

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE INDIAN SCENARIO

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ABSTRACT

The growing vulnerability of India to natural catastrophes, population health crises, and industrial disasters has added pressure on the crisis governance and leadership systems. Even though there are elaborate statutory mechanisms provided under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, there are still serious institutional and leadership failures in the event of high-impact crises. This paper looks at the role of leadership ambiguity, poor adaptive capacity and poor psychological resiliency in undermining the institutional effectiveness in managing crisis in India. It takes the approach of doctrinal research of law in order to study statutory frameworks on crisis response including the Disaster Management Act, 2005, operation of the National Disaster Management Authority, State Disaster Management Authorities and the National Crisis Management Committee as well as judicial response to significant crises such as industrial disasters and emergency in relation to health. The review shows that there are structural deficiencies in statutory interpretation, coordination requirements and accountability arrangements that lead to fragmented crisis governance. The article is an addition to the study of law, combining leadership theory and crisis law, constitutional requirements pursuant to Article 21 and administrative responsibility principles. It proposes a rebalanced legal policy that entrenches adaptive leadership, decentralized power, and multi-stakeholder coordination in the crisis management regime in India.

Keywords: Crisis Management; Disaster Law; Institutional Resilience; Leadership; India.

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I. Introduction

In India, the reaction to crisis management is getting increasingly complex during recent decades as it depends on the confluence of socio-economic gaps, rapid population growth, climate-related disasters, technological hazards, and the problems relating to the governance. The occurrence in India is very diverse in recurrent crises like cyclones, floods, droughts, pandemics, industrial accidents and conflicts, border conflict, and institutional collapses and failures. Factors inherent in these crises point to incompatibility on the rate at which these risks are altering and the capacity of institutions and leadership to adjust to these changes. The increasing risk of climatic events and the peculiarities of the ecological region and great concentration of people in the nation increase the impact of disasters that is why the efficiency of the leadership will be the determining factor of resistance (Deepa et al., 2025).

India has established a complex legislative, institutional system of crisis management. The National Disaster Management Act of 2005 formalized a multi-layered arrangement of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMAs), District Disaster Authority (DDMAs) and agencies specialized in a particular crisis such as the National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC). Even though these structures are good structural undertakings, the real-world cases are keen to indicate that there is always endless lapses of coordination, preparedness, communication, and clear leadership. The situation in the field of disaster response is also far from being even because of administrative capacity, resources, and lack of political focus inconsistency spread among the states (Joseph et al., 2023).

In this case, the problem of leadership goes out as the central point where institutional resilience is centred. Resilience does not only entail the capacity to absorb a shock but also, it is also the capacity to anticipate, adopt and transform after a crisis. The leadership influences all the components of resilience, including strategic plans, managing the use of resources, instant decision-making, and inter-agency coordination and communication with the participants, and the ultimate learning once the crisis is over. As researchers claim, there are at least three characteristics of a leadership style, emotional competence, and adaptive capacity that drive the organisational readiness and the outcomes of future crisis (Dewani et al., 2025; Williams et al., 2017).

However, its leadership crisis is still insufficient due to systemic issues such as bureaucratic hierarchy, political interference, broken chains of command, and lacking standards of

leadership development programmes. Decision-making processes can be reactive and protocol-constrained to the extent that there is little ability to improvise, stimulate the intellect, and bottom-up innovation. This can be quite an issue in a high stress environment where crisis is dynamic and requires prompt decision making.

The present paper will critically analyze the Indian leadership environment in crisis and on three major determinants of institutional resilience that is, leadership ambiguity, intellectual stimulation, and psychological capital. Using the latest literature, governmental structures, and intersectoral perceptions, the paper argues that India needs a multi-dimensional leadership model that will include the flexibility, emotional stability, and decentralised capacity training. The heightening of the leadership in the bureaucracy, politics as well as the community is also required to transform the environment that is crisis-prone in India into the vigorous ecosystem.

