INEFS – National Institute of Physical Education and Sport
LID Moldova – Development Initiatives Laboratory Foundation
LOC – League of Cities and Communes
MAE – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MJ – Ministry of Justice
MAN – National Alternative Movement
MRM – Respect Moldova Movement
MO UJM – Observation Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova
OSCE/ODIHR – Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PAS – Party of Action and Solidarity
PDA – Democracy at Home Party
PPDA – Dignity and Truth Platform Party
PAM – Moldovans Alliance Party
PCRM – Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova
PL – Liberal Party
PLDM – Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova
PG – General Prosecutor’s Office
PMM – Great Moldova Party
PN – Our Party
PNM – Moldovan National Party
PNOI – New Historical Option Party
PNUD – United Nations Development Programme
PONA – Party for People, Nature and Animals
PS – Party of Change
PSDE – European Social Democratic Party
PSRM – Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova

PRIM – Republican Party “Heart of Moldova”
PVM – Future of Moldova Party
SIS – Information and Security Service
STISC – Information Technology and Cyber Security Service
UCSM – Christian-Social Union of Moldova
UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund
USMF – State University of Medicine and Pharmacy “N. Testemițanu”
UTM – Technical University of Moldova

1. Legal and Regulatory Framework Applicable to the Elections

1.1. Analysis and Evaluation of the Electoral Legislation

The previous parliamentary elections of July 11, 2021, were organized in accordance with the provisions of Electoral Code No. 1381/1997. The parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, were organized in accordance with Electoral Code No. 325/2022. Since the adoption of the Code in its new version, it has undergone multiple amendments and/or additions made through 9 laws passed by Parliament, and another 2 legislative interventions resulted from the constitutional review carried out by the Constitutional Court.

After the Parliament set the date of the parliamentary elections, the text of the Electoral Code was amended by three laws: Law No. 112 of May 22, 2025, Law No. 130 of May 29, 2025, Law No. 100 of June 13, 2025, and Law No. 191 of July 10, 2025.

Law No. 112/2025 adjusted the provisions of the Electoral Code regarding the identity documents based on which voters can vote, as well as the method of confirming their domicile/residence, following the introduction of a new type of identity document into the national system — the identity card, with the holder's domicile information available only electronically, by querying state information systems.

Law No. 130/2025 introduced a series of amendments and additions to the text of the Electoral Code, especially regarding the extension of the activity periods of lower-level electoral bodies, particularly the electoral district councils. At the same time, new regulations were introduced, changing the rules of the game for electoral actors or potential actors. For instance, the concept of “independent candidate” was redefined, introducing new conditions that potential candidates must meet: they must not have been a member of a political party within the last 70 days before the elections and must not have expressed support in any form for a political party during the same period. The notion of a “camouflaged electoral bloc” was introduced, along with legal consequences for this irregular form of association. New regulations also revised the concept of “complaint,” excluding the “notification” form from its content. Additionally, notifications submitted by persons whose rights and interests were not directly affected were to be resolved according to the general administrative procedure applicable to petitions, as established by the Administrative Code. Likewise, Law No. 130/2025 revised the procedure for verifying the admissibility of complaints. Thus, inadmissibility was to be communicated to the party concerned without examining the complaint on the merits, through an administrative act issued by the chairperson of the electoral body. Law No. 294/2007 on political parties was also adjusted, particularly regarding the regime of donations by individuals to political parties, expanding the range of acceptable financial sources to include income from farming activities, individual entrepreneurship, patent holding, freelance work, etc. Additionally, Article 93(1) was amended to specify that the procedure for declaring a complaint inadmissible falls under the competence of the chairperson of the electoral body, through an administrative act, without requiring a decision by the entire body.

According to Law No. 100/2025, besides the Electoral Code, a series of amendments were made to several other legislative acts, some unrelated to the electoral field (e.g., Law No. 54/2003 on Counteracting Extremist Activity). Most changes affected Law No. 294/2007 on political parties. The major electoral impact came from new provisions requiring political parties to create and/or update their electronic registers of members according to the legal criteria and to submit to the Public Services Agency the nominal lists of members of their collegial governing bodies.

Moreover, under the new rules, failure to submit the required data results in the party's disqualification in terms of eligibility as a potential electoral actor. Thus, following the entry into force of the law establishing the election date, the legislature imposed new conditions on registered political parties for participating in elections — substantially undermining the principle of legislative stability provided in Article 27 of the Electoral Code and the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. This new obligation, imposed during the period when political parties were preparing for the elections, was, in the opinion of the UJM Observation Mission, a disproportionate measure in relation to its objectives. Such a measure could have been adopted in due time before the announcement of the elections or applied afterward. Electoral actors were unjustifiably burdened with a task inappropriate to the electoral campaign.

Of particular note is the amendment to Article 21 of the Law on Political Parties made by Law No. 100/2025. Specifically, the powers of the Ministry of Justice were significantly expanded. Through the introduction of paragraphs (1¹) and (3¹)–(3⁵), the Ministry of Justice became a central actor in the censorship and political control of parties, being empowered to:

initiate the limitation of a party's activity for failure to submit a financial report or membership register (paragraph 1¹);

apply directly to the court without prior procedure if a party's actions are deemed a threat to national security (paragraph 3¹);

request immediate precautionary measures that can block the party's activity within just three days (paragraphs 3²–3³).

This concentration of administrative power in a single executive body raises serious issues of separation of powers and risks of political abuse.

The notions in paragraph (3¹), such as “undermining electoral processes,” “disinformation campaigns,” “propaganda of military aggression,” or “large-scale voter corruption acts,” are extremely broad and vague. Without clear criteria, the Ministry of Justice could subjectively interpret legitimate political activities (such as messages, opposition campaigns, or government criticism) as threats to national security. This type of regulation could discourage political opposition, critical press, and civic activism, making it incompatible with European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) standards on freedom of association (Article 11 ECHR) and political pluralism.

Although the norm introduces judicial oversight (by the Court of Appeal Centru and the Supreme Court of Justice), the procedure is fast-tracked and immediately enforceable, and rulings can take effect at once. The three-day period for precautionary measures and their enforcement before a substantive ruling could effectively block a political party during the campaign—even if the court later rejects the request. Such an effect amounts to arbitrary suspension, contrary to ECHR jurisprudence in cases such as *Refah Partisi v. Turkey* and *Communist Party of Romania (PCR) v. Romania* (inadmissible, but relevant for proportionality).

Applying this norm near the elections is particularly problematic because:

it could be invoked to limit an electoral competitor under the pretext of illegal financing or “disinformation”;

the freezing of accounts and prohibition of activities (paragraph 5) could effectively neutralize a party before a final decision.

The mechanism provided in Article 21(3¹)–(3³), which allows the suspension of a party’s activity within three days through precautionary measures, without in-depth examination or effective guarantees of adversarial proceedings, does not provide real protection against political abuse and fails the test of “necessity in a democratic society.” Consequently, the article risks being declared incompatible with Article 11 ECHR, as it allows arbitrary and disproportionate interference in the activities of political parties. This creates the risk of the measure being used politically, especially during the electoral period, violating the principle of political pluralism.

Furthermore, it is noted that the legislature maintained and strengthened the supervisory and control role of the Ministry of Justice over political parties, even though this administrative authority no longer serves as the registrar of political parties.

In conclusion, Article 21, although inspired by the idea of a “defensive democracy,” exceeds the constitutional limits on restricting freedom of association and fails to comply with ECHR standards regarding the necessity and proportionality of restrictive measures. The norm should be revised by: defining key terms more precisely; introducing effective judicial safeguards; and prohibiting the application of precautionary measures during the electoral period. It is also necessary to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a constitutionality review of these controversial provisions.

Law No. 191/2025 added a new subject with the right to file complaints — journalists — in paragraph (1) of Article 94 of the Code.

Among the related legal provisions, it is worth noting the amendments to the Criminal Code and the Contravention Code, which tightened the regime for countering and penalizing acts of electoral corruption and introduced new types of offences, such as the unauthorized collection of signatures in support of an independent candidate.

The UJM Observation Mission noted that, for the most part, the amendments to the electoral and related legislation aimed at procedural aspects and clarifying the normative deficiencies identified in previous elections. However, legislative solutions that delegated to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) the task of clarifying electoral procedures through its own normative acts are regrettable, especially in cases where the CEC’s interventions were developed and approved on the eve of or during the electoral period itself. Moreover, the continuing practice of legislative intervention in the electoral framework immediately before the organization of a regular (scheduled) election undermines legal certainty and the transparency of procedures in this field¹.

1.2. Complaints and Notifications Submitted During the Reporting Period

The UJM Mission monitored the information published by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) on its official website, under the section “Complaints/Notifications/Cases.” During the monitored period, 99 complaints and 62 notifications were submitted. Of the 99 complaints, 92 were filed during the electoral campaign period, including on election day. Another 6 complaints were registered after election day (on October 4–5, 2025).

¹ See the findings in Chapter IV of the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission for the Presidential Election and Constitutional Referendum in the Republic of Moldova from 20.10.2024.

The UJM Mission observed that the largest number of complaints referred to the abusive use of administrative resources for electoral purposes (32 cases) and unauthorized electoral displays/irregular electoral advertising (25 cases).

Other complaints concerned irregularities in campaign financing – e.g., exceeding spending limits or undeclared funding (9 cases), defamatory or hate-inciting content in electoral materials (9 cases), electoral agitation conducted by electoral officials (9 cases), existence of a “camouflaged electoral bloc” and electoral agitation during the silence period – 8 cases in total, including 5 on election day.

There were also a few isolated cases, such as complaints about alleged voter bribery (suspicions of offering money, goods, or favors to influence votes) and about the use of the image of the President of the Republic of Moldova or foreign officials for electoral purposes, involvement of minors in campaign activities, and other similar issues. Overall, these complaints indicate persistent concerns about the fairness of the electoral campaign, including the use of administrative resources, compliance with campaign rules, and transparency of financing.

The complaints were filed almost exclusively by electoral competitors, with one exception from a private individual. The largest number of complaints came from the Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (34), followed by BEPSCIVM (28), Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) (16), Moldovan National Party (PNM) (6), Our Party (PN) (3), and the “Democracy at Home” Party (PDA) (6).

After election day, complaints were filed by PDA and independent candidate Olesea Stamate, mainly concerning the actions and campaign financing of other competitors, pointing to potential post-election financial irregularities.

Of the 99 complaints in total, the CEC fully upheld 3 complaints, partially upheld 4, and rejected 10 as unfounded or inadmissible. When the reported matters exceeded the CEC’s direct competence or involved possible contraventional/criminal acts, the Commission forwarded the cases to the competent institutions:

- to police inspectorates: 42 complaints for investigation of possible illegalities (usually voter bribery, abuse of administrative resources, or other acts requiring inquiry);
- to district electoral councils: 9 complaints for examination and resolution at the respective level;
- to the State Chancellery and the Intelligence and Security Service (SIS): 1 complaint each;
- to local public authorities (LPA): 5 complaints.

In 21 documented cases, the Mission found that the CEC issued direct written responses to complainants without adopting a formal decision. These replies were generally provided when the petitioner lacked legal standing, filed outside legal deadlines, or when the matter fell outside CEC’s jurisdiction. In such instances, the CEC treated the reply as an administrative closure without a formal decision.

During the monitored period, the CEC adopted 17 decisions addressing 23 complaints (some decisions covered multiple related cases), and others were resolved through 79 official responses sent to complainants or authorities. The 6 post-election complaints were also resolved: 4 examined during the CEC meeting on October 5, 2025, forming part of Decision No. 4148/2025, and 2 resolved through written replies.

During the parliamentary elections, the CEC was involved in 32 court cases concerning challenges to its actions, inactions, or decisions. All complaints were examined by the competent courts, which issued final rulings.

Throughout the monitored period, the UJM Mission noted a significant increase in the number of complaints and notifications submitted to the CEC. This reflects both intensified political competition and a higher degree of engagement and vigilance among competitors, unregistered parties, and individuals. This trend confirms a growing culture of contestation, driven by mutual distrust, concerns about administrative resource use, and divergent interpretations of rules on agitation and advertising.

The main themes of complaints were:

1. Use of administrative resources – repeatedly reported by “ALTERNATIVA” and BEPSCIVM, denouncing the involvement of public officials, mayors, ministers, and ambassadors in campaign-related activities. Some cases alleged involvement of the Prime Minister and other high-ranking officials in actions favoring PAS.
2. Unauthorized agitation and advertising – posters placed in prohibited areas (on fences, public buildings, private spaces without consent), distribution of manipulative or defamatory materials, and use of messages and symbols from the 2024 presidential campaign.
3. Non-transparent financing and involvement of public institutions – complaints about the use of official state institution pages to promote electoral messages and undeclared online funding by unregistered entities.
4. Camouflaged electoral blocs and irregular associations – reported by BEPSCIVM and PNM, referring to informal alliances between PAS, the Liberal Party (PL), and the National Union Bloc (BUN).
5. Defamation, hate speech, and use of minors’ images – complaints concerning online smear campaigns and use of children’s images in campaign videos, contrary to child protection principles and electoral ethics.
6. Access to voting and equal opportunities – BEPSCIVM reported the reduction of polling stations for diaspora and Transnistrian voters, describing it as a discriminatory measure.

The Mission found that CEC generally complied with procedural deadlines, but there was a lack of consistency and transparency in publishing its decisions. The UJM Mission viewed positively the consolidation of identical complaints and the involvement of targeted institutions in clarifications, but also noted deficiencies in interinstitutional communication and uncertainty regarding court ruling enforcement.

The Mission observed that the topics of complaints have diversified, evolving from procedural issues to systemic concerns about institutional impartiality, campaign financing, and misuse of public office for electoral purposes.

The UJM Mission also noted that the CEC did not update the Regulation on the procedure for examining complaints during the electoral period. Although Article 93(1) of the current Electoral Code assigns the competence for declaring inadmissibility of complaints to the chairperson of the electoral body, point 15 of the Regulation still assigns it to the electoral body itself.

Regarding notifications received by the CEC, out of the 62 submitted during the monitored period, most were filed by BEPSCIVM (14), followed by Electoral Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (7), PAS (6), and PLDM (4). Other notifications came from various political formations, police inspectorates,

and individuals. Generally, these notifications referred to the unlawful involvement of the President of Moldova in the campaign, non-enforcement of court rulings by the CEC, interference of law enforcement bodies in the activities of some competitors, and CEC's lack of reaction to smear campaigns and suspicious financing. In some cases, CEC found no legal grounds for action, while in others it forwarded notifications to the General Police Inspectorate.

During this election, the Mission observed an unusual situation—the notification of the electoral authority regarding the unauthorized use of a political party's registered symbols and trademarks during a protest. On July 28, 2025, PAS reported the unauthorized and abusive use of its registered trademark “/pas/” in a smear campaign against the party².

The UJM Mission noted that, according to the State Agency for Intellectual Property (AGEPI), “any natural or legal person or group of persons may register a trademark,” meaning that a political party, like any other entity, has the exclusive right to register and use its trademark (name, symbol, logo, etc.).

Similarly, the Mission recorded an unusual practice where an inspectorate officer acted ex officio (self-initiated), without being notified by any electoral participant. Based on the self-notification report, the CEC issued Decision No. 3749³, by which it revoked a member of District Electoral Council No. 25, designated by the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), citing violations of electoral principles in exercising duties⁴.

1.3 List of Political Parties Eligible to Participate in the Elections

According to art. 27 letter g) of the Electoral Code, the CEC publishes the list of political parties that have the right to participate in the elections, based on the data provided by the Public Services Agency (ASP). Political parties registered with the ASP until the entry into force of the act establishing the election date were eligible to participate in the elections. According to the Open Data/Political Parties List of the Republic of Moldova⁵ on the official ASP website, as of April 18, 2025, the State Register of Legal Entities included 66 political formations.

In accordance with the provisions of art. 11 para. (5) and (7) of Law no. 294/2007 on political parties, introduced by Law no. 100/2025, eligibility to participate in elections is conditioned on political parties submitting to the ASP, before the start of the electoral period, the numeric and nominal list of party members falling under art. 3 para. (1) letter e⁵) of Law no. 133/2016 on the declaration of assets and personal interests.

On July 14, 2025, based on information provided by the ASP, the CEC published⁶ the list of political parties eligible to participate in the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025. According to the decision, the list includes a total of 39 political formations. For the first time, the CEC “established a reserve for revoking the right to participate” regarding 14 parties out of the 39 on the list, namely in the case of non-issuance by the ASP of a favorable individual administrative act and/or issuance of an enforceable court decision regarding the dissolution/limitation of the activities of the political parties concerned.

² PAS Complaint No. 362/1-2025 of 28.07.2025.

³ CEC Decision No. 3749 of 06.08.2025.

⁴ Interim Report No. 2 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, p. 3.

⁵ List of political parties in the Republic of Moldova.

⁶ CEC Decision No. 3651 of 14.07.2025.

On August 1, the Commission requested updated information from the Agency regarding the political parties in question. Based on the response received, the CEC excluded 4 political formations from the list of parties entitled to participate in the parliamentary elections: Political Party Agrarian Party of Moldova, Political Party Force of Alternative and Salvation of Moldova, Political Party “CHANCE”, Political Party “VICTORY”⁷. Under these conditions, only 35 (53%) of the 66 registered political formations remained eligible.

MO UJM noted that the addition of para. (7) to art. 11 of Law no. 294/2007, by introducing a new sentence: “Political parties that, before the start of the electoral period, have not submitted to the Public Services Agency all the information provided for in para. (5) letter b) do not have the right to participate in the elections” – raised interpretation issues. With the addition of the notion of “electoral period” in art. 1 of the Electoral Code with a new sentence, the time period to which it refers became interpretable. According to the first thesis of the notion, the electoral period began with the publication of the act establishing the election date, i.e., on April 18, 2025, while the Commission set the start of this period for July 14. Therefore, the temporal applicability of the new legal provision introduced in para. (7) of art. 11 of the Law on political parties remains debatable. MO UJM considers that Parliament must resolve this legal conflict. The legal norm must enjoy precision, and the legal relations arising under it must be predictable.

In the same context, MO UJM noted that the new legal provisions, which give ASP discretion to decide on the right of a political party to participate in elections, is a measure that exceeds the role, mission, and functions of the Public Services Agency, according to the relevant legal framework. According to the ASP Statute, approved by Government Decision 314/2017, the agency’s mission consists of coordinating and organizing activities aimed at implementing state policies, as well as providing public services, such as, among others, the state registration of legal entities. In any case, the ASP is neither a public authority that develops state policies nor a state body exercising jurisdiction. Therefore, we consider that the function of filtering political parties near an electoral contest, assigned by the amendments to the Law on Political Parties, is an improper function for this public⁸ institution.

2. Activity of Electoral Bodies (CEC, CECE II, BESV)

The parliamentary elections were administered by the CEC. Within the electoral body system, the Commission is the higher-level electoral authority, which coordinated the activity of 37 second-level constituency electoral councils and 2,274 polling station electoral bureaus, established both within the country and abroad.

2.1 Conduct and Internal Climate of CEC Meetings

To organize and conduct the elections, the Commission held at least 55 meetings, during which over 300 decisions were adopted. The meetings were open to the public. Analysis of these meetings highlighted several aspects that, according to MO UJM, required attention and improvement. Among the observed shortcomings were: non-compliance with certain procedural rules, lack of transparency in the decision-making process, limitation of participants’ freedom of expression through intentional interruptions, ignoring arguments, or restricting speaking time to an unclear 2-

⁷ CEC Decision No. 3742 of 03.08.2025.

⁸ Interim Report No. 1 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, p. 16.

minute limit. Additionally, the amiability of communication between members, and between members and participants, was at times negative. Documents related to draft decisions were transmitted too shortly before the start of the meetings, and for some draft decisions, the opinion of the Legal Directorate was missing.⁹

Despite this, MO UJM noted efficient communication by the CEC with candidates, as well as constant provision of advice and guidance to ensure the correctness of documents and actions undertaken. Furthermore, the majority of electoral competitors with whom the Mission met appreciated the professionalism and openness of the members of the commissions responsible for receiving and verifying documents for registration in the electoral race.

MO UJM also noted and expressed concern over the practice of some Commission members abstaining from voting on draft decisions or proposals without providing reasoned justification for their abstention. In this context, it was observed that although some decisions were promptly published in the “Parliamentary Elections¹⁰ 2025” section, others were posted with delays. Similarly, the minutes of the meetings were published late.

Information for stakeholders and the general public was provided through press releases, CEC social media pages, and the new online platform for the diaspora. However, it should be noted that interested actors in the electoral field, including MO UJM, were often unable to access and consult relevant information, as the “Antechamber / Incoming and Outgoing Documents” subsection was frequently inaccessible.

2.2 Confirmation of Persons Authorized to Participate in Electoral Procedures

For the registration of candidates for the position of deputy in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, CEC confirmed 14 individuals as representatives of the contestants in the Central Electoral Commission for the entire electoral period, and 17 individuals as treasurers for the campaign period.

For each electoral contestant in the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025, CEC set a maximum of 2,150 trusted persons. In total, CEC confirmed, upon request, only 74 trusted persons: 72 from PN and 2 from Mișcarea Respect Moldova (MRM). MO UJM observed, based on statements made by electoral contestants during meetings, a lack of interest in the institution of the trusted person and the representative in the lower-level electoral bodies (CECE II). Some contestants cited a lack of human and financial resources, while others considered that the role of these persons was limited and that changes in the legal framework placed them in a “gray area.” For this election, MO UJM documented at least one case of involvement in electoral campaigning in favor of PAS by persons not authorized for this purpose by CEC (the case of Minister Alexei Buzu¹¹).

Before the start of the electoral period (14 July 2025), public associations, educational and research institutions in the electoral field in the Republic of Moldova, foreign electoral authorities, international organizations, foreign governments, and NGOs abroad had the possibility to submit documents for the accreditation of observers and international electoral experts. It is noted that on

⁹ Interim Reports No. 1 (pp. 9–10), No. 2 (p. 2), No. 3 (pp. 4–5), No. 4 (p. 4) of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025.

¹⁰ Interim Report No. 3 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, p. 5.

¹¹ Interim Report No. 4 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, p. 14.

30 July 2025, the electoral authority modified the Regulation regarding the status of observers and the procedure for their accreditation, although 80 observers had already been accredited by that time. MO UJM considers that these amendments risked unjustifiably limiting access of civil society organizations to the electoral observation process. Moreover, CEC did not ensure adequate public information regarding the entire process of amending the Regulation (obtained opinions, summary table of recommendations and proposals received¹²).

