


Monitoring the media coverage  
of the March 1998 parliamentary  
elections in Ukraine  
**Final Report**  
July 1998

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European Institute for the Media



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Monitoring the media coverage of the  
March 1998 parliamentary elections in  
Ukraine

# Final Report

July 1998

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The European Institute for the Media

Kaistrasse 13, 40221, Düsseldorf, Germany

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# 1 Introduction

## **Professor Dr. Bernd-Peter Lange**

With the support of the European Commission, the European Institute for the Media (EIM), based in Düsseldorf, Germany, has conducted a monitoring mission of the media coverage of the parliamentary elections in the Ukraine. Quantitative monitoring of the media began on 9 February 1998 and concluded on election day, 29 March 1998. For the month of February, the US International Research and Exchange Board (IREX ProMedia) also participated in sponsoring this research.

Almost three weeks prior to election day, the EIM sent a team of international experts to conduct the qualitative research and to work together with Ukrainian specialists in analysing the data.

The project director of the monitoring mission was Professor Dr. Bernd-Peter Lange (Germany), director-general of the EIM. The mission took place under the auspices of the EIM's East-West Cooperation Programme (now Media and Democracy Programme), of which Ms. Ina Navazelskis (USA) was the director at this point, and who was project manager of this mission. Also coordinating administrative developments for the Ukrainian mission was Ms. Ljudmila von Berg, for the EIM in Düsseldorf. The quantitative research was coordinated and analysed by EIM staff in its affiliate office in Kyiv, Alevtina Boretskaya and Vladimir Natalchenko, under the guidance of its director, Ms. Irina Polyakova (Ukraine). The international experts who monitored the media coverage in Ukraine were: Dr. Margot Light (United Kingdom), associate professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, Mr. Stefaan Verhuist (Belgium), director of the Programme on Comparative Media Law and Policy at the University of Oxford, Mr. Andrew Palmer (United Kingdom), editor at the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Ms. Gillian McCormack (United Kingdom), expert in media in the Russian Federation at Glasgow Caledonian University.

There were three main strands to the monitoring process:

- (a) From 9 February to 29 March, quantitative analysis was conducted of selected key broadcast and print media outlets in the cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odesa and Simferopol. Programmes and publications were analysed according to the amount and the tone of coverage they afforded of the elections and the campaigning political parties.
- (b) Together with IREX ProMedia, a series of roundtables with selected journalists was held in the aforementioned cities in February and March with members of EIM's Dusseldorf and Kyiv staff, where preliminary results of the quantitative monitoring were presented and discussed.
- (c) A series of interviews with representatives and employees of media organisations, regulatory bodies, electoral authorities and representatives of political parties was conducted by the team of international experts, constituting the qualitative portion of the research.

This was not EIM's first mission in Ukraine. The EIM monitored the parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine in 1994 on behalf of the European Union. As well as other activities, the EIM also organised an international seminar outside Kyiv on the theme of *Media and Elections - Lessons for Political Journalism in May 1994*. The *Ukrainian Media Bulletin*, published by EIM's Office in Kyiv in Ukrainian and English, is now in its fourth year of existence.

The European Institute for the Media is a non-governmental policy-orientated independent research body operating in the field of European media development. It has significant previous experience in the field of media monitoring. Since 1992 the EIM has, on behalf of the EU, monitored the media coverage of elections in:

Country -	Election	Year
Armenia	Parliamentary elections	1995
	Presidential elections	1996
	Presidential elections	1998
Azerbaijan	Parliamentary elections	1995
Belarus	Presidential elections	1994
	Parliamentary elections	1995
	Referendum	1996
Croatia	Presidential elections	1997
Georgia	Parliamentary and presidential elections	1995
Moldova	Parliamentary elections	1994
	Presidential elections	1996
	Parliamentary elections	1998
Russia	Parliamentary elections	1993
	Parliamentary elections	1995
	Presidential elections	1996
Ukraine	Parliamentary and presidential elections	1994
Estonia	Parliamentary elections	1994
Hungary	Parliamentary elections	1994
Romania	Parliamentary and presidential elections	1992
	Presidential elections	1996
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Parliamentary, presidential and cantonal elections	1996
	Municipal elections	1997
Macedonia	Parliamentary and presidential elections	1994
Serbia	Parliamentary elections	1992
	Parliamentary and presidential elections	1997
Albania	Municipal elections	1996

Thanks for the successful accomplishment of the mission must go to the following: the staff of the Tacis Democracy Programme in Brussels; Dr. Margot Light, Ms Gillian McCormack, Mr Andrew Palmer, Mr Stefaan Verhulst; the staff of the monitoring team in Kiev, in particular Ms Irina Polyakova. Finally, the monitoring teams would like to thank all the people interviewed during the course of the mission for their co-operation.

The current mission in the Ukraine was funded by the EU's Tacis Democracy Program. This report has been prepared by the European Institute for the Media. The findings, conclusions and interpretations expressed in this document are those of the monitors and the European Institute for the Media alone and should in no way be taken to reflect the policies or opinions of the European Commission.

Düsseldorf, July 1998

## 2 Ukraine and the 1998 elections

*Margot Light*

The March 1998 national parliamentary elections were the second since Ukraine became a sovereign independent state in 1991. In 1994 elections were held for the unicameral parliament under a majoritarian electoral system and a much amended constitution which dated from Soviet times. The electoral law under which the 1994 elections were held required a 50 per cent voter turnout in a constituency for the election to be valid. To be elected as a parliamentary deputy a candidate required 50 per cent of the votes cast. As a result of these stringent conditions, only 338 of 450 seats had been filled after two rounds of voting. In the next two years frequent attempts were made to fill the rest of the seats. On numerous occasions the elections were declared invalid because of a low turnout.

Of the 338 deputies who were successfully elected, 163 were unaffiliated to any party, 86 represented the Communist Party, 20 belonged to Rukh, 18 to the Peasant Party, 14 to the Socialist Party, while 11 other parties were represented by eight or less deputies. Parliament was thus very fractured, but the largest group of deputies owed allegiance to left-wing parties.

Following the parliamentary elections, presidential elections took place in June and the incumbent president, Leonid Kravchuk, was replaced by Leonid Kuchma. He had served briefly as Prime Minister to Leonid Kravchuk and he campaigned on a programme of economic reform and greater cooperation with Russia. After the election, he modified his pro-Russian stance and his commitment to economic reform often seemed ambivalent. He found it very difficult to persuade parliament to pass legislation which would entrench economic reform. Moreover, although he brought supporters from his home base in Dnipropetrovsk to fill important government positions (invoking the charge that Ukraine was governed by the Dnipropetrovsk clan), there were frequent changes of government. Ukraine has had four prime ministers between 1994 and 1998.<sup>1</sup> The deterioration of Ukraine's economy continued and corruption became pervasive.

### 2.1 Foreign policy

Despite the modifications in President Kuchma's campaign platform, relations with Russia have gradually improved since 1994. In 1995 agreements were reached on the most

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<sup>1</sup> Distinct informal and often nepotistic groups of business associates are usually in the Ukraine called clans. Between 1994 to 1996, Volodymyr Horbulin, who had known Kuchma since the two worked together in Dnipropetrovsk, became secretary of the Security and Defence Council, former Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Prosecutor Hryhory Vorsinov became Prosecutor General, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Governor Pavlo Lazarenko was appointed deputy prime minister in charge of the fuel and energy complex in 1995, and promoted to prime minister in May 1996. Lazarenko consolidated the Dnipropetrovsk group's influence in Kyiv and by late 1996, all the ministers responsible for industry in his cabinet either had roots in Dnipropetrovsk or came from the allied elite in neighbouring Zaporizhia. According to some reports, as many as 200 representatives of the Dnipropetrovsk clan occupied positions at the top of the executive bodies. In mid-1997 Lazarenko was accused of corruption and dismissed. His successor and long-time rival, Valery Pustovoitenko, also comes from Dnipropetrovsk, where he was mayor until his appointment to the government in 1993.

important issue that divided the two countries: the future of the Black Sea fleet. The division of ships and infrastructure between the two countries began to be implemented. On 29 May 1997 Russia and Ukraine signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership. Nevertheless, both parliaments delayed ratifying the agreement (the Ukrainian Rada eventually ratified the friendship treaty in January 1998) and relations were frequently strained. Ukraine is dependent on Russia for energy, and permanently in heavy debt to Russian energy companies. By March 1998, for example, Ukraine owed \$1.2 billion to Russia's Gazprom.

The Russian government has not, however, managed to persuade Ukraine to become a more active and enthusiastic member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Ukrainian government maintains that Ukraine is only an associate member and has refused to participate in a large number of CIS projects relating to economic integration, as well as measures directed towards greater cooperation in the fields of security and military affairs. Unlike most other CIS countries (but like Azerbaijan), Ukraine has not agreed to combined Russian-Ukrainian control over Ukraine's external borders, and nor has it agreed to a military treaty (apart from the agreement relating to the Black Sea fleet) which would give Russia basing rights in the Ukraine.

In the run up to the parliamentary elections, the Russian government began actively to back President Kuchma and, therefore, the parties loyal to him. At the end of February President Kuchma paid his first official visit to Moscow. Ukraine and the Russian Federation signed a Treaty on Economic Cooperation for the period till 2007. It aims to double trade turnover between the two countries, which totalled \$14 billion in 1997. The two leaders also agreed to cooperate in the construction of military transport planes, to ensure quick ratification of agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, and to further develop equal partnership and cooperation among CIS members. A Russian-Ukrainian commission on military-technical cooperation is to be formed, and the two countries will seek to promote Russian and Ukrainian weapons on world markets. Kuchma also assured President Yeltsin that Ukraine will not join NATO.

When the decision was made to expand NATO eastwards, Western leaders suddenly understood that Ukraine would be left in an exposed position, potentially subject to pressure from Moscow. As a result, Ukraine has received more attention from Western states in the last few years. It is currently the third largest recipient of American foreign aid and the United States is the largest foreign investor in Ukraine (\$315 million in the first six months of 1997). However, both US aid and further direct private investment are under threat as a result of complaints by U.S. firms about business conditions in Ukraine.

The US administration also threatened to withdraw aid and prevent private investment unless Ukraine cancelled a deal to produce turbines for an Iranian nuclear reactor. A sub-contract of a Russian deal with Iran, the deal ensured employment and pay for thousands of workers at the Turbatom plant in Kharkiv. To compensate for the job losses, the US offered Ukraine an agreement on nuclear cooperation (including aid to construct two reactors at Khmelnytskyi and Rivno). On 6 March the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Hennady Udovenko, announced that Ukraine would cancel the deal and the two leaders signed a 30-year nuclear cooperation agreement. Whatever the long-term advantages of nuclear cooperation with the USA might be to Ukraine, in the short-term the prospect of unemployment caused by the cancellation rebounded adversely on the election prospects in Kharkiv of the Popular Democratic Party (NDP), commonly known as the 'party of power'.

## 2.2 Domestic politics

After a five-year drafting process, and a two-year battle between the president and parliament over the relative advantages of a presidential and a parliamentary system, a new constitution was adopted in Ukraine in June 1996. The product of compromise, the constitution established a semi-presidential system. A unicameral parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, was to be elected by universal adult suffrage every four years on the last Sunday of March. It was accorded the right to make laws, adopt the budget, and approve the appointment of the prime

minister nominated by the president. The Cabinet of Ministers was made accountable to the Rada and would have to resign if a majority of deputies to the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution of no-confidence. The proposal for a vote of no-confidence would have been made by a third of the delegates. The constitution guarantees parliamentary deputies immunity from criminal prosecution. There are no limits to the number of terms a person can serve as a deputy.

The president, who is elected by universal adult suffrage for a five year period (the next presidential election is on the last Sunday of October 1999), cannot serve for more than two terms.<sup>2</sup> He appoints, and may dismiss, the prime minister, signs laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, and has the right to veto them and return them to the Rada for further consideration. He can also revoke acts of the Cabinet of Ministers. The president is guaranteed the power to issue decrees for three years, and can hire and fire local administrators. The Verkhovna Rada can remove the president if a majority of deputies propose his removal, if two-thirds of the deputies vote in favour of the proposal, and if three quarters of the delegates vote in favour of impeachment after the Constitutional Court has reviewed the investigation conducted by a commission set up for this purpose.

The constitution gave Kyiv and Sevastopol the status of 'cities of republican importance'. Crimea retained its autonomous status but the constitution did not provide for reserved seats for representatives of the Crimean Tatars. During the election campaign this caused protests. Since the late 1980s approximately 250,000 Tatars have returned to Crimea from Central Asia where they were exiled under Stalin. An estimated one-third do not have Ukrainian citizenship and could not, therefore, participate in the elections. On 10 March 3,000 of them demonstrated in Simferopol for the right of non-citizens to vote. In particular, they requested the Ukrainian parliament to pass a law allowing Crimean Tatars without Ukrainian citizenship to participate in the elections for the Crimean parliament. There was some anxiety that the protests might become violent and might disrupt the elections in Crimea. Although their request was not granted, however, they did not attempt to prevent the elections.

The 1996 constitution transferred effective executive power from the president to the cabinet of ministers. It gave the cabinet the responsibility of formulating the country's programme of development (economic, scientific, technical, social and cultural) and implementing it. When Prime Minister Lazarenko began to conduct a policy independent of President Kuchma, the two fell out. This led not only to Lazarenko's dismissal but also to the feud between two rival Dnipropetrovsk clans which dominated the election campaign.