II. Identification of Statement of the Research Problem

India has a sophisticated statutory and institutional framework of managing crisis and disaster which is majorly guided by the Disaster Management Act, 2005. But history shows us again and again that responses to crisis are characterized by failure to coordinate, lack of clarity in leadership and failure of institutions to hold themselves accountable. Lack of clear demarcated authority, unequivocal interpretation of statutory requirement and scarcity of judicially enforceable leadership performance standards have led to an ad hoc, and reactive governance. This study focuses on the main issue of the ability of the current Indian legal system to facilitate successful leaders of crisis scenarios and institutions, or the lack of statutory clarity and gaps in governance to bode constitutional duty regarding protection of life and welfare of the people.

III. Research Methodology

It uses a doctrinal legal research methodology but is concerned with the examination of primary legal sources such as statutes, rules, executive guidelines and judicial decisions as regards crisis and disaster governance in India. The main legal framework of analysis comprises the Disaster Management Act, 2005, the subsidiary regulations, NDMA guidelines, and the provisions of the constitution, especially Article 21. Court decisions made when there is industrial catastrophe, environmental emergencies, and when there is a general national health crisis are studied to evaluate how courts understand the role of a state and administrative liability. Legal findings are contextualized using secondary sources including academic

literature, policy documents, and studies on governance. It is a qualitative analytical methodology to assess normative coherence, statutory effectiveness, and institutional design.

IV. Analysis & Findings

A. Leadership Ambiguity and Crisis Decision-Making in India

One of the most persistent issues of India, in terms of crisis response and institutional resilience, is that of leadership is unclear. They are ambiguous when there is a problem with roles, responsibilities, and authority lines, and hence, slow or contradictory decisions are made. Contemporaneous NDMA, SDMA, NCMC, line ministries, paramilitary forces, and state administrations also be inclined to give up parallel chains of command lack of an apparent chain of command (Tomar and Srivastava, 2025). Such complexity in the structure undermines coordination, especially in the scenario of a multi-state or multi-sectoral crisis.

The vagueness of leadership has manifested itself in the irregularity of the guidelines provided by the national and state authorities in the case of major crises such as COVID-19 epidemics, national lockdowns, and disastrous industrial accidents. To give an example, the issue of health requirements and migration transportation regulation, along with the operations of quarantine showed the lack of the coherent system of managing the crisis. Deepa et al. (2025) reveal that the institutional logics conflicting with each other during the crisis delays the process of developing a shared sense-making procedure and such procedure restrains the adaptive and transformative resilience.

It may also be regarded via the celebration of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy and the Vizag Gas Leak (2020) manufacturing tragedy that additionally uncovers the problem of fragmentation in leadership. At local level, the district governments are confronted with clandestine jurisdiction of environmental bodies as compared to the industry safety agency alongside the emergency agencies. This indecisiveness slows down the rate of operation, restricts the flow of information, and slows down the marshalling of the technical and medical forces.

Moreover, the oscillations of the centralized modes of political regulating, the decentralized administrative practice perplex. Political leaders tend to give commands without being adequately clear on how the bureaucrats implement them, thereby the bureaucrats become uncertain with regards to the priorities of the institution. This affects crisis logistics, evacuation, and interdepartmental coordination decisions. As observed by the authors such as

Mizrak (2024), countries in which the role of crisis leadership has a well-organized structure are better off compared to countries with a disseminated structure of authority.

Absence of clarity in leadership hence becomes a giant challenge in the preparedness of the India crisis. It responds slowly, develops inconsistencies in mass communications, and extinguishes the trust in citizens. The key to conquering the ambiguity will require a clear command structure, crisis plans, areas of clarity and coordination in leadership training, which is constituent of becoming clear, coordinated and collaboratively make decisions

B. Intellectual Stimulation and Adaptive Leadership Capacity

One such attribute of a leader is intellectual stimulation, which encourages creativity, analytical reasoning, and creativity of innovation among the teams, mostly during the period when the crisis is shifting at a very high rate. The idea of adaptive leadership when flexibility, experimentation, and scenario-based thinking leads is regarded at the global level as extremely critical in managing disasters. However, according to the researchers, the culture of leadership in India remains highly marked by hierarchical models of authority and systems that are based on compliance and do not support risk-taking (or innovativeness) (Joseph et al., 2023).