For monitoring and reporting on the elections, CEC accredited a total of 3,358 observers from 67 subjects with accreditation rights (national and international). Of these, 2,446 were national, and 912 international (observers and experts). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied accreditation to certain international observers (Russians), based on a negative opinion issued by the Information and Security Service. Additionally, CEC confirmed 114 journalists from 19 media institutions in the country and abroad (see Annex 1), as well as 293 interpreters.

MO UJM notes that, although the number of national and international entities interested in monitoring the 2025 elections remained similar to 2024 (2025 – 10 national and 57 international; 2024 – 9 national and 55 international), the number of accredited observers increased significantly (+947 observers¹³). Regarding journalist confirmation, both the number of media institutions interested in covering the elections and the number of confirmed journalists doubled.

National observers represented 73% of the total, 49% of them accredited by Promo-LEX Association, and 43% by the Union of Jurists of Moldova, both organizations conducting national observation missions for the elections.

2.3 Authorization for conducting opinion polls and exit polls.

Interest in voters' political preferences was expressed by 10 sociological companies. Thus, the CEC authorized 16 opinion polls for surveying citizens, and in some cases, for publishing the results regarding their political preferences. The MO UJM also found and reported, on the one hand, actions of public opinion manipulation regarding voters' preferences and the chances of electoral competitors, through at least 6 polls conducted and published without CEC authorization. On the other hand, it noted the lack of actions from state institutions to investigate cases of non-compliance with legal provisions and to sanction them.

Additionally, the CEC rejected the only request to organize an electoral exit poll. In its decision, the Commission cited previous violations committed by the requesting company in conducting authorized opinion polls, as well as the dissemination in the public space of false information regarding the authorization of the requested exit poll.

2.4 Certification of electoral officials

The certification of individuals interested in the position and role of electoral officials was ensured and managed by the Center for Continuous Electoral Training (CICDE), together with CECE II. Certification exams were conducted during the period from April 10 to September 26, 2025. The purpose of the certification was to professionalize electoral officials, as well as other categories of individuals interested and/or involved in the electoral process, by ensuring that they possess

¹² Interim Report No. 2 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, Annex No. 4.

¹³ At the request of the authorities, the CEC withdrew the accreditation of over 200 observers.

knowledge of electoral legislation and legislation related to the electoral process, as well as updating this knowledge.

According to publicly available information, in the 2025 session, CICDE organized 565 exams, with a total of 8,746 participants. Of these, 7,764 obtained the qualification certificate, which attests to their knowledge and competencies in the electoral field. The pass rate was high, reaching 88.77%.

However, the MO UJM identified multiple cases of electoral officials being involved in electoral campaigning in favor of a particular electoral competitor, instances of insufficient knowledge of electoral terminology and procedures, as well as situations in which they were not familiar with the main source of information regarding the entire electoral process (the website cec.md, section Parliamentary Elections of 28.09.2025).

Additionally, it should be noted that two of the three parties with the right to nominate reported difficulties encountered by individuals proposed for appointment as electoral officials during the registration process for participation in the certification exams for training/specialization in the electoral field.

2.5 Approval of public interest messages

Throughout the entire electoral period, the Commission issued 46 permissive acts approving a series of public interest messages prepared by 24 legal entities: 11 from the public sector and 13 from the private sector. Among the 11 public entities, two have the status of international organizations: the Office of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). The largest number of public interest messages were prepared by the CEC – 16. The Ministry of Education and Research and the Ministry of Justice each prepared two messages, while the Bureau for Relations with the Diaspora (BRD) within the State Chancellery, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General Inspectorate of Police, and CICDE each prepared one.

Of the 13 private sector entities, some are non-profit organizations (A.O. “Promo LEX”, A.O. “Institute for European Policies and Reforms”, A.O. “Youth Media Center”, A.O. “InfoNET Alliance”, A.O. “National Youth Council of Moldova”, A.O. “Community Plus”, LID Moldova Foundation, A.O. “Media Alternativă”), while others are commercial companies (SRL “Practic Media Group”, SRL “Bright Communications”, SRL “Nahaba Studio”/Racketa Production, SRL “Paprika Media”, SRL “Independent Trust Media”).

In its interim reports¹⁴, MO UJM provided detailed accounts of the CEC approval process for public interest messages and conducted a content analysis of the respective advertising materials.

The content analysis identified three main types of approved messages:

- Institutional and informative messages with a civic character, regarding electoral procedures, education, justice, military service, or the activity of authorities;
- Civic awareness messages, mainly prepared by non-governmental organizations, focused on the importance of voting and combating voter bribery;

¹⁴ Raportul intermediar nr. 2 (p. 8-9), Raportul intermediar nr. 3 (p. 11-14), Raportul intermediar nr. 4 (p. 8-11) și Raportul intermediar nr. 5 (p. 5-7) ale Misiunii Uniunii Juriștilor din Moldova de Observare a Alegerilor Parlamentare din 28.09.2025.

- Motivational and emotional messages, such as video spots or digital banners, promoting active participation in elections through appeals to unity, responsibility, or patriotism.

Analyzing the approval activity of public interest messages, MO UJM made several observations:

A general finding is that the CEC authorizes any public interest message, which does not correspond to the role and mission for which it was established — namely, to organize and conduct elections. It is considered that the Commission should only authorize public interest messages with an electoral theme during the electoral period, and not any public interest messages with other themes. According to MO UJM, the legislator should amend Art. 17(2) of Law 62/2022 on advertising.

MO UJM also identified non-compliance regarding the legal status of public interest message providers. According to CEC Regulation¹⁵ no. 1155/2023, only public sector entities and registered non-commercial organizations in Moldova may qualify as providers. Nevertheless, messages from commercial companies (SRLs) and international organizations (CoE Office, UNFPA) were approved, which fall outside the categories provided by the regulation. Additionally, some institutions subordinated to ministries or other central administrative authorities (such as the General Inspectorate of Police) are not explicitly listed among eligible public entities in point 106 of the Regulation, raising the issue of broad interpretation by the electoral authority. Moreover, the CEC did not provide evidence in its decisions of verifying NGO statutes to confirm the objectives outlined in point 107 subpoint 3) of the same Regulation.

At the content level, the approved messages varied considerably in tone, purpose, and impact:

- Some materials were neutral and informative, in line with electoral communication standards (e.g., campaigns by CEC or BRD);
- Others contained political connotations, promoting thematic narratives similar to those of the ruling party (“European future,” “peace,” “external threats,” “historic vote”);
- In some cases, messages were emotionally prescriptive or intimidating, using phrases that could be interpreted as pressure on voters (“don’t play with your vote or you could lose everything”) or offensive expressions (“only a pig is satisfied with what it is given”);
- Certain video spots (e.g., “Vania Baț against electoral corruption”) were considered inappropriate and degrading, violating Art. 13(4)(f–h) of Law¹⁶ 62/2022 on advertising, which prohibits shocking, denigrating information or content that affects human dignity.

Additionally, campaigns aired without CEC authorization were reported, such as “Moldova that unites us”, launched by the Media Group Realitatea, for which the Commission did not issue an official position.

In light of the above, MO UJM recommends:

1. Legislative clarification of Art. 17(2) of Law 62/2022, explicitly limiting the CEC’s competence to authorizing only public interest messages with electoral themes during electoral periods;
2. Non-acceptance of commercial companies and international organizations as message providers, in line with the spirit of CEC Regulation no. 1155/2023;

¹⁵ CEC Regulation on the procedure for providing, distributing, and broadcasting political, electoral, and public interest messages.

¹⁶ Law No. 62/2022.

3. Establishment of a formal procedure to verify the statutes of non-commercial organizations prior to message approval, to confirm the declared public interest objectives;
4. Strengthening content control over messages to ensure compliance with Art. 13(4) of Law 62/2022, by excluding politically biased, offensive, or manipulative content;
5. Adoption of a unified methodology for evaluating the public interest nature of messages and distinguishing them from political advertising;
6. Increased decision-making transparency — full publication of requests, approved materials, and the reasoning behind CEC decisions, to ensure public oversight and institutional credibility.

2.6 Approval of conditions for providing advertising spaces.

On July 30, 2025, the Commission approved the decision regarding the conditions for providing advertising space and other related services by advertising broadcasters on fixed or mobile devices for the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025¹⁷. Thus, by examining the requests of the nine entities that submitted statements regarding the conditions for offering advertising spaces and other related services to electoral competitors, the electoral authority exercised its legal powers provided under Art. 54 of the Electoral Code.

MO UJM notes that the CEC assumed the competence to authorize/approve the conditions for providing advertising spaces. According to Art. 54(10) of the Electoral Code, advertising broadcasters who manage or own fixed or mobile advertising devices are obliged to make public the conditions under which they offer advertising space and other related services to electoral competitors, informing the CEC. The electoral authority, without legal basis, assumed the prerogative of “approving” the conditions offered by the broadcasters. From the content of the operative part of the CEC decision, it can be inferred that the electoral authority issued a permissive administrative act, generating rights for some economic agents while simultaneously creating prohibitions for others.

2.7 Pre-registration of voters

During the period April 22 – August 14, 2025, the CEC provided citizens of the Republic of Moldova with the right to vote who were abroad and intended to participate in the electoral process the opportunity to pre-register. Through this mechanism, voters declared in advance their intention and the location where they wished to vote.

According to publicly available data published on the official website ip.cec.md, a total of 16,134 voters from 58 countries pre-registered. The largest number of pre-registrations (13,039, or 80.81%) were made by Moldovan citizens in the Russian Federation, followed by Italy (484), Germany (432), France (262), the United Kingdom (257), Romania (248), and the United States of America (224).¹⁸

Compared to voluntary pre-registration, registration for voting by mail was mandatory for voters wishing to vote abroad through postal/courier services. An important aspect was that registration from the previous election was not valid, and a new registration was required. During the period

¹⁷ CEC Decision No. 3686 of 30.07.2025

¹⁸ In total, the application includes 127,085 prior registrations, including from previous elections, and voters who have not changed their location abroad are not required to register again.

June 3 – August 14, 2025, 2,593 citizens residing in the 10 eligible¹⁹ countries opted for voting by mail. The CEC accepted 2,472 of the submitted applications. The largest number of applications came from voters in the United States of America – 1,339 persons. The fewest applications were from voters in New Zealand (7), the Republic of Korea (12), and Japan (14).

MO UJM periodically presented, in its interim²⁰ reports, an analysis of the legal framework and the main findings regarding this aspect.

Indicator	Pre-registration	Voting by mail
Nature	Voluntary	Mandatory
Target countries	88 countries (51 active)	10 countries
Number of registrations	16,134	2,472
Country with the most registrations	Russian Federation (>13,000)	USA (1,339)

From the general findings and observations, we reiterate that pre-registration as an optional instrument is much more widely used than voting by mail as a voting option. Overall, the authorities actively promoted pre-registration through public interest messages and other civic education materials. According to aggregated data, voting by mail remains a less popular option among Moldovan citizens abroad.

MO UJM also notes that the incorrect link in the CEC press release for registering for voting by mail — <https://pvc.cec.md> instead of <https://vpc.cec.md> — negatively affected the authority's efforts to promote the mandatory pre-registration required for this type of voting.

Furthermore, comparing the data on voting by mail registrations with pre-registration data²¹ shows that voter preferences did not align with those of the authorities. In MO UJM's opinion, a reconsideration by Parliament and the CEC of the list of countries for which voting by mail was offered would have been necessary.

Additionally, the Government, through its official channel “Prima sursă”, announced as part of its achievements for citizens in the diaspora the expansion of voting by mail to 10 countries (+4 states). MO UJM noted the absence of data demonstrating that the basic criterion for expanding the list of target countries had been met, namely: “pre-registration for the previous election of at least 30 applications or participation of at least 30 people in previous elections.”

¹⁹ USA, Canada, Kingdom of Norway, Kingdom of Sweden, Republic of Finland, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand.

²⁰ Interim Report No. 1 (pp. 14–15) and Interim Report No. 2 (pp. 13–14) of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025.

²¹ <https://vpc.cec.md> and <https://ip.cec.md>

Given the low number of voters who pre-registered to vote by mail in the four newly added countries (Japan – 14, Republic of Korea – 12, Australia – 53, New Zealand – 7) and the lack of official data proving the feasibility of this measure, MO UJM²² concluded that the rationale behind the decision to expand the number of states was primarily political. Moreover, the low participation raises questions regarding the efficiency and appropriateness of expanding this mechanism.

MO UJM recommends further development and improvement of the pre-registration mechanism, regardless of the voting method, by establishing stricter criteria, including mandatory procedural elements, to enhance the effectiveness of this instrument. Registration portals (for pre-registration and voting by mail) must always be functional, well-promoted, and easily accessible. Voting by mail could be extended to other countries, but only after collecting sufficient data to demonstrate genuine interest (e.g., a minimum of 30 pre-registrations or actual participants) — as stipulated by revised Law no. 109/2024.

2.8 Establishment of polling stations for voters from localities on the left bank of the Dniester.

In its interim reports²³, MO UJM reported and analyzed the process of establishing and relocating polling stations intended for voters from localities temporarily outside the control of the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova. MO UJM highlighted the following aspects:

On August 24, 2025, the CEC approved the list of polling stations for voters from the left bank of the Dniester: only 12 stations, compared to 30 in the 2024 presidential elections. The trend of reducing polling stations continues: 2019 – 47, 2020 – 42, 2021 – 41, even though the number of eligible voters in the region is increasing. Three CEC members issued a separate opinion, considering the measure a limitation of voting rights for over 278,000 citizens, violating principles of equality and non-discrimination.

During the organization of polling stations for voters from the left bank of the Dniester, MO UJM raised legal and procedural criticisms:

- The right to vote must be equally guaranteed to all citizens, regardless of their place of residence or domicile.
- Polling stations established on territory controlled by constitutional authorities do not present a security risk.
- The number of polling stations should not be based solely on turnout in previous elections, as existing obstacles have previously limited access to voting.
- The reduction in polling stations was not justified by a real public interest, violating the principle of proportionality and Constitutional Court findings regarding the security of legal relations.

The CEC involved the State Chancellery, SIS, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Supreme Security Council, and the Reintegration Policy Bureau. MO UJM noted the lack of legal basis for this structure, as organizing polling stations falls exclusively under the CEC according to Art. 40 of the Electoral Code.

²² Interim Report No. 2 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, pp. 13–14.

²³ Interim Report No. 3 (pp. 8–10) and Interim Report No. 5 (pp. 7–8) of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025.

MO UJM also reported on restrictions and relocations imposed in the days leading up to election day. Before the September 28, 2025 elections:

- Authorities announced works on six bridges over the Dniester, temporarily limiting traffic.
- The CEC relocated four polling stations and established reserve locations just three days before the elections, citing security risks.

The relocation, combined with traffic restrictions, created additional obstacles for voters and effectively affected access to voting for voters from the left bank of the Dniester.

In this context, MO UJM reiterates legal aspects, international standards, and ECtHR jurisprudence:

- CEC competencies derive from Arts. 27 and 32 of the Electoral Code; SIS has technical security duties, not responsibilities for organizing polling stations.
- Changes impacting the electoral process should not be made shortly before the elections (Venice Commission).
- ECtHR jurisprudence (Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, Sitaropoulos & Giakoumopoulos v. Greece) emphasizes the state's obligation to ensure effective voting opportunities, not merely formal ones.

Regarding the CEC decision to change the address of 5 of the 12 polling stations for residents of the Transnistrian region, the Electoral Code contains special provisions: Art. 78(3)(f) explicitly states that, for parliamentary, presidential elections, and republican referendums, the supplementary electoral list must include citizens from left-bank localities temporarily outside the control of constitutional authorities, as confirmed by the State Voter Register.

Therefore, citizens with domicile or temporary residence in left-bank localities temporarily outside constitutional control have the right to be included in supplementary lists and to vote at any polling station in the country. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court, in Decision no. 48 of May 14, 2024, confirmed this right:

"Regarding Art. 40(1) of the Electoral Code, the Court observes that the voting rights of voters from the left bank of the Dniester on territory controlled by the Moldovan authorities are not affected, given their effective ability to register in supplementary lists of any polling station and to vote in parliamentary, presidential elections, and republican referendums. Art. 78(3)(f) of the Electoral Code eliminates the risk of any alleged discretionary attitude by the CEC in organizing special polling stations for voters from the left bank of the Dniester. Therefore, Art. 40(1) of the Electoral Code does not affect the right to vote guaranteed by Art. 38 of the Constitution."

In conclusion, MO UJM considers that the reduction and relocation of polling stations, combined with traffic restrictions, raises issues of proportionality, accessibility, and public perception. The lack of compensatory measures can be perceived as an indirect restriction of the right to vote, affecting the credibility and integrity of the electoral process.

2.9 Establishment of polling stations abroad

According to Art. 39 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova, the number of pre-registrations constitutes one of the criteria used in determining the number of polling stations established abroad, as well as their locations. Subsequently, based on the data, on 24 August 2025, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) approved the organization of 301 polling stations for the

parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025, of which 297 abroad and 4 for processing votes by mail. The decision was not adopted by consensus, being issued with a separate opinion.

MO UJM conducted a detailed analysis of the process of organizing polling stations abroad.²⁴

Regarding the way of substantiating its decision, the CEC invoked the following criteria:

- data from pre-registrations compared with participation in previous elections;
- the dynamics of increasing participation in various European countries;
- requests received from citizens or diaspora organizations.

However, the veracity of the registrations from the Russian Federation (>13,000) was questioned by the CEC, without clear technical arguments. Even though in Moscow, the two existing polling stations previously absorbed over 10,000 voters (double the maximum capacity of one station), their number was not increased. Collective requests from Russia and other states (Italy, Austria, Slovenia etc.) were rejected due to the lack of qualified digital signatures, although the issue of capacity and proportionality remains. The distribution of polling stations seems to ignore the proportions of Moldovan communities in different countries: for example, Italy had many planned stations, but a reduced number of registrations for this election; in Russia, the opposite — many registrations, few stations.

Thus, MO UJM found inconsistencies and disproportionate treatment by the authorities. The contrast between technical data and the authorities' decisions reveals a selective approach:

- In Russia, although there are over 200,000 Moldovan citizens and a very high number of pre-registrations, only 2 polling stations were maintained.
- In Italy, the number of stations increased significantly (31 in 2021 → 60 in 2024 → 75 in 2025), although only 484 citizens registered for the current election.
- Historical dynamics show an inverse treatment: Russia — 17 stations in 2021 → 2 in 2024 and 2025; Italy — constant increase.

The invocation by the MFA of security risks in Russia, Israel or Ukraine is partially unconvincing — justifiable in Kyiv, but insufficiently substantiated for Moscow or other regions of the Russian Federation not affected by armed conflict.

Another critical aspect identified was the establishment of an “inter-institutional working group” that includes entities without explicit competencies in the electoral field, raising questions about the legal basis. CEC created this “inter-institutional working group” which includes MFA, SIS, State Chancellery, and Supreme Security Council. In MO UJM's opinion, this structure raises the following problems:

- CSS is an advisory body, not an executive public authority.
- SIS and CSS do not have legal competences regarding the establishment of polling stations.
- The Electoral Code provides for cooperation of public institutions with CEC only within the limits of legal powers, which in this case is not clearly respected.

MO UJM's recommendations, in this context, are as follows: CEC and MFA should publish in advance the criteria applied for the allocation of polling stations abroad, including the degree of

²⁴ Interim Report No. 3 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, pp. 6–8.

coverage of the Moldovan community, the number of pre-registrations, and the estimated real capacity. The motivations of the decisions regarding the establishment of polling stations should include clear arguments regarding proportionality, effective access to voting, and equality of voters. The number of polling stations in countries where the Moldovan community is significant (e.g., Russian Federation) must be adjusted proportionally, based on current data on the number of eligible citizens and logistical capacity. Also, recalibrations should be made in countries with a reduced number of pre-registrations, to avoid underutilization or excessive allocation of resources. The criteria used, the data applied, and the results (participation, incidents, access) should be public and subject to monitoring by accredited observers.

2.10 Activity of the constituency electoral councils

In the period 2–26 September 2025, MO UJM observers conducted 228 visits to the constituency electoral councils. According to them, in 99% of cases, the members of the electoral bodies were open toward observers. Only in 1% of visits, electoral officials showed some reserve, possibly because this was the first election observation mission carried out by the Union of Jurists of Moldova. In most cases, observers received answers to the questions addressed to electoral officials and had access to all electoral materials. Also, according to them, the councils were properly equipped for organizing and carrying out activities specific to the electoral process.

At the same time, 15 situations were identified in which, at the time of the visit, the decisions of six Level II CECEs (No. 8 Cantemir, No. 12 Criuleni, No. 15 Dubăsari, No. 20 Hîncești, No. 23 Nisporeni, and No. 25 Orhei) were not communicated to interested persons by posting at the council's premises.

The 37 constituency electoral councils had the following numerical composition: 3 CECEs (No. 1, 2, and 38) — each with 11 members; 33 councils were formed of 9 members each; and CECE No. 37 — with 7 members. According to CEC decisions regarding Level II CECEs, through 20 decisions, the electoral authority made modifications and additions to the nominal composition, to the list of relieved persons, and to those appointed to the working apparatus of 11 electoral councils.

2.11 Confirmation/accreditation of persons authorized to assist in electoral operations.

According to the Regulation on the Status and Activity of Electoral Competitor Representatives, each electoral competitor could appoint one representative to the lower-level electoral bodies. Electoral councils confirm these representatives both within their councils and in the electoral offices they have established.

It is noted that only 13 of the 23 electoral competitors exercised the right to appoint representatives to the electoral councils and electoral offices established both domestically and abroad.

In total, at the Level II CECE, 9,307 representatives were confirmed, of which 1,433 were in electoral offices established abroad. Thus, in the councils and electoral offices established domestically, 7,874 representatives were confirmed, appointed by ten electoral competitors:

- Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (1,915)
- PN (1,344)
- BEPSCIVM (1,930)

- PAS (1,602)
- MRM (959)
- PDA (14)
- PSDE (30)
- CUB (52)
- Olesea Stamate (5)
- Andrei Năstase (23)

In the electoral offices established abroad, 11 electoral competitors confirmed their representatives:

- Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (271)
- PN (166)
- BEPSCIVM (167)
- PAS (36)
- PDA (78)
- CUB (173)
- NOI (204)
- AUR (133)
- LOC (3)
- Olesea Stamate (9)
- Andrei Năstase (193)

The highest number of representatives were confirmed from Bloc “ALTERNATIVA” (2,186), followed by BEPSCIVM (2,097), PAS (1,638), PN (1,510), MRM (959), NOI (204), CUB (225), Andrei Năstase (216), AUR (133), PDA (92), Olesea Stamate (14), PSDE (30), and LOC (3).

Additionally, at the Level II CECE, 15 national observers and 17 journalists were accredited (see Annex No. 1).