The Ukrainian parliament had begun to object to Prime Minister Lazarenko well before he quarrelled with President Kuchma. Parliamentary delegates accused him of distributing the wholesale natural gas market in favour of the Dnipropetrovsk-based United Energy Systems. By 1997, it controlled almost half of Ukraine's wholesale gas market, buying gas mostly from Russia's Gazprom for barter. It is now the largest private business in Ukraine. In February and March 1997 Lazarenko's cabinet was reshuffled, several of his Dnipropetrovsk associates were dismissed and criminal investigations were initiated against some of them on corruption charges. President Kuchma's image began to suffer, because he was closely associated with Lazarenko. The campaign culminated in June 1997 with Lazarenko's forced resignation as Prime Minister and replacement by Valeriy Pustovoitenko. The confrontation between the legislative and executive branches of government persisted, however, right up to the elections. The feud between the two Dnipropetrovsk clans also continued and merged into the election campaign when Lazarenko's team joined Hromada which set itself up, in particular, against the NDP.

There was a brief period of optimism about Ukraine's economic recovery in 1994, following President Leonid Kuchma's election, since his economic programme appeared to follow the prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank. The introduction of the hryvna in 1996 marked

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<sup>2</sup> Many politicians saw the March 1998 parliamentary ballot as a trial run for the presidential elections in 1999.

the beginning of some stabilization and inflation was reduced from 40 per cent in 1996 to under 12 per cent in 1997. However, the economy soon fell back into decline. Despite significant amounts of aid from Western financial institutions and governments, GDP fell by four percent in 1997 compared to the same period in 1996. This was an improvement on the 10 percent decline in 1996, but still left Ukraine near the bottom of post-Communist countries in terms of economic growth. Since 1990, Ukraine's gross domestic product has declined by approximately 60 percent. Few structural changes in the economy have taken place. Privatization has proceeded very slowly (and without any transparency). In part, this is due to resistance by the fractured parliament to a consistent policy of reform. But it is also caused by the advantages certain groups derive from delaying and postponing economic reform.

Parallel with the decline in GDP, a clan-based redistribution of property has been taking place in Ukraine which has enriched a few people, but which has failed to create a propertied middle class or to engender popular support for reform. Moreover, endemic institutional corruption has provoked the flight of companies which had begun to invest in the country. Dozens of anti-corruption campaigns have been launched but they have not resulted in the conviction of any high-placed bribe-takers. Even the investigation into Pavlo Lazarenko's alleged wrongdoings seems to have more to do with the election campaign (and the 1999 presidential race) than with a genuine desire to rid Ukraine of corruption.

Tax collection is poor in Ukraine and the government is constantly in arrears in paying wages and pensions. In January 1998 wage arrears in budget-financed enterprises amounted to more than Hr 6.6 billion. The average monthly salary is only Hr 156 (\$76) and farmers earn as little as Hr 81.6 per month (\$40). Although the official unemployment rate is only 2.3% of the able population, 'latent' unemployment (employees laid off or forced to take unpaid leave) is thought to affect one in three employees. There is thus a great deal of poverty, but social conditions are not as bleak as the statistics suggest. The contradiction between real life and the statistics makes many observers assume that most of the Ukrainian economy has gone underground into the "shadow" economy. Nevertheless, the economy appears to be in permanent crisis. As a result, there is very little popular support for economic reform, much cynicism about the national elections, and a great deal of nostalgia for the past.

Agreeing an electoral law proved no easier than adopting a constitution and it took until 23 October 1997 for the Ukrainian electoral law to be signed into law. The law stipulated that half the deputies to the Verkhovna Rada would be elected on the basis of proportional representation according to lists of candidates nominated by political parties and electoral blocs. The maximum number of candidates that could be nominated by a party or electoral bloc was 225. The proportional representation ballot papers would carry the names of the parties or electoral blocs participating in the elections and the top five names on the party list. Nominations for the party lists had to be completed 120 days before the date of the elections and had to be accompanied by a list of 200,000 voters' signatures, of which no less than 10,000 signatures had to be from voters in each of any 14 of Ukraine's 27 administrative territorial units.

The other half of the delegates would be elected on the basis of single-mandate majoritarian ballots. The nomination of candidates for single-mandate electoral constituencies had to be completed 60 days before the date of the elections and they had to be accompanied either by a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the local branch of the party or electoral bloc nominating the candidate, or by a list of at least 900 signatures from voters in the constituency supporting the nomination. The single-mandate ballot papers would list the names of the candidates and their party affiliations (if they had a party affiliation).

Candidates would be permitted to stand for both single-mandate and on a proportional representation party list, but if they were elected to both, they would be obliged to take up the single-mandate seat.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The Constitutional Court declared this provision unconstitutional in March 1998, but decided that it should be allowed to stand for the 28 March elections.

The ballot papers for the proportional representation and single-mandate elections would be printed in different colours. As in previous elections, voters would have an option to indicate that they did not vote for any of the candidates or parties listed on their ballot papers. Unlike all past Ukrainian elections, however, affirmative voting was required (i.e. voters would have to put a cross or tick next to the party or candidate they favoured), rather than the previous system in which voters had to cross out the names of the parties or candidates they were voting against.

The electoral law provided for funds from the state budget to finance the printing of electoral posters and the publication in state papers, and the broadcasting on state radio and television stations of party programmes and the programmes of candidates in the single-mandate constituencies. Personal election funds could also be created from donations by individuals and legal entities, but parties and candidates could not accept contributions from state bodies at any level, or from foreigners. Although there was no limit to the size of these personal election funds, political parties and individual candidates had to open bank accounts and information about the accounts was to be published in the press. All sources of funding had to be reported no later than two days before the elections.<sup>4</sup>

The 225 proportional representational seats in the Verkhovna Rada would be divided between parties or electoral blocs which received 4 or more than 4 per cent of votes cast and candidates would be deemed elected according to their sequence in the list. In the single-mandate constituencies, the candidate who received the most votes would be deemed elected.

In January 1998 a local election law was adopted, providing for elections for mayors and members to oblast, raion, city, village and neighbourhood Radas on the same day as the national elections. A separate law was also adopted for elections in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. As a result of the simultaneous elections, some voters would have as many six ballot papers to complete. During the election campaign it became evident that many voters thought that local elections, which were deemed to effect them directly, were far more important than the national elections.

Until 1998 political parties played only a small role in Ukrainian politics. Politics centred on personalities and personal connections and a dominant role was played by regional 'clans' (in other words, local directors and private businessmen who, in the new situation created by independence in 1991, found that they had more in common with one another than with bureaucrats and politicians in Kyiv). Regional elites learnt to fend for themselves and their interests often conflicted with those of elites in neighbouring regions and with the national interest. They began to compete for control over the economy and for top political jobs. The most powerful clans were those in Donetsk and in Dnipropetrovsk. Until the 1994 presidential election, the Donetsk clan was in the ascendancy. President Kuchma, however, came from Dnipropetrovsk and, as we have seen, he promoted members of his own clan into top government positions. The dismissal of Prime Minister Lazarenko split the Dnipropetrovsk clan.

In the run-up to the 29 March elections, new parties began to be founded, often based on regional clans. The NDP, for example, was created by politicians close to President Kuchma, and it soon began to be called the 'party of power'. Once Lazarenko and his supporters joined Hromada, it began, above all, to represent the interests of the rival Dnipropetrovsk clan. The Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc, by contrast, was strongest in Donetsk, the home of its founders. Since all three are centrist in ideological outlook, as are fourteen of the other parties which contended the election, they might well have been able to obtain a convincing majority if they had cooperated to form a single electoral bloc to contest the elections. However, personal and regional rivalries proved too strong, and they all registered separately. Those

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<sup>4</sup> The revenues reported by political parties and electoral blocs and published by *Holos Ukrainy* on 26 March are listed in Appendix 1.

who support left wing policies in Ukraine demonstrate a similar reluctance to combine forces to create coalitions for electoral purposes. As a result, the ten different parties and electoral blocs with left-wing sympathies registered separately to contest the elections.

The fear of not reaching the 4% threshold did persuade some parties to cooperate, however, and observers generally agreed that the clan system had been replaced by a party system, even if the major parties tended to be based on territorial financial and industrial groups. Of the 50 registered parties and electoral blocs in Ukraine, 30 succeeded in fulfilling the criteria for contesting the elections. Of these 30, 9 were electoral blocs, or coalitions, and 21 were parties (a list is provided in Appendix 2).

When the campaign for the March 28 national elections began, therefore, the Ukrainian economy was in a poor shape, and there was general disillusion with national politics among the electorate. Voters were faced with a choice between a large number of poorly differentiated parties, many of them supporting similar programmes and policies. Most of the parties and electoral blocs had been formed recently and did not have local organisations. The only party with a strong national organisation was the Communist Party of Ukraine.

The parties which successfully passed the 4% threshold in the proportional representation national elections on 28 March are listed in Appendix 3.

## 3 Media regulation in Ukraine

*Stefaan G. Verhulst*

*Mass media in Ukraine are mainly governed by the Constitution, the Law on Information, the Law "On Printed Mass Media (the Press) in Ukraine" and the Ukrainian statute "On Television and Radio Broadcasting". A brief discussion of each follows, together with a description of the main regulatory bodies and a analysis of court practices. Special attention is also given to the specifications concerning the media (coverage) in the new Electoral Law.*

### 3.1 General framework

- *The Constitution of Ukraine* was adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) on 28<sup>th</sup> June 1998. Article 15 states that censorship is prohibited. Moreover it also guarantees freedom of political activity, not prohibited by the Constitution and the laws of the Ukraine. Article 34 states that:
- Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and speech, and to the free expression of his or her views and beliefs.
- Everyone has the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information by oral, written or other means of his or her choice.
- The exercise of these rights may be restricted by law in the interests of national security, territorial indivisibility or public order, with the purpose of preventing disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, the reputation or rights of other persons, preventing the publication of information received confidentially, or supporting the authority and impartiality of justice.

*The Law on Information* was adopted on October 2, 1992. It provides a comprehensive statutory framework for the legal structure governing the mass media in Ukraine.<sup>5</sup> It also sets forth general principles of gathering, disseminating, using and storing of information, ensures the security of information and stipulates the rights of citizens for access to information. In a sense, the Information Statute is to other acts on mass media regulation as a constitution is to the general sphere of law-making. As such, it provides legal grounds for information activities and for follow-up laws such as the Statute "On Printed Means of Mass Information (the Press) in Ukraine" adopted on November 16, 1992 and the Law "On Television and Radio Broadcasting", adopted on December 21, 1993, described below.

The Statute consists of six chapters and 54 Articles which establish the general principles of information (Articles 1-11), the legal basis of informational activity (12- 16), types and sources of information (17-41), rights and duties of participants in informational relations (42-44), protection of information and responsibility for the violation of the legal acts on information (45-49), and international informational activities (50-54).

"Information" is defined in Article 1 as "documented or publicly-announced news on events and occurrences that take place in society, the state and the environment". It also deals with broadcasting as a mass information medium providing "publicly disseminated [...] audio-visual information" (Article 20). The focus of the Law is on "informational relations that appear in all spheres of life and activity in society and the state while obtaining, using,

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<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of the Act see Andrei Richter, *Ukrainian Broadcasting: a Primer*. In *Post-Soviet Media Law and Policy Newsletter*, March 1993

disseminating and preserving information" (Article 3). The main principles of informational relations are (Article 5):

- the guaranteed right of access of information;
- openness, availability of information and freedom of its exchange;
- objectivity, reliability of information;
- completeness and accuracy of information;
- the legality of obtaining, using, disseminating and preserving information;

The main goals and means of the state's information policy are determined in Article 6. These are:

- provision to citizens of access to information;
- creation of national systems and networks of information;
- reinforcement of material, technical, financial, organisational, legal and scholarly bases for informational activity;
- provision of an effective usage of information;
- creation of a general system of protection of information;
- promotion of international co-operation in the field of information, and guarantee of the informational sovereignty of Ukraine.

Article 9 is crucial -- it defines the essence of the right of information. It says:

"All citizens of Ukraine, juridical persons and state institutions have the right of information, which stipulates the opportunity for freely obtaining, using, disseminating and preserving the information necessary for the realisation of their rights, freedoms and legal interests, and for the fulfilment of their assignment and functions".

The Statute "On Information" also places a number of restrictions on information flow by saying that "information shall not be used to call for an overthrow of the constitutional order, a violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, or as propaganda for war, violence, cruelty, fanning of racial, national, religious enmity, or as instrument to violate human rights and liberties" (Article 46). The same Article safeguards state "and other secrets stipulated by law", as well as "information regarding medical secrets, bank deposits, profits from enterprising activity, child adoption, correspondence, phone calls and cable messages, except when law stipulates otherwise".

Important for transborder communication rights is Article 50, which states: "Citizens of Ukraine have the right to free and unrestricted access to information from foreign sources, including direct television broadcasting, radio broadcasting and the press".

The Law "On Printed Mass Media (the Press) in Ukraine" was adopted on the 16<sup>th</sup> of November 1992, but several Articles<sup>6</sup> of the Law were amended on November 11, 1993. The Law creates the legal framework for the activities of the press, guarantees its freedoms and regulates the relationship between the editorial staff, citizens and other organisations and bodies.

In general (Chapter I), Article 2 determines that the press shall be free. The establishment and financing of state bodies, institutions, organisations or positions for censorship of the mass media shall be prohibited. However printed mass media in Ukraine can not be used for the (Article 3):

Dissemination of data which are prohibited by Article 43 of the Law on Information

- Calling for seizure of power, change of constitutional order or territorial integrity of Ukraine
- Propaganda of war, violence, and cruelty
- Fomenting racial, national and religious hostility
- Dissemination of pornography and other criminally punished acts.