The agility to solve problems developed out of the bureaucracy left behind by colonial governance is founded upon adherence to the rules and not solving problems in an agile manner. This results in the fact that procedural compliance and innovative approaches to crisis are deemed more significant to the eyes of the officers and crisis managers. This deep-rooted mentality is a compelling hindrance in emergencies where the established policies might not be relevant in solving the complexity or a new scenario with professionalism. Dewani et al. (2025) provided that the resilience of a particular organisation is also improved by supporting the leadership through intellectual stimulation, the exchange of information, questioning the assumptions, and empowering the frontline agents.

Moreover, adaptive leadership requires an interdisciplinary collaboration which is an indispensable need in case of multi-dimensional crisis such as disasters associated with pandemic or climate situation. However, the Indian bureaucratic training programmes still subject the students to small details of crisis simulation, cross-sectoral or international best practices. Compared to the states in which the academic of crisis leadership is well-developed, India relies on the tenure-based promotion principle rather than adaptive skills demonstrated (Chatterjee et al., 2024).

The second point of intellectual stimulation is the ability to operate with technological and data-driven decision-making tools to foresee and manage crisis. Even though India has been developing in the field of early warning and digital governance, at the same time, the leaderships in the district and state levels are not necessarily even trained to read complex data and implement predictive analytics in the decision-making process. This inhibits the disaster forecasting and risk mapping, and real-time response coordination of organizations.

Systemic reform, i.e. introducing crisis laboratories, cross-sector education, the exchange of learning across states, opening leadership to the world, etc., must therefore be reinforced, in order to promote adaptive leadership. The ability to develop intellectual stimulation, adaptive skills will make Indian institutions more responsive, proactive and resilient.

C. Psychological Capital and Emotional Competence in Crisis Leadership

The psychological capital (PsyCap) that encompasses such crucial aspects as resilience, hope, efficacy, and optimism is the needed element of effective leadership in the time of crisis. Having psychological capital leaders would be better placed to handle the uncertainty and motivate teams, effective communication, and creating stability in the organization during times of crisis. Dewani, Mehta, and Jha (2025) emphasize that the development of behavioural response within the organization is almost entirely pegged on the emotional resilience criteria, especially in cases where the organization is stressed.

The area that the crisis managers can operate in India is the area where they must be criticized politically, the administrative hierarchies and the increased expectations directed towards the people. Such circumstances are likely to cover emotional and physical strength and accumulate state of decision paralysis. These are risk aversion, excess caution, or overreliance on strict procedures that leaders may develop. This impacts negatively on responsiveness and agility to the crisis.

Also important are emotional competence such as empathy, self-regulation and social awareness. The emotionally competent leaders in the research by Shingwekar and Maurya (2025) have a superior communication that contributes to the reduced panic and misunderstanding in terms of the crisis moment. The training of emotional intelligence is however yet to be of significance in Indian administration training and political leaders.

Another aspect of psychological capital is self-efficacy. High self-efficacy leaders are prone to making bold decisions, delegating where necessary, and making rational risk assessment

decisions. Lack of positive behavior on the contrary, leaders with low psychology capital levels may not make any critical decision or may delay decision making, thereby rendering the institute weak.

The organizational culture also affects psychological capital. The unfavorable work environment characterized by strict communication patterns, high degree of hierarchical structure, and punishments contribute to the absence of psychological safety and make sure that crisis managers are hesitant to speak out and propose innovative solutions. Williams et al. (2017) assert that psychological safety is built by resilient organizations by means of open communication and sharing of issues.