2.12 Completion/modification of the nominal composition of the polling station electoral offices.

According to the Level II CECE decisions, the electoral councils adopted a total of 312 decisions through which they made modifications to the nominal composition of the polling station electoral offices and their working apparatus. The modifications aimed at completing incomplete compositions, correcting errors, excluding members at their request or revoking them, including for involvement in electoral campaigning activities, as well as changing the persons appointed to the working apparatus and those relieved of duties.

2.13 Activity of the polling station electoral offices (BESV).

For the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2025, the CEC and CECE established a total of 2,274 polling station electoral offices (BESV), representing the largest number of electoral offices opened compared to national elections held between 2016–2025.²⁵

²⁵ Presidential elections: 2016 – 2.111; 2020 – 2.143; 2024 – 2.219
Parliament elections 2019 – 2.141; 2021 – 2.150; 2025 – 2.274

Based on the decisions of the electoral bodies regarding the establishment of BESV, MO UJM noted that²⁶, at the time of analysis, at least 18,731 citizens of the Republic of Moldova had been confirmed as electoral officials within the BESV.

Most polling stations were established with 7 members (730 BESV – 32%) and 9 members (664 BESV – 29%), followed by compositions of: 11 members (516 BESV – 22%), 5 members (245 BESV – 11%), 13 members (61 BESV – 3%), and 15 members (58 BESV – 3%). Electoral offices with 13 and 15 members were exclusively established abroad.

None of the political parties entitled to designate one member to each BESV fully exercised this right. The overall designation of members in the established polling station offices was as follows: PAS – 2,182 members (96%), PSRM – 1,890 members (83%), PCRM – 978 members (42%). It is noteworthy that two of the three parties with the right of designation reported difficulties encountered by individuals proposed for election as electoral officials during registration for the certification exams for electoral training/specialization.

For BESV established abroad (301 offices), the designation rate was: PAS – 268 members (89%), PSRM – 88 members (29%), PCRM – 15 members (5%).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), as an entity with the right to designate members, managed to fill all remaining vacant positions. In total, the institution designated and confirmed 2,716 electoral officials. MO UJM considers this figure concerning, given that MAE, with just over 200 employees, does not have the capacity to cover even the minimum number of two members (301*2=602) in each electoral office. Therefore, it can be inferred that MAE recruited members from other sources, such as Moldovan diaspora associations.

Analyzing the decisions establishing BESV, MO UJM found that local public authorities exercised their designation rights at a rate of 70%²⁷ per electoral district. Additionally, although in a relatively small proportion (379 members), local public authorities supplemented the composition of electoral bodies when it was incomplete. From the Electoral Officials Register, at least 4,661 persons were confirmed as electoral officials.

Between 5–26 September 2025, MO UJM observers conducted 443 visits to 271 BESV located in municipalities where the electoral councils are headquartered. According to their reports, in 95% of cases, electoral officials were open to observation in the field. In the remaining cases, some reservation toward observers was noted, similar to CECE, possibly because this was the first election observation mission conducted by the Union of Jurists of Moldova. During 96% of visits, observers received answers to their questions and had access to all electoral materials.

However, according to the reported data, MO UJM found that in approximately 27% of visited offices, the electoral body's decisions and the full list of registered candidates were not communicated to interested parties through posting at the office.

Throughout the observation period, MO UJM also found cases of electoral officials engaging in activities beyond those permitted as subjects involved in the electoral process. Specifically, some officials were observed participating in electoral campaigning in favor of registered competitors.

²⁶ Interim Report No. 4 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, pp. 11–13.

²⁷ For 25 of the 36 electoral districts, local public authorities appointed 3 members to all constituted electoral bureaus.

As noted, according to CECE decisions, the revocation of members was one of the reasons for modifying the composition of electoral offices.

MO UJM emphasizes that, in exercising their duties, an electoral official has no right to conduct any other activity as a subject involved in the electoral process, may not make statements or campaign in favor or against competitors, and may not support any competitor financially or by any other means, directly or indirectly. By agreeing to exercise the role of electoral official, one is expected to demonstrate a high degree of integrity, impartiality, and professionalism. MO UJM considers this aspect requires increased attention in the training of electoral officials.

One aspect observed during visits to polling station offices was the extent to which voters used the possibility of verifying their information in the electoral lists. According to information collected by observers during discussions with electoral officials, voter interest in the mechanism for verifying the accuracy of data in the electoral lists was low. The most frequent corrections concerned information regarding the domicile or temporary residence of voters.

3. Registration of Electoral Competitors

During the period corresponding to the candidate nomination procedure for the elections²⁸, 46 subjects announced their intention to participate in the elections as electoral competitors: 21 individuals intending to run as independents, 21 political parties, and 5 electoral blocs.

Of the 21 prospective independent candidates:

- 4 registration applications were accepted,
- 3 applications were rejected,
- 13 individuals withdrew from this process—either returning the collected subscription lists or without returning them,
- and 1 person did not collect the subscription list forms after registering the initiative group.

The independent candidates admitted²⁹ to the race were: Olesea Stamate, Andrei Năstase, Victoria Sanduța, and Tatiana Crețu. The electoral authority rejected the registration applications of Dina Carpinschi, Natalia Clevadi, and Igor Ianac³⁰. The reason for the refusal was an insufficient number of supporting signatures presented by the applicants: 908, 66, and 1,816 valid signatures, respectively. It is noted that, by exception, for independent female candidates, the electoral law sets a minimum threshold of 1,000 supporting signatures, compared to 2,000 signatures required for male candidates.

Of the 21 registration applications for political parties as electoral competitors:

- 15 applications were accepted,
- 6 were rejected.

For electoral blocs:

- 4 applications were accepted,

²⁸ In addition to the “Check Yourself in RSA!” application, accessible at verifica.cec.md, voters could also verify this information at electoral bureaus.

²⁹ CEC Decisions No. 3779 of 13.08.2025, No. 3745 of 06.08.2025, No. 3836 of 22.08.2025, and No. 3865 of 26.08.2025.

³⁰ CEC Decisions No. 3860 of 25.08.2025, No. 3863 and No. 3864 of 26.08.2025.

- 1 was rejected.

In the justification for rejecting³¹ the electoral bloc “Victorie-Pobeda,” the Commission indicated that the participants’ activities during the administrative procedure contained elements falling under at least the restrictions provided in Art. 3(12), points 1(c), 2, 3, 4, and 6 of Law no. 294/2007 on political parties³².

The electoral subjects admitted to the race (15 political parties and 4 electoral blocs) complied with the gender representation quota of at least 40% of both sexes on the candidate lists, as required by law. The majority of candidates nominated by the political formations are members of the respective parties.

The specifics of the registration or rejection of each electoral subject were reflected in interim reports no. 1-5³³, published on the UJM website.

After finalizing the candidate lists of political parties and electoral blocs, the situation regarding the candidates is as follows:

Electoral Competitor	Number of Candidates on the List	Party-Affiliated Candidates	Non-Affiliated Candidates	Women Quota, %	Men Quota %
PAS	104	84	20	40,4	59,6
PDA	86	86	0	44,18	55,82
CUB	59	59	0	40,68	59,32
ALDE	54	54	0	51,9	48,1
PNM	54	54	0	46,3	53,7
PSDE	86	85	1	46,5	53,5
MRM	101	101	0	42,6	57,4
BEPSCIVM	80	80	0	40	60
BEA	106	97	9	46,2	53,8
BEÎ	60	60	0	45	55
LOC	53	25	28	52,8	47,2
AUR	62	62	0	41,9	58,1
PMM	56	56	0	44,6	55,4
PAM	57	23	34	40,4	59,6

³¹ CEC Decision No. 3670 of 19.07.2025.

³² CEC Decision No. 3670 of 19.07.2025.

³³ Interim reports of the MO UJM for monitoring the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025.

PL	56	56	0	44,6	55,4
PNOI	55	55	0	45,5	54,5
BUN	79	46	33	41,8	58,2
UCSM	53	14	39	56,6	43,4
PN	102	74	28	44,12	55,88
Total number of candidates	1.363	1.171	192	45,05	54,94

Of the total candidates nominated by political parties or electoral blocs, 86% are members of the parties that nominated them, while the remaining 14% are candidates without affiliation to those parties. An atypical situation is observed in the case of the political formation “Christian Social Union of Moldova” (UCSM), which nominated candidates who are not members of the party in 73.6% of cases. Similarly, the political party “Alliance of Moldovans” (PAM) has 59.6% of candidates on its list without party membership, and the political party “League of Cities and Communes” (LOC) has 52.8% of candidates without political affiliation. The electoral bloc “Union of the Nation Bloc” included 41.72% of candidates without political affiliation. The political party “Our Party” nominated 27.45% of candidates without party affiliation, and the political party “Party of Action and Solidarity” (PAS) – 19.23%.

It is worth noting that the most frequent reason for refusing to register candidate lists was non-compliance with the gender quota. The same reason led to adjustments made by electoral subjects in the lists submitted for registration during the administrative procedure at the request of the CEC. Another frequent reason for refusal of candidate registration was incomplete documentation or other formal discrepancies. In numerous cases, the CEC excluded from the lists submitted by political formations candidates who did not appear before the document reception group to sign a special form confirming the personal submission of candidacy documents. Subsequently, by refusing to register candidates who did not appear to sign, the remaining candidate list underwent modifications, including regarding the gender quota, which required electoral competitors to make adjustments during the ongoing administrative procedure.

MO UJM noted that the rule requiring candidates to confirm by personal signature the submission of candidacy documents is excessive. Requiring candidates to appear in person before the authority to confirm their consent to run indicates a lack of trust in individuals, severely affecting the institution of representation, especially when submission by a party representative is considered insufficient. Furthermore, requiring the candidate to sign using the exact signature specimen from their ID shows, once again, that state authorities treat nominated candidates as potential actors in bad faith.

Other formal discrepancies were identified in several cases, with the CEC requesting corrections during the administrative procedure, demonstrating that the administrative authority respected the principles established in Articles 28–34 of the Administrative Code. However, in some cases, the CEC did not request clarifications or completions from participants, indicating, in MO UJM’s opinion, inconsistent approaches by the electoral authority.

For some electoral competitors, the CEC intervened excessively in the decision-making autonomy and internal bureaucracy of parties by requesting documents prior to the decision to nominate

candidates. This was the case with BEPSCIVM, from which minutes of statutory bodies of the constituent parties proposing candidates were requested. Without a similar approach for other blocs, such as Blocul Împreună, it can be deduced that this was not uniform, indicating unequal treatment.

In other cases, the CEC excluded candidates citing prior convictions, connections with parties declared unconstitutional, or restrictions under Article 16 of the Electoral Code. The candidate lists of the political parties “Great Moldova” (PMM) and “New Historical Option” (PNOI) were invalidated entirely due to the exclusion of candidates for these reasons. In PNOI’s case, the CEC excluded a candidate questioning their eligibility as a party member. In both cases, courts found that collective sanctions (annulment of entire lists) were unlawful and ordered reconsideration of the applications. The courts also found that the CEC applied discriminatory treatment compared to other electoral competitors and emphasized that the authority must notify the petitioner of identified non-compliance, specifying which irregularities persist and giving the opportunity to remedy them.

MO UJM documented cases of unjustified abstention from voting by CEC members when approving decisions on candidate list registration requests. This practice is equivalent to tacit refusal, contrary to the Electoral Code and the Administrative Code. According to these laws, the CEC has a legal obligation to resolve petitioner requests through an administrative act (favorable or unfavorable) within 7 days. In this context, adopting decisions past the deadline for certain electoral competitors can be considered a violation of the duty of neutrality and equal treatment, and deliberate delays could constitute administrative abuse with electoral effects.

During the candidate registration period, MO UJM documented that PAS and the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (PPDA) submitted a joint candidate list, publicly presented as an expression of “unity of pro-European forces.” MO UJM identified all elements of a camouflaged³⁴ electoral bloc. The existence of this bloc was tolerated by the CEC. Additionally, it was noted that until the end of the candidate nomination period, PPDA did not attempt to run independently, reinforcing the suspicion that the party participated jointly with PAS as part of a camouflaged bloc. A few days after the election, Dinu Plîngău stated³⁵ his intention to return to PPDA, adding that “time will tell” when and how this will occur. He also stated he would refuse to join the PAS parliamentary faction, preferring to serve as an independent MP.

Another irregular form of association was observed with the “BUN” electoral bloc, which, as a registered electoral competitor, decided to withdraw in favor of PAS. On 22 September, representatives of this competitor held a press³⁶ conference declaring their withdrawal and intention to unite efforts with PAS. PAS president Igor Grosu attended, demonstrating the explicit, coordinated, and concerted nature of this action. Although announced six days before the election, an official withdrawal request was not submitted to authorities, so the competitor remained on the ballot without the electoral bodies applying the “Withdrawn” stamp. According to the press conference, both parties signed an agreement committing to joint actions. This declared withdrawal served as a strategic political gesture with symbolic and mobilizing effects. OSCE/ODIHR standards emphasize that genuine political pluralism should not be artificially reduced through unofficial alliances or tactical withdrawals supporting power. The action by BUN leaders becomes problematic if it is part of “camouflaged blocs,” i.e., undeclared alliances circumventing financing, transparency, and real electoral competition norms. Ultimately, without

³⁴ Interim Report No. 1 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, pp. 12–14.

³⁵ Plîngău met with Platforma DA after the parliamentary elections.

³⁶ The Unirea Națiunii Bloc withdraws from the elections and announces its support for PAS.

the “Withdrawn” stamp on ballots, 797 voters cast votes for this competitor on election day, according to CEC data, meaning a significant number were misled by the political maneuver of the BUN leaders.

3.1 Exclusion of Electoral Competitors from the Race

The last week before election day was marked by several high-profile cases of the exclusion of candidates from political parties, and in one case, even an entire list of candidates.

On September 23, 2025, the CEC examined³⁷ a submission³⁸ from the Information and Security Service (SIS) regarding the list of candidates of PDA. Following the examination of this matter, the CEC found that two candidates on the list of the “Democrația Acasă” party simultaneously held leadership positions in the “Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor” (AUR) party in the Republic of Moldova and excluded them from the list. The “Democrația Acasă” party was warned and given a 24-hour deadline to adjust the order of candidates on the list in order to meet the criteria for equal representation of both genders. Analyzing this case, MO UJM observes the following.

By its nature, the SIS submission constitutes a complaint, which is also deduced from the adoption clause of Resolution No. 4054 – among the legal grounds, Article 91 of the Electoral Code is indicated. According to Article 91(1)(a) of the Electoral Code, a complaint is a request seeking the review, annulment, in whole or in part, or issuance of an administrative act by the electoral body. The SIS based its submission on Article 3, point 1(b), Articles 7(1), points 5) and 21) of the Law on the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova, as well as Article 28(1), point 5 of the Electoral Code. The cited provisions of the SIS framework law relate to competences concerning state security, counterintelligence activities, personnel training and retraining, the collection and processing of information to detect and counteract subversive activities of foreign intelligence services, etc. These provisions have no connection to the electoral domain.

At the same time, according to Article 28 of the Electoral Code cited in the submission, it should be noted that this provision refers to the additional duties of the SIS during the electoral period to contribute to the proper conduct of the elections. These duties exhaustively include: a) ensuring the security of actions related to the preparation of the voting ballot matrices, printing and distribution of ballots, and the destruction of matrices; b) preventing unauthorized access to technical means for printing ballots and other electoral documents, including during the printing process; c) within its competence and existing legal framework, ensuring the informational security of connections within the State Automated Information System “Elections,” including the cybersecurity of the CEC’s activities regarding the organization and conduct of elections; d) within its competence and existing framework, informing the CEC about violations in campaign financing and/or initiative groups.

We therefore observe that the SIS assumed an improper prerogative – informing the CEC about members of registered political parties – a function that belongs to the ASP.

On the other hand³⁹, the SIS cites provisions of Article 4(2)(h), (l) of the State Security Law No. 618/1995, according to which actions influencing electoral processes, hybrid threats against the state, etc., pose dangers to the state – all attributed to the AUR party, which, according to the SIS submission, would be “subject to external influence,” likely linked to the homonymous party in Romania – AUR Romania, whose leader, George Simion, is declared undesirable in the Republic of Moldova. However, the SIS submission targets PDA and not the AUR party in Moldova.

³⁷ The Unirea Națiunii Bloc withdraws from the elections and announces its support for PAS.

³⁸ [Law nr. 136/2023](#).

³⁹ SIS requests that CEC, based on an anonymous complaint, exclude the “Democrație Acasă”

PDA was registered as an electoral competitor by CEC Resolution No. 3682 on July 30, 2025. This act, being an individual administrative act, according to point 6 of its operative part, could be contested within 3 days without following a prior procedure. This period constitutes a statute of limitations, a timeframe in which any interested party may exercise opposition to the validity of an administrative act issued by a public authority, after which this right expires definitively. Statutes of limitation are imposed by law to ensure the security of legal relations. Once the period expires, the situation becomes stable, and all parties must comply. This is an application of the principle of legal certainty and legitimate trust. In this case, the period expired on August 2, and the CEC should have acted accordingly to protect the security of ongoing legal relations.

Substantively, PDA is accused of participating in an irregular association within a covert electoral bloc with the AUR party. However, it must be noted that AUR participated in the race with its own list of candidates, without withdrawing – officially or declaratively. Therefore, the accusation against PDA, in the opinion of MO UJM, is trivial and unsustainable. In contrast, in the association between PAS-PPDA-BUN, all defining elements of a covert electoral bloc were identified – an association between electoral competitors and/or political parties through which they conduct joint, concerted electoral activities, creating the perception of collective participation. Furthermore, in that case, specific features according to the CEC criteria were met: “To qualify activities as joint, concerted and/or coordinated within a covert electoral bloc, the following criteria shall apply, without limitation: declared cooperation without registration by the competent authority in Moldova; joint electoral promotion activities; coordinated use of political or electoral promotional resources, material, financial or logistical (office, team, vehicles, symbol, or name); joint electoral discourse.”

According to the letter and spirit of Article 111 of the Electoral Code, the modification of the candidate list constitutes an (exclusive) right of the electoral competitor (the party that nominated the candidate list), and the exercise of this right is limited to 10 days before election day to prevent potential abuses regarding individual candidates on the same list. Substantively, the CEC imposed a sanction on PDA by excluding the two persons indicated in the SIS submission from its list. In this context, according to Article 102(5) of the Electoral Code, for participation in a covert bloc, the annulment of registration may be applied to the electoral subject, and in this case, the subject of the bloc is the constituent party. Therefore, literally, the sanction regarding annulment of registration is collective and applies to the party that participated in concerted electoral actions with other formations, which in practice means the annulment of the entire candidate list. Another observed aspect is that although PDA requested the synchronous withdrawal of the two persons from the list to avoid doubts about their political affiliation, the CEC rejected the request, adopting a punitive resolution. Moreover, by obliging the party to modify the remaining candidate list to meet gender quotas after the exclusion of the two candidates, the CEC allowed a violation of the 10-day legal term when such modifications could have been made.

By the same resolution, the CEC also applied warnings to both political formations – PDA and AUR – for failing to update member registries following the transfer of the two persons from one party to another. We observe that the inactions attributed to the two subjects are regulated by the Law on Political Parties. According to Article 102(2) of the Electoral Code, a warning sanction is applied to an electoral subject for “violation of norms of regulatory acts in the electoral domain.” Therefore, the CEC extrapolated the case and unjustifiably extended the sanction to the provisions of another law.

Finally, we note that the electoral subject was caught in a trap intended to violate its right to defense. According to point 6 of the operative part of Resolution No. 4054, PDA was summoned to modify its candidate list within 24 hours of adoption, although, according to point 9, it was granted 3 days to contest it at the Central Court of Appeal.

Another notable case of exclusion of a series of candidates from a competitor's list concerned the "Inima Moldovei" (PRIM) party. On September 26, 2025, the CEC excluded the "Inima Moldovei" party from the electoral race following a ruling of the Central Court of Appeal that ordered a precautionary measure in the Ministry of Justice's (MJ) action to limit the party's activities for 12 months.

The origin of this matter was a CEC decision⁴⁰ adopted on September 17, 2025, following complaints accusing PRIM of financial violations. From the text of this decision, it appears that the CEC could not establish the veracity of the accusations and therefore decided "to initiate a complex control mission of PRIM's financing for the period May 1 – August 31, 2025, and BEPSCIVM for the period August 3 – October 1, 2025," which would be completed with a "report including a summary of main verified aspects, control activities performed, findings, and possible recommendations, as well as documents and information obtained." The deadline for this control was set for March 31, 2026. At the same time, the decision was sent to the Ministry of Justice to "examine the applicability of Article 21 of Law No. 294/2007 regarding political parties concerning PRIM." The CEC decision was contested at the Central Court of Appeal on the same day, with the complainant⁴¹ requesting suspension of the decision. However, according to a press release, the Ministry of Justice filed an action in court seeking to limit PRIM's activities immediately upon receiving the CEC decision, on September 19, and subsidiarily, to apply the precautionary measure of limiting the party's activities during the trial. What seems surprising is the speed with which MJ examined the applicability of Article 21 of the Law on Political Parties: on September 18, it was notified of the CEC decision and given a copy of the administrative file (according to point 6 of CEC Resolution No. 3993), and by September 19, the solution – filing the action in court – was already identified. However, according to the CEC resolution, a comprehensive financial control should have been conducted first to clarify the key aspects forming the basis of the accusation against PRIM, which is essential for the "examination of applicability of Article 21."

We also observe that, on one hand, the court refused to suspend the execution of the CEC administrative act as a precautionary measure for the complainant, whose rights were directly affected by the contested decision, and, on the other hand, the court issued a precautionary measure at the MJ's request, limiting the party's activities and thus affecting its electoral rights. Eventually, the ⁴²CEC resumed examining⁴³ the case, based on the Central Court of Appeal ruling ordering the limitation of the party's activities during the examination⁴⁴ of MJ's action. By Resolution No. 4114, the CEC decided to revoke its own Resolution No. 3651⁴⁵ regarding PRIM, excluding the party from the list of eligible parties for the September 28 parliamentary elections and excluding 26 candidates from the BEPSCIVM list submitted by PRIM. At the same time, the electoral bloc was summoned to adjust the list of remaining candidates to meet gender quotas within 24 hours of the decision, although, according to point 4 of the resolution, a 3-day period was granted for contesting the administrative act. Similar to the PDA case, through this legal maneuver, the CEC deprived the electoral subject – BEPSCIVM – of the right to an appeal. Also, as in the PDA case, according to Article 111 of the Electoral Code, modifying the candidate list is the exclusive right of the electoral competitor, and exercising this right is limited to 10 days before election day to

⁴⁰ Regulation regarding the specificities of establishing and registering electoral blocs.

⁴¹ HCEC No 4114,.