Moreover usage of the press shall be prohibited if it is aimed at:

- Interfering in the private lives of citizens and/or the encroachment of their honour or dignity
- Disclosing any information which can cause the identification of a minor offender without his/her consent and consent of his/her representatives.

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<sup>6</sup> The Articles 14, 16, 18, 27, 32 of the Law On Printed Mass Media. The modifications concerned the distribution of non-registered print media, the certificate of registration, closure of a print media outlet and accreditation of journalists.

Chapter II deals mainly with the obligation of a state registration before publication and the right of establishment of the press. Significantly, Article 10 does not permit the monopolisation of a nation-wide and regional public-political printed mass media. Moreover an individual or legal entity can not be founder or control more than 5 percent of such editions.

The rights and obligations of the journalist are contained in Article 26. Journalists have the right:

- To freely receive, use, discriminate (publish) and preserve information;
- To attend state bodies of power, bodies of local and regional self-government and enterprise, establishments and organisations and be received by their officials.
- To openly access records including employment of any technical means except cases provided by Law.
- To freely access statistical data, archives, libraries and museum funds; restrictions of this access shall be stipulated only by specifics of values and special conditions on their protection that shall be determined by actual legislation of Ukraine;
- Of preference on receiving open, according to regime, access of information.
- Of free satisfaction of inquiry or access to official documents.
- To be present by presenting editors certificate or other document that witness his/her belonging to a printed mass media on the area of natural disaster, catastrophies in places of accidents, mass disorders in meetings and demonstrations, in territories where state of emergency is announced.
- To appeal to specialists verification, of receipt of information materials.
- To discriminate messages and materials prepared by them under their own signature, under symbolic name (pseudonym) or without signature (anonymously);
- To refuse the publication of materials under the journalist's signature if its content contradicts personal conviction of the author after editing.
- To preserve anonymity of authorship and sources of information except cases when this information shall be disclosed upon the courts' request.

A journalist shall be obliged:

- To observe programmes of activity of printed mass media with editors of which he/she is employed or other contracted relations and act in accordance with provisions of the statute of editors.
- To submit objective and reliable information for publication;
- To satisfy requests of persons who give information concerning their authorship or preserving anonymity of authorship.
- To refuse an assignment from the editor (chief editor) or editors if it can not be accomplished without violation of the Law.
- To introduce oneself and present an editor's certificate or other document that verifies his/her belonging to the printed mass media.
- To exercise the duties of a participant of information relations.
- To refrain from disseminating information/materials for commercial purposes which contains advertising data about requisites of manufacture of product or service (his/her address, contact number, bank account) commercial features of a commodity or services etc.

The international activity of printed mass media (Chapter IV) is governed by the international treaties concluded by Ukraine and the representation office of foreign printed mass media in Ukraine shall be established upon the agreement of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The accreditation of foreign correspondents shall be exercised by the Ministry of International Relations.

Finally (Chapter V), the Law lists the grounds for responsibility linked with publication and some exemptions, such as in the case of official transcripts, data received from information agencies or published in other printed media.

Broadcasting (radio and television) is regulated by the Ukrainian *statute "On Television and Radio Broadcasting"* which became effective on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February 1994.<sup>7</sup> Several Articles of the Law were amended on 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1995.<sup>8</sup> Ukraine has also signed the Transfrontier Television Convention as a member of the Council of Europe. The Ukrainian Statute "regulates the activity of television and radio organisations on the territory of Ukraine and defines the legal, economic, social, and organisational conditions of their activity, implementing freedom of expression, the rights of citizens to receive complete, reliable, and useful information, and the open and free discussion of public questions (preamble)".

The Ukrainian *statute "On Television and Radio Broadcasting"*: Chapter I deals with general principles and definition. Article 2 lists the main principles of broadcasting in Ukraine: objectivity, reliability of information, competency, guarantee for citizens of a right of access to information, free expression of their views and opinions, securing of ideological and political pluralism and observance of professional ethics and universal moral norms. Article 2 prohibits also the dissemination of "state secrets". The Law On State Secrets, described below, specifies further some of the restrictions.

Article 5 concerns the creation of the National Television and Broadcasting Council, which has regulatory oversight. The details will be discussed under the heading of the regulators.

Licensing and organisation is regulated by Chapters II and III. The Broadcasting Law envisions a pluralistic system in Ukraine, providing for operation of both state-owned and independent broadcasters. It governs over-the-air television and radio, as well as cable services. A number of provisions also relate to services providing signal delivery on behalf of broadcasters. Among permitted sources of revenue for broadcasters are budgetary appropriations, license fees, and within limitations, advertising (Articles 44, 30). However, state television may not earn more than 25 percent of its annual budget from advertising activity. The law also prohibits interruption of official broadcasts, programmes for children under 14 years of age, as well as of entertainment and sports programs of less than 30 minutes duration. Advertisement of alcohol, tobacco and narcotic drugs is not allowed (Articles 30 and 31).

Limitations exist as to who may own a broadcasting facility. Those who are prohibited from holding a license are foreign citizens, political parties, trade unions, and religious organisations, as well as their enterprises and entities (Articles 13 and 14). Further limitations are placed on foreign investment in broadcasting in Ukraine. First of all, foreigners may invest in the broadcasting business only if permitted to do so (and only up to a maximum of 30% of the company's stock capitalisation) by the National Council, which also exercises continuing oversight over such investment (Article 13). The Law prohibits also foreign programming exceeding 50 percent of the total broadcasting time of each station (Article 8).

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<sup>7</sup> According to Andrei Richter and Peter Krug, if the provisions of the Broadcasting Law would be observed and enforced Ukraine would have one of the politically most free electronic media in the former Soviet Union, although the Broadcasting Law poses what could be troublesome content restrictions and potential liabilities on broadcasters. Here, much will depend on the role of the courts, who are given considerable responsibility for resolving disputes under the Broadcasting Law. A well-functioning market economy, non-existent in Ukraine, is another prerequisite for the development of political democracy. Its creation is also crucial for the economic freedom of the independent broadcasters and journalists. Thus, only by a compromise between the legal and practical rules, between the state, public, and private interests, between national and foreign (first of all, Russian) interests in the sphere of broadcasting can Ukraine guarantee the future progress of its electronic mass media. For a discussion of the Statute see: A. Richter and P. Krug, *The New Ukrainian Statute: A Commentary*. In: *Post Soviet Media Law and Policy*, April 1994, Issue 7.

<sup>8</sup> The Articles 1, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 24, 26, 30, 32 and 45 of the Law. The modifications clarified the terminology, defined the status of the state bodies concerned with TV and radio and the National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting, introduced anti-monopoly restrictions, set the structure of the National TV and Radio Company, and introduced rules for cable TV, sponsorship, advertising and technological base of broadcasting organizations.

Beside the general principles of Chapter I, the Law enumerates also a wide range of rights and duties (Chapter IV) for broadcasters, their employees, and for the public (both recipients of information and those who may be injured by defamatory material or invasion of privacy). Article 37 lists the following obligations for "tele-radio organisations":

- a) to disseminate objective information;
- b) in the operation of communication lines, not to create interference in the transmission and reception of programs of other tele-radio organisations;
- c) to comply with state standards and technical parameters of television and radio broadcasting;
- d) to give viewers advance notice if it airs a program for which it has received payment;
- e) to follow the rules of advertising activity and sponsorship stipulated by this Law;
- f) to treat with respect the national dignity, national identity and culture of all peoples;
- g) to keep secret, on the basis of documented confirmation, information about persons who have provided information or other materials on the condition that their identities be kept confidential;
- h) not to disseminate materials that violate the presumption of innocence of a defendant before a court verdict;
- j) not to disseminate information about the private life of citizens without their consent, if this information is not a matter of public concern. In a case where a court determines that dissemination and information about the private life of a citizen does not present information which is a matter of public concern, the moral and material damage shall be compensated in accordance with procedures as established by applicable legislation of Ukraine.

The Law is more expansive on the rights of "artistic employees", a term that presumably includes journalists. The Broadcasting Law makes it clear that journalists, guided by their TV and radio companies' "programme guidelines" and statutes, should check the information that they obtain, and may not violate restrictions set forward by mass media legislation and labour agreements (Article 39).

Journalists are granted (Article 38) a limited right of access to information. They may collect and obtain information if this information is necessary to produce a program; pay visits to the governmental offices, enterprises, and institutions when they have an assignment from their broadcasting company; attend public rallies and demonstrations if they show their credentials (whom they should show the credentials to is not clear from the text, but probably to the police or state security). They have the right to be acknowledged with the final edition of a programme made with their participation before it is aired, but may not make content or other changes. They have the right to withdraw their responsibility for the changes made against their will. They can decline assignments from the superiors, if they contradict the law. The journalists have no rights of co-determination.

Members of the audience and the general public may seek money damages for violation of their rights (Article 47), including a right to privacy (Article 37(j)). They also have rights of reply, refutation, or personal commentary (Articles 40 and 43), including a right to refute information which degrades the honour and dignity of persons even if the information is truthful. The audience has a limited opportunity to influence the policy and practice of broadcasting, exercised mainly through the call-in shows, letters to the TV and radio companies and to the National Council (cfr infra). A person interviewed or used as an information source by a journalist may demand (in writing) a review of the material before its broadcast and order its deletion (Article 42).

Finally, Article 46 of the Law contains a long list of violations.

Important in the context of election coverage were Articles 28 and 29. Article 28 dealt with the use of television and radio in election campaigning and Article 29 with the provision of broadcast time for official pronouncements and declarations. The new Electoral Law amended however these provisions and replaced them with the requirements described below.

## 3.2 Media and elections

Further details concerning election coverage by the media are dealt with in Chapter V (Pre-Election Campaign Publicity) of the new Electoral Law. Article 31 states clearly that "Citizens of Ukraine, political parties, other public associations, work collectives of enterprises, institutions and organisations have the right to discuss freely and comprehensively election programmes of candidates for deputies, their political, business, and personal qualities and pre-election programmes of political parties, electoral blocs of parties whose lists of candidates for deputies are registered, and carry out campaign publicity "for" or "against" candidates for deputy or candidate lists of political parties, electoral blocs of parties at meetings, discussions, in the press, on radio and television.[...] and pre-electoral campaigning may be conducted in any form and through any means which do not violate the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine". Beside detailed rules concerning materials (i.e. posters) of the Pre-Election Campaign Publicity in the Multi-Mandate All-State (Article 32) and in a Single-Mandate Election Constituency (Article 33), the Law determines further the use of the mass media.

Article 34 says:

1. The representatives of mass media are guaranteed free access to all events, connected with elections, except internal political party meetings or meetings of members of election blocs of political parties or support groups of candidates for deputies. Election commissions, executive bodies and bodies of local self-government shall provide them with information about the preparation and conduct of elections.
2. Political parties, electoral blocs of parties, which nominated lists of candidates for deputy, and individual candidates for deputy, shall have the right to use at the expense of funds, allocated from State budget of Ukraine for the conduct of the election campaign, mass media, where state bodies, state organisations and institutions or bodies of local self-government are founders or one of the founders (further - mass media with a state share, with a share of bodies of local self-government), in the order established by this Law.
3. The list of national mass media with a state share shall be published by the Central Election Commission upon the submission of the Ministry of Information of Ukraine, the list of local, regional mass media with a state share, with share of bodies of local self-government - shall be published by constituency election commissions upon the submission of appropriate local state administrations, bodies of local self-government no later than by the time of expiration of the term for registration of lists of candidates for deputies of political parties, electoral blocs of parties, and candidates for deputy in single-mandate election constituencies.
4. The order of provision of political parties, electoral blocs of parties with air time shall be established by the Central Election Commission, and for candidates for deputies - by constituency election commissions, adhering to the principle of equal opportunities for all political parties, electoral blocs of parties and respectively to candidates for deputies who were nominated in single-mandate election constituencies.
5. Air time for the conduct of pre-election campaign publicity shall be provided at the expense of funds, allocated from the State budget of Ukraine for the conduct of election campaign, by television and radio companies on working days between 7:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. Kyiv time.
6. The schedule of air time with an indication of pre-election campaign publicity programs, its concrete date and time on the air shall be compiled by the administrative bodies of television and radio companies upon the results of drawing lots, as conducted respectively by the Central Election Commission and constituency election commissions. This schedule shall be published in all-national and local mass media.
7. Pre-election campaign publicity television and radio programmes of local companies shall not coincide in time with the same programs on national channels.
8. Inclusion of pre-election campaign publicity materials of political parties, electoral blocs of parties, of candidates for deputy in television and radio information programmes, or of political advertisement shall be unacceptable. Political advertisement shall be separated and delineated as it is.