To increase the level of psychological capital among Indian leaders, the trainings programmes are to be accompanied with stress management, emotional intelligence, the team psychology and cognitive resilience. Incorporating the creation of psychological capital in the conceptual framework of NDMA, SDMA, and administration academies would be far-reaching in the performance of crisis management leaders.

D. Resource Mobilization and Bureaucratic Coordination Challenges

One of the critical parameters in crisis managements capacity is resource mobilization in that it directly influences the rate, scale, and effectiveness in responding to emergencies. The problem with resource mobilization in the Indian context concerns bureaucratic faction, financial limitations, logistic congestion and excessive imbalance in the administrative strength on the state level. Despite the mature legislative and institutional system, NDMA, SDMA, and NCMC, mobilization of resources does not always work in the high impact of disasters, as the operations and the formal structures are at variance (Tomar and Srivastava, 2025).

Other most endemic problems include the inflexibility of the bureaucracy system. Many of the guidelines that guide procurement processes, deployment, and authorization of emergency expenditures are burdened with bureaucratic procedures. This contributes to the delays in mobilization of required medical supplies, rescue equipment, evacuation means, and communication. During the second wave of the COVID-19, one such issue is the hearing of a lack of oxygen exacerbating the crisis not only since he could not receive the required amount, but also due to the deficiency of transport infrastructure and adequate inter-state correspondence facilities. This is because the bottlenecks show that, the fact that India has

massive resources is balanced by bureaucratic inertia which rids speedy implementation of the same.

The other component of the mobilization of resources is the inequality of institutional capacity in the states. The more developed states such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra state have a comparatively well-developed system of disaster management and system of early warnings and trained personnel. Less fortunate neighborhoods, in turn, might lack well-developed emergency services. The SDMAs are also far more disproportionate on effectiveness purposes such that the resilience outcomes in the country do not reflect consistent performance. The resilience of organizations requires well-adjusted systems as indicated by Sanjay et al. (2025) even though the governance in India is highly decentralized and thus the discrepancies in a system are normal rather than complementary.

Moreover, a system of integrating the resources of the privates into the national crisis responding has not been present. The knowledge of the private sector is hardly reached through formal systems, even with its heavy corporate-level logistics systems and healthcare facilities as well as the available technological capabilities. The COVID-19 pandemic showed that private hospitals and companies played a very important role in supporting the efforts of the government and the fact was nearly spontaneous rather than a planned one. Emami et al. (2024) emphasize that the partnerships between the public and the private are specifically linked to the resilient systems that incorporate clear frameworks rather than some types of arrangements that were created in the crisis period.

Cooperation with civil society organizations is also problematic. Thousands of NGOs and volunteering organizations are available in India, and the situation is generally complicated by the unclear government-related processes, registration, and external financing. The norm in disaster situation circumstances is that local NGOs tend to be faster than the government to get to the remote locations but lack coordination and thus, overlay each other in some areas and show gaps in others.

To improve the potential of managing its crises, it is necessary to make the resources mobilization reforms focus on the ease of bureaucratism, real-time logistical preparations, and the standardized relations with the participants of the private market and civil society. Digital resource tracking systems, cross state resource-sharing agreements, and decentralized warehousing are some of the digital resources that can improve operational preparedness. The

leadership must take the position of a facilitative trait where accentuation is liable to change, coordination and anticipatory planning to rigid procedural adherence in the following directions.

E. Institutional Resilience Frameworks: Learning from Domestic and Global Experiences

The institutional resilience has to do with the capability of an organization to perceive threats, adsorb shocks, behavior change, and that of change in structure to reduce the vulnerability of the organization over the long term. The Indian state helps to tune an institutional resilience to the interaction between governance structure, leadership behaviors, financial assets and the organizational culture. Despite the strengthening of structural preparedness of the country through Disaster Management Act (2005) and other reforms institution resilience has been unreliable and responsive, as opposed to being proactive.