⁴² HCEC No 3993

⁴³ CAC Decision of 25.09.2025.

⁴⁴ Press release of the Ministry of Justice.

⁴⁵ Decision regarding the list of political parties entitled to participate in the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025.

prevent possible abuses regarding individual candidates. The CEC arbitrarily modified the list ex officio.

Most importantly, under the Electoral Code, situations leading to annulment of an electoral competitor's registration are strictly limited. In this case, they concern instances where: a) undeclared financial or material resources exceeding 1% relative to the electoral fund cap or initiative group fund; b) exceeding the electoral fund or initiative group fund cap; c) using financial resources from abroad, except for donations from Moldovan citizens with income obtained abroad. Analyzing CEC Resolution No. 3993, given the very weak evidentiary basis, the CEC had no grounds to annul the registration in the electoral litigation. Therefore, public authorities (CEC and MJ) pursued an administrative litigation route, made possible by amendments to the Law on Political Parties introduced by Law No. 100/2025. This strategy was chosen to circumvent the Electoral Code procedure. MO UJM notes that the model instituted in this election, whereby political parties are excluded from the race following CEC review of eligible party lists approved at the start of the electoral period, is dangerous and violates international standards for free and fair elections. The lack of a legal mechanism ensuring stability and security of legal relations seriously affects the fairness of the election, public trust, electoral integrity, and election results. Additionally, following PRIM's exclusion from the election, the CEC left intact its resolutions regarding the registration of the BEPSCIVM bloc, in full composition, without excluding PRIM from the bloc, and the electoral competitor retained its full name and logo for printing on ballots – both referencing PRIM – the phrase “Inima Moldovei” in the bloc's name and the heart symbol in the electoral logo. Paradoxically, following PRIM's exclusion from the list of eligible parties, it could not participate in the formation of blocs, which are themselves electoral subjects. Therefore, for consistency, the CEC should have revised Resolution No. 3729⁴⁶ of August 3, 2025, by excluding PRIM from the bloc's composition, and consequently, amending the annex approving⁴⁷ the model and text of the ballot for the September 28, 2025 parliamentary elections. This omission can be explained by the fact that the entire batch of ballots had already been printed and distributed to lower electoral bodies, and ordering a new batch would have imposed enormous financial pressure, with printing and distribution in record time being practically impossible⁴⁸. On the evening of September 26, 2025, after extended examination of multiple submissions against the “Moldova Mare” party, the CEC⁴⁹ excluded this party from the race, annulling the registration of the competitor and the entire candidate list. This case is unprecedented, considering the timing of the decision and especially its finality. The decision was contested at the Central⁵⁰ Court of Appeal on Saturday, September 27, and the court ruled on September 28, election day, while voting was ongoing. The Central Court of Appeal rejected the complaint, upholding the CEC's annulment of the PMM candidate list registration, and in the afternoon of September 28, the Supreme Court of Justice declared⁵¹ the appeal inadmissible. Only in the evening of September 28, at 19:30, did the CEC meet to take additional measures to adjust the electoral process according to the new circumstances. The CEC decided⁵² to instruct lower electoral bodies regarding procedures for

⁴⁶ Decision regarding the registration request of the “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Heart, and Future of Moldova” for participation in the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025.

⁴⁷ HCEC No. 3943.

⁴⁸ Interim Report No. 5 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, p. 10.

⁴⁹ Interim Report No. 5 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, p. 10.

⁵⁰ Central Court of Appeal Decision: PMM vs. CEC.

⁵¹ Supreme Court Conclusion regarding the inadmissibility of the PMM appeal against the CAC decision.

⁵² HCEC Nos. 4128,

counting ballots and totalizing results. As the application of the “Withdrawn” stamp for the competitor was already too late, this operation was abandoned, but ballots containing the option to vote for this competitor were to be declared invalid and counted as such. A problem arose at polling stations abroad, where the time zone is at least +2 hours compared to Moldova. Protocols needed to be amended, and data in the State Information System “Elections” recalibrated.

According to the election totalization protocol prepared and approved by the CEC, 30,857 ballots were categorized as “invalid.” To understand the potential impact of the late withdrawal of PMM without reflecting it on ballots, we refer to statistics from previous elections. At the last parliamentary elections in 2021, invalid ballots numbered 13,749; at the 2024 presidential elections – 18,464; at the 2020 presidential elections – 19,797. The arithmetic mean of the three recent national elections is 17,336 invalid ballots. The difference between this figure and that in the current election is 13,521, likely representing voters who consciously voted for PMM unaware that the competitor had been withdrawn, as ballots did not carry the “Withdrawn” stamp.

In conclusion, according to Article 100(1) of the Electoral Code, “during the electoral period, competent authorities examine complaints within 3 days of submission, but no later than election day; courts apply the same term when examining electoral disputes, including appeal procedures.” This provision guarantees predictability for election day. Exceeding these deadlines may affect the free expression of voters’ choice.

Regarding the substance of the electoral litigation in PMM’s case, it originated from: a submission by an electoral competitor and complaints from several law enforcement agencies – Orhei Police Inspectorate, National Investigation Inspectorate, Gagauzia Territorial Police Directorate, Bălți Police Inspectorate, National Anticorruption Center, and the SIS. Analysis of CEC Resolution No. 4119 shows that complaints were based on journalistic investigations, statements of individuals, data from ongoing criminal investigations, references to protocols regarding persons accused of voter bribery, references to materials from criminal cases initiated in 2025, and various information on PMM members and supporters’ activities in 2024-2025 accumulated by the SIS. In points 102–104 of the reasoning section, the CEC refers to prohibitions applied to the party leader, Victoria Furtună, published in the Official Gazette on July 23 and 26, 2025. Point 117 refers to the materials of the examined complaints documenting illicit activities of three PMM-affiliated groups from March to September 2025. The CEC also considered the association of PMM with some parties affiliated with Ilan Șor, reported in complaints referring to the 2024 presidential elections and subsequent period. We note that although these circumstances occurred long ago, authorities did not invoke them to prevent PMM from being eligible in the parliamentary elections. After the CEC approved the list of parties eligible to participate on July 14, 2025, no subject raised concerns⁵³ regarding these circumstances. PMM was listed at position 6, unaffected by revocation reservations for positions 26–39. The issue of prohibitions on the party leader was not raised during candidate list registration examination on August 23 and again on September 5, despite being published in July. Conversely, the CEC initially rejected PMM’s request due to non-compliance with gender representation criteria. Detailed analysis is presented in MO UJM⁵⁴ interim reports No. 3 and No. 4.

Summarizing the cases described in this section, we find that considering the timing of exclusions, authorities’ actions affected the legal certainty of electoral competitors’ status and limited their right to an effective remedy, contrary to international standards. In this context, we reference the ECHR judgment in *Abil v. Azerbaijan* (March 5, 2020), which establishes that “to prevent arbitrary

⁵³ HCEC Nos. 3651

⁵⁴ Interim Report No. 3 (p. 19) and Interim Report No. 4 (p. 6) of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025.

disqualification of candidates, relevant national procedures should include sufficient safeguards protecting candidates from abusive and unfounded allegations of inappropriate electoral conduct, and disqualification decisions should be based on solid, relevant, and sufficient evidence.” We also note, in context, Article 50 of the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines of 2020 regarding political⁵⁵ party regulation: “The necessity of restrictions must be well balanced. The chosen limitation should represent a proportionate and minimally intrusive measure to achieve the intended purpose.” We consider that Moldovan legislation should be revised to limit arbitrariness and establish effective mechanisms that enhance legal stability guarantees in the electoral process and ensure effective and timely remedies in electoral litigation procedures.

4. Pre-election and election period

The notion of the “electoral period”, in the original wording of the Electoral Code, was defined as “the period between the entry into force of the act establishing the election date and the day on which the election results are confirmed by the competent authorities, but not exceeding 120 days.” This definition was supplemented by Law no. 1/2024 with the following statement: “The start date of the electoral period shall be established by a decision of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC).”

As a result of this amendment, the provision became imprecise and open to interpretation. On the one hand, according to the text, the time interval defined as the electoral period begins to run from the entry into force of the act setting the election date—in this case, April 18, 2025⁵⁶. On the other hand, according to the CEC-approved calendar program, the electoral period started on July 14, 2025⁵⁷. Thus, in the first scenario, the electoral period would last until August 18, while in the second scenario, it would last until October 14.

It should be noted that, according to Art. 60(3) of Law no. 100/2017 on normative acts, the law must ensure precision and clarity. In the opinion of the UJM Election Observation Mission, the lack of precision regarding this temporal marker in the electoral calendar complicates the proper implementation of activities planned in the calendar program.

The first difficulty concerns the delimitation of the electoral campaign from the rest of the electoral period, especially regarding the applicability of categories of publicity available to subjects of law: political publicity vs. electoral publicity.

Art. 1 of the Electoral Code contains the notion of “pre-election agitation” – appeals, statements, actions for nominating candidates in elections, preparation for collecting signatures to support them or for initiating a referendum, and signature collection, including all such actions undertaken by the designated candidate themselves. However, we note that this notion is not regulated by law—it does not describe the conditions of conduct, the period, the forms of manifestation, etc.

Thus, it is concluded that the notion of “pre-election agitation” was unnecessarily introduced in the law. On the other hand, we observe that the law does not use the concept of “pre-electoral period” in which pre-election agitation would fall. Therefore, it is concluded that this form of agitation cannot exceed the limits of the electoral period.

⁵⁵ CDL-AD(2020)032-e Joint Guidelines of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR on Political Party Regulation.

⁵⁶ HP No. 77/2025.

⁵⁷ HCEC No. 3601 of 18.06.2025.

4.1 Hidden Advertising and Use of Administrative Resources

In its interim reports⁵⁸, the UJM Observation Mission (MO UJM) reported and analyzed cases of public authorities' involvement in electoral campaign activities and the use of administrative resources.

During the pre-election and election period, MO UJM observed an intensification of media campaigns carried out by public authorities, particularly the Government, presented as "public interest messages," according to the definition provided in Article 2 of Law no. 62/2022 on advertising. However, in terms of content and form, some of these campaigns went beyond civic information, transforming into tools for the indirect promotion of the ruling party.

Campaigns such as "Moldova Can," "European Village," "Building a European Moldova," "Europe is Near," or "Growth Plan" were massively promoted through billboards, TV spots, and online posts, being broadcast on official government platforms. Content analysis reveals elements of narrative continuity with the political messages of the ruling party (PAS) – emphasizing government achievements, European integration, investments, and economic growth.

Thus, these campaigns can be classified as disguised electoral advertising because they:

- use public resources (financial, logistical, and institutional);
- promote topics identical to PAS's electoral campaign;
- create an image transfer between the public authority and the ruling party.

Moreover, the timing of their dissemination (a few weeks before the elections) and their presence on the Government's official pages contradict the principles of neutrality of public authorities and equal opportunities for electoral competitors, as provided in Article 50(b) of Electoral Code no. 325/2022.

In addition to public communication, MO UJM observed administrative decisions with direct electoral impact:

- The budget rectification "Budget Plus," which allocated additional funds for social assistance and local projects during the electoral period;
- The provision of a one-time financial support of 1,000 MDL to families with schoolchildren by CNAS, starting on September 4, 2025 — less than three weeks before the elections;
- The reduction of electricity tariffs, decided by ANRE, by 0.51 and 0.68 MDL/kWh, a measure that created the perception of economic benefits in favor of the government.

Although such actions were administratively justified, they produced political effects favorable to the incumbent competitor and affected the principle of equal opportunities.

MO UJM documented several cases of using the office, infrastructure, and material resources of the state to promote electoral competitors. These practices contravene Article 50(b) and Article 70(6) of the Electoral Code, which prohibit the abusive use of administrative resources and

⁵⁸ Interim Reports No. 1 (pp. 17–18), No. 2 (pp. 15–18), No. 4 (pp. 18–20), and No. 5 (pp. 15–16) of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025.

guarantee equal opportunities for all electoral competitors. Cases of indirect involvement of dignitaries and state institutions in activities with electoral undertones were observed:

- The Speaker of Parliament, Igor Grosu, a PAS candidate, conducted overseas tours and meetings with the diaspora at the premises of Moldova's diplomatic missions, attended by ambassadors and state officials. These activities do not fall within the prerogatives of his position (Article 14 of the Parliament Regulations) nor the competencies of diplomatic missions (Article 4 of Law no. 761/2001, Article 15(4) of Law 158/2008) and were classified as abusive use of administrative resources.
- During the campaign period, Igor Grosu participated in events presented as "working visits," promoting local projects with messages such as "Europe is visible in every locality," which represents disguised electoral agitation.
- The Minister of Labor, Alexei Buzu, participated in events involving the donation of goods funded from the state budget during the electoral campaign.
- The Mayor of Chişinău used slogans ("We Build. You See It!", "We Do. We've Shown It's Possible") in favor of the electoral bloc "Alternativa."

MO UJM signaled the phenomenon of "merit misappropriation," where electoral competitors (PAS, BEA, PN) claimed achievements of other local authorities or previous governments. For example: PAS claimed projects implemented with external or prior funding (e.g., the Varnița School of Arts); Ion Ceban and Renato Usatîi leveraged local managerial achievements (modernizations, urban infrastructure) in their campaigns to promote administrative competence. This practice distorts public perception and creates confusion between institutional and party merits.

MO UJM also documented publicized cases of organizing electoral meetings in higher education institutions (UTM, USMF, INEFS), sometimes during class hours, with mandatory student participation. The rectors of these institutions were listed on some party lists, and using educational spaces and resources for campaign purposes violates institutional neutrality norms and public ethics. Youth organizations condemned these practices as forms of political pressure and misuse of public infrastructure for electoral purposes.

MO UJM assesses that the use of media campaigns and administrative resources generated:

- disproportionate advantages for the ruling party,
- confusion between public and political communication,
- distortion of the fair character of the campaign,
- a direct impact on the principle of equal opportunities among competitors,
- a decrease in public trust in the neutrality of state institutions.

The lack of prompt reactions from competent authorities reinforced the public perception of tolerance toward such practices.

In this context, MO UJM recommends clarifying the regulatory framework regarding the use of administrative resources during campaigns, including for diplomatic missions and central authorities. In particular:

- CEC – to explicitly prohibit the dissemination of public interest messages with political content during the electoral period;
- Government – to suspend public information campaigns with potential electoral impact during the electoral period;

- Parliamentary Communication Service – to ensure strict separation between institutional and party communication;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs – to institute electoral neutrality rules, expressly prohibiting involvement or hosting of party activities;
- Parliament – to clarify the official competencies of the Speaker regarding external trips and public communication;
- Central and local public authorities – to ensure clear separation between institutional and political communication, avoiding the use of electoral symbols and slogans.

4.2 Involvement of the Presidential Institution

Although, according to the legislation, the President is obliged to maintain political neutrality and cannot participate in party activities or the electoral campaign, MO UJM observed active involvement of the presidential institution in public actions and communications with electoral undertones during the electoral period. An analysis of the presidential institution's involvement in the electoral campaign was presented in MO UJM Interim Report no. 5⁵⁹.

MO UJM noted a constant association between the Presidency and the ruling party (PAS), materialized through:

- The President's participation in the National Political Council meeting and PAS annual political conference;
- Involvement in identifying potential candidates and conveying messages aligned with the party's narratives.

These actions generated an institutional image transfer in favor of the ruling party, contravening the principle of apoliticism of the presidential office.

During the campaign period, the Head of State participated in domestic and international public events, where speeches contained messages favorable to a political option. Additionally, during official overseas visits, the President met with the diaspora, delivering mobilizing appeals to vote, reflecting messages similar to the ruling party's campaign.

MO UJM analyzed two public addresses by President Maia Sandu, broadcast in the final days of the campaign, and reports the following:

- The message from September 22 contained references to security risks, foreign influence, voter corruption, and calls for civic mobilization. By contrasting "Europe–peace–dignity" vs. "Russia–corruption–betrayal," the message induced political polarization corresponding to PAS's campaign narratives.
- The message from September 26, just two days before the election, reiterated the call to vote using emotional and personal formulations ("I do not want to live in a country run by thieves," "ousting the oligarch," "Moldova's European future"). Although the President stated she spoke "as a citizen," the context and platform gave the message an official character, transforming it into a disguised political appeal under the guise of a civic message.

⁵⁹ Interim Reports No. 1 (pp. 17–18), No. 2 (pp. 15–18), No. 4 (pp. 18–20), and No. 5 (pp. 15–16) of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025.

Regarding the President's speeches during the electoral period, MO UJM concluded that, overall, they:

- exceeded the constitutional limits of the presidential role as guarantor of sovereignty and integrity;
- implicitly favored one political actor and disadvantaged others;
- employed polarizing and emotional language, with alarmist tones ("risk of losing EU funds," "danger of military infiltration");
- could be perceived as indirect means of influencing the electorate, affecting the principle of equality among electoral competitors.

MO UJM also found that the presidential institution's involvement in the electoral campaign, through speeches, event participation, and public communications, contravenes the political neutrality principle provided by the Constitution, Constitutional Court rulings, and the Electoral Code, as well as the principle of responsibility and loyalty stipulated by Law no. 199/2010 on the status of public dignitaries regarding public office.

Although the messages were presented as civic appeals, their timing, tone, and content had a direct electoral impact, consolidating the ruling party's image and affecting the perception of impartiality of the presidential institution.

In this context, MO UJM recommends:

1. Clarifying norms regarding the neutrality of the presidential office. Parliament and the Constitutional Court should revise the legal framework to expressly prohibit the President from participating, directly or indirectly, in electoral campaign activities.
2. Clear separation of institutional and political communication. The Presidential Office should develop internal procedures delineating official messages from political communication, including online, during the electoral period.
3. Prohibition of using administrative resources. Official events, external visits, or institutional communications of the President must not coincide temporally and thematically with any party's electoral campaign. The Electoral Code should be amended to extend the prohibition of administrative resource use to individuals not running as candidates.
4. Monitoring of official speeches during campaigns. CEC and the Audiovisual Council should establish clear mechanisms to monitor messages disseminated by state institutions during the electoral period, preventing the use of public platforms for political purposes.
5. Promoting civic education regarding the apolitical role of the presidential institution. Civil society and media should contribute to strengthening constitutional culture by explaining the importance of institutional neutrality in the electoral process.

4.3 Involvement of Diplomatic Officials in Political Activities

The UJM Observation Mission found the involvement of some diplomatic corps representatives in politically charged activities. Providing diplomatic mission premises for ruling party events and the presence of ambassadors at political meetings constitute indirect involvement in the activity of an electoral competitor, considered unacceptable in a democratic state.

A notable case is the behavior of the Moldovan Ambassador to Romania, Victor Chirilă, who openly expressed political opinions and preferences regarding the parliamentary elections on September 28, 2025, through public social media posts. His statements ("we will be free or the

slaves of a diabolic empire,” “I will vote for our European future”) constitute manifestations of political preference and may be interpreted as calls to vote for pro-European parties.

The situation was exacerbated by the lack of an official response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the distribution of the message by PAS Deputy Radu Marian indicates political validation of the ambassador’s conduct. A similar message was transmitted by the ambassador in Greece, Andrei Popov, who, while informing voters about polling stations, introduced expressions such as “continuation of the European path” or “do not stay home,” turning institutional communication into an indirect political appeal.

In the same vein, Ambassador Viorel Ursu (Nordic countries) delivered a video message combining informative elements with mobilizing rhetoric (“a single chance to decide the country’s direction,” “peace depends on you”), reducing the neutrality of the message.

MO UJM analyzed in detail the cases of diplomatic officials’ involvement in campaign activities in its interim⁶⁰ reports.

According to Article 9(2) of Law no. 761/2001 on the diplomatic service, diplomatic service members are public officials with a special status, obliged to act loyally to the state, not to a political actor. Article 15(4) of Law no. 158/2008 on public office and the status of public officials stipulates that a public official “shall refrain from expressing or manifesting political preferences and from favoring any political party.”

Therefore, any message with political content, direct or implicit, published during the exercise of the function, contravenes the obligation of political neutrality of diplomatic officials and can be interpreted as interference in the campaign.

In this context, MO UJM recommends:

- Sanctioning violations: cases of political involvement by ambassadors should be evaluated by the MAE Disciplinary Committee and, if applicable, referred to the Central Electoral Commission.
- Separation of institutional and personal communication: official embassy and ambassador accounts should only publish neutral logistical information regarding the electoral process.
- Training and education: introducing training modules on political neutrality and diplomatic function ethics at the MAE Diplomatic Institute.

4.4 Camouflaged Partisanship

MO UJM observed disguised involvement in the electoral campaign by actors who are not electoral subjects. For instance, the NGO “Watchdog” placed politically charged electoral advertising on fixed advertising devices located on the public domain of administrative-territorial units, even though it is not an advertising provider under Law no. 62/2022 on advertising. The billboards, titled “They ask for your vote, but who pulls the strings?” and “Do not listen to Putin’s parrots,” were observed by our observers in at least six districts. The panels included the note “information campaign.” These types of messages aimed to stigmatize certain politicians and reinforce the narrative that they do not act in the national interest but are controlled externally.

⁶⁰ Interim Reports No. 2 (pp. 15–16) and No. 5 (pp. 18–20) of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025.

They were capable of increasing public distrust in the electoral process and mobilizing the electorate to reject certain candidates.

In conclusion, MO UJM considers these billboards a visual work of civic propaganda with electoral impact, caricatural and satirical, clearly conveying that some politicians are not independent but manipulated behind the scenes. It operates at the boundary between civic information and electoral instrument, aiming to influence public opinion through irony and easily recognizable symbols.

MO UJM observed that such interference in the electoral campaign by actors who are not electoral subjects posed major risks to the integrity of the electoral process. Since civil society organizations engage in campaigns for or against electoral competitors, this constitutes unfair electoral competition. The involvement of NGOs in campaigns on behalf of or against competitors is a form of proxy battle, as they become indirect instruments through which a political actor promotes its interests while avoiding public exposure. This form of involvement also carries a major risk – unrecorded electoral expenditures – because if the NGO conducts a disguised campaign, expenses could be classified as illegal donations to the electoral competitor. The problem is even more acute if the NGO carries out such campaigns with foreign financial support.

4.5 Cases of Undermining Freedom of Expression and (Non-)Ensuring Pluralism of Opinion

MO UJM observed actions that can be interpreted as possible violations of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and as forms of restricting freedom of expression and civil⁶¹ society activism. Although state institutions promote European values and democratic principles and claim to safeguard citizens' fundamental rights, in practice, tactics have been observed aimed at suppressing critical voices, those who think differently, investigate, inform, and present alternative perspectives.