9. Interruption of pre-election campaign publicity programmes of political parties, electoral blocs of parties, of candidates for deputy with an advertisement of goods and services, and with other announcements shall be prohibited.
10. Political parties, electoral blocs of parties whose candidate lists were registered in multi-mandate all-state election constituency shall have the right, at the expense of funds allocated from State budget of Ukraine, for the conduct of the election campaign, to publish their election programme up to four pages long, (up to 7,800 symbols) typed in the format of one and a half spaces in equal foliographic execution, in national printed periodicals with a state share.
11. Candidates for deputy in a single-mandate election constituency shall have the right, at the expense of funds allocated from State budget of Ukraine for the conduct of the election campaign, to publish their election programme up to two pages long, (up to 3,900 symbols) typed in the format of one and a half space in equal foliographic execution, through constituency election commission in local printed periodicals with a state share, with share of bodies of local self-government.
12. The sequence of publication of pre-election programmes of political parties, electoral blocs of parties, and candidates for deputies in single-mandate election constituency shall be established by the respective electoral commissions through drawing lots.
13. In the event the mass-media publicised unreliable materials about a political party, electoral bloc of parties, or individual candidates for deputy, the respective mass media shall, within 7 days but no later than two days prior to the election day, provide the representatives of political party, electoral bloc of parties, or individual candidates for deputy concerned in the unreliable materials distributed, with the same amount of time on television, radio or the same printed space, no less than 2000 symbols, used in order to publish a refutation of unreliable materials.
14. The prevention of exercising the right to conduct pre-election campaign publicity as well as abuse of the right to carry out this campaign publicity shall entail accountability in accordance with the law.

Article 35 lists the restrictions for the conduct of pre-election Campaign Publicity. These are:

1. During the election campaign, candidates for deputy, including those who are employed by radio and television, are prohibited from appearing on radio and television more than the time allotted to other candidates for deputy.
2. The amount of printed publicity for candidates, including those who are employees of state printed mass media, cannot exceed the amount of printed publicity allotted to other candidates for deputy.
3. Campaign publicity in private mass media is limited only by the amount of the personal election fund, under the conditions of equal payment for air time or printed space for all candidates.
4. The election campaign shall be restricted in organisations, formations and units of the Ministry of Defense, National Guard, Ministry of Interior, State Committee of Frontier Protection, Secret Service and Civil Defense. Meetings of candidates, authorised persons of political parties, electoral blocs of parties, and authorised persons of candidates with voters who are service members of the aforementioned departments shall be organised by the constituency election commission with mandatory invitation of all registered candidates as well as authorised persons of political parties, electoral blocs of parties, no later than three days before the meeting. From the beginning of the election campaign, visits to these organisations, formations and military units by separate candidates, their authorised persons or authorised persons of political parties, electoral blocs of parties are prohibited. Only distribution of printed campaign publicity materials manufactured by the Central Election Commission and respective constituency election commissions, and by candidates for deputy is allowed.
5. The distribution of anonymous campaign publicity materials, or publicity materials under a pseudonym is prohibited.
6. In the event anonymous campaign publicity materials, or those under pseudonym, and materials calling for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order, violation of the territorial integrity of the state, national, lingual, racial, religious superiority have been distributed, election commissions, upon receiving such information, must appeal to bodies

of internal affairs to halt illegal campaigning and to take measures, stipulated by legislation of Ukraine.

7. Participation of state institutions, bodies of self-government and their authoritative and public officials, chairmen, deputy chairmen, secretaries and members of election commissions in election campaign publicity is prohibited.
8. Campaign activity on the day of the elections in any form (distribution of election leaflets, posters, appeals to vote "for" or "against" candidates or boycott the elections) is prohibited. Printed campaign publicity materials, posted earlier outside the premises for voting, shall remain at these same places.
9. Bodies of local self-government, respective local state administrations allot places, set up stands and boards in public places for posting the materials of the election campaign publicity, stipulated by this Law, as well as for posting of information on events of election campaign. Placing such materials on buildings, which are monuments of architecture or which violate traffic safety, is prohibited.
10. State television and radio companies, printed mass media with a state share, share of bodies of local self-government, their officials, creative workers of mass media are prohibited from supporting or giving preferences in any form to any political parties, electoral blocs of parties, candidates for deputies and their electoral programmes in their reports, materials and programs during the period of pre-election campaign.
11. The conduct of pre-election campaign publicity, followed by providing of voters with goods, securities, credits, lotteries, money and services free-of-charge or under privileged conditions, is prohibited.
12. Publicising of sociological surveys and public opinion polls regarding rating of political parties, electoral blocs of parties, or separate candidates for deputy, and of other prognosis in state or private mass media 15 days prior to election day is prohibited.
13. Candidates for deputy who hold positions, including on the basis of compatibility, in state bodies, bodies of local self-government, in state enterprises, in military units formed according to laws of Ukraine are prohibited from involving or using the following for any activity connected with the conduct of their pre-election campaign: people subordinated to them (during working hours), office transportation, communication means, equipment, premises and other objects and resources at the place of his/her work.

### 3.3 Other laws relevant to the media

*The Law On Copyright and Neighbouring Rights* was adopted by parliament on December 23, 1993 and enacted on February 23, 1994. It provides for protection procedures and damages against piracy, and protects the rights of creators of art, literature, science, broadcast production and performers. The Law is important for the future progress of private TV, which is closely tied with the enforcement of copyright regulation, since most of the companies cannot afford payments to Western copyright holders, and their popularity (and in some cases mere existence) depends on pirated programming.

*The Law On Communication* was adopted by parliament on May 16, 1995. It regulates the procedures to obtain a license to transmit TV and radio programmes.

*The Law On Advertising* was adopted by parliament on July 3, 1996 and governs the production, creation, dissemination and receiving of advertising. There is a blanket ban on advertising for prescription medicines and addictive substances. Advertising of tobacco and alcohol products is prohibited on radio and television. Political advertising is however not included.

On the 24th February 1996, the president signed a *decree "On state support to print media outlets"*. It grants privileges to print media outlets founded by state bodies, creative unions, public organisations or collectives of editorial staffs which registered before 1 August 1994. The advantages are not applicable to print media founded or co-founded by profit-making enterprises or private persons.

On the 16th October 1997, the Act "*On the Coverage of Activity of the National Government and Self-Government Bodies in Ukraine by the Mass Media*" came into force having been signed by the President. The Act foresees a minimum quota of three percent of annual airtime of the national state TV channel to be allocated for such coverage and develops a procedure to finance coverage of the parliament, government, and the president's activity by the electronic mass media.

On the 22nd October 1997, the Parliament adopted the Law "*On State Support of Mass Media and Social Protection of Journalists*". It determines the legal, economic and organisational principles for the state support of mass-media and social security of journalists. It has been stated that financial dependence can be considered as an important reason why journalists are more vulnerable to political pressure. This explains why this law is important in the context of the elections. The scope is however limited and can not be applied to for instance commercial mass-media (funded by advertising) and foreign owned media.

On the 26<sup>th</sup> of March, further *Amendments to the Ukrainian Statute on television and radio broadcasting* were published. These amendments had been adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in the autumn of 1997 and had they been signed into law earlier, they would have significantly improved the performance of the media during the elections. These changes prohibit radio and television companies from broadcasting advertisements without payment. They also prohibit the organisations which provide radio and television broadcasting from refusing access to licensed radio and television companies which have not defaulted on payment for their frequencies. Heads of television and radio companies are no longer liable for (defamatory) statements made in political programmes transmitted on their channels during campaigns for elections or referenda (unless the statements violate the constitution). Furthermore, from the moment an election date has been announced, no television or radio company can be deprived of the right to transmit its programmes without a court order.

In addition to the above laws, there are several laws not specifically targeted to the media, yet with an indirect relevance (see court practice below).

*The Civil Code of Ukraine* (adopted in 1988, amended on May 10, 1995) lays down the civil rights (e.g. dignity and reputation of citizens and legal entities). Article 7 of the Civil Code allows anyone, including public officials, to sue for damages if circulated information, including a publication, is untrue or if it insults a person's honour or dignity. Journalists complain that the law is biased against them because it does not limit damages.

*The Criminal Code of Ukraine* (adopted May 10, 1995) stipulates rules and penalties for stirring up national and religious hatred, racism, disclosure of state secrets, defamation, contumely and breach of copyright. Article 125 of the Criminal Code prescribes imprisonment of up to 5 years for libel. There is no known separate regulation regarding public officials (except for the President).

*The Law On State Secrets* was adopted by parliament on January 21, 1994. According to its text, information pertaining to defense, the economy, foreign relations, state security and the safekeeping of law and order are state secrets, the divulging of which can harm Ukraine's vital interests. A list of subjects regarded as classified state secrets was published on August 17, 1995. Statistics on the nation's gold reserves, strength of the armed forces, reports from the meteorological center of significance to defense, information on people engaged in intelligence activity, etc. shall be classified as secret. Furthermore, the Committee for Protection of State Secrets enjoys broadly defined powers over all media.

The Ukrainian law "*On [...] protection of dignity and business reputation [...]*" allows legal entities and individuals to appeal to Court and demand rectification or compensation for allegedly defamatory or inaccurate information.

### 3.4. Regulatory bodies

Ukraine has a variety of bodies involved in media legislation and regulation. A brief discussion follows.

#### **Ministry of Information**

A presidential decree signed on November 13, 1996 established a new Ministry of Information beyond the structures of the Ministry on Press and Information. The aims are formulated as follows: "further improvement of the system of informing citizens of Ukraine on political, social, economic and other important issues [...] and more effective use of the state media in achieving this goal". The minister of Information (appointed by the president after nomination by the prime-minister, and part of the Cabinet of Ministers) was commissioned to work out the activities of the Ministry.

The new Ministry incorporates several state bodies formerly associated with the media. Besides the old Ministry on Press and Information<sup>9</sup>, the state news agency (established on the basis of the Ukrainian national news agency UKRINFORM), as well as the State Committee on TV and Radio (Derzhteleradio)<sup>10</sup>, are subordinate to the new Ministry of Information. Concerning broadcasting, since January 1995 all national state radio and television channels in Ukraine are run by the *National Television Company and the National Radio Company*. Together with the state broadcasting (television and radio) companies of the twenty four regions ('oblasti'), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the cities of Kiev and Sebastopol they fall under the control of the State Committee on TV and Radio – currently part of the Ministry of Information. Derzhteleradio chairman, as well as the chairs of the two National Companies are appointed by the president of Ukraine, although the former has to be approved by the parliament. The heads of the regional TV and radio companies are chosen - with the consent of local administrations - by Derzhteleradio.

*The Radio Broadcasting, Radio Communication and Television Concern (RRT)*, the sole entity that runs communication channels and major transmitters, transferred under the Decree of the president of Ukraine of January 3, 1995 from the control of the Ministry of Communications to that of Derzhteleradio.

*The Permanent Committee of the Parliament of Ukraine on Legislative Protection of Freedom of Speech and the Media* convened first in April 1994. It consists of nine Members of Parliament and has sub-committees on print media, broadcast media and protection of freedom of speech/legislative initiatives. Its attention is concentrated on the legal aspects of the relation between the state, the media and the citizens. A special inquiry was for instance launched by the Committee which examined the suspension of *Pravda Ukrainy* at the end of January 1998. The paper was shut on the grounds of registration irregularities and a breach of the electoral law. Yet there were worrying questions over the legal competence of the Ministry of Information to order the suspension. Nor was it clear that every possible step had been taken before suspension. Most worrying of all was the timing of the suspension (a few months before the elections), given that the dispute over the paper's registration stretched back several months.

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<sup>9</sup> The Ministry on Press and Information was charged with the implementation of state policies regarding the print media (e.g. registration of newspapers, control printing houses, distribution, control the compliance of print media to the law, etc.)

<sup>10</sup> 'Derzhteleradio' was charged with the implementation of state policies regarding the broadcast media (supervise the National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting, the distribution of information broadcast media abroad, in charge of the Broadcast and Communication Concern RRT)

*The National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting Issues* is a state body reporting to the Ukrainian parliament. The Council was established according to Article 5 of the Broadcasting Law (cfr. Above), consists of eight persons approved by the Ukrainian parliament, with four of them nominated by the chairman of the parliament and four by the Ukrainian president. Their term of office is four years. The Council is set up with the aim of implementing and complying with legislation in the sphere of television and radio broadcasting, guaranteeing the freedom of speech and the rights of citizens on information, protecting the rights of the audience, users, workers and distributors of audio-visual information, rational use of the frequency resources and participating in the development and implementation of the state policy in the sphere of television and radio broadcasting.

*The Central Election Commission* is a permanently acting state body, which must ensure, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, this and other laws of Ukraine, the organisation of the preparation and conduct of elections for the President of Ukraine, the People's Deputies of Ukraine, as well as all-Ukrainian referendums. It heads the system of election commissions (territorial, constituency, polling station), which are formed for the preparation and conduct of those elections. One of its tasks is to manage the observance of the constitutional norms of the Electoral Law, and the implementation of the Law of Ukraine "On the elections of the President of Ukraine", and ensure its uniform application throughout the territory of Ukraine, within the limits of its competence. As such the media coverage of the elections – regulated by the Electoral Law, as described above - are monitored by the Commission. However, the Law on Central Election Commission of Ukraine specifies no powers of enforcement, which makes the Commission rather dependent upon other regulatory bodies and the courts.

### 3.5 Court practice

The overall majority of cases that have to do with the media in Ukraine are defamation lawsuits. The Law "On amendments to the laws and regulations concerning protection of dignity and business reputation [...]" (cf. supra) adopted on 6 May 1993 allows legal entities and individuals to appeal to Court and demand retraction or compensation for allegedly defamatory or inaccurate information. This law has been used in particular by state bodies against media outlets. The requested sum for compensation can be (unrealistically) high, since the law does not stipulate figures. As a result a chilling effect and consequent tendency towards self-censorship on matters sensitive to the Government has taken place. Other laws (see above, e.g. on state secrets, the Constitution, etc.) have been used to the same effect.