The studies throughout the globe indicate that resilience systems integrate both crisis management and organizational learning in the long run. Williams et al. (2017) assert that organizations that can integrate crisis response with resilience-building processes reflect the positive recovery outcomes. The resiliency structure in India is however flawed in terms of institutional memory. The disaster post-assessments are superficial and determining the lessons are not consistently generalized towards the national and state guidelines. An example of this, in as much as the cities of Mumbai, Chennai and Hyderabad are still experiencing the recurrent cases of urban flooding, the reality of the structural vulnerability which is in regard to drainage, zoning, and emergency planning is continuously but futilely unreadable.

The international structures such as Disaster Risk Reduction Framework as designed by the Sendai Framework emphasize on four major aspects, which involve, understanding of the risk in disasters, better governance, resilience investment and effective responsiveness through preparedness. Mizrak (2024) observes that highly institutional resilient countries can invest heavily in risk resilient based planning as well as decentralized decision-making. India has adopted elements of Sendai inaction plans (both at the national level and states level), which remain decentralized in its implementation. Many state governments lack overlapping risk assessment or vulnerability maps. Communicacy of the environment, health, infrastructure, and disaster management departments contribute to impediment of holistic risk management.

This is a solid version of crisis governance models which is anchored on sound local institutions worldwide. Disaster management by community of Japan, digital surveillance

incorporated in South Korea, and collaborative emergency governance in New Zealand give a valuable lesson as an example. These systems were characterized by community engagement, open communication, and empowered local agencies. As one of the potentials in India, Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) are empowered with potential of decentralized resilience building but lack training, authority and resources. Training workshops rather than continuous training programmes are limited to capacity building projects on district collectors, block development officers and local councils.

The other areas of the health sector can be applied in the analysis of resilience. Emami et al. (2024) have discussed that robust health systems need to be redundant, able to overcome, polyvalent protocols, and coordination of high quality. The case of pandemics and disease outbreaks in India also reveals the successes (i.e. the fact that India manages to create and spread vaccines) and the failures of the situation such as the lack of government spending on health, the lack of ICU, and the lack of skilled personnel.

The response-based approach to resilience in institutional issues in India has to be transformed to anticipatory and transformative model. This means the improvement of data processes, the proactive nature of analytics, the sharing of wisdom between states, and societal-level disaster planning and leadership continuum. A fusion of both the local and international best practices that are achieved by means of proper correspondence to the socio-economic conditions of the local background can add much value to the institutional competencies to manage complex crises.

F. Crisis Communication Gaps and their Impact on Resilience

Communication in relation to the crisis is a very important component of successful crisis management since it determines the behavior of the people involved, institutional confidence, and the synergy to action. Frequently, deficiencies in communication have undermined the resiliency in India by developing false information, misunderstandings among people, and inconsistency of policies put into practice. Shingwekar and Maurya (2025) claim that rigid and slow, and extremely bureaucratic approaches to communication have contributed to mistrust of the population and stagnation of the organization's experience of crisis situations.

One of the major problems is that communication between the main government and state is not unified. In crisis situations, as it occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, the citizens have received conflicting information on the lockdown regulations, traveling, testing, and the

right to vaccination. These inconsistencies were not just administrative lapses, but there were more fundamental communication gaps between political and bureaucratic leadership. Deepa et al. (2025) reported that the reaction to the crisis is delayed because of the lack of consistency in instructions due to fragmented institutional logics.

The absence of caring and ready communication is another issue. Crisis messages use in India is primarily transmitted via the use of technical bullets or legal messages or general press conferences. These lack the emotional element to soothe the citizens and do away with panic. The authors recommend applying the 3E model Empathy, Engagement, and Explanation, a model of communication effectiveness improvement that consists of a theoretical framework (Shingwekar and Maurya 2025). Popular paranoia should also be addressed by the leaders, and they must be capable of conveying the rationale of any action and seek consultations with people and not command them how to act.