Several active and critical channels on Telegram and YouTube reported cases of intimidation, attempted attacks, and obstruction of their activity. At least four of these channels were attacked, some while publishing materials related to alleged acts of corruption committed by state institution representatives. The disruption was carried out through coordinated attacks, including the use of bot farms, fake accounts subscribing simultaneously (up to 21,000 within a few hours), distributing illegal content within channels, and then reporting them to platform administrators. However, it is noteworthy that these channels were not blocked immediately before the elections.

MO UJM expresses disagreement with any actions of disinformation and manipulation of public opinion, regardless of the authors or sponsors, including through the use of fake or non-transparent sponsored accounts. At the same time, the mission emphasizes that Articles 32 and 34 of the Constitution guarantee citizens freedom of thought, opinion, and public expression by any means: word, image, or other methods, as well as the right of access to any information of public interest. Article 34(5) states that media cannot be subjected to censorship.

In this context, MO UJM considers that every eligible voter, encouraged to vote in an informed and responsible manner, must have access to a plurality of sources: clear, alternative, independent, and credible. This is essential for making a conscious and responsible choice regarding public office holders.

⁶¹ Interim Report No. 3 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, pp. 24–26

4.6 Early election campaign on social media.

During the monitored period, prior to the official start of the electoral campaign, MO UJM actively monitored the activity of the 35 eligible political parties, focusing on online communication (Facebook, TikTok, Telegram) and on identifying potential instances of disguised electoral campaigning. Consequently, MO UJM found that 16 of the 35 political formations actively used digital platforms to interact with the electorate and consolidate their public visibility. Online communication intensified significantly in the period immediately preceding the official launch of the campaign, reflecting a high level of political polarization and competition.

The parties shaped their digital presence around several dominant narratives, consistently identified in messages disseminated on social media:

1. Promotion of the European direction and government achievements – particularly by the governing party (PAS), which emphasized infrastructure modernization, external support, and programs for the diaspora, positioning European integration as a guarantee of stability and development.
2. Direct criticism of the government and socio-economic situation – a narrative promoted by opposition parties (PSRM, PCRM, PN, MAN, PSDE, PDA, etc.), which highlighted inflation, poverty, population exodus, and the use of public institutions for political purposes.
3. National identity, sovereignty, and traditional values – utilized by both pro-statehood parties (PSRM, PRIM, PMM) and unionist formations (AUR, PNM, PL), turning these themes into tools for emotional mobilization and consolidation of electoral bases.
4. Anti-corruption, justice, and fight against external influences – addressed mainly by PAS, ALDE, PS, and other reformist formations, emphasizing the cleansing of state institutions and combating corruption.
5. Socio-economic issues and local development – opposition parties approached these topics with empathetic and populist discourse, while the governing formation promoted positive messages and concrete results regarding infrastructure, public services, and the "European Village" program.

MO UJM found that, although political messages from the pre-campaign period did not formally meet the elements of electoral agitation, numerous political actors conducted activities with the character of disguised electoral campaigning, through actions and messages with electoral content disseminated before the official campaign period began.

Recurring patterns of this practice were identified, including the exploitation of public functions and administrative events for political promotion, especially by PAS, MAN, and PN, through reporting on local projects and government activities with electoral connotations; organizing public meetings, conferences, and community actions with electoral mobilization messages or criticisms of opponents, observed in ALDE, PSRM, PCRM, PRIM, PVM, and PDA; issuing political promises in non-electoral contexts, such as reducing tariffs, supporting agriculture, creating jobs, or increasing birth rates; direct political attacks and self-presentation as the sole viable alternative, practiced by PSRM, PCRM, PRIM, MAN, AUR, and other formations, which correlated criticisms of the government with mobilization appeals and "national salvation" messages.

The analysis of public and digital communication highlighted a pronounced polarization of political discourse, structured along two main axes: geopolitical – between support for European integration and the promotion of neutrality or eastern orientation, and identity – between Moldovan

statism and Romanian unionism. The mission noted that pro-European parties predominantly used a moderate, rational, modernization-oriented tone, while Eurosceptic formations promoted a more emotional and alarmist language, invoking risks related to the loss of sovereignty or alleged external interference. This polarization was amplified through social networks, where the rapid circulation of short messages, often without verifiable sources, contributed to the fragmentation of the information space and increased the risk of misinformation among the electorate.

The pre-campaign period was characterized by intensified online political communication, dominated by narrative, emotional, and polarizing content, aimed more at mobilizing their own electorate than fostering substantive public debate. MO UJM noted that the distinction between institutional and electoral communication was frequently blurred, particularly in the case of actors in government, raising concerns about the equitable use of administrative resources and public visibility. Dominant themes – European direction, national identity, and justice – were exploited for electoral purposes before the official campaign began, contributing to the radicalization of public discourse and reducing the climate of political tolerance.

The digital environment became the main channel for political communication and projection, but also a major source of tensions, misinformation, and verbal attacks between electoral competitors.

Overall, the pre-campaign period set the stage for a highly polarized electoral competition, characterized by intense party involvement, strategic use of online platforms, and recourse to communication practices sometimes beyond the limits provided by electoral⁶² legislation.

5. Conduct of the Electoral Campaign

MO UJM found that, contrary to the provisions of the Electoral ⁶³Code, the majority of registered electoral contestants began campaigning before the official start date (29 August 2025)

To provide an objective assessment of the campaign conduct, besides collecting information from the field and online sources reported by long-term observers deployed in each electoral constituency, MO UJM held meetings and collected the views of 13 of the 23 electoral contestants.

Based on the processed information, MO UJM concluded that the campaign was aggressive, marked by disinformation, manipulation, hate speech, exploitation of fears, intimidation, abuses, pressure, and personal ⁶⁴attacks. Although the purpose of an electoral campaign is to convince voters to support a candidate, the campaign focused less on presenting achievements or programmatic proposals and more on disrespectful, humiliating, divisive messaging, categorizing voters into opposing groups: "with me" or "against me," "people" and "bâdle," "good" and "bad," "pro-European" and "pro-Russian"⁶⁵. MO UJM encouraged voter participation but emphasized that voting is a free and voluntary right and that no one should pressure voters to participate,

⁶² Interim Report No. 3 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, pp. 31–45.

⁶³ The electoral campaign begins on the date of registration of the electoral contestant, but no earlier than 30 days before election day.

⁶⁴ Interim Reports of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, No. 4, p. 14 and No. 5, p. 12.

⁶⁵ Ibidem.

abstain, or choose a specific candidate. Convincing voters should be based on comparing promises with achievements or the feasibility of proposed actions.

With the increasing shift from offline to online communication, MO UJM noted that most contestants emphasized their digital presence. Social media use became an integral part of campaign strategies, allowing rapid and targeted communication with specific voter groups. Traditional campaign methods, such as direct voter meetings, distributing campaign materials, door-to-door outreach, and participation in debates and media programs, were also maintained.

5.1 Campaign Activities Conducted by Contestants

During the period dedicated to the electoral campaign, MO UJM observers reported that the electoral competitors conducted over 1,500 activities aimed at mobilizing voters and convincing them to go to the polls and support a particular candidate. According to the information reported by the observers, on September 27, 2025 (Saturday – the day of silence), no electoral campaigning materials were observed.

Most of these activities – 59% (885) – consisted of actions involving the distribution of electoral materials, while the remaining 41% (615) were direct meetings with voters. Thus, following the processing of information reported from the field, MO UJM notes that electoral competitors with sufficient financial and human resources managed to reach a larger number of voters. In contrast, other competitors with limited resources had a reduced physical presence in the field, which, in the mission's opinion, affected their ability to interact directly with the electorate.

According to statistical data, seven out of the 23 electoral competitors (PAS, BEPSCIVM, Alternativa, MRM, PN, PSDE, and PDA) carried out 79% of the total campaign activities observed and reported from the field. The highest number of activities was reported for PAS, BEPSCIVM, Alternativa, and PN. It should also be noted that some electoral competitors conducted campaign activities outside the territory of the Republic of Moldova, in an attempt to reach voters from the diaspora.

It should be recalled that while some electoral competitors stated that their meetings with voters took place in a calm atmosphere with the support of public administration authorities, others reported aggressive behavior from certain public officials who allegedly hindered the organization of these meetings. There were also reports of cases in which police representatives were present at meetings with voters, documenting and photographing the citizens who attended. MO UJM emphasizes that, according to the provisions of the Electoral Code, police representatives are responsible for ensuring security and public order in the places and venues where meetings between electoral competitors and voters take place, and under no circumstances should they document or photograph participants.

In this context, MO UJM condemns the abuses committed by representatives of law enforcement institutions, as such actions constitute a form of intimidation of citizens and a restriction of their right to be directly informed about the electoral programs of the competitors. At the same time, such practices also affect the right of competitors to present their electoral programs and to interact freely with voters in order to gain support through the vote.

Another instrument used by competitors to present their electoral programs and inform voters on a wider scale was participation in electoral debates. It should be recalled that by submitting their declarations on editorial policy to the Audiovisual Council, 82% (27 out of 33) of audiovisual media service providers in television and radio broadcasting announced their intention to organize and conduct electoral debates.

MO UJM did not directly monitor the participation and performance of electoral competitors in these debates but addressed this topic during meetings with them. Most competitors stated that, as far as possible, they would participate in the debates to which they were invited. However, they emphasized that, given limited resources and strategic priorities, direct meetings with voters remained their main method of communication with the electorate.

Since these discussions took place in the midst of the electoral campaign, the mission managed to gather the competitors' opinions regarding participation in debates. Thus, while some appreciated access to debates as relatively fair, others complained of unequal treatment, lack of impartiality, and the fact that the debates were often superficial, lacking real discussion of electoral programs and instead marked by personal attacks.

MO UJM also found that, despite the obligation to treat all competitors equally and fairly, without bias, some media institutions conducted electoral campaigning in favor of the ruling party and did not accurately and impartially reflect the positions and activities of other electoral competitors. In connection with the same issue, mention should be made of the conversation of the PoIE Communication Group, publicly available, concerning how President Maia Sandu's speech was to be perceived and reflected by media sources. In MO UJM's view, such messages highlight that certain media institutions concertedly reflected specific official positions.

At the same time, MO UJM considers that the television series "*Plaha*", broadcast during the electoral campaign and containing transparent allusions to real political figures, went beyond the status of a mere cultural product and functioned as a tool with the potential for negative propaganda. The timing of its broadcast, in the midst of the campaign, increased the risk of influencing voters' choices, especially among the undecided. The state's involvement through the acquisition of broadcasting rights raised suspicions regarding the use of public resources for electoral purposes and runs counter to the principle of neutrality of authorities as stipulated by the Electoral Code and OSCE/ODIHR standards.

5.2 Involvement of Law Enforcement in the Electoral Campaign

The first week of the electoral campaign was marked by a series of raids and searches carried out by law enforcement in several localities across the country. These measures took place in a criminal case concerning the illegal financing of political parties and electoral campaigns, voter bribery, and money laundering, targeting PRIM—a political formation registered in the electoral race as part of BEPSCIVM. Since the investigation was accompanied by press releases generating breaking news, along with video footage of masked and armed law enforcement officers intervening on-site, as well as audio fragments obtained from surveillance operations, the Mission concluded that these actions appeared to exceed the actual purpose of the investigation. According to PRIM, the political formation considered itself the victim of government-led reprisals, accused

of pressure and abuse, and claimed that the purpose of these actions was to discredit it in the eyes of voters. Additionally, considering that the raids and searches were conducted in the midst of the electoral process, the MO UJM acknowledged the hypothesis that these measures could have affected voters' choices, as the overall electoral climate was impacted.

According to the Minister of Internal Affairs, during the electoral period, the police carried out around 200 searches and initiated several criminal cases targeting corruption associated with public gatherings. Daniella Misail-Nichitin stated that the coordinated shadow actions had a direct political purpose and were orchestrated by the fugitive politician Ilan Șor. "The aim is to destabilize the situation. The aim is to use all possible resources, including intermediaries, so that the pro-European vector can be replaced with a pro-Russian one in the next Parliament."⁶⁶ According to the official, state institutions did not limit themselves to applying sanctions but also focused on preventive measures. In this context, the MO UJM concluded that the political statements of the Minister of Internal Affairs confirmed the hypothesis that the large-scale investigations also aimed to send warning messages to voters. Therefore, these actions could have induced a certain sense of fear or intimidation.

A case of abuse, intimidation, and humiliation by the police against its candidates was also reported by the "Democrația Acasă" Party. The bus carrying the party's candidates and supporters was stopped in traffic, and the driver was prohibited from continuing, with the license plates removed⁶⁷. Similarly, the "Partidul Nostru" reported in meetings with the MO UJM that its representatives were stopped and detained in traffic for unfounded reasons.

In the opinion of the MO UJM, regardless of the formal reasons behind the actions of the patrol officers, these cases negatively affected the electoral climate and the activity of electoral competitors.

A scandalous case was recorded in Gagauzia against the backdrop of police actions to prevent and combat electoral corruption, conducted under the slogan "Don't play with your vote, or you could lose everything!" Thus, the representative of the State Chancellery in Comrat, Serghei Cernev, urged the citizens of Gagauzia "not to participate in the parliamentary elections," claiming that this would help them avoid accusations of vote selling. According to the official, an amnesty was planned for individuals who had previously received heavy fines for alleged "vote selling," but if voters in Gagauzia participated in the parliamentary election, "they would no longer be able to prove that they had not sold their vote." These statements are in total dissonance with the central authorities' efforts to encourage participation in the elections. In the view of the MO UJM, urging voters ⁶⁸to abstain from voting to avoid suspicions of electoral corruption constituted a form of pressure on them. Such actions, especially when coming from public authorities, can severely affect the free nature of the exercise of the vote.

5.3 Complex Cyber Attempt on the monitorizez.eu Platform

⁶⁶ Republic of the Union. 200 searches.

⁶⁷ Bus left without license plates.

⁶⁸ Scandal in Gagauzia.

MO UJM collected information on campaign activities conducted by electoral competitors, as well as irregularities observed in the field, through the platform *monitorizez.eu*. Access to the platform was provided to both accredited observers of the mission and citizens.

However, it should be noted that on September 11, 2025, the *monitorizez.eu* platform was the target of a coordinated cyberattack. The attack aimed to test the resilience of the digital infrastructure and compromise authentication and access mechanisms. The attack was carried out in multiple stages, involving various actions: from attempts at fraudulent authentication and code injection to reconnaissance activities and exploration of the internal structure of the application.

Technical analysis indicated that the main source of the attempts was workstations located in the Republic of Moldova, connected through the StarNet and Orange networks. Consequently, the incident was classified as a local exploitation attempt—attacks launched from compromised equipment within the country, without the involvement of known external infrastructures.

The attack followed a progressive logic, typical of organized exploitation attempts. In the first stage, brute force attacks and command injections targeting ⁶⁹the authentication system were identified, followed by attempts at XSS⁷⁰ injection and interface template manipulation (template injection⁷¹). Simultaneously, attempts at DNS exfiltration were observed, intended to extract sensitive information through channels disguised as legitimate traffic. Following the failure of these methods, attackers resorted to reconnaissance scans, generating thousands of requests to non-existent endpoints, hidden resources, and administrative interfaces in an effort to identify additional vulnerabilities.⁷²

MO UJM confirms that the platform demonstrated high technical resilience and that protection systems responded appropriately. The authentication mechanism, based on SHA-256 hashes with unique salt for each password, JWT tokens for stateless sessions with automatic expiration, and role-based access control (RBAC), blocked all unauthorized login attempts. The Nginx firewall rejected all abnormal exploration requests, and ClamAV detected and removed all malicious files attempted in simulated uploads. The effectiveness of the platform's multilayer security architecture was confirmed. Additionally, the *monitorizez.eu* infrastructure proved capable of repelling complex attacks, even when launched from within local networks using the communications infrastructure of national providers StarNet and Orange.

5.4 Involvement of Foreign/Official Persons in the Electoral Campaign

MO UJM notes that, contrary to Article 70(4) of the Electoral Code, which prohibits the involvement of foreign citizens and institutions or organizations from outside the country in the electoral campaign, certain internal political actors (particularly PAS and PSRM) benefited from

⁶⁹ The incident involved over 1,000 unauthorized authentication attempts conducted over several hours.

⁷⁰ Attackers used command injection payloads to attempt server-level command execution, as well as XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) code insertions in user fields.

⁷¹ Template injection attacks targeted rendering engines in an attempt to trigger uncontrolled code execution.

⁷² Detected activities included scanning of non-existent endpoints, GraphQL queries for internal API mapping, admin panel discovery attempts, and probing sensitive files for configuration or backup documents.

image transfer from foreign officials and favorable public statements made in the context of the electoral campaign.⁷³

In its interim reports, MO UJM reported and analyzed cases of foreign involvement in the electoral campaign.

Forms of Involvement and Relevant Documented Cases

1. Bilateral Meetings and Public Events

- Igor Dodon (PSRM) publicized his meeting with the Russian Federation Ambassador in Chișinău, interpreted as a signal of political support.
- Igor Grosu (PAS) publicized meetings with the Prime Minister of Romania and the EU Ambassador in Chișinău.
- Visits by officials from France, Germany, Poland, and Romania (August 27, 2025) were accompanied by public statements regarding European financial assistance and support for European integration, perceived as favorable electoral messages for PAS.
- Their presence in Chișinău under the auspices of the Presidency contributed to strengthening the governing party's image, affecting the principle of equality among competitors.

2. Visit of the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos (September 3–5, 2025)

- The visit included meetings with government officials, the economic sector, and civil society, but not with other pro-European electoral competitors.
- The Commissioner's statements ("completion of negotiations by 2028 if Moldovans elect a trustworthy Parliament") had a direct electoral connotation by associating European integration success with PAS's victory.
- The timing and content of the visit had a favorable electoral effect for the government; postponing it to the post-electoral period would have eliminated the risk of perceived interference.

3. Statements by Former U.S. Ambassadors

- Eight former U.S. ambassadors signed a public letter expressing support for pro-European forces and warning about the risk of a pro-Russian victory.
- Although the signatories did not hold official positions, the message potentially influenced the electorate, being perceived as external political support for the pro-European camp.

4. Activities of Political Parties from Other States

- The Romanian party Uniunea Salvați România (USR) carried out public actions mobilizing Moldovan diaspora voters to support pro-European forces.
- These actions may be classified as indirect interference, even if motivated by political and ideological solidarity.

⁷³ Interim Report No. 3 (p. 26), Interim Report No. 4 (pp. 17–18), and Interim Report No. 5 (pp. 20–23) of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025.

5. Statements by European Officials on the Eve of the Elections

- The new EU Ambassador to Chişinău, in her first public message, stated that “Moldova will be part of the European Union,” perceived as political validation of the governing party’s agenda.
- European Commissioner Marta Kos, in her concluding message of the bilateral screening, used emotive language (“Moldova, you can be proud”), resembling electoral rhetoric, even if formally technical.
- In the electoral context, these statements can be interpreted as external interference in internal political debate.

In conclusion, MO UJM assesses that some visits and statements by foreign officials, even if diplomatically motivated, had a significant political effect, strengthening the governing party’s image. The Presidency of the Republic of Moldova provided the institutional platform for events with potential electoral impact, which can be considered indirect involvement in the campaign. Using the image and statements of foreign diplomats for electoral purposes affects the principle of equal opportunities and electoral neutrality. From the perspective of OSCE/ODIHR standards, such situations are considered forms of external influence incompatible with free and fair elections.

Recommendations by MO UJM:

1. Strictly enforce Article 70(4) of the Electoral Code, explicitly prohibiting the use of foreign officials’ images, statements, or visits for electoral purposes.
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should develop diplomatic protocols limiting public statements by foreign officials during electoral periods.
3. The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) should establish clear procedures for identifying and sanctioning cases of electoral use of official visits.
4. Political parties should refrain from exploiting foreign statements or events during campaigns to maintain democratic integrity.
5. Moldova’s international partners should exercise caution and neutrality in public communications during electoral periods, avoiding statements that may be interpreted as electoral support.

6. Reflection of Meetings with Electoral Competitors

With the launch of the electoral campaign, MO UJM sent official invitations to all registered electoral competitors at that stage for organizing meetings. Some competitors were open and accepted the invitation, while others did not respond. In total, MO UJM sent 21 invitations for meetings.

MO UJM met with representatives of PAS, LOC, Alianţa “Moldovenii,” ALDE, PN, MAN (representing Blocul “Alternativa”), PSRM (representing BEPSCIVM), independent candidates Andrei Năstase, Olesia Stamate, and Victoria Sanduţa, the European Social Democratic Party (PSDE), the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (Moldova), and the Coalition for Unity and Wellbeing (CUB). In total, MO UJM met with 13 electoral competitors: 10 political parties and 3 independent candidates.

The purpose of the meetings was to understand the electoral climate from the perspective of each competitor, including challenges encountered and perceptions of the electoral process. The

observation mission developed a questionnaire distributed to all electoral competitors met and collected their opinions on the electoral climate, administrative process, media access, campaign conditions, and other aspects relevant to assessing the fairness and transparency of the elections.

The questionnaire covered topics such as: the impact of recent amendments to the Political Parties Law, perceptions of electoral legislation fairness, organization of CEC activities regarding registration document review, media coverage, quality of training for BESV members, and challenges in organizing public events, electoral displays, or direct voter contact. Questions also addressed competitors' perceptions of vote security in the diaspora, intimidation, information manipulation, and campaign pressures. Issues regarding monitoring electoral incidents, participation in debates, and analysis of other parties' programs were also included.

Based on these meetings, the mission found that legislative changes in the pre-electoral period were perceived by most competitors as unpredictable and restrictive. Lack of public consultations, immediate application of new provisions, and some contradictions between primary and secondary regulations caused confusion and administrative difficulties. Competitors reported that new requirements regarding documentation, submission of personal information, and short compliance deadlines created logistical pressure and affected electoral process predictability.

Regarding CEC activities, competitor perceptions were divergent. Some appreciated the institution's professionalism and openness, while others reported a lack of impartiality, uneven application of rules, and difficulties in submitting documents. Experiences with CEC varied widely: some competitors (e.g., PAS, PN, Victoria Sanduța) assessed the relationship positively, while others (e.g., BEPSCIVM, Blocul Alternativa, LOC) reported bias, partisanship, or even hostility. Double standards and partial attitudes by some CEC members were cited. The document submission procedure was sometimes cumbersome. The requirement for all candidates' physical presence at registration was considered disproportionate, occasionally leading to exclusion from candidate lists. These practices were seen as signs of rigid, bureaucratic management affecting predictability and uniformity in the electoral process.

A recurring issue raised was unequal access to media, especially public television. Several opposition formations complained about absence from main news bulletins, lack of fair debates, and biased editorial treatment, including selective presentation or omission of critical opinions. Some private broadcasters were accused of selective promotion of topics, refusal to air video materials, and editorial control favoring the governing party. These practices affected visibility and media pluralism, creating a perception of unequal media competition.