Editorial staffs and newspapers regularly lose court cases; often the accuracy of information is difficult to prove (either because the source cannot be divulged or for other reasons). The courts tend to arrest bank accounts in advance of deliberations in order to secure financial means to compensate moral damages thus paralysing the production process of the news organisations. If the case is indeed lost, the media outlets are generally in a more catastrophic financial situation than the usually already are. Comprehensibly, the editors have become careful in publishing material.

In October 1997, the Constitutional Court made a crucial interpretation of Article 23 of the Law on Information to prohibit not only the collection, but also the storage, use and distribution of personal information gathered without an individual's consent. Among the data classified as "confidential information" that can not be gathered without one's consent falls e.g. an individual's educational and marital status, religious affiliation, health, assets and even data and place of birth. It was generally perceived that under such conditions the work of journalists will be limited even more.

Close scrutiny from government officials; and politically motivated visits by tax inspectors were reported<sup>11</sup>. The owner of the popular newspaper Kiyevskiy Vedomosti claimed for instance that unremitting investigations by law enforcement agencies, including tax police inspectors, into his concern's operations were linked to the newspaper's reports about alleged abuse of office by the Minister of Internal Affairs and chief of staff of the presidential administration. The newspaper Region complained of massive, politically-motivated tax police investigations in March and April 1997, following the publication of an article accusing the then-Prime Minister of establishing a monopoly on supplies of natural gas to Ukraine.

### 3.6 Media regulation: summary

In allotting free time and space, the law was adhered to, but the number of candidates meant that the amount of time and/or space available was limited, and insufficient to enable candidates to explain their policies and views.

Moreover, the amendments to the Ukrainian Statute on television and radio broadcasting signed into law by the President on 26 March 1998, while representing significant improvements, were too little, too late. These amendments had been adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in the autumn of 1997 and had they been signed into law earlier, they would have significantly improved the performance of the media. These changes prohibit radio and television companies from broadcasting advertisements without payment. They also prohibit the organisations responsible for allocating radio and television frequencies from refusing access to licensed radio and television companies which have not defaulted on payment for their frequencies. Heads of television and radio companies are no longer liable for defamatory statements made in political programmes transmitted on their channels during campaigns for elections or referenda (unless the statements violate the constitution). From the moment an election date has been announced, no television or radio company can be deprived of the right to transmit its programmes without a court order.

The Central Election Commission performed poorly in its role as arbitrator in cases of alleged media abuse. Nor was it charged with the duty of informing the electorate about the mechanism of voting. It monitored the implementation of the electoral law but had neither the financial resources, nor the expertise, nor the power to deal adequately with the enforcement of the election law.

In a number of cases the authorities were perceived to use the law in order to manipulate the election campaign:

- Several violations were observed of articles 34 (use of mass media) and 35 (pre-election campaign publicity) of the Election Law. However, the enforcement seemed confused and inconsistent. For instance, para 11 of article 35 states that free-of-charge services are prohibited. This was one of the charges against *Pravda Ukrainy*, although several regional newspapers used the same strategy without legal consequence.
- A strict enforcement of the rules of the legislative framework for the media (broadcasting law, press law, etc.) led to several court cases relating to past violations during the election campaign. These cases dealt mainly with registration and licensing issues (for example, the case of Chernomorskaya Telekompaniya in Simferopol).
- An increased number of media libel suits led to the closure of some newspapers and to a 'chilling effect', with a resulting self-censorship.

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<sup>11</sup> See US State Department's report on Human Rights Practices for 1997 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January 30, 1998. Available at: [http://www.state.gov/www/global/human\\_rights/1997\\_hrp\\_report/ukraine.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/ukraine.html)

- Close scrutiny from government officials, especially at the local level; and politically motivated visits by tax inspectors were also observed.
- The absence of a legal framework for political advertising was an important inadequacy.



## 4 The general situation for the mass media in Ukraine

*Gillian McCormack*

In assessing the performance of the Ukrainian media during the March 1998 parliamentary elections, it would be insufficient to observe their actions at the time without providing some kind of a framework to understand the context in which they have come to exist and work. The wide variety of media options open to the average Ukrainian will be set out in detail here, in an effort to clarify the situation in the run up to the elections.

Recent Sosis Gallup polls indicated that television is very important in Ukraine. According to this data, only about 20% of Ukrainians regularly read newspapers, (14% of Ukrainian adults do not read newspapers at all) whereas almost every household owns a television and radio. This relatively low readership activity is linked to the limited buying capacity of the major part of the population. The cost of buying regular newspapers when put against the modest income of the average Ukrainian partly explains the popularity of television and radio, which are free. It is also worth mentioning that subscription costs for national newspapers have made those living in the regions look to more local publications, which are considerably cheaper.

The polls indicate that as a result, 62% of Ukraine's inhabitants gain information about social and political events from TV programmes, 38% -- from radio and just 18% from newspapers.

Before the elections at least, the level of trust placed in the information provided by the mass media was not high -- 19% of adults trusted the national mass media -- although the media came in third place in a list of social institutions after religious organisations and the Military. Television had higher credibility than print media and radio. According to the findings of the survey conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Social Studies and "Social Monitoring" Centre in September 1997, 55% of the population trusted television coverage and 33% did not. In comparison, 51% of the population trusted the print media, while 37% did not.

Another factor which is important in providing a general picture of the media in Ukraine involves ownership and financing. The media's engagement with certain political groups can be tied to commercial interests and politicians belonging to what the Ukrainians describe as regional "clans". The dynamic of this relationship forms part of the explanation for why the media responded as it did to the election campaign.

### 4.1 Broadcasting

The National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting has issued licenses for broadcasting to 121 TV companies, 109 radio stations and 26 TV-radio organisations. 18 are state-owned and 238 are private companies.

There are three nation-wide TV broadcasters:

- National Television Company of Ukraine, "UT-1", state-owned under Derzhteleradio company.
- "Studio 1+1" (commercial)
- "Inter" (commercial)

There are two regional TV channels and one nation-wide network:

- "ICTV", part owned by the State Property Fund
  - "NBM", recently founded commercial channel which began operating at the end of last year
  - Nation-wide network "STB", which was set up by commercial enterprises and Internews
- Four nation-wide radio channels broadcast programmes of the National Radio Company, ("UR-1", "UR-2", "UR-3" and a world service channel -- "Radio Ukraine") and 8 radio stations have regional status, all broadcasting on FM.

Audience reach of the nation-wide TV channels:

"UT-1" -- 60% of the Ukrainian population

"Studio 1+1" -- 73%

"Inter" -- 77.3%

"ICTV" -- 22%

## 4.2 Print media

There are currently 4.5 thousand newspapers registered in Ukraine, of which 2.5-3 thousand are actually published.

In mid-January, the state-owned postal service Ukrposhta (a monopolist in the delivery of periodicals) summarised the results of the subscription campaigns for the first half of 1998. As of the 1st of January 1998, 12.1785 million copies of periodicals were subscribed through Ukrposhta, an increase of almost 26% on the second half of 1997.

The following periodicals were subscribed:

- Ukrainian newspapers (nationwide distribution) -- 3.22 million copies
- Ukrainian magazines -- 1.04 million copies
- CIS newspapers -- 44.3 thousand copies
- CIS magazines -- 123.3 thousand copies
- local periodicals (regional distribution) -- 7,750.2 thousand copies

In comparison with the previous year, the subscribed circulation of Ukrainian nationwide newspapers increased by 37.3%, local and regional by 20% and magazines by 42.2%.

Among Ukrainian social and political newspapers, the following have the largest circulations by subscription:

- *Silski Visti* (Rural News) -- 568.690 copies
- *Pravda Ukrainy* (The Truth of Ukraine) -- 532.332 copies (At the moment the publication has been banned by order of the Minister of Information)
- *Golos Ukrainy* (The Voice of Ukraine) -- 247.936 copies
- *Uryadovy Kurier* (Governmental Courier) -- 139.745 copies

Today the Ukrainian populace increasingly prefers to read regional and city newspapers rather than nationwide ones, while at the same time the number of readers is increasing. In 1994, only 43.2% of Ukrainians preferred regional and local publications, whereas at the beginning of 1998 this figure had increased to 51.5%. At the same time, 22.7% of the population preferred district publications.

According to the results of polling conducted by Socis Gallup, at the end of 1997 the most popular nationwide social and political newspapers were *Argumenty i Fakty-Ukraine* (read by 12.5% of the population), *Komsomolskaya Pravda-Ukraine* (8.4%) and *Kievsie Vedemosti* (8.3%).

The following social and political newspapers have the highest general circulation (subscription and retail):

- *Silski Visti* -- 591 thousand copies
- *Pravda Ukrainy* -- 540 thousand copies (normally; after being closed down the paper was still printed but at a minimal level of circulation)
- *Golos Ukrainy* -- 261 thousand copies
- *Fakty* -- 225 thousand copies
- *Komsomolskaya Pravda-Ukraine* -- 195 thousand copies
- *Uryadovy Kurier* -- 158 thousand copies
- *Kievskie Vedemosti* -- 140.5 thousand copies
- *Vseukrainskie Vedemosti* -- 118 thousand copies
- *Argumenty i Fakty- Ukraine* -- 110 thousand copies
- *Rabochay Gazeta* -- 105 thousand copies

### 4.3 News agencies

Additionally, there are five national news agencies:

- Interfax-Ukraine -- private, registered on the 15th of September 1992
- UKRINFORM -- after November 1996, it was transformed into the State Information Agency DINAU
- Ukrainian Republic Independent Agency UNIAR -- private, founded in January 1992
- Ukrainian Independent News Agency UNIAN -- founded in 1993

### 4.4 Professional organisations

The Journalists' Union of Ukraine was founded in 1957 and re-registered on the 20th of January 1993. It has 12,000 members, branches in all regions of Ukraine, is a member of the International Federation of Journalists and deals with media management, international contacts and the protection of journalists. In 1994, a Committee for the Freedom of the Press was established within the framework of the Union. The Union also has a fund for journalists which supports veterans and the disabled and a fund for socially relevant publications.

The Trade Union of Ukrainian Journalists' Independence is a non-partisan NGO, founded on the 5th of May 1990. Its aim is to protect the rights and freedoms of journalists, to assist the professionalisation of journalism, and to promote ethics. The Guild of Editors-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Media is a public organisation founded on the 12th of May 1995 and has about 100 members. It lobbies for the protection of the rights of journalists in the legislative and executive branches of power.

The Foundation for the Protection of Freedom of Speech and Information is a non-partisan organisation founded by popular public figures, including politicians, writers and artists. It attempts to counteract violations of freedom of speech and involves itself in cases of suspected persecution. There is also a Crimean Union of Free Journalists.

## 4.5 Private enterprises and the media

Besides media outlets owned by state-structures, several private enterprises have invested significantly in the media sector. Privatbank, for example, finances the companies "Privat-TV Dnepr", "Privat-TV Kharkiv" (in addition to donating US\$1,500,000 to purchase equipment), "ITA Vikna", the radio station "Radio Premier" in Dnipropetrovsk and the newspaper *Kievskie Vedemosti*.

Another commercial enterprise with shares in the media is the Ukrainian Financial Group. It supports the newspapers *Business Ukraine* and *Halytski Kontrakty*. Other investors are the Dendi Bank, Praveksbank and the Enran enterprise. On a regional level, industrial firms have sometimes provided support to the media. This support is, however, mainly of a temporary character and media outlets regularly change sponsors, moving under the umbrella of major banks or energy and trade organisations.

The vast majority of commercial structures support media outlets for political reasons. The relationship between political power and economic power is amply demonstrated in the Ukrainian context by the main dynamic involved in the engagement of the media by private enterprise. Media ownership provides a basis with which to promote those political leaders who will lobby for specific business interests in the corridors of power. Given the unprofitable nature of the vast majority of media outlets in Ukraine, the need for a direct return on investment can hardly form a major basis for understanding the trend of this dynamic.

## 4.6 Foreign investment

After Russia, Ukraine is the CIS republic with the most foreign capital invested in the media, particularly in broadcasting. This is in part due to the envisaged future profits in the TV and Radio market, the growing advertising volume which doubles annually in this sector and the dwindling circulation of newspapers. In fact, most of the broadcasting companies (both FM and TV) and regional channels have foreign partners. Their investment is limited to 30%, according to Ukrainian legislation on foreign ownership of electronic media.

Grants from Western organisations have helped some independent media to start up or continue their operations. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored two major media projects in Ukraine -- the Independent Ukrainian News Agency UNIAN and the International Media Centre (IMC, with a 30% participation by Internews). Several media programmes have been financed through the Eurasia Foundation and IREX, who are in turn financed by USAID.

Foreign investment into the print media is limited, due to declining print-runs, decreasing advertising volume and the low purchasing power of the population. The exceptions are *Zerkalo Nedeli* (sponsored by a former Ukrainian but now US national, Yuri Orlikov, and a Russian newspaper published in the US) and the newspaper *Financova Ukraina* (sponsored by Financial Times/Pearson). The newspaper *Den* was allegedly also launched with the assistance of foreign capital.

## 4.7 Nationwide TV channels

The nationwide TV channels are controlled by political and economic groupings which support the president and the executive power, a fact which is supported by the quantitative data accumulated and printed elsewhere in this report. UT-1 broadcasts programmes of the state TV company and some programmes produced by commercial studios TRK "Alternativa" and TRK "Gravis". This channel is the megaphone of the executive power and therefore promoted the People's Democratic Party (NDP). News and analytical programmes (UTN, "Seven Days"), political talk-shows ("It is He"), publicistic programmes ("Accents") were dominated by representatives of the "party of power", gave them positive coverage and frequently attempted to discredit opponents.