Misinformation is also one of the key setbacks. The massive Indian digital infrastructure and the low digital literacy is resulting in spread of rumours in some regions. During an emergency, falsehood can lead to failure to follow safety measures, panic-buying, social disorder or vaccine skepticism. Good leadership entails instituting quick communication networks, fact-check departments, and coordination with the media so as to collaborate with them in a bid to maintain rumours and update them instantaneously.

The other area that has not been covered is communication with the front-line responders. There must exist a good internal communication to coordinate various sectors of agencies that include police, medical staff, the manpower in disaster response, and even the district administrations. However, internal communication is generally novel, top-down, and slow, which makes the execution in the field slow. Real-time dashboards, mobile communications tools, and integrated emergency operation centers can be helpful in improving the flow of information.

Lastly, crisis communication is not much inclusive in India. Most of the vulnerable groups which tend to be sidelined in the information dissemination process are migrant workers, rural residents, linguistic minorities, and people with disabilities. The 2020 migrant crisis has revealed that millions of individuals were unable to have or had very limited official knowledge regarding their plans of transport, distribution of food, or shelter. Some of the processes through communication that should be incorporated to make it inclusive include

multilingual messages, visual messages and assistance, community radio, and cooperation with local organizations.

Improvement of the crisis communication, consequently, should involve institutionalisation of open-mindedness systems, single-handling messaging, media association and community interaction strategies. Leaders should consider adopting communication that is founded on compassionate, transparent and friendly communication to strengthen the trust and institutional power.

G. Multi-Stakeholder Leadership: Integrating Bureaucracy, Politics, and Civil Society

Plays are designed using complex socio-political situations in which the structure of government, political leadership, players in the business sector and civil society form part of those who play crucial roles. The Indian society is stratified, and the crisis management cannot be addressed only with help of the state institutions but of course requires the multi-stakeholder and integrated model of leadership. This model is to include bureaucratic leadership to be institutional, political leadership to provide legitimacy and mobilization of people, and civil society leadership to work with communities, provide final-mile, and become socially resilient. Sanjay et al. (2025) state that excellent organizational resilience is developed when such different stakeholders act as a team rather than as individuals.

Indian response system to crisis is comprised of bureaucratic leadership. The local collectors, the state secretaries, the emergency management commissioners and the administrative officers oversee the implementation of legal frameworks, inter-agencies, and efficiency in the application of functions. They should be able to execute the role of activation of emergency operation centers, relief allocation and management of evacuations, and implementation of recovery plans. As much as the bureaucratic leadership is core, rigid hierarchies, workloads, fragmentation of the procedures and lack of ability in the newer crisis, competencies become limiting. The political directive, as well as the statutory requirements imposed on the bureaucrats, is usually in conflict with each other, and it may also hinder a prompt response in case of a crisis. Joseph et al. (2023) emphasize that rather than the control-based model of leadership, bureaucratic heads should concentrate on bureaucratic Leadership model that incorporates the community involvement modes as well as the technical expertise (facilitative leadership models).

Centrality is also very high in political leadership. It is with the political actors that crisis discourses and the distribution of resources, the politics of bureaucracy, and engagement with the citizens are constructed. In effect, health ministers or mayors can mobilize the feeling of the people, act fast to make decisions and lobby policy changes, and chief ministers. However, it can be regarded that political leadership can be an obstacle to the management of crisis as some decisions can be made based on electoral interests, regionalism, or partisanship. Deepa et al. (2025) are of the opinion that, the compatibility of the political administration significantly diminishes the flexibility of the institutions especially when the power leaders like the radicalisation of the political interests at the expense of the independence of the administration. The optimal crisis leadership paradigm must, therefore, be comprised of a combination of both institutional skills and political power in which all decisions made must be informed by scientific facts and participatory leadership as opposed to political expediency.