The mission also observed an amplification of hate speech, information manipulation, and smear campaigns, especially online. Competitors reported negative labeling, personal attacks, psychological pressure, direct threats, and disinformation campaigns polarizing the electorate. Cases of intimidation, arbitrary refusal by local authorities to allow use of public spaces, and perceived police abuse were reported. Such practices created a tense and unfair electoral competition climate.

A significant portion of competitors noted the use of administrative resources in favor of incumbents. Their high visibility at official events, combined with favorable media coverage of government activities, was perceived as indirect masked electoral campaigning, affecting the principle of equal opportunity.

Regarding the organization of the electoral process in the diaspora, the mission noted critical perceptions about vote security and transparency abroad. Competitors highlighted unclear polling

station locations, delays in certifying electoral office members, and technical deficiencies in the IT system managed by the Information Technology and Cybersecurity Service (STISC). Some parties reported difficulties in appointing representatives to external polling stations due to ID requirements, limiting independent vote monitoring in the diaspora.

Training quality for election office members organized by CICDE was also uneven. Opposition competitors reported problems accessing training, technical deficiencies, and overlapping certification schedules with candidate list submission deadlines, reducing their representatives' participation capacity.

Although most competitors acknowledged that the electoral process was conducted in an organized and functional administrative framework, perceptions of fairness and equal opportunity remained strongly divided. Cases of vote-buying, intimidation, misogynistic messages, difficulties in organizing public events, and access to display spaces were reported. The mission documented seven cases of electoral corruption through its monitorizez.eu platform.

Regarding confidence in the voting process, some competitors expressed concerns about vote security in the diaspora and technical vulnerabilities of the IT electoral system. However, most appreciated that the presence of independent observers and mechanisms for reporting irregularities could help build public trust in the integrity of the elections.

In conclusion, MO UJM found that the electoral process was technically and procedurally managed correctly, but significant perceptions of inequality and distrust persisted regarding institutional impartiality, media access equity, and use of administrative resources. These deficiencies, combined with a polarized electoral climate and information manipulation, overall affected the principle of equal opportunities among competitors and public confidence in the fairness of the electoral process.

7. Implementation of Local Public Authorities' (LPA) Responsibilities in Organizing Elections

The obligation to establish the minimum number of spaces for electoral posters and the minimum number of venues for holding meetings with voters was fulfilled by all city halls within the territorial jurisdiction of the electoral council. Of these, 34 met the deadline set in the Calendar Program, while one was delayed by eight days. However, MO UJM identified cases in which the space designated for electoral posters, which should have been equally provided to all electoral competitors, was not ensured by the local public administration in accordance with legal provisions. Additionally, this space was used disproportionately by some electoral competitors. Furthermore, there was a situation in public spaces where a police representative was involved in removing a competitor's posters.

MO UJM also found that some electoral competitors violated the established rules, placing electoral posters on private property fences as well as on the building of a local public authority. Although police representatives carried out multiple activities in the field to check the placement of electoral publicity and posters in unauthorized locations, no centralized information from the General Police Inspectorate (IGP) was issued through an official statement regarding the results of these inspections and, based on them, any measures or warnings addressed to electoral competitors about their obligation to comply with the rules.

Regarding the provision of spaces for meetings with voters, some electoral competitors interviewed by MO UJM reported unfair, sometimes even aggressive, behavior by authorities.

Under various pretexts, access to these spaces was denied, including in public institutions and certain localities.

MO UJM draws the attention of local public authorities to the legal obligation to guarantee all electoral competitors access to a minimum number of specially designated spaces for electoral posters, as well as to spaces intended for meetings with voters. Ensuring complete, accurate, and fair information to citizens about the electoral process and the electoral programs of competitors is also the responsibility of local public authorities. By fulfilling legal obligations and being open to voters' need to be properly informed, LPAs contribute to the conscious exercise of the right to vote and to the conduct of free, fair, and transparent elections.

On the same topic, MO UJM identified at least one case where, approximately a month before the electoral campaign, the local public authority (Țaul village hall) organized meetings between PAS candidates for the position of Member of Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and voters. MO UJM also noted that, just a few hours later, the hall modified the topic of the meeting: what was initially a meeting with PAS candidates was later presented as a discussion about the achievements in Țaul and the measures to be taken in the near future to improve the standard of living in the locality. According to the LPA, representatives of Parliament and the Government of the Republic of Moldova were to participate in the discussion to address citizens⁷⁴ problems and needs.

LPAs exercised the right to designate candidates for the composition of polling station election offices. According to CECE II decisions regarding the establishment and confirmation of the nominal composition of BESV, 6,166 persons were presented and confirmed by local public authorities as electoral officials, representing 70% of the total members. Additionally, local councils supplemented the necessary number of members in electoral offices where political parties had not submitted candidates.

The right to declare their place of residence was ensured for all voters who changed their residence and wished to be registered in the voter list of the polling station corresponding to their new residence. According to data collected by MO UJM observers during visits to city halls within the electoral council's territorial jurisdiction, 1,959 voters exercised this right.

8. Monitoring of Mass Media Regarding the Coverage of Political Parties and Electoral Competitors

During the electoral period, and where applicable during the electoral campaign, written materials and audiovisual programs of electoral nature⁷⁵ were broadcast/published in accordance with the Regulations on Election Coverage by Mass Media⁷⁶ Institutions and the Audiovisual⁷⁷ Media Services Code. Thus, 33 audiovisual media services (21 television and 12 radio)⁷⁸ committed to covering the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, respecting the principles of fairness, balance, and impartiality.

⁷⁴ Interim Report No. 1 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, p. 20.

⁷⁵ News and current affairs programs, electoral information shows, electoral promotion programs, electoral debates, and electoral advertising programs.

⁷⁶ Regulation regarding media coverage of elections.

⁷⁷ Audiovisual Media Services Code of the Republic of Moldova.

⁷⁸ Interim Report No. 2 of the Mission of the Union of Jurists of Moldova for the Observation of the Parliamentary Elections from 28.09.2025, Annex No. 1.

MO UJM analyzed the frequency and manner in which the 35 political parties admitted to participate in these elections, as well as the 23 electoral competitors, were represented in national media. Monitoring included 4 television channels (PRO TV, Jurnal TV, TV8, Moldova 1), 3 radio stations (Radio Moldova, Radio Chișinău, Radio Europa Liberă), 10 online portals (realitatea.md, știri.md, zdg.md, newsmaker.md, noi.md, unimedia.md, deschide.md, agora.md, nordnews.md, nokta.md), and 3 news agencies (IPN, INFOTAG, MOLDPRES).

Monitored TV channels reflected the activities of 34 of the 35 political parties and all electoral competitors. However, the number of appearances varied between 95 and one. The most frequently mentioned electoral competitors were: BEPSCIVM (95 appearances), followed by PAS (77 appearances) and the “ALTERNATIVA” bloc (59 appearances). Conversely, the least reflected competitors were Tatiana Crețu (11 appearances) and UCSM (13 appearances), and the least reflected political formations were PPDA, each with only one mention. Data analysis shows a predominance of neutral coverage, with 80% of mentions being neutral and 20% negative. Between July 14 – September 28, 2025, only two positive mentions were identified, both related to PAS. PAS activities were most frequently reflected neutrally (67 appearances), while BEPSCIVM was most frequently reflected negatively (40 appearances). According to the collected data, Moldova 1 TV was the most active in covering electoral competitors and political parties (294 mentions), followed by Jurnal TV (244), PRO TV (236), and TV8 (203). However, in interviews with electoral competitors, they reported lack of access and invitations from the public TV Moldova 1.

Radio stations reflected the activities of 32 of the 35 political parties and all electoral competitors. The number of appearances varied between 38 and one. The most frequently reflected were BEPSCIVM (38 appearances) and PAS (37 appearances). The least mentioned were the “Împreună” bloc (1 appearance) and independent candidates Olesea Stamate and Tatiana Crețu (3 mentions each). UCSM and NOI were the least reflected political formations (2 mentions each). This category had the highest proportion of neutral mentions (90%) and no positive mentions. PAS and BEPSCIVM were both reflected neutrally (35 mentions each). Radio Moldova was the most active radio station (182 mentions), followed by Radio Chișinău (144) and Radio Europa Liberă (100).

Monitored online media reflected the activities of 33 of the 35 political parties and all electoral competitors. The number of appearances varied between 394 and one. PAS was most frequently mentioned (394 appearances), followed by BEPSCIVM (187), the “ALTERNATIVA” bloc (118), and PN (117). The least mentioned was the “Împreună” bloc (3 appearances). PPDA and PONA were the least reflected (1 and 4 mentions, respectively). Online portals recorded the most positive mentions (8%), 72% neutral, and 20% negative. PAS activities were both frequently neutral (169 mentions) and negative (210 mentions). PAM activities were most frequently positively reflected (58 mentions). The most active portals were unimedia.md (359 mentions), știri.md (355), zdg.md and newsmaker.md (242 each), while the least active were deschide.md (71), nokta.md (128), and nordnews.md (149).

News agencies reflected the activities of all political parties admitted to elections and all registered electoral competitors. Mentions varied between 48 and one. PAS (48 appearances) and BEPSCIVM (37 appearances) were most frequently reflected. Independent candidate Tatiana Crețu (1 mention), Olesea Stamate, and UCSM (2 mentions each) were least mentioned. PPDA, PRM, PNOI, and PPM were mentioned only once each. 83% of mentions were neutral and 15% negative. PAS and BEPSCIVM were most frequently neutral (31 and 27 mentions) and negative (13 and 10 mentions), with four of five positive mentions relating to PAS. IPN was the most active news agency (145 mentions), followed by INFOTAG (144) and MOLDPRES (60).

In conclusion, media coverage of political parties and electoral competitors was unequal. Some competitors had significant exposure: PAS (556 mentions), BEPSCIVM (357), “ALTERNATIVA” bloc (217), PN (196), while others had minimal mentions: Tatiana Crețu (20), UCSM (30), Victoria Sanduța (31), “Împreună” bloc (35). Most competitors expressed indignation to MO UJM about the lack of equal opportunities and access to media institutions. They also noted that despite their status as competitors, media interest in their activities remained low. Several reported being targets of campaigns of defamation, misinformation, and slander by some media channels and multiple fake social media accounts.

Neutral mentions predominated (77%), with PAS (302), BEPSCIVM (233), and PN (196) most frequently neutral. Negative mentions were 18%, mainly targeting PAS (233) and BEPSCIVM (116). Positive mentions most frequently reflected PAM (58), MRM (24), and PAS (21).

9. Narratives of Electoral Competitors on Social Media

During the electoral campaign, MO UJM analyzed the social media pages of registered electoral competitors. The Mission notes that online platforms (Facebook, TikTok, Telegram) remain essential tools for communicating with the electorate, extensively used to disseminate electoral messages, consolidate party identity, and mobilize voters to support a competitor. Communication was highly personalized and adapted to the specifics of each competitor.

The most frequently observed narratives in the online discourse of electoral competitors were:

Criticism of the government by opposition parties as the main electoral strategy

This rhetoric was used by BEPSCIVM, the Alternativa Bloc, AUR, PN, MRM, PDA, the “ÎMPREUNĂ” electoral bloc, PNM, ALDE, and CUB. This theme dominated the campaign and was widely exploited. Terms such as “social genocide,” “dictatorial regime,” or “yellow plague” were frequently used to portray the PAS government as inefficient, dangerous, or corrupt. The primary intention was to demobilize PAS supporters and channel social frustration in favor of an alternative political force. Messages were distributed through diverse formats—from memes and short TikTok videos to live streams and press conferences—and targeted predominantly voters affected by socio-economic crises.

Addressing economic development and social issues as a differentiation between government and opposition

Competitors using this rhetoric included PAS, Alternativa Bloc, BEPSCIVM, PN, AUR, PSDE, CUB, MRM, PAM, LOC, and Olesea Stamate. The Mission observed that economic issues were approached from opposite perspectives: opposition competitors focused on failures (prices, migration, unemployment), while the governing competitor (PAS) promoted achievements and investments. This thematic line reflected a contrast: some competitors sought empathy and outrage, while the government emphasized competence and progress. Both aimed to mobilize their core electorate and attract undecided voters by addressing everyday realities.

Positioning competitors regarding Moldova’s geopolitical orientation

This rhetoric was used by PAS, PNM, CUB, AUR, ALDE, PL, PDA, the “ÎMPREUNĂ” electoral bloc, and MRM. The topic was heavily ideologized, serving as the main dividing line between camps. Pro-EU parties conveyed optimistic and mobilizing messages, presenting integration as a

guarantee of stability and prosperity. European imagery, EU symbols, and the “European Moldova” rhetoric were ubiquitous. The pro-neutrality or pro-East camp used an alarmist and defensive tone, warning of risks related to external conflicts and loss of sovereignty. The emphasis was on neutrality, peace, and the “Moldovan” model of development. Polarization on this subject was high, with messaging tailored to distinct ethnic and geographic segments.

Use of national identity, language, and traditional values in electoral competition

This theme was used to mobilize specific segments of the electorate based on cultural identity and traditional values. Discourses ranged from unionists to proponents of a separate, conservative national identity with religious and anti-Western emphasis. This rhetoric was used by AUR, PNM, BEPSCIVM, PAM, PN, PAS, PL, and CUB. BEPSCIVM emphasized traditional values—religion, family, morality—in contrast to what they called “imposed Western values.” Messages aimed to mobilize a conservative and religious electorate.

Use of justice, anti-corruption, and electoral integrity issues for mobilization

This theme was exploited to project the image of a reformist party, politically persecuted, or a defender of fair elections. Expressions ranged from reformist narratives to accusations of corruption against opponents or insinuations of imminent electoral fraud. Competitors using this rhetoric included PMM, Alternativa Bloc, AUR, PN, CUB, the Împreună Bloc, ALDE, and LOC.

Justice issues were addressed on multiple levels: some (CUB, LOC, and Împreună Bloc) adopted a reformist and technocratic rhetoric, demanding efficiency and judicial independence, while others (MAN and ALDE) positioned themselves as victims of a repressive political system. The narrative frequently included anti-corruption appeals, mutual accusations, and insinuations of election fraud. This theme served both mobilization and potential post-electoral contestation. The tone was often accusatory, emphasizing distrust and the need to “clean the system.”

9.1 Top Unrealistic Promises Shared on Social Media

During the electoral campaign, online discourse played a crucial role in informing and mobilizing voters. To better understand the campaign’s characteristics and influence on the democratic process, the Observation Mission analyzed social media content, focusing especially on unrealistic promises. This analysis used AI-based tools. The main findings regarding online electoral behavior are:

Overpromising social and economic benefits

Most competitors promised large increases in salaries, pensions, allowances, or subsidies (PAS, MRM, PNM, CUB) without providing detailed fiscal plans or sustainable funding sources. For example, PAS promised pensions of 6000 lei, doubled salaries for teachers, and a 30% higher average salary, without a fiscal plan, while BEPSCIVM promised decent salaries and pensions, also without specifying funding sources—ignoring the budget deficit. Similar promises were observed for PSDE, MRM, PDA, and CUB.

Overemphasis on quick and simplified solutions to complex problems

Several competitors (PAS, BEPSCIVM, Alternativa Bloc, PAM, AUR, PNM) promised rapid solutions for major objectives: EU accession in 4 years, unification with Romania, Transnistria reintegration, accelerated industrialization, or guaranteed peace. Such statements ignored

geopolitical and economic realities, presenting an unrealistic strategic vision. For instance, PAM proposed a 15-year industrialization plan amid economic instability, ignoring global risks and reliance on external funding. PNM promised “Greater Moldova” through rapid territorial unification and complete cultural reform, including total removal of Soviet monuments.

Populism as a dominant strategy

Competitors frequently used populist discourse, promising immediate material benefits (50,000 lei per child, tax holidays, VAT elimination, doubled salaries) without specifying implementation responsibility. Populism was used to mobilize vulnerable voters but risked widening the gap between promises and reality. It was used by PAS, PN, BEPSCIVM, MRM, AUR, PNM, and LOC. Forms varied, but the essence remained: spectacular, simplified promises without financial or legal responsibility.

Overestimation of the state’s administrative capacity

Several competitors promised large-scale reforms (justice, economy, education, healthcare) in very short timeframes, ignoring the real institutional capacity of Moldova’s public administration. Often, the discourse ignored the lack of human, technical, and financial resources, showing a disconnect between vision and feasibility. Observed cases included Alternativa Bloc (3,000 new enterprises and 200,000 jobs in a short period), PAS (complete reform of educational, medical, and transport infrastructure), PN (fixed allocations law for sports and youth), BEPSCIVM (rapid control over Giurgiulești port).

Exploitation of identity and geopolitical themes

Promises regarding unification, neutrality, withdrawal from international blocs, or geopolitical labeling (pro-Russian, traitors, unionists) were used to polarize voters and mobilize them emotionally. This trend was evident in BEPSCIVM, PL, and PNM campaigns.

10. Election Day

Access of observers to polling stations was obstructed by the management of electoral offices established abroad, starting from early morning. Although observers have the right to assist—without participating—in all electoral operations, including ballot verification, sealing, and opening, only 92% could observe this stage. The reason cited by BESV management was that observers were not on the list of confirmed representatives. Additionally, BESV issued MO UJM observers credentials as representatives of the electoral competitor Union of Jurists of Moldova, which is legally incompatible with observer status.

Observers allowed access could monitor the preparation of polling stations. In 96% of cases, ballot boxes were properly sealed (stationary boxes with 4 seals, mobile boxes with 1 seal).

Opening and closing of polling stations (07:00 and 21:00 local time) occurred unevenly. Most stations (86%) opened on time, while 14% opened earlier or later. Closing was in accordance with schedule in 98% of observed cases. At least 15 cases were reported where unauthorized persons (police officers or mayors) remained in polling stations after official closure.

Observers could freely monitor electoral procedures in 99% of cases, including vote counting, which was generally transparent. However, cases of manipulation, intimidation, and pressure by electoral office members and representatives on MO UJM observers were reported, attempting to make them leave before counting, using false claims about accreditation cancellation.

Some electoral offices abroad were reluctant to provide data on the number of voters using supplementary lists.

Although CEC issued public clarifications, MO UJM emphasizes that electoral officials, including the president and secretary of the electoral office, must act correctly, informed, impartially, and respect the rights of authorized participants.

Reported Incidents on Election Day

The Mission provided a platform, monitorizez.eu, to all parties interested in monitoring the electoral process (OTL and OTS observers of the Mission, citizens, and representatives of electoral competitors). This platform was dedicated to collecting reports on election day. Through it, a total of 552 reports were submitted.

The Mission processed the reported information and identified 367 incidents, categorized as follows:

- Violation of ballot secrecy – 180 cases (photographing ballots, unjustified group voting)
- Interruption of video recording of electoral operations – 35 cases
- Accuracy of electoral lists – 20 cases (voters assigned to the wrong polling station, voters not listed, deceased persons included in lists)
- Electoral agitation – 32 cases (campaign materials within 100 meters of polling stations or pro-candidate/negative PR inside polling stations)
- Organized transport of voters to polling stations – 5 cases
- Voter bribery – 3 cases (offering money, goods such as alcohol, food, or packages in exchange for votes, or direct promises of post-election rewards)
- Presence of unauthorized persons in polling stations after closing – 15 cases (police officers, local mayors)
- Other – 88 cases (tearing ballots in front of others, abandoning ballots in booths, attempted ballot theft, attempting to vote with expired ID documents, bomb alerts, system errors)

The MO UJM also noted that election day took place in a tense environment, with security incidents, logistical difficulties, and high-level political interventions. Multiple bomb alerts, although false, disrupted the voting process and created panic, which can be considered an indirect form of discouraging participation. Voters on the left bank of the Dniester faced additional obstacles due to the relocation of five polling stations and lack of alternative transportation, which practically limited their ability to exercise their right to vote.

In parallel, public statements by the President of the Republic of Moldova and the President of Romania, favoring a particular political vector, violated international recommendations on institutional neutrality.

Overall, the election functioned technically properly, but it was marked by a climate of insecurity, unequal access to ballot boxes, and a risk to the neutrality of public authorities.

From the perspective of international standards, the main issues were:

- Impact on security and freedom of voting due to alerts and incidents on election day
- Limitation of equal access to the electoral process for certain voter categories
- Risk of compromising the neutrality of public authorities through direct involvement of the presidents in the campaign

11. Tabulation of Election Results

According to Article 85, paragraph (1) of the Electoral Code, the CEC (Central Electoral Commission) must draw up a protocol for the tabulation of parliamentary election results within 5 days.

The CEC approved⁷⁹ the final results on October 5, 2025. According to the calendar, the fifth day after election day was October 3, 2025. It is noted that the legal deadline was exceeded by 2 days, which we believe was due to a misinterpretation of the legal norm by the CEC.

According to point 118 of the Calendar Program for the organization and conduct of the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, approved⁸⁰ by the CEC, the deadline indicated in Article 85, paragraph (1) of the Electoral Code was set for October 5. The CEC likely used September 30 as the reference point, which was the deadline for submitting the tabulation protocols prepared by the district electoral councils, based on the protocols of polling station electoral bureaus, which themselves were submitted within 18 hours of the closing of voting.

Literally, the provision in Article 85 of the Electoral Code does not explicitly refer to the election day as the reference point for calculating the 5-day period. However, other deadlines for preparing and submitting protocols (18 hours for BESV, 48 hours for CECE II) have a clear reference — they are calculated from the closing of polling stations. The 5-day period should logically follow the same sequence of actions after the conclusion of voting⁸¹: 18 h → 48 h → 120 h (5 days).

The election event — the parliamentary elections — takes place on a single day, set by the official act determining the election date. The Parliament set the parliamentary elections for September 28, 2025, which should serve as the reference date for calculating deadlines and organizing the proper conduct of the election. Deadlines set by law are counted in calendar days and are related to election day. According to Article 12 of the Electoral Code, the day of the election is not included in the calculation of deadlines. Therefore, the election day constitutes “Day X”, from which procedural deadlines are calculated.

To avoid differing interpretations, Parliament should amend Article 85 of the Electoral Code to clarify this aspect. Additionally, Article 12 should also be supplemented for clarity.

According to point 1 of CEC Decision No. 4149, the elections were declared valid, as the minimum turnout required by Article 127 ($\frac{1}{3}$ of registered voters) was achieved. The introductory section of the decision states that the basic electoral lists included 2,738,735 voters, while the supplementary lists included 342,244 voters. On election day, 1,609,579 voters participated, corresponding to a turnout rate of 52.24%.