UT-2 broadcasts the programmes of "Studio 1+1", which occupies all of prime-time viewing and most of the morning broadcast. This TV company has some foreign investment, (part of its shares belongs to the British company Central European Media Enterprise), but it is believed to be linked to Israeli citizen Vadim Rabinovich, the president of Rico Capital Group holding. This holding includes, among other companies, the advertising agency "Prioritet" which sells all airtime relating to "Studio 1+1" and is the largest agency selling outside advertising. Rabinovich is also head of the Trade Industrial Chamber "Ukraine-Israel". One of the members of the Chamber's Supervisory Board is the president's assistant Aleksandr Volkov, one of the president's closest advisors. Himself a prominent businessman, Volkov was one of the president's most ardent supporters during the 1994 Presidential election campaign. Certain other representatives of the above-mentioned bodies are running in the elections within the list of the Green Party of Ukraine and Volkov is seventh on the list of the NEP bloc. The chief managers of "Studio 1+1" repeatedly declared their intention to maintain political neutrality during the parliamentary elections.

In December 1997, the managers of "Studio 1+1" terminated the political current affairs programme "Pislyamova", which was written and presented by Olexander Tkachenko. Several days later, Tkachenko resigned. Although this was not the first time the makers of "Pislyamova" had encountered difficulties after one of their programmes, the problem was generally linked to the airing of an edition of the programme investigating an apparent rift within the presidential administration. Although both sides of the dispute were given equal access, the fact of the exposure of dissent within the president's ranks was thought to have caused immense displeasure. Tkachenko declined to comment at the time on the cause of his resignation, but later described the circumstances of his departure in an article printed in the Jamestown monitor:

"Managers of major TV channels privately admit that it is impossible to broadcast without political backing and bribes. Business people say they would think very carefully before criticizing politicians, especially those in power. Any company that does so is likely to find itself subject to a barrage of tax audits and fire-inspections; given that Ukrainian legislation is always changing, it is easy for officials to obstruct a newspaper or keep a TV company off the air...My TV show "Pislyamova" (Afterwords) was named Ukraine's best political programme in 1996 and again in 1997. And yet I had no choice but to close it down. Had I not done so, the whole of 1+1 TV channel which put my show on the air would have been under threat. No other major TV channel has been willing to take my show on."

The selection of party representatives for the new talk-show "5 to 5" (which is supposed to be made at random by a computer) was also perceived by many observers with the greatest scepticism. The computer failed to select parties inconvenient for the president and the executive power, including Hromada. The fact that the programme was broadcast at all made something of a mockery of the studio leaders' assertions that they would not be participating in the pre-election campaigning.

The main broadcaster at UT-3 is Ukrainian Independent TV Corporation "Inter". It is a Ukrainian-Russian joint venture, of which 29% (according to official sources) is owned by the Russian joint stock company ORT (Public Russian Television). The General Director of the channel is Aleksandr Zinchenko, who is seventh on the list of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united).

ICTV is a Ukrainian-American joint venture -- 30% of its shares belong to US Story First Communications. It is a commercial channel focusing largely on entertainment. It also airs news programmes produced by the TV information agency "Vikna".

STB was founded in June 1997 and has set itself up as a national network. STB programmes are rebroadcast in almost all the major cities of Ukraine and is the only major TV company in Ukraine which uses satellite for transmitting signals. Chairman of the STB administrative board, Vladimir Sivkovich, is ninth on the list of the Labour and Liberal Party bloc.

In general, in the run up to the elections, all the nationwide television stations were controlled by individuals or groups which were favourable to the "party of power".

## 4.8 The nationwide press

Almost all of the nationwide daily newspapers of Ukraine reach a relatively small number of the population and have small circulations (on the scale of Ukraine). This is perhaps, first and foremost, connected with the fact that almost all newspapers are unprofitable. As a result they are unable to invest sufficient resources into their own development. The cost of newspaper production is extremely high, however the paying capacity of the population is low. The economic crisis affecting Ukraine has had an inevitable impact on the market for advertising which is rather narrow. Without external capital investment, therefore, newspapers have been unable to take the necessary steps to increase their circulation. This has made them an easy target for commercial structures wishing to gain political control over nationwide publications.

The case of *Pravda Ukrainy* is one of many examples which demonstrate this tendency. At the end of last year, its circulation was approximately 35,000 copies. Then, at the beginning of 1998, its circulation unexpectedly escalated to 532,000 copies. This increase was achieved with the assistance of a commercial company which paid the subscription of the newspaper for 500,000 readers. In exchange, the newspaper was required to support the political party Hromada during the elections, (a swift glance at the content of news and political analysis contained within the newspaper provides ample proof of this fact, although several leading media commentators also noted the relationship in the run up to the elections).

The same situation was noted with *Fakty* and *Vseukrainskie Vedemosti* in the latter part of 1997, which both decreased subscription and cover prices in order to attract more readers. This strategy was successful: *Fakty's* circulation grew to 200,000 copies (the newspaper was only launched in the summer of 1997) and *Vseukrainskie Vedemosti's* circulation was increased from 30,000 to 118,000 copies. Editorial policy was noticeably affected: *Fakty* began to support the SDPU(o), and *Vseukrainskie Vedemosti* became the tribune of Hromada (see graphs 11 and 12).

The political priorities of the state-owned newspapers were clear from the outset. *Uryadovy Kurier* and *Rabochaya Gazeta* (founded by the Cabinet of Ministers) supported the NDP, *Golos Ukrainy* (founded by the Verkhovna Rada, the Speaker of which is the leader of the Socialist Party, Moroz) supported the Socialist and Peasant Party bloc and Hromada (Chief Editor of *Golos Ukrainy* was fifteenth on the Hromada list) and *Silski Visti* followed in the footsteps of *Golos Ukrainy* (Deputy Editor Ivan Bokiy is in the first five members of the Socialist and Peasant Party bloc).

*Kievskie Vedemosti*, the popular Kyiv tabloid, reflected the diverse and changing political interests of its owner and Editor-in-Chief. The main shareholder, Mikhail Brodsky and the Editor-in-Chief were formerly members of Rukh. At the end of 1997, they left the party and published a number of articles accusing Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chernovii of links with the KGB. Brodsky established a civil association called "Kievans" in order to take part in the elections for Mayor of Kiev. The Editor of the paper's analytical department Sergei Kiselev was on the party list of Hromada and there was evidence of a bias towards Hromada in the newspaper. The subsequent arrest of Brodsky on tax offences was one of the major scandals of the election campaign.

The daily newspaper *Den* and the weekly *Zerkalo Nedeli* are rather specific to the Ukrainian market. Publishing mainly political and economic analysis, they are very influential amongst the political establishment despite their small circulations -- *Den* with a circulation of 45,000 and *Zerkalo Nedeli* with 30,000. They are also often quoted and referred to by other media, including local publications (oblast and city) in different regions of Ukraine. Traditionally, these newspapers were perceived as presenting balanced and objective information. In the run up to the elections, however, *Den* began to demonstrate a tendency to support Evgeny Marchuk and the SDPU(o) and lost a certain amount of credibility with its readership as a result. The same tendency was noted in one of the most respected business weeklies *Buznes*, published by the company Blits-Info (whose president Sergei Melnichuk is tenth on the SDPU(o) electoral list). In addition, the chairman of the supervisory board of the private joint stock company Ukrainian Press Group, (which founded *Den*) Anatoly Novikov, was running in the parliamentary elections under the banner of the Socialist and Peasant Party bloc.

*Zerkalo Nedeli*, founded by the Ukrainian emigré Yuri Orlikov, now resident in the United States, attempted to maintain a distance from the political struggle. However, regular readers believed the paper had a tendency to sympathise with Evgeny Marchuk, in contrast to its critical attitude to most of the other contending politicians. *Zerkalo's* Editor-in-Chief, Vladimir Mostovoi, revealed to the monitoring team the fact that Orlikov had sold 40% of his shares in the previous year to an off-shore Panamanian firm which turned out to have links to Lazarenko, leader of Hromada.

From late 1997, it appeared that preparations had begun to carve the national newspapers up between the different political groups which were running in the parliamentary elections, although the major protagonists in this preparation were largely members of the centrist political groups. The fact that many of the nationwide newspapers owners and editors were themselves intending to run for candidature, further complicated the situation.

## 4.9 The regional media

If the major national newspapers were vulnerable to offers of major investment at the time of the pre-election campaign, then the regional media were even more so. Each region of Ukraine supports dozens of commercial and state television companies and sometimes thousands of commercial and state publications. There is also the phenomenon of newspapers founded by city and regional administrations and those which are nominally independent but supported in fact by local industrial and trade organisations.

The circumstances which make it impossible to achieve self-financing for the nationwide newspapers are exacerbated in the regions. Despite the market for regional publications, given the decline of subscription to nationwide ones, regional publications face similar problems in relation to the cost of printing. The struggle for advertising revenue in the regions is often more hopeless than in the capital. This leaves the regional media more open to offers of investment on the part of local élites.

- The cost of advertising on regional television companies was somewhat less than on nationwide companies; nevertheless the prices were still prohibitive for the less well off parties and candidates. The regional media, with only localised transmission and small circulations, are bound up by much more local considerations, both politically and economically. Therefore, the regional media tend to reflect the local situation in such a way as to diminish the importance of national questions, except in so far as they might have a local relevance.

## 4.10 The general situation for the mass media in Ukraine: summary

- The situation for the Ukrainian mass media in the run up to the parliamentary elections in March 1998 was characterised by economic and politically-motivated interference and by scandal. The lack of economic independence of the majority of media in Ukraine made them a target for powerful economic clans with their own political agendas.
- The state-owned media had been charged with fulfilling their obligations according to the electoral law which allowed a limited but equal access of political parties to airtime, and with the responsibility for fair and unbiased coverage of all of them. The commercial media were constitutionally empowered with freedom of speech.
- In some ways, the professionalisation of the media since the 1994 elections and the growth in numbers of television and radio companies and weekly and daily publications gave grounds to believe a plurality of information and opinion might be on offer to the Ukrainian voter in 1998.

## 4.11 The performance of national television during the elections

### 4.11.1 General

There are three nation-wide TV channels in Ukraine. **UT1**, which is state owned, broadcasts the programmes of the National Television Company of Ukraine and some programmes produced by commercial companies. It also broadcasts programmes made by commercial studios. It earns some of its income through advertising. Technically, it is accessible in 96% of Ukrainian territory, and it reaches 60% of the population. In September 1997 its share of the audience during prime time was 8% on week nights, 9% on Fridays and 4% on weekends and holidays. Its audience share fell to 6.71% during prime time (which was also the time during which election broadcasts were transmitted) in the election period 1-14 March 1998.

**UT2** broadcasts programmes made by Studio 1+1 for much of its prime time. Studio 1+1 belongs in part to Central European Media Enterprises, a US controlled transnational group. The news programmes broadcast by Studio 1+1 are produced by TSN. The National Television Company also uses **UT2** to broadcast educational, training and popular scientific programmes for four hours a day. **UT2** is accessible in 92% of Ukrainian territory and reaches 73% of the Ukrainian population. Its share of the audience during prime time in September 1997 was 30% on week nights, 32% on Fridays and 36% on weekend and holiday nights. It rose to 43.29% during prime time in the period 1-14 March 1998.

The main broadcaster on **UT3** is Ukrainian Independent TV Corporation, Inter, part owned by the Russian TV company, ORT. **UT3** is accessible in Kiev, 23 regions and Crimea and reaches 77.3% of the population. Its share of the audience during prime time in September

1997 was a steady 36% on week nights and 37% on weekends and holidays and it fell to 33% during prime time in the period 1-14 March 1998.

**ICTV** is a Ukrainian-American joint venture, and the State Property Company owns some of its shares. It broadcasts entertainment programmes and its news programmes produced by Vikna. It is accessible in Kiev and 21 regions of Ukraine and reaches 22% of the population. Its share of audience during prime time in September 1997 was 4% on week nights and Fridays and 2% on weekends and holidays and it fell to 1.89% during prime time in the period 1-14 March 1998.

**STB**, founded in June 1997, is the newest commercial television channel in Ukraine. It transmits via satellite and reaches 60% of the population. In the regions, local TV stations receive STB programmes by satellite and rebroadcast them on terrestrial channels. It is, therefore, accessible in Kiev and 10 regions of Ukraine. By September 1997 its share of audience during prime time was 1% on all days of the week and it rose slightly to 1.12% during prime time in the period 1-14 March 1998.

Apart from the television channels, there are also four nation-wide radio channels in Ukraine. They broadcast programmes of the National Radio Company (UR-1, UR-2, UR-3 and the foreign broadcast channel Radio Ukraine). 8 radio stations have regional status (they all broadcast in the FM band). Of the 121 TV companies, 109 radio companies and 26 TV-radio organisations in Ukraine, 18 are state-owned and 238 are private companies.

Standards of television production have improved a great deal in Ukraine. This was reflected in the technical quality of documentary programmes, and it was strikingly evident in the sophistication of political advertising. In part this was the result of competition, in part it reflected increasing access to modern technology such as the Internet. This has resulted in more diversity in the media.

#### 4.11.2 National television and coverage of the election campaign

Two general factors coloured the television coverage of the election campaign. The first is the control exercised over the national TV channels by political and economic groupings which supported the president and the government. UT1, for example, both openly favoured the NDP during the election campaign and discredited opponents of the 'party of power', while the chief director of the independent company Vikna admitted that advice from ICTV's owners led them to refuse to accept a Hromada advertisement. The second and equally important factor is the fact that senior media personnel were themselves candidates in elections at various levels. The general director of UT3, for example, was a high-ranking candidate for the SDPU(o) and, while the channel was careful not to oppose the 'party of power', it actively supported the SDPU(o). The chairman of STB's board, on the other hand, was a high ranking candidate for the Labour and Liberal Party Bloc, and the channel reflected this fact in its political coverage.