The crisis in India also depends on the leadership of the civil societies. Good participation in relief efforts, awareness, and rehabilitation by non-governmental organizations, volunteer organizations, community organizations, and even religious organizations is also good. This is because their membership to communities makes them more effective as they can focus on vulnerable groups unlike government agencies. To take a case in point, during the COVID-19 crisis, community kitchens, oxygen distribution centers, vaccination efforts as well as transportation of migrant workers were at the heart of the civil society organizations. As it is observed by Anand (2025), the non-formal networks and social capital generally empower resilience in the country more than formal governance. Nevertheless, the demands of registration, lack of finances, and bureaucratic suspicion are some of the structural barriers to the full potential of civil society cooperation.

The other significant stakeholder in crisis leadership is that of the private sector. The businesses of the company possess logistic systems, innovative skills, supply-chain background, and technological innovations that can play an enormous role in the national response capacities. The financiers of the crisis collection concerning corporate social responsibility (CSR) are corporations but a more holistic process is required to enable cohesiveness of the merits of the private sector to be a systematic part of the emergency management systems. To be resilient during a crisis, Mizrak (2024) states that the contemporary world should have a combined effort of the government and the business environment rather than improvised options. The situation in the global-supply-chain disruptions in India demonstrate that the government

agility of the private sector to fill the void does not have to be improvised but must be institutionalised.

Through the diversity of the actors on board, the multi- stakeholder leadership must as well incorporate co- production of crisis strategies where each of the stakeholders will assume his role based on his strength. The result of co-production is better innovation, inclusivity, and problem solving depending on the situation. This within Indian context would imply that it ought to establish partnership with the state governments, cross-sectoral training and institutionalization of partnership between the NDMA, the state governments, the civil society organizations, the academic institutions and the corporate entities. Williams et al. (2017) state that the distributed leadership model is used to run resilient organizations, where the leadership was not exercised by one person but emerged as the output of the coordinated and collaborative action.

Another aspect of the multi-stakeholder leadership is community-led resilience. The local communities are most affected, especially in remote or marginalized areas, in most cases when a disaster strikes. Its involvement of the community is significant in the dissemination of early warning, evacuation assistance, mobilization, and cultural adaptation of crisis response locally as well in terms of resources. Emami et al. (2024) believe the institutional preparedness is greatly enhanced by a decentralized and community-oriented approach that will ensure the recovery in the long term. There is a contextual understanding of PRI, urban local bodies, and self-help groups regarding them, yet they must be more firmly integrated into formal crisis governance structures.

However, there are his levels of conflicting priorities, the absence of communication, institutional silos, and power asymmetries, which does not allow the stakeholders to cooperate with one another. The political leaders may attach significance to visibility, bureaucrats to procedure and civil society to speed and flexibility. The disparities prevent the coordinated action without clearly defined collaborative forms. The failure of the management of the past crises, as Chatterjee et al. (2024) explain, is typically associated with the lack that exists in the coordination of the agencies that work under the same mandate.

To solve these problems, India must institutionalize multi-stakeholder leadership by:

1. Joint crisis planning across the government (Cross-government), civil society, academic and corporate.

2. Cross-sectoral training on crisis leadership is through simulations and common exercises.
3. Integrated communication channels with the aim of establishing a fluent flow of information amongst the agencies.
4. Legal issues of the partnership of the law between the state and the private, with more accountability and transparency in response to crisis.
5. District level disaster planning community representation in institutions.

Such measures can transform crisis response systems into intertwining cooperation and strengthening alongside flexibility within a decentralized and hierarchical way. Lastly, such aspect of crisis leadership in India is required to unite institutional resilience resulting to the crisis by bureaucratic, political, and community players in such a manner that co-creation of institutional resilience to the crisis is achieved, rather than created ex post.