We note that in calculating the turnout, the CEC arithmetically summed the number of voters in the basic lists with those in the supplementary lists. Of the 342,244 voters on supplementary lists, 279,355 voted in the 297 polling stations abroad, most of whom were already included in the basic electoral lists based on their domicile. Therefore, the CEC should have performed a qualitative analysis of the data and excluded from the calculation those voters who appeared on both basic and supplementary lists, to avoid double counting.

⁷⁹ HCEC No. 4149

⁸⁰ HCEC No. 3601.

⁸¹ Articles 83(6) and 84(4) of the Electoral Code.

For comparison, in the 2021 parliamentary elections, the CEC conducted ⁸²this filtering exercise: of the 284,568 voters on supplementary lists, only 63,597 were not included in the basic lists, the remaining 220,971 were already counted among the 2,738,735 voters on the basic lists. Accordingly, in calculating turnout, only the 63,597 voters were added.

In this context, we consider that for parliamentary elections, which take place in a single nationwide constituency, the base for calculation should be the total number of voters registered in the State Voter Register. Referring only to the number of voters in the basic lists is justified only for local elections, where the electorate consists solely of those domiciled within the respective administrative-territorial unit. In this regard, Parliament should clarify these aspects by amending Article 127 of the Electoral Code.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova

1. Clarify Article 17, paragraph (2) of Law No. 62/2022, explicitly limiting the CEC's authority to authorize only public-interest messages with an electoral theme during election periods.
2. Revise the legal framework to explicitly prohibit the President from directly or indirectly participating in electoral campaign activities, except when acting as an electoral competitor.
3. Amend the Electoral Code to prohibit the use of administrative resources, extending this to individuals not participating as candidates. Official events, foreign visits, or institutional communications falling under Law No. 199/2010 should not coincide temporally or thematically with a political party's campaign.
4. Revise the definition of "electoral period" in the Electoral Code to ensure precision and avoid ambiguous interpretation.
5. Regulate the concept of "pre-electoral agitation", describing conditions, period, forms of manifestation, etc.
6. Revise Article 102(5)(h) of the Electoral Code to explicitly and exhaustively define criteria for evaluating parties' association within disguised electoral blocs.
7. Amend Article 85 of the Electoral Code to clarify the temporal reference for the 5-day deadline.
8. Amend Article 12 of the Electoral Code to specify that election day serves as the temporal reference for calculating procedural deadlines.
9. Amend Article 127 of the Electoral Code to extend the calculation base for voter turnout by replacing "number of persons registered in electoral lists" with "number of voters registered in the State Voter Register."
10. Revise Article 21 of Law No. 294/2007 on political parties to restore compatibility with political pluralism and freedom of association under the Constitution and Article 11 of the ECHR, preventing arbitrary interference in party activities.
11. Establish, under Article 28 of the Parliament's Rules, a subcommittee to exercise parliamentary oversight over the SIS, ensuring legality, protection of human rights, and non-politicization of its activities, especially during elections.

⁸² HCEC No. 5178.

12. Amend Law No. 294/2007 and the Electoral Code to guarantee that the list of eligible political parties cannot be modified at the discretion of administrative bodies.
13. Clarify the role and competences of the Ministry of Justice and Public Services Agency regarding control over political parties.
14. Amend primary legislation (Electoral Code and related laws) to expressly prohibit non-commercial organizations from influencing voters' opinions or participating in election agitation.
15. Clarify, through official interpretation, the Speaker of Parliament's competencies concerning foreign visits and public communication, ensuring strict separation between institutional and party communication.

For the Constitutional Court

Revise jurisprudence to explicitly prohibit the President from direct or indirect participation in electoral campaign activities.

For the Central Electoral Commission

1. Publish in full and on time all correspondence with third parties, electoral information, protocols, and decisions to ensure transparency and institutional credibility.
2. Do not approve public-interest messages from commercial companies or international organizations, strictly enforcing points 105–106 of the Regulation on political, electoral, and public-interest advertising.
3. Introduce a procedure to formally verify the statutes of non-commercial organizations before approving messages, confirming declared public-interest objectives.
4. Strengthen content control of public-interest messages to comply with **Article 13(4) of Law No. 62/2022**, excluding politically biased, offensive, or manipulative content.
5. Adopt a unified methodology for evaluating public-interest character and distinguishing it from political advertising.
6. Collaborate with the **Audiovisual Council** to monitor state-disseminated messages during the electoral period, preventing the use of public platforms for political purposes.
7. Strengthen documentation and prevention of disguised involvement in campaigns by actors who are not electoral subjects (e.g., NGOs).
8. Prevent unauthorized dissemination of messages, public information campaigns, or polling of citizens regarding political preferences without CEC approval.
9. Further develop and improve the **pre-registration system** for all voting methods, establishing stricter criteria and mandatory elements to enhance its effectiveness.
10. Extend the pre-registration mechanism for postal voting abroad to collect sufficient data reflecting citizens' real interest, according to Law No. 109/2024 (amended).
11. Announce in advance the criteria for establishing polling stations abroad, based on accurate data regarding voters' interest in participation.
12. Ensure clear and detailed reasoning in decisions establishing polling stations abroad and for voters from the left bank of the Dniester, regarding proportionality, effective access, and equality.
13. Prepare or amend secondary legislation (regulations, instructions) well before the electoral period to ensure predictable procedures.
14. Adjust point 15 of the Regulation on examination of complaints to align with **Article 93(1) of the Electoral Code**.
15. Avoid informal resolution of complaints through simple administrative responses, without formal decisions, in matters of substance.

16. Ensure uniform reasoning in CEC decisions to avoid perceptions of preferential treatment of certain electoral competitors.
17. Respect deadlines established by the Electoral Code to guarantee orderly procedures and secure legal relationships, ensuring the right to effective appeal.
18. Establish clear procedures to identify and sanction cases of electoral use of foreign officials' visits.

For the Presidency of the Republic of Moldova

1. Clearly separate institutional from political communication by developing internal procedures delimiting official messages from political messaging, including online, during the electoral period.
2. Adjust the schedule of official events, foreign visits, and institutional communications so they do not coincide temporally or thematically with any party's campaign.

For the Center for Continuous Electoral Training

1. Emphasize, in training activities for electoral officials, the aspects of duties and incompatibilities to ensure fairness, impartiality, and professionalism.
2. Test the system in advance to facilitate registration for certification exams and guarantee the right of electoral subjects to appoint their members to polling station bureaus.

For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. Evaluate cases of political involvement of embassy staff through the disciplinary commission.
2. Separate institutional from personal communication so that official embassy accounts publish only neutral logistical election information during the electoral period.
3. Introduce training modules on political neutrality and diplomatic ethics at the MAE Diplomatic Institute.
4. Publish periodically (1–2 times a year) the number of Moldovan citizens and communities abroad.
5. Develop diplomatic protocols limiting public statements of foreign officials in Moldova during the electoral period.

For the Ministry of Internal Affairs

1. Strengthen documentation and sanctioning of disguised involvement in election campaigns by actors who are not electoral subjects (e.g., NGOs).
2. Document and sanction cases of unauthorized dissemination of messages or polling of citizens regarding political preferences without CEC approval.
3. Ensure security and public order at meetings of electoral competitors or other subjects, preventing voter intimidation through documentation or photography (Art. 28 Electoral Code).
4. Exercise duties strictly within the powers provided by the Electoral Code.

For the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova

Exercise powers strictly within legal limits, avoiding direct or indirect involvement in electoral procedures, including complaints examination, candidate eligibility evaluation, or validation of candidate lists, to guarantee impartiality and functional separation between state institutions.

For the Central and Local Public Administration

1. Ensure fair and equal access for all electoral competitors to public premises for voter meetings.
2. Clearly separate institutional from political communication, avoiding the use of electoral symbols or slogans.
3. Maintain institutional neutrality throughout the electoral process, including preventing public officials' direct or indirect involvement in campaigns.
4. Suspend public information campaigns with potential electoral impact during the electoral period.

For the Audiovisual Council

1. Establish, jointly with the CEC, mechanisms to monitor state-disseminated messages during the electoral period, preventing the use of public platforms for political purposes.

For the Electoral Competitors

1. Avoid practices of intimidation, division, defamation, violence, and discriminatory or offensive language toward other competitors, supporters, or electoral bodies.
2. Ensure transparency and full compliance in campaign financing, declaring all sources, actual expenses, and in-kind contributions.
3. Respect fair competition by abstaining from forming or supporting disguised electoral blocs or other informal political associations that could mislead voters.
4. Refrain from using party members' administrative achievements for electoral purposes.
5. Refrain from using foreign officials' images, statements, or visits for electoral purposes.

For the Media Institutions

1. Promote civic education on the apolitical role of the presidency and strengthen constitutional culture by explaining the importance of institutional neutrality in elections.
2. Participate in the joint effort of electoral authorities, public and private institutions, civil society, and educational institutions to educate citizens with voting rights.
3. Report on elections with fairness, balance, and impartiality, avoiding favoritism or disfavor toward any competitors.
4. Ensure equitable coverage of all competitors, providing proportional time and space in news, reports, interviews, and debates.

For the Civil Society Organizations

1. Promote civic education on the apolitical role of the presidency and the importance of institutional neutrality in elections.

2. Maintain neutrality by refraining from direct or indirect involvement in competitors' campaigns.

Anexa nr. 1 Accreditation of observers and confirmation of journalists.

Observers accredited by the CEC and DEC's			
Promo-LEX Association	1196	Institute for Human Rights in Moldova	36
Union of Jurists of Moldova	1057	INFONET Alliance	16
INFONET Alliance	5	East-European Foundation of Moldova	2
Public Association "BAȘTINA-NIMORENI"	2	Public Institution "Continuous Training Centre in the Electoral Field"	7
Public Association "Pilgrim-Demo"	13	Public Association Movement "War Veterans' Force for Nation and Country"	127
Total national observers			2461
Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania	3	Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in the Republic of Moldova	7
Central Election Commission of Georgia	2	Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in the Republic of Moldova	2
Central Election Commission of the Republic of Albania	2	Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in the Republic of Moldova	4
Central Election Commission of Ukraine	2	Embassy of the Italian Republic in the Republic of Moldova	2
Central Election Commission of the Republic of Armenia	2	Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden in the Republic of Moldova	7
Central Election Commission of the Republic of Latvia	2	Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in the Republic of Moldova	1
Central Election Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan	2	Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the Republic of Moldova	19
Central Election Commission of the Republic of Lithuania	2	Embassy of the Slovak Republic in the Republic of Moldova	1
Central Election Commission of Ireland	1	Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Republic of Moldova	8
Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan	1	Embassy of the Republic of Finland in the Republic of Moldova	2
Central Commission for Elections and Referenda of the Kyrgyz Republic	2	Embassy of Canada in the Republic of Moldova	2
Central Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan	2	Embassy of the French Republic in the Republic of Moldova	8
Election Commission of the Republic of India	2	Office of the Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in the Republic of Moldova	5

Supreme Electoral Council of the Republic of Turkey	2	Embassy of Japan in the Republic of Moldova	6
National Electoral Institute of the United Mexican States	1	Embassy of the Republic of Austria in the Republic of Moldova	4
Parliament of Ukraine	15	Embassy of the Czech Republic in the Republic of Moldova	2
European Parliament	14	Embassy of the United States of America in the Republic of Moldova	56
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)	272	Embassy of Hungary in the Republic of Moldova	2
European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO)	8	Embassy of the Kingdom of Denmark in the Republic of Moldova	1
Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation	3	Embassy of the Kingdom of Belgium in the Republic of Moldova	2
World Association of Electoral Bodies (A-WEB)	4	Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey in Comrat	6
International Republican Institute Washington, Chişinău Branch	30	Swiss Cooperation Office	2
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly	118	International Foundation for Electoral Systems	36
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe	28	European Platform for Democratic Elections	14
European Association for Dialogue and Democracy (EDDA)	25	Pro Democracy Association Club Târgu Neamţ	2
Charitable Association of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities "DJERELA"	3	Association "Expert Forum"	8
International Organization of La Francophonie	8	Initiative for Dialogue and Democracy (SILBA)	44
Association "Funky Citizens"	89	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	4
Organization "Committee for Open Democracy" (USA)	10		
Total international observers			912

Journalists confirmed by the CEC and DEC's			
Periodic Publication "Observatorul de Nord" SRL	9	Public Association Academy of Media Creativity and Innovation	4
Private Institution "Radio Orhei"	1	Public Association of Reporters "NORD MEDIA"	20
Public Association "Nord Press Club"	7	Public Association "Media Birlii – Media Union"	6
Periodic Publication "EXCLUSIV MEDIA" SRL	6	Independent Periodical "Ecoul Nostru" SRL	2
SRL "Satelrom-TV"	2	TV Station OK«GRT»	13
Bright Communications SRL	23	Bright Communications SRL	2
Company "Privesc.Eu" SRL	7	SRL "TRUEMEDIA"	2

Public Association “VOCEA NORDULUI”	8	News Agency “INFO-PRIM NEO” SRL	7
Public Institution State Information Agency “MOLDPRES”	2	News Agency “Agence France-Presse”	3
Periodic Publication “ZIARUL DE GARDĂ” SRL	1	Public Association “Building Bridges Project”	3
Public Association “Farul Moldovei”	2	Freelancer	1
Total confirmed journalists			131

Anexa nr. 2 Media Monitoring: July 14 – September 25, 2025

Table of Diagram No. 1 (Media Coverage)




Table of Diagram No. 1 (Media Coverage)

	TV (4)	RADIO (3)	ONLINE (10)	AGENCY (3)
POS	2	0	185	5
NEG	190	41	436	53
N	785	385	1,573	291

Table No. 1 (Coverage of Political Parties and Electoral Competitors)

No.	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Party of Action and Solidarity”	21	233	302	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	1	9	78	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	1	0	78	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	1	14	76	party and competitor

5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	4	67	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	1	1	81	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	8	116	233	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	6	39	156	party
7.2	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	2	34	144	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	13	43	136	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	3	26	136	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	24	13	79	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	1	29	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	3	64	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	51	competitor
11.1	Political Party Party of National Reunification “ACASĂ”	0	0	36	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	34	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	58	1	59	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Towns and Communes	0	1	53	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	1	9	68	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	11	45	161	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	2	21	63	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	13	47	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	11	32	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	4	31	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Party of Change”	0	0	51	party
16.2	Political Party Ecologist Green Party	0	0	38	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	18	14	164	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	4	4	54	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	2	35	102	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	4	2	53	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	46	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	31	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	20	competitor

24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	10	9	78	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	1	party
26	Political Party “US”	1	1	12	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	15	party
28	Political Party Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	2	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	1	13	party
30	Movement of Professionals “Hope Надежда”	0	1	21	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	3	party
32	Political Party Renaissance	0	13	36	party

MEDIA SOURCES MONITORED

Television (News Bulletin)	Radio Station	Radio Station	Radio Station
PRO TV 20:00	RADIO MOLDOVA	REALITATEA.MD	IPN
JURNAL TV 19:00	RADIO CHIȘINĂU	STIRI.MD	INFOTAG
TV8 19:00	RADIO FREE EUROPE	ZDG.MD	MOLDPRES
MOLDOVA 1 21:00		NEWSMAKER.MD	
		NOI.MD	
		UNIMEDIA.MD	
		DESHIDE.MD	
		AGORA.MD	
		NORDNEWS.MD	
		NOKTA.MD	
Television (political talk show)	Title	Guests of the talk show	Date/Time
PRO TV	În profunzime	1. 2.	21:00
JURNAL TV	Cabinetul din Umbră		Thursday – 20:00
	Ora Expertizei		Monday – 20:00
	Secretele Puterii		Wednesday – 20:00
TV8	Cutia Neagră		Thursday – 19:55
	Întreabă Ghețu		Friday – 19:55
MOLDOVA 1	Electoral Debates		
CINEMA 1	7 Days		weekend – 22:30
N4	The Fourth Power		19:00
TVC21	Important		Monday–Saturday – 17:00 / Sunday – 11:00

A. TELEVISION CHANNELS

A1: Pro TV

No.	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	2	5	17	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	0	5	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	5	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	1	4	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	5	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	4	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	10	13	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	4	6	party
7.2	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	0	4	6	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	5	3	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	4	3	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	0	6	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	2	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	8	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	5	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “ACASA”	0	0	2	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	2	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	5	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	6	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	1	3	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	4	10	competitor

15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	4	1	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	2	1	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	2	1	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	4	10	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Party of Change”	0	0	3	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	2	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	2	7	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	0	3	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	7	7	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	4	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	3	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	3	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	2	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	1	2	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	2	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Political Party Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	1	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	1	party
30	Movement of Professionals “Speranța Надежда (Hope)”	0	0	1	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	0	party

A2: Jurnal TV

No.	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	0	3	14	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	1	9	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	8	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	2	5	party and competitor

5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	1	8	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	5	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	12	11	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	5	4	party
7.2	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	0	5	2	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	7	2	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	4	20	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	1	6	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	3	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	1	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “ACASĂ”	0	0	0	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	0	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	6	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	6	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	0	6	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	4	9	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	3	3	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	1	2	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	1	2	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	3	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Party of Change”	0	0	5	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	0	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	1	9	party and competitor

18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	0	3	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	3	6	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	8	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	7	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	6	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	3	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	3	2	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Political Party Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	0	party
30	Movement of Professionals “Speranța Надежда (Hope)”	0	0	0	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	1	0	party

A3: TV 8

No.	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	0	3	14	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	1	9	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	8	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	2	5	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	1	8	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	5	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	12	11	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	5	4	party
7.2	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	0	5	2	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	7	2	party

7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	4	20	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	1	6	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	3	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	1	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “ACASĂ”	0	0	0	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	0	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	6	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	6	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	0	6	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	4	9	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	3	3	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	1	2	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	1	2	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	3	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Party of Change”	0	0	5	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	0	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	1	9	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	0	3	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	3	6	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	8	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	7	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	6	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	3	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	3	2	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Political Party Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	0	party

30	Movement of Professionals “Speranța Надежда (Hope)”	0	0	0	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	1	0	party

A4: Moldova 1

No.	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	0	0	22	partid și concurent
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	0	7	partid și concurent
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	9	partid și concurent
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	1	8	partid și concurent
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	1	8	partid și concurent
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	8	partid și concurent
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	8	19	concurent
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	6	8	partid
7.2	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	0	3	10	partid
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	3	7	partid
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	3	8	partid
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	0	6	partid și concurent
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	5	partid și concurent
10	Liberal Party	0	0	8	partid și concurent
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	9	concurent
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “ACASĂ”	0	0	3	partid
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	4	partid

12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	6	partid și concurent
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	6	partid și concurent
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	0	7	partid și concurent
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	4	13	concurent
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	0	2	partid
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	0	2	partid
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	0	2	partid
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	5	concurent
16.1	Political Party “Party of Change”	0	0	5	partid
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	4	partid
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	0	12	partid și concurent
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	0	6	partid și concurent
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	4	9	partid și concurent
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	6	concurent
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	2	concurent
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	6	concurent
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	5	concurent
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	0	4	partid
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	partid
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	2	partid
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	2	partid
28	Political Party Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	partid
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	2	partid
30	Movement of Professionals “Speranța Надежда (Hope)”	0	0	2	partid
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	partid
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	2	partid

B. POSTURI RADIO

B1: Radio Moldova

No.	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	0	1	16	party and competitor

2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	0	6	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	6	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	0	6	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	7	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	4	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of the Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	1	16	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	6	party
7.2	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	6	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	1	10	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	1	7	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	0	4	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	2	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	6	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “ACASĂ”	0	0	1	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	1	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	3	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	2	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	1	4	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	1	2	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	1	3	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	0	2	party

15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	1	2	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	1	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Party of Change”	0	0	2	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	2	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	1	7	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	0	4	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	1	6	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	5	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	3	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	6	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	3	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	0	2	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	1	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Political Party Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	1	party
30	Movement of Professionals “Speranța Надежда (Hope)”	0	0	1	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	2	party

B2: Radio Chișinău

Nr	Partid/Concurent	Pozitiv	Negativ	Neutru	Statut
Nr	Partid/Concurent	Pozitiv	Negativ	Neutru	Statut
1	Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate	0	1	10	partid și concurent
2	Partidul Social Democrat European	0	0	2	partid și concurent
3	Partidul Național Moldovenesc	0	0	2	partid și concurent
4	Democrație Acasă	0	1	6	partid și concurent
5	Alianța Liberalilor și Democraților pentru Europa	0	0	2	partid și concurent
6	Coaliția pentru Unitate și Bunăstare	0	0	3	partid și concurent
7	Bloc „Patriotic al Socialiștilor...”	0	2	7	concurent
7.1	Partidul Socialiștilor din RM	0	3	9	partid
7.2	Partidul Comuniștilor din RM	0	2	6	partid
7.3	Partidul Republican Inima Moldovei	0	1	7	partid
7.4	Partidul Viitorul Moldovei	0	1	7	partid

8	Mișcarea Respect Moldova	0	0	2	partid și concurent
9	Uniunea Creștin-Socială din Moldova	0	0	2	partid și concurent
10	Partidul Liberal	0	0	3	partid și concurent
11	Bloc „Unirea Națiunii”	0	0	2	concurent
11.1	Partidul Reîntregirii Naționale „ACASĂ”	0	0	4	partid
11.2	Partidul Național Liberal	0	0	3	partid
12	Alianța „Moldovenii”	0	0	2	partid și concurent
13	Liga Orașelor și Comunelor	0	0	1	partid și concurent
14	Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor	0	1	1	partid și concurent
15	Bloc „Alternativa”	0	2	6	concurent
15.1	Mișcarea Alternativa Națională	0	1	2	partid
15.2	Partidul Dezvoltării și Consolidării Moldovei	0	1	1	partid
15.3	Partidul Acțiunii Comune – Congresul Civic	0	1	1	partid
16	Bloc „Împreună”	0	0	0	concurent
16.1	Partidul Schimbării	0	0	3	partid
16.2	Partidul Verde Ecologist	0	0	3	partid
17	Partidul Nostru	0	0	4	partid și concurent
18	Noua Opțiune Istorică	0	1	2	partid și concurent
19	Moldova Mare	0	1	5	partid și concurent
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	1	concurent
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	0	concurent
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	concurent
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	concurent
24	Democrat Modern din Moldova	0	0	5	partid
25	Partidul Republican din Moldova	0	0	0	partid
26	NOI	0	0	1	partid
27	Uniunea Centristă din Moldova	0	0	2	partid
28	Popular din Moldova	0	0	0	partid
29	Pentru Oameni, Natură și Animale	0	0	2	partid
30	Mișcarea Profesioniștilor „Speranța Надежда”	0	1	1	partid
31	Platforma Demnitate și Adevăr	0	0	0	partid
32	Partidul Renaștere	0	4	0	partid
1	Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate	0	1	10	partid și concurent
2	Partidul Social Democrat European	0	0	2	partid și concurent
3	Partidul Național Moldovenesc	0	0	2	partid și concurent