These two factors blurred the role of the media as independent, neutral observers. Not surprisingly, it added to the partisan nature of the coverage of the elections. The national television companies as a whole covered only those centrist parties which were not opposed to the 'party of power'. At best they criticised, or even worse, remained silent about the remaining parties contending the elections.

Apart from its failure to provide the electorate with full and impartial information about the choices available, television coverage of the campaign also did not fulfil the duty of familiarising voters with the mechanism of voting (the positive voting required in this election was the diametric opposite of the previous system of striking out candidates to which Ukrainian citizens were accustomed). The Verkhovna Rada commissioned the Foundation for the Defence of the Freedom of Speech to make a television programme explaining the new laws. Further financial support for the programme, which was to be shown three times on TV

and broadcast four times on radio, was given by USAID. According to the director of the Foundation, the programme had already been made when the Minister of Information intervened on the orders of the President to prevent the programmes being broadcast on state channels. They appeared later on commercial channels. The International Foundation for Election Systems, on the other hand, a non-governmental organisation which is funded by USAID, produced 5 minute television programmes to explain the new system of voting. State TV officials refused to show them, but an appeal to the Minister of Information led to prime time slots being made available from March 11 on UT1 and UT2

There were two major controversies concerning television programmes which were related to the election campaign. The cancellation of the analytical programme 'Pislyamova' in December, made by Studio 1+1 and shown on UT-2, and the resignation of its editor, Oleksandr Tkachenko, was generally thought to be the result of political pressure by the channel's owners. Although the official reason for the cancellation of the programme was a decision to discontinue the contract (an appeal to the Court of Arbitrage found in favour of the programme), the decision was made shortly after the programme reported on internal problems within the presidential apparatus.

Many political parties also complained about the programme '5 by 5', a controversial programme which was launched by Studio 1 + 1 on 3 March, which pitted the first five candidates on the electoral lists of two political parties against one another (and against the presenters who, according to monitors, tended to reveal their prejudices and preferences in their questions) in a debate. According to the producers, the problem arose because they only intended showing 8 programmes and had not thought that as many as 30 parties and electoral blocs would contest the elections. They decided, therefore, to use a computer to make a random choice of parties to be invited. However, a number of parties (11 in all) objected to the informal format of the programme and their inability to control the questions and refused to participate. Other parties resented the fact that they had not been selected to appear, and complained that the programme gave unfair extra free coverage to those parties which had been selected. Critics of the programme regarded the computer selection with a certain degree of cynicism and pointed out that the programme did not figure parties which the 'party of power' considered its real opposition.

The quantitative analysis of the coverage of the election campaign by the national media supports the criticism that none of the channels offered full and impartial information about the parties and electoral blocs contesting the elections. On UT1 the party that received the most coverage in the period 2 to 28 March was the NDP (see graph 1). UT1's combined coverage during news, special election and other programming, including direct advertising, came to 144 minutes, or 2 hours and 24 minutes. The party that followed with the second most coverage (in news and special election programme coverage only) was Hromada (87.84 minutes). Rukh garnered over an hour of coverage at just over 67 minutes. This was followed by NEP, which, although mentioned for only 50 seconds during news programmes, advertised heavily on state television (almost 62 minutes) and was mentioned briefly during special election programming, and the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (50.6 minutes). Parties which received half-an-hour of coverage or less were, in descending order: the Green Party (32.96 minutes), SDPU(o) (28.8 minutes), CPU (25.03 minutes), SLON (25 minutes), the SPU- SelPU (18.02 minutes), UNA (10.53 minutes) and finally, the Agrarian Party which received the least amount of coverage (9.86 minutes).

Two parties dominated the news coverage over the main state television broadcaster for most of the month of March -- Hromada and the NDP (see graph 1). While there was slightly more coverage of Hromada (over 56 minutes) than the NDP (almost 54 minutes), the references to the former were almost entirely negative, while the references to the latter, overwhelmingly positive.

News coverage of other parties -- such as the CPU, Rukh, SDPU(o), SPU- SelPU, UNA, the Green Party, NEP and the Agrarian Party -- was insignificant, as they clocked in less than six minutes each. SLON was not mentioned in news coverage at all.

On UT-2, only 2 parties received more than half an hour's coverage from 2 to 28 March: NEP with 39.51 minutes and the Green Party with 31.49 minutes coverage. Moreover, the total of advertising time on UT2 (122.03 minutes) exceeded both news and special election programming put together (see graph 2).

The party that received the most coverage on UT2 was NEP with just under 40 minutes. The Green Party (31.49 minutes), the NDP (29.85 minutes) and the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (28.30 minutes) were next. However, both for the Green Party, and for the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc most of the coverage was due to advertising, whereas for the NDP, the 'party of power', the coverage was due to news and special election programming. In contrast Hromada (with only 6.9 minutes), CPU (3.21 minutes) and SPU/SelPU (1.65 minutes) were hardly covered. An interesting observation is that SLON only got access to UT-2 via advertising since no news coverage or special election programming were noted.

The most covered party was NEP and the coverage was neutral to begin with, becoming positive in the final week of the campaign. SDPU(o), the Agrarian Party, and the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc also received positive reference. The most positive coverage, however, was accorded to the NDP. Hromada's coverage, on the other hand, was extremely negative.

Inter's coverage was dominated by the SDPU(o) (see graph 3). Total coverage of all election programming came to just over 4 hours, of which almost 65 per cent was concerned with advertising one party, the SDPU(o). News programmes made up only 40.62 minutes and again the SDPU(o) dominated with 17.74 minutes.

On ICTV, less than 30 minutes of news programmes between 1 and 28 March were devoted to the elections (see graph 4). Hromada and SDPU(o) received more than half the news coverage, but Hromada's coverage was negative in tone, while the coverage of SDPU(o) was neutral. The CPU and SPU/SelPU had less than 2 minutes news coverage, while Rukh, the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc, the Green Party and NEP had less than a minute each. UNA and SLON were not mentioned on the news at all. More than half of all coverage was advertising and Rukh dominated with almost 72 per cent of all advertising time (25.25 minutes).

STB's special election programmes covered only SPU/SelPU, Hromada and the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc and accorded them 18.91 minutes each (see graph 5). Whereas the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc received positive treatment, however, the tone in relation to both SPU/SelPU and Hromada was negative. The Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc also took up by far the most advertising time (nearly 1.5 hours, compared to the Green Party, the second largest advertiser on STB with 5.63 minutes). On the news programmes, however, Rukh (20.36 minutes), the CPU (16.43 minutes), the Agrarian Party (5.90 minutes), SPU/SelPU (5.45 minutes) and Hromada (2.6 minutes) all received more coverage than the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (2.46 minutes). Apart from Rukh, however, the references to the other parties were negative in tone.

Neither SPU-SelPU, nor Hromada advertised at all on national television. In the case of Hromada, a senior party member claimed that the national channels had refused to show its advertisements. The Agrarian Party, UNA and the CPU, which bought 8.1 minutes, 2.2 minutes and 1.13 minutes respectively, advertised very little. The largest advertisers were SDPU(o), with a total of 2.87 hours, followed by the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (2.13 hours), the NDP (1.26 hours); NEP (1.25 hours); the Green Party (1.24 hours); Rukh

(1.23 hours); SLON (49 minutes). In all, the parties and electoral blocks monitored used a total of 10.65 hours on television for paid advertisements.

## 4.12 Broadcasting: summary

Three things are clear from this analysis:

- First, the national television, whether state or commercial, did not consider that providing full information to its viewers, i.e. the electorate, was an important duty of the media.
- Second, the distinction between news and opinion was often blurred in the television coverage of the election campaign. News items and special election programmes frequently were more akin to negative or positive advertising than to documentary reporting.
- Third, the struggle waged by parties for votes in the broadcast media was primarily a battle for television air time. As a result, the competition between 'image-makers' acquired almost as much importance as the competition between candidates.

In short, national television was broadly unsuccessful in providing accurate and fair information on the political processes at work during the parliamentary campaign in Ukraine.

# 5 Coverage of the campaign by the national print media

*Andrew Palmer*

## 5.1 Overview

On the face of it, the national print media are thriving, with large numbers of registered titles. But papers are not very widely read in Ukraine, and they have little independent financial strength. That had two major implications for the campaign. Firstly, the print media were likely to be less influential than television in shaping voters' intentions. Secondly, political parties were able to exploit newspapers' financial vulnerability for their own ends, notably by funding particular outlets.

Most of the papers monitored by the team had financial links to a particular party, or to a particular branch of the state power structures, and these ties were visible in the results of the monitoring process. Private media broke no laws in taking strident editorial lines; state-owned papers, however, did thereby contravene Article 35, which forbade "print media with shares belonging to the state...from expressing support or any kind of preference in their materials or programmes to any party".

State papers were nevertheless careful to comply with the electoral law on free and equal access. Statistics show that *Golos Ukrainy* and *Uryadovy Kurier* did provide approximately 450 cm<sup>2</sup> in promotional space to all participating parties on the dates arranged in February and March. The monitoring team found no breach of the electoral law in this respect.

## 5.2 Quantitative results

The monitoring team scrutinised the coverage of six newspapers. The results discussed here cover the period March 1st 1998 through to March 28th 1998.

A word of warning. It was not possible for the monitoring team to ascertain precisely when money had changed hands in return for coverage. Several interviewees indicated that material which was presented as normal editorial reportage was often paid promotional material provided by parties and candidates.

The monitoring results reflected the ties, openly acknowledged by the paper's editor, between *Den* and the SDPU (o), and the paper's opposition to the government. The SDPU (o) received 7975 cm<sup>2</sup>-worth of coverage in March, second only to the NDP, and was given almost twice as much photo coverage as any other party. Coverage of the SDPU (o) was overwhelmingly positive. (see graph 6)

The NDP actually garnered more attention than any other party—the paper devoted 9575 cm<sup>2</sup> of textual coverage to the NDP and another 987 cm<sup>2</sup> of photos—but the tone of the coverage was consistently negative.

*Den* paid less attention to other parties, but its coverage of other contenders was more neutral in tone. For a paper with a credible editorial reputation, however, the rather scanty coverage

given to the Communists was noticeable. As a significant party which was tipped to perform well in the polls, the activities of the CPU were under-reported.

The deputy editor-in-chief of *Kievskie Vedomosti*, Sergei Rakhmanin, denied affiliation to any particular political party, but did describe the paper as being anti-governmental (see graph 7). The monitoring results largely bore him out. The NDP received by far the most editorial attention during March—15,425 cm<sup>2</sup> compared with 4346 cm<sup>2</sup> for Hromada, the next most visible party. The tone of the NDP coverage was overwhelmingly negative, a stance which was exacerbated by the paper's vehement coverage of the controversial arrest of Mikhail Brodsky, a major shareholder in the paper.

*Kievskie Vedomosti's* most positive coverage was reserved for Hromada, something which may have reflected the presence of one of its editors as a candidate on the party's list. The paper also gave mildly favourable coverage to the SDPU (o), the Socialists, the PTU/LPU and the Reforms and Order Party.

The Communists received more negative coverage than good, but its major cause for complaint was the meagre amount of space it received—a paltry 445 cm<sup>2</sup>. Any paper laying claim to an independent editorial line should have devoted more attention to one of the country's major political forces, however disagreeable to the paper's editors. Other major parties received roughly similar amounts of coverage, however, and the paper generally deserves credit for the broad sweep of its campaign reporting.

Over the course of February and March, this state-owned *Golos Ukrainy* discharged its obligations under the electoral law to provide equal amounts of free advertising space to all of the parties. Editorially, however, reflected both its ownership structure and the political preferences of its editor-in-chief. (see graph 8)

As the parliamentary newspaper, *Golos Ukrainy* focused heavily on the Socialists, whose leader, Oleksandr Moroz, was at that time parliamentary speaker. The Socialists garnered more coverage than any other party bar one—4284 cm<sup>2</sup>—although the team accepts that much of that coverage centred on the official duties of Mr Moroz rather than the election campaign *per se*. More culpably, however, coverage of the Socialists was positive in tone.

The paper also gave favourable attention to Hromada, a stance which is traceable to the prominent position of the editor-in-chief, Sergei Pravdenko, on the Hromada party list. Hromada absorbed 4688 cm<sup>2</sup>-worth of text during March, an amount which cannot be explained away by the paper's official focus on parliamentary activities. Coverage of the party was also positive in tone. By contrast, the NDP, the party most closely connected to the government, received baldly negative coverage.

Did the paper's coverage contravene Article 35 of the electoral law, forbidding the state media to display political preferences? The answer is complicated by the fact that the monitoring results reflected hidden advertising as much as an editorial line: an interview with the paper's deputy editor-in-chief (see below) made it clear that campaign coverage was a commodity to be bought, and that paid advertising was not necessarily marked as such. But while hidden advertising may explain the positive coverage of the Socialists and Hromada, it does not explain the negative coverage of the NDP, nor does it excuse the distorted perspective provided by the paper. The team therefore finds that *Golos Ukrainy* did violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the electoral law in respect of its editorial coverage.

*Silski Visti*, the largest paper in Ukraine displayed roughly similar preferences to *Golos Ukrainy*—no surprise given that its deputy editor-in-chief was one of the top five on the list of the Socialists' and Peasants' parties bloc (see graph 9). The paper gave the most space (4710 cm<sup>2</sup>) and the heftiest photographic attention (174 cm<sup>2</sup>) to the Socialists, and larded its

coverage with positive references. The Socialists were the only party to place direct advertising in the paper.

The Communists did not gain much benefit from their proximity on the political spectrum to the Socialists: the party received a paltry 278 cm<sup>2</sup> of coverage in the whole of March.

The NDP was again on the receiving end of negative coverage. *Silski Visti* dished out 4233 cm<sup>2</sup>-worth of coverage, most of it unfavourable. The Agrarian Party, Rukh and the NEP were also treated negatively.

As a state-owned paper—its founder is the Cabinet of Ministers—*Uryadovy Kurier* fulfilled its obligation to provide a platform for the free publication of parties' electoral programmes (see graph 10). The rest of its coverage was utterly and culpably one-sided, however.

The NDP received an enormous amount of coverage—11,556 cm<sup>2</sup>-worth of text and 985 cm<sup>2</sup>-worth of photographs. More importantly, references to the NDP were uniformly glowing.

By contrast, other parties were egregiously under-reported. The Communists were given 250 cm<sup>2</sup> during March, the Socialists 256 cm<sup>2</sup>, the SDPU (o) 389 cm<sup>2</sup> and Hromada 300 cm<sup>2</sup>. The only party to receive photographic coverage, besides the NDP, was the SDPU (o).

As was the case for *Golos Ukrainy*, the disparity in the amounts of space devoted to the parties may reflect an imbalance in hidden advertising. It could simply be that the NDP pumped a lot of campaign money into *Uryadovy Kurier* and that other parties simply steered clear of the paper. But at the very least, the paper made no effort to provide adequate coverage of its own during the campaign. And the impact of that failure was to supply readers of the paper with a biased perspective of the campaign, violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the electoral law in respect of editorial coverage.

*Vseukrainskie Vedomosti* faithfully reflected its financial links to Hromada. Mr Lazarenko's party was the only one allowed to place direct advertising in its pages, and Hromada's 3951 cm<sup>2</sup> of textual coverage and 811 cm<sup>2</sup> of photographic coverage was favourable in tone (see graph 11).

The NDP came in for the brunt of the paper's negative coverage, earning itself more than twice the amount of space given to Hromada in the process. But these two parties aside, *Vseukrainskie Vedomosti* did creditably in providing relatively neutral coverage of a broad sweep of parties. It was particularly noteworthy that the SDPU (o), with which the paper is engaged in a controversial libel battle, received a fair volume of coverage whose overall tone was basically unprejudiced.

### 5.3 Print media: summary of the quantitative analysis

The quantitative results showed a pattern of partisanship on the part of individual papers, which tallied precisely with their loyalties to their owners and financial backers. An array of papers with conspicuous political loyalties is, of itself, no cause for concern.

The electoral law on free access was adhered to, and although state-owned papers were guilty of playing fast and loose with the requirement that they take a neutral editorial line, a significant number of political parties had access to a friendly newspaper. For instance, Hromada could address its electorate through the pages of *Vseukrainskie Vedomosti* and *Golos Ukrainy*, the SDPU (o) could target *Den's* readership and the NDP could exploit favourable coverage in the pages of *Uryadovy Kurier*.

By reading a range of papers, voters were therefore able to tap into a broad stream of political views. In this sense, print media provided a valuable corrective to the election coverage by broadcast media, which gave almost no voice to opposition parties.

Nor was the print media's campaign coverage satisfactory, however. The unashamed bias of almost every newspaper which was monitored (*Kievskie Vedomosti* stands out as an exception) diminished the value of each as a source of independent analysis and evaluation. Even-handed reportage of the campaign was conspicuous by its absence: most papers devoted the vast bulk of their coverage to the parties they most liked and most disliked, or to the parties which had the biggest advertising budgets.

These failings disadvantaged not just voters, who struggled to distinguish a morass of 30 parties, but also some of the parties themselves. New parties which had a low public profile were given very little chance to gain recognition among the electorate; and poorer parties were denied the same sort of access to media as their richer counterparts.

Of the major political parties, the Communists had most cause for complaint: despite being one of the most important forces in the campaign (and the most successful party of all once the votes had been counted), they received very little coverage from the most influential print media outlets. Some might see this as ironic—that a party with a rather subdued media profile should perform so well. Others may wonder whether more vigorous analysis of the party platforms would have helped dent the Communists' support.

## 5.4 Qualitative analysis

The monitoring team's interviews with editors, journalists and politicians centred on three major themes, each of which had an impact on the coverage of this campaign:

■ **The financial pressures** which bear down on Ukrainian newspapers, from poor retail revenues to meagre advertising spend. Papers were consequently dependent on owners and financiers, many of which are political parties, and were seduced by the commercial opportunity represented by the election campaign. The effect on the distribution of space which this occasioned, and the advantage it gave to those parties which owned papers and those which had healthy campaign budgets, is clear from the quantitative results.

Editors interviewed by the monitoring team were generally clear-headed about the financial realities of their situation. They accepted that papers were not yet viable self-financing businesses, and that they therefore needed outside financing. But the assertion by a number of editors that they still had control over the editorial line of their paper appears questionable given the quantitative results.

■ **The lack of credibility** of print media as a source of independent analysis; and the lack of objective campaign coverage which voters were given. The financial vulnerability of the print media provides a partial explanation for the lack of editorial analysis, as does the political pressure which many papers claimed to be under (see below).

Other factors also came into play. There was the difficulty of writing cogently about a campaign with 30 parties, and the problem of conducting serious analysis of parties and candidates whose policies often seemed undeveloped.

Additionally, the monitoring team found little evidence of a genuine understanding of the role of media as an independent source of opinion and reportage. The deputy editor of *Golos Ukrainy* saw nothing wrong with the paper's failure to mark advertising as paid for, for instance, despite the confusion this was bound to cause readers. Most editors interviewed had no intention of

running pre-election editorials as a platform for airing their own views, and at least one interviewee perceived editorials as diminishing the paper's informative value.

■ The **political pressures** on newspapers, manifested via the power structures' control of distribution networks, customs posts (a row over difficulties in importing certain Russian titles simmered throughout the campaign) and other channels of influence.

There were repeated allegations that the government and the presidential administration in particular exercised considerable leverage over newspapers. Accusations were levelled by a number of editors that tax inspections were used as a device to unsettle opposition papers, and that individual journalists were given warnings to follow a particular editorial course.

#### 5.4.1 The major incidents

Two incidents in particular came up repeatedly as evidence of political interference in the workings of the print media—the arrest of a major shareholder in *Kievskie Vedomosti*, and the suspension of *Pravda Ukrainy*.

Mikhail Brodsky, the *Kievskie Vedomosti* shareholder and a businessman and candidate for deputy, was arrested and charged with illegal trade activity in mid-March. Allegations swirled that the arrest had been made for political reasons, in a bid to silence Mr Brodsky and to send a warning to the paper not to carry further anti-governmental articles.

The team cannot speculate on the real reason for Mr Brodsky's detention, but the manner and timing of his arrest can clearly be interpreted as a veiled threat to the editorial staff at *Kievskie Vedomosti*. Events such as these lend credence to fears that a culture of self-censorship could take hold among Ukrainian journalists. As such, whatever the rights or wrongs of Mr Brodsky's case, his arrest had the potential to affect the quality of campaign reporting negatively.

The suspension of *Pravda Ukrainy*, a paper with financial links to Hromada and a correspondingly pro-Hromada editorial line, at the end of January 1998 caused the team even greater concern.

According to the deputy minister of information, the paper was shut on the grounds of registration irregularities and a breach of the electoral law. The registration problem surfaced in the autumn of last year, when the paper formed a joint venture with an unidentified offshore company, thereby necessitating re-registration. The legal documents which were eventually supplied for this purpose were inadequate, argued the ministry.

According to the ministry, the paper also spent money which it had received from an unidentified offshore company and from Hromada via a charitable fund, to distribute the paper free of charge. That, charged the ministry, was in violation of Article 35 of the electoral law, which forbids "the conduct of pre-election campaign publicity, followed by the provision of voters with goods, securities, credits, lotteries, money and services free of charge or under privileged conditions".

But even accepting that the laws had been breached, worrying questions remain. It is unclear that the Ministry of Information had legal competence to order *Pravda Ukrainy's* suspension. The Ministry itself maintains that in the absence of a legally registered founder, that right fell to it by default. But its argument that the paper could launch an appeal against its decision is disingenuous: an election campaign is quickly over while judicial procedures are easily delayed.

Nor is it clear to the team that every possible step was taken by the authorities before the ministry turned to the drastic option of suspension. There are nagging doubts about the timing of the suspension, given that the dispute over the paper's registration stretched back several months and no action had been taken before then. In addition, enforcement of the law

prohibiting free distribution of goods and services was inconsistent—several regional newspapers used the same strategy without suffering any legal consequences, and the deputy minister himself appeared to play down its importance in his interview with the team.

The monitoring team therefore wishes to place its concern over *Pravda Ukrainy's* suspension on record. Although the paper was still somehow being printed and distributed, it clearly could not report and comment on the campaign unimpeded, and there are grave suspicions that the newspaper was suspended for political reasons.

## 5.5 Print media: summary of the qualitative analysis

- State papers gave free access to political parties in accordance with the letter of the law, but their clear editorial preferences contravened the spirit of the law.
- Almost every paper monitored displayed overwhelming political bias, usually in accordance with their ownership structures and financial dependencies. This at least gave many opposition parties the sort of access to the electorate denied to them by national broadcast media. The glaring exception was the Communist Party, which was badly under-reported.
- The clear prejudices of individual newspapers harmed their ability to act as independent intermediaries between voter and politician. Print media did not adequately evaluate the choices before voters, and in their failure to mark paid materials clearly, newspapers actually did voters a disservice.
- The lack of commercial viability of the newspapers makes them vulnerable to financial dependency, and the monitoring team heard widespread and convincing testimony of political pressure being applied by the executive branch in particular. The suspension of *Pravda Ukrainy* appeared to support this testimony.

In sum, the print media may not have given any single party an advantage but its coverage did disadvantage almost every voter. Long-term structural problems explain the poverty of their reporting and comment.

## 6 The election campaign in Lviv

*Andrew Palmer*

### 6.1 Political situation

Lviv is the capital of the Lviv region and serves as the political, economic and cultural heart of Western Ukraine. The city has long been a centre of Ukrainian nationalism, and the integrity of the Ukrainian nation consequently featured prominently as a campaign issue, along with the effects of the country's economic implosion.

The prevailing ideological consensus favours parties on the right and centre of the political spectrum—those which stress the consolidation of Ukrainian independence. Rukh, which in the 1994 elections was the dominant political force in Western Ukraine, remains a substantial player, but the emergence of other centrist parties, notably the NDP, has fragmented its support.

Parties on the left-wing, such as the Communists and the Socialists, have scant support in the west of the country. Indeed, it appeared that leftist parties made little effort to campaign vigorously in Lviv. Posters and placards advertising centrist and rightist parties were ubiquitous; those backing the left were conspicuous by their absence. When candidates from the Socialist and Communist camps campaigned in person, the monitoring team received testimony to the effect that hecklers routinely drowned them out.

### 6.2 Media situation

The local media landscape is vibrant. There is a selection of daily and weekly newspapers, whose print quality is generally excellent; a choice of radio stations; and in addition to the regional state TV broadcaster, a highly successful private station called TV Mist.

Commercial pressures on media are nevertheless as intense in Lviv as they are elsewhere in the country (although both TV Mist and Lviv Wave, a local radio station, claim to be self-financing). As such, many media outlets viewed the campaign as a splendid commercial opportunity. Every interviewee visited by the team was unequivocal that the proportion of paid electoral material in the media far outweighed the proportion of unpaid material, particularly in the final stages of the campaign.

Politically, local media outlets tended not to be identifiable with particular parties. On the other hand, the Lviv media do reflect the political consensus in the region. The most influential outlets in Lviv are, broadly speaking, centrist or right-wing in their orientation; the left wing does not have a significant mouthpiece. In meetings with editors, journalists and politicians, the Communists and Socialists were repeatedly referred to as anti-state and anti-constitutional and therefore unworthy of coverage. In addition, several interviewees expressed a commercial anxiety: that coverage of leftist parties would cost them their viewers and readers.

### 6.3 Media coverage of the election campaign

The team monitored coverage of the following media outlets: Kanal 6, the local state TV broadcaster, TV Mist, *Vysoki Zamok*, *Za Vilnu Ukrainu* (both published three times weekly), and *Expres*, a weekly publication.

The results are subject to a familiar qualification: items identified by the monitoring team as news may in fact have been paid for and placed as hidden advertising. A regional representative of ICTV estimated that 99.5% of all electoral coverage in the Lviv media was paid for.

Regarding **television**, state media adhered to the formal precepts of the election law and provided opportunities to all of the parties to present their platforms. In general, coverage of the campaign was active, with TV Mist deserving special commendation for its broadcasting of special election programming without being under any legal obligation to do so.

Editorially, however, the coverage was badly skewed towards centrist and right-wing parties and against left-wing parties. This bias took two forms—quantity of coverage and tone of coverage:

- Kanal 6, the state broadcaster, gave the heaviest coverage in its news items to the NDP, the SDPU (o) and Rukh. The Socialists, a highly significant political party, garnered just 17 seconds' worth of coverage in the course of March. The tone of coverage was slanted to favour