V. Conclusion

The complex dynamics of crisis management and institutional resilience in managing disasters of governing India have been critically addressed in the paper concerning the leadership aspect. By the analysis, it becomes known that crises, whether natural, technical, or even governance-related are the things that reveal the loopholes in the leadership models, the governance structures, system of resources mobilization, communications systems, and the learning systems in the institution. Regardless of the strong presence of legislative system and an institutional structure in responding to the disaster, it is undeniable that disaster management in India depends a lot on the quality leadership that heads these institutions.

In its turn, leadership ambiguity was also pointed out among reasons that impeded crisis coordination. The existence of simultaneous functions on the side of the NDMA, SDMA, line ministries, and political departments, bewilder decision-making and slows it down. All these systems are related to decentralized power and conflicting institutional logics as observed by Deepa et al. (2025) degrading sense making of crisis and delaying adaptive response. The answer to this kind of issue must deal with reprimanding the chain of command, positioning in roles, as well as a collection of less ambiguous intergovernmental coordinating guidelines.

The paper has also revealed that intellectual stimulation and adaptive leadership is needed in managing fast changing crises. Lack of creativity in problem solving and rapid paced invention is still a deep-rooted aspect of the administrative culture in India because high level of

hierarchy and procedural method of solving problems is highly practiced in the country. Joseph et al. (2023) state that one of the features that should be taken into account in the administrative capacity-building programmes is inter-disciplinary training, data-driven decision-making, and cross-sectoral collaboration. Without the adaptive leadership, the institutions will only be reactive and not anticipatory.

Psychological capital and emotional intelligence was also found to be another important characteristic of resilience in leadership. There is a need to have good crisis managers who are not only technically gifted and strategically gifted, but are also emotionally strong, sensitive, and communicative individuals. Dewani et al (2025) argued that with the help of psychological capital, leaders will remain stable within the environment in order to influence teams and survive through uncertainty. Emotional intelligence, stress management and group problem-solving as the training modules would therefore be very beneficial in leadership within Indian institutions.

The paper has also observed another constraint to mobilisation of resources through bureaucratic inflexibility, inequalities of the capacities of the different states as well as inadequate integration of civil society and capabilities of the entities of the private sector. The fact that institutional resilience is encouraged by an efficient flow of resources inside the sector and across regions cannot be denied (Sanjay et al., 2025). There are electronic resource-trace mechanisms, decentralised chain supply, and institutionalised relationships amongst the populace and the privates, which can make India more prepared to go.

Crisis communication has been a highly relevant, and, nevertheless, underestimated resilience determinant. The insufficiency, discontinuity, or failure to be understood by communication of any given governmental entity does not only create confusion amongst the people but also diminishes the level of trust thereby leading to non-compliance and social panic. Shingwekar and Maurya Empathy, Engagement, and Explanation model (2025) will come in handy to fix the current options of crisis communication in India.

Lastly the part of the discussion on multi-stakeholder leadership emphasizes the role of a combination of bureaucratic power and political legitimacy, agility in the market and the role played by the civil society. The one actor cannot manage socio-economically geographically complex societies such as India in cases of crisis. A good emergency response depends on the ability of the leaders to create strategies collectively, mobilize resources, and attempt to

organize the responses. The distributive leadership model that must apply in this case then is institutional resilience that should not be grounded on hierarchical control but rather on collaboration.

In general, the crisis management situation in India is evolving, yet it has a long way to reach. The reinforcement of leadership at all levels namely political, bureaucratic, institutional level, and the community amongst others is necessary in order to establish a robust nation that is capable of responding to present and coming challenges. Multi-dimensional leadership approach that will include the elements of flexibility, emotional aptitude, technological expertise, and alliance with stakeholders will help India change the existing scenario of reactionary approach in combating crisis management to proactive management of risks. It is only through such an institution of leadership transformation that India can gain maximum of its institutional power and guard its citizens against the emerging complexity of the twenty-first century.



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