4	Democrație Acasă	0	1	6	partid și concurent
5	Alianța Liberalilor și Democraților pentru Europa	0	0	2	partid și concurent
6	Coaliția pentru Unitate și Bunăstare	0	0	3	partid și concurent
7	Bloc „Patriotic al Socialiștilor...”	0	2	7	concurent
7.1	Partidul Socialiștilor din RM	0	3	9	partid
7.2	Partidul Comuniștilor din RM	0	2	6	partid
7.3	Partidul Republican Inima Moldovei	0	1	7	partid
7.4	Partidul Viitorul Moldovei	0	1	7	partid
8	Mișcarea Respect Moldova	0	0	2	partid și concurent
9	Uniunea Creștin-Socială din Moldova	0	0	2	partid și concurent
10	Partidul Liberal	0	0	3	partid și concurent
11	Bloc „Unirea Națiunii”	0	0	2	concurent
11.1	Partidul Reîntregirii Naționale „ACASĂ”	0	0	4	partid
11.2	Partidul Național Liberal	0	0	3	partid
12	Alianța „Moldovenii”	0	0	2	partid și concurent
13	Liga Orașelor și Comunelor	0	0	1	partid și concurent
14	Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor	0	1	1	partid și concurent
15	Bloc „Alternativa”	0	2	6	concurent
15.1	Mișcarea Alternativa Națională	0	1	2	partid
15.2	Partidul Dezvoltării și Consolidării Moldovei	0	1	1	partid
15.3	Partidul Acțiunii Comune – Congresul Civic	0	1	1	partid
16	Bloc „Împreună”	0	0	0	concurent
16.1	Partidul Schimbării	0	0	3	partid
16.2	Partidul Verde Ecologist	0	0	3	partid
17	Partidul Nostru	0	0	4	partid și concurent

18	Noua Opțiune Istorică	0	1	2	partid și concurent
19	Moldova Mare	0	1	5	partid și concurent
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	1	concurent
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	0	concurent
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	concurent
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	concurent
24	Democrat Modern din Moldova	0	0	5	partid
25	Partidul Republican din Moldova	0	0	0	partid
26	NOI	0	0	1	partid
27	Uniunea Centristă din Moldova	0	0	2	partid
28	Popular din Moldova	0	0	0	partid
29	Pentru Oameni, Natură și Animale	0	0	2	partid
30	Mișcarea Profesioniștilor „Speranța Надежда”	0	1	1	partid
31	Platforma Demnitate și Adevăr	0	0	0	partid
32	Partidul Renaștere	0	4	0	partid

B3: Radio Europa Liberă

Nr	Political Party/Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	0	0	9	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	0	1	party and competitor
3	National Moldovan Party	0	0	0	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	0	2	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	0	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Prosperity	0	0	1	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	0	12	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	7	party
7.2	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	6	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	1	7	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	1	7	party

8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	0	2	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	0	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	1	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “HOME”	0	0	1	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	1	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	0	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	1	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	1	2	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	0	5	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	0	3	party
15.2	Political Party “Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	0	3	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	0	2	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Change Party”	0	0	0	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	0	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	0	9	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	0	1	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	0	3	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	0	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	0	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	0	2	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Political Party Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	1	party
30	Professionals Movement “Hope Надежда”	0	0	1	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party

32	Political Party Renaissance	0	0	3	party
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C. ONLINE MEDIA

C1: Realitatea.md

Nr	Party/Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Action and Solidarity Party	2	11	17	party and competitor
2	European Social Democratic Party	0	2	6	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	4	party and competitor
4	Democracy at Home	0	0	1	party and competitor
5	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	4	party and competitor
6	Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	6	party and competitor
7	“Patriotic Bloc of Socialists...”	0	3	9	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of RM	1	0	8	party
7.2	Communist Party of RM	0	1	11	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	2	1	9	party
7.4	Future of Moldova Party	1	0	8	party
8	Respect Moldova Movement	4	2	6	party and competitor
9	Christian-Social Union of Moldova	0	0	1	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	3	party and competitor
11	“Union of the Nation” Bloc	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	National Reunification Party “HOME”	0	0	3	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	3	party
12	“Moldovans” Alliance	1	0	6	party and competitor
13	League of Cities and Communes	0	0	4	party and competitor
14	Alliance for the Unification of Romanians	0	0	4	party and competitor
15	“Alternative” Bloc	4	0	17	competitor

15.1	National Alternative Movement	0	0	4	party
15.2	Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova	0	0	2	party
15.3	Common Action Party – Civic Congress	0	0	2	party
16	“Together” Bloc	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Change Party	0	0	2	party
16.2	Green Ecologist Party	0	0	2	party
17	Our Party	7	1	11	party and competitor
18	New Historical Option	1	0	3	party and competitor
19	Great Moldova	0	1	5	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	2	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	6	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	2	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	1	competitor
24	Modern Democrat of Moldova	2	1	1	party
25	Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	NOI	0	0	1	party
27	Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	2	party
28	Popular from Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	For People, Nature, and Animals	0	0	0	party
30	Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда”	0	0	2	party
31	Dignity and Truth Platform	0	0	0	party
32	Renaissance Party	0	0	2	party

C2: Știri.md

Nr	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	5	24	29	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	1	1	11	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	1	0	9	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	1	1	5	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	5	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	1	0	5	party and competitor

7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	1	4	14	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	2	13	party
7.2	Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	13	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	3	13	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	1	10	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	2	8	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	0	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	8	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	4	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “HOME”	0	0	5	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	5	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	5	0	11	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	3	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Unification of Romanians	0	3	13	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	6	7	16	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	0	7	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	1	4	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	0	2	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Change Party”	0	0	4	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	4	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	1	0	11	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	0	1	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	5	15	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	1	8	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	7	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	competitor

23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democrat of Moldova	0	0	7	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	1	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Political Party Popular from Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	1	1	party
30	Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда”	0	0	2	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	1	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	1	party

C3: Zdg.md

Nr	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	0	3	21	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	1	5	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	3	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	2	5	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	5	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	5	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	15	17	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	2	12	party
7.2	Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	0	12	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	1	11	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	1	10	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	1	4	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	4	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	5	party and competitor

11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “HOME”	0	0	2	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	2	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	1	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	4	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Unification of Romanians	0	1	4	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	3	9	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	4	4	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	2	5	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	2	4	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	1	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Change Party”	0	0	5	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	5	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	2	6	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	1	2	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	2	6	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	1	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	1	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democrat of Moldova	0	1	6	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	1	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	2	party
28	Political Party Popular from Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	1	party
30	Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда”	0	0	1	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	2	2	party

C4: Newsmaker.md

Nr	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
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1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	1	10	27	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	1	4	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	7	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	0	4	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	3	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	8	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	4	15	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	14	party
7.2	Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	2	11	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	0	12	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	0	7	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	2	3	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	1	1	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	7	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	4	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “HOME”	0	0	2	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	2	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	1	0	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	1	1	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Unification of Romanians	0	1	0	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	3	13	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	0	11	party

15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	0	6	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	0	3	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	2	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Change Party”	0	0	3	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	3	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	2	10	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	1	2	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	1	3	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	2	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	3	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	1	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	2	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democrat of Moldova	0	0	7	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	2	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Political Party Popular from Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	0	party
30	Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда”	0	0	2	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	3	party

C5: Agora.md

Nr	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	2	7	16	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	2	4	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	5	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	1	6	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	3	party and competitor

6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	7	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	13	10	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	2	13	party
7.2	Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	10	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	4	9	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	1	9	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	1	2	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	1	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	4	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “HOME”	0	0	4	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	4	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	0	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	2	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Unification of Romanians	0	0	2	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	1	10	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	1	3	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	1	2	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	0	2	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Change Party”	0	0	3	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	3	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	0	9	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	1	3	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	0	7	party and competitor

20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	0	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	1	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	1	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democrat of Moldova	0	0	5	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	1	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	1	party
28	Political Party Popular from Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	1	party
30	Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда”	0	0	1	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	3	party

C6: Deschide.md

Nr	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	5	1	10	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	0	0	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	0	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	0	1	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	1	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	2	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	0	2	7	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	0	0	3	party
7.2	Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	2	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	0	2	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	0	0	2	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	0	0	0	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	0	party and competitor

10	Liberal Party	0	0	0	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	0	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “HOME”	0	0	2	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	2	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	0	0	0	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	3	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Unification of Romanians	0	0	0	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	0	2	2	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	0	1	1	party
15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	0	0	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	0	0	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Change Party”	0	0	1	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	1	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	0	0	3	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	0	0	2	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	1	2	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	1	0	2	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	0	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democrat of Moldova	0	0	4	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	0	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Political Party Popular from Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	0	party
30	Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда”	0	0	0	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	2	party

C7: Noi.md

Nr	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party “Action and Solidarity Party”	0	115	23	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democratic Party	0	1	3	party and competitor
3	Moldovan National Party	0	0	2	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	0	5	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	0	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Welfare	0	0	1	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc “Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”	6	3	22	competitor
7.1	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	2	1	8	party
7.2	Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova	1	0	9	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	9	1	11	party
7.4	Party “Future of Moldova”	1	0	6	party
8	Political Party “Respect Moldova Movement”	4	1	9	party and competitor
9	Political Party “Christian-Social Union of Moldova”	0	0	0	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	0	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc “Union of the Nation”	0	0	1	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party “HOME”	0	0	0	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	0	party
12	Political Party Alliance “Moldovans”	6	0	2	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	1	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Unification of Romanians	1	0	8	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc “Alternative”	1	1	7	competitor
15.1	Political Party National Alternative Movement	2	1	6	party

15.2	Political Party “Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova”	0	1	5	party
15.3	Political Party “Common Action Party – Civic Congress”	0	0	2	party
16	Electoral Bloc “Together”	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Political Party “Change Party”	0	0	2	party
16.2	Political Party Green Ecologist Party	0	0	1	party
17	Political Party “Our Party”	7	0	15	party and competitor
18	Political Party “New Historical Option”	3	0	5	party and competitor
19	Political Party Great Moldova	0	0	3	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	3	0	4	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	4	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democrat of Moldova	8	1	10	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party “NOI”	1	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	1	party
28	Political Party Popular from Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party “For People, Nature and Animals”	0	0	0	party
30	Professionals’ Movement “Hope Надежда”	0	0	0	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	1	1	party

C8: Unimedia.md

Nr	Partid Politic/Concurentul electoral	Pozitiv	Negativ	Neutru	Statut
1	Partidul Politic „Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate”	0	115	23	partid și concurent
2	Partidul Politic Partidul Social Democrat European	0	1	3	partid și concurent
3	Partidul Național Moldovenesc	0	0	2	partid și concurent
4	Partidul Politic Democrație Acasă	0	0	5	partid și concurent
5	Partidul Politic Alianța Liberalilor și Democraților pentru Europa	0	0	0	partid și concurent

6	Partidul Politic Coaliția pentru Unitate și Bunăstare	0	0	1	partid și concurent
7	Blocul Electoral „Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei”	6	3	22	concurent
7.1	Partidul Socialiștilor din Republica Moldova	2	1	8	partid
7.2	Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova	1	0	9	partid
7.3	Partidul Republican Inima Moldovei	9	1	11	partid
7.4	Partidul „Viitorul Moldovei”	1	0	6	partid
8	Partidul Politic „Mișcarea Respect Moldova”	4	1	9	partid și concurent
9	Partidul Politic „Uniunea Creștin - Socială din Moldova”	0	0	0	partid și concurent
10	Partidul Liberal	0	0	0	partid și concurent
11	Blocul Electoral „Unirea Națiunii”	0	0	1	concurent
11.1	Partidul Politic Partidul Reîntregirii Naționale „ACASĂ”	0	0	0	partid
11.2	Partidul Național Liberal	0	0	0	partid
12	Partidul Politic Alianța „Moldovenii”	6	0	2	partid și concurent
13	Partidul Politic Liga Orașelor și Comunelor	0	0	1	partid și concurent
14	Partidul Politic Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor	1	0	8	partid și concurent
15	Blocul Electoral „Alternativa”	1	1	7	concurent
15.1	Partidul Politic Mișcarea Alternativa Națională	2	1	6	partid
15.2	Partidul Politic „Partidul Dezvoltării și Consolidării Moldovei”	0	1	5	partid
15.3	Partidul Politic „Partidul Acțiunii Comune - Congresul Civic”	0	0	2	partid
16	Blocul Electoral „Împreună”	0	0	0	concurent
16.1	Partidul Politic „Partidul Schimbării”	0	0	2	partid
16.2	Partidul Politic Partidul Verde Ecologist	0	0	1	partid
17	Partidul Politic „Partidul Nostru”	7	0	15	partid și concurent
18	Partidul Politic „Noua Opțiune Istorică”	3	0	5	partid și concurent
19	Partidul Politic Moldova Mare	0	0	3	partid și concurent

20	Andrei Năstase	3	0	4	concurrent
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	4	concurrent
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	concurrent
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	concurrent
24	Partidul Politic Democrat Modern din Moldova	8	1	10	partid
25	Partidul Politic Partidul Republican din Moldova	0	0	0	partid
26	Partidul Politic „NOI”	1	0	0	partid
27	Partidul Politic Uniunea Centristă din Moldova	0	0	1	partid
28	Partidul Politic Popular din Moldova	0	0	0	partid
29	Partidul Politic „Pentru Oameni, Natură și Animale”	0	0	0	partid
30	Mișcarea Profesioniștilor „Speranța Надежда”	0	0	0	partid
31	Partidul Politic Platforma Demnitate și Adevăr	0	0	0	partid
32	Partidul Politic Partidul Renaștere	0	1	1	partid

C9: Nordnews.md

No	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party "Party of Action and Solidarity"	0	9	8	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democrat Party	0	0	1	party and competitor
3	National Moldovan Party	0	0	1	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	0	0	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	0	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Prosperity	0	0	2	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc "Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova"	0	1	5	competitor
7.1	Socialists Party of the Republic of Moldova	1	3	8	party
7.2	Communists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	3	6	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	2	6	party

7.4	Party "Future of Moldova"	0	2	5	party
8	Political Party "Respect Moldova Movement"	16	0	8	party and competitor
9	Political Party "Christian-Social Union of Moldova"	0	0	0	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	1	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc "Union of the Nation"	0	0	1	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party "HOME"	0	0	0	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	0	party
12	Political Party Alliance "The Moldovans"	0	0	3	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	2	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	0	1	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc "Alternative"	0	0	4	competitor
15.1	Political Party Alternative National Movement	0	1	2	party
15.2	Political Party "Party for Development and Consolidation of Moldova"	0	1	2	party
15.3	Political Party "Common Action Party – Civic Congress"	0	1	1	party
16	Electoral Bloc "Together"	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Political Party "Change Party"	0	0	2	party
16.2	Green Ecologist Party	0	0	2	party
17	Political Party "Our Party"	3	2	15	party and competitor
18	Political Party "New Historical Option"	0	0	4	party and competitor
19	Political Party "Great Moldova"	2	0	4	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	0	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	1	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	1	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	2	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	1	2	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party "US"	0	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party

29	Political Party "For People, Nature and Animals"	0	0	0	party
30	Professionals Movement "Hope Надежда"	0	0	0	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	1	party

C10: Nokta.md

No	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party "Party of Action and Solidarity"	0	1	11	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democrat Party	0	0	2	party and competitor
3	National Moldovan Party	0	0	2	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	1	3	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	0	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Prosperity	0	0	2	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc "Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova"	0	14	8	competitor
7.1	Socialists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	2	8	party
7.2	Communists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	2	9	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	5	3	party
7.4	Party "Future of Moldova"	0	2	5	party
8	Political Party "Respect Moldova Movement"	0	0	1	party and competitor
9	Political Party "Christian-Social Union of Moldova"	0	0	1	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	0	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc "Union of the Nation"	0	0	1	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party "HOME"	0	0	0	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	0	party
12	Political Party Alliance "The Moldovans"	0	0	0	party and competitor

13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	0	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	0	2	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc "Alternative"	0	4	5	competitor
15.1	Political Party Alternative National Movement	0	2	3	party
15.2	Political Party "Party for Development and Consolidation of Moldova"	0	3	2	party
15.3	Political Party "Common Action Party – Civic Congress"	0	3	1	party
16	Electoral Bloc "Together"	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Political Party "Change Party"	0	0	0	party
16.2	Green Ecologist Party	0	0	0	party
17	Political Party "Our Party"	0	0	5	party and competitor
18	Political Party "New Historical Option"	0	0	1	party and competitor
19	Political Party "Great Moldova"	0	1	3	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	0	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	0	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	0	3	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party "US"	0	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party "For People, Nature and Animals"	0	0	0	party
30	Professionals Movement "Hope Надежда"	0	0	1	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	2	4	party

D: AGENȚIE DE ȘTIRI

D1: IPN

No	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party "Party of Action and Solidarity"	3	5	10	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democrat Party	0	0	4	party and competitor

3	National Moldovan Party	0	0	6	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	1	5	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	1	2	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Prosperity	0	0	5	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc "Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova"	0	7	13	competitor
7.1	Socialists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	3	4	party
7.2	Communists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	4	3	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	1	1	party
7.4	Party "Future of Moldova"	0	2	1	party
8	Political Party "Respect Moldova Movement"	0	0	2	party and competitor
9	Political Party "Christian-Social Union of Moldova"	0	0	0	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	1	1	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc "Union of the Nation"	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party "HOME"	0	0	1	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	0	party
12	Political Party Alliance "The Moldovans"	0	0	2	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	0	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	0	1	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc "Alternative"	0	2	12	competitor
15.1	Political Party Alternative National Movement	0	1	2	party
15.2	Political Party "Party for Development and Consolidation of Moldova"	0	0	2	party
15.3	Political Party "Common Action Party – Civic Congress"	0	0	1	party
16	Electoral Bloc "Together"	0	0	2	competitor
16.1	Political Party "Change Party"	0	0	3	party
16.2	Green Ecologist Party	0	0	1	party
17	Political Party "Our Party"	0	2	7	party and competitor
18	Political Party "New Historical Option"	0	0	2	party and competitor
19	Political Party "Great Moldova"	0	2	3	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	3	competitor

21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	1	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	0	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	0	5	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party "US"	0	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	1	party
28	Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party "For People, Nature and Animals"	0	0	1	party
30	Professionals Movement "Hope Надежда"	0	0	1	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	0	0	party

D2: Infotag

No	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party "Party of Action and Solidarity"	1	3	13	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democrat Party	0	0	2	party and competitor
3	National Moldovan Party	0	0	3	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	0	3	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	3	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Prosperity	0	0	3	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc "Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova"	0	0	11	competitor
7.1	Socialists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	5	party
7.2	Communists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	5	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	0	1	5	party
7.4	Party "Future of Moldova"	0	1	4	party

8	Political Party "Respect Moldova Movement"	0	0	3	party and competitor
9	Political Party "Christian-Social Union of Moldova"	0	0	2	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	3	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc "Union of the Nation"	0	0	3	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party "HOME"	0	0	3	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	2	party
12	Political Party Alliance "The Moldovans"	0	0	3	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	4	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	0	4	party and competitor
15	Electoral Bloc "Alternative"	0	0	7	competitor
15.1	Political Party Alternative National Movement	0	0	1	party
15.2	Political Party "Party for Development and Consolidation of Moldova"	0	0	1	party
15.3	Political Party "Common Action Party – Civic Congress"	0	0	1	party
16	Electoral Bloc "Together"	0	0	3	competitor
16.1	Political Party "Change Party"	0	0	3	party
16.2	Green Ecologist Party	0	0	3	party
17	Political Party "Our Party"	0	0	7	party and competitor
18	Political Party "New Historical Option"	0	0	3	party and competitor
19	Political Party "Great Moldova"	0	0	3	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	1	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	1	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	1	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	1	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	0	1	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	1	party
26	Political Party "US"	0	0	1	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	2	party
28	Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	1	party
29	Political Party "For People, Nature and Animals"	0	0	2	party
30	Professionals Movement "Hope Надежда"	0	0	2	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	1	party

32	Political Party Renaissance Party	0	1	4	party
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D3: Moldpres

No	Political Party / Electoral Competitor	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Status
1	Political Party "Party of Action and Solidarity"	0	5	8	party and competitor
2	Political Party European Social Democrat Party	0	0	2	party and competitor
3	National Moldovan Party	0	0	0	party and competitor
4	Political Party Democracy at Home	0	0	2	party and competitor
5	Political Party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	0	0	0	party and competitor
6	Political Party Coalition for Unity and Prosperity	0	0	1	party and competitor
7	Electoral Bloc "Patriotic of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova"	0	3	3	competitor
7.1	Socialists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	4	party
7.2	Communists Party of the Republic of Moldova	0	1	2	party
7.3	Republican Party Heart of Moldova	1	1	3	party
7.4	Party "Future of Moldova"	0	1	3	party
8	Political Party "Respect Moldova Movement"	0	0	1	party and competitor
9	Political Party "Christian-Social Union of Moldova"	0	0	0	party and competitor
10	Liberal Party	0	0	0	party and competitor
11	Electoral Bloc "Union of the Nation"	0	0	2	competitor
11.1	Political Party National Reunification Party "HOME"	0	0	0	party
11.2	National Liberal Party	0	0	0	party
12	Political Party Alliance "The Moldovans"	0	0	0	party and competitor
13	Political Party League of Cities and Communes	0	0	0	party and competitor
14	Political Party Alliance for the Union of Romanians	0	0	1	party and competitor

15	Electoral Bloc "Alternative"	0	1	2	competitor
15.1	Political Party Alternative National Movement	0	0	1	party
15.2	Political Party "Party for Development and Consolidation of Moldova"	0	0	0	party
15.3	Political Party "Common Action Party – Civic Congress"	0	0	0	party
16	Electoral Bloc "Together"	0	0	0	competitor
16.1	Political Party "Change Party"	0	0	1	party
16.2	Green Ecologist Party	0	0	0	party
17	Political Party "Our Party"	0	0	5	party and competitor
18	Political Party "New Historical Option"	0	0	1	party and competitor
19	Political Party "Great Moldova"	0	0	1	party and competitor
20	Andrei Năstase	0	0	1	competitor
21	Olesea Stamate	0	0	1	competitor
22	Victoria Sanduța	0	0	1	competitor
23	Tatiana Crețu	0	0	0	competitor
24	Political Party Modern Democratic Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
25	Political Party Republican Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
26	Political Party "US"	0	0	0	party
27	Political Party Centrist Union of Moldova	0	0	0	party
28	Popular Party of Moldova	0	0	0	party
29	Political Party "For People, Nature and Animals"	0	0	0	party
30	Professionals Movement "Hope Надежда"	0	0	0	party
31	Political Party Platform Dignity and Truth	0	0	0	party
32	Political Party Renaissance	0	0	0	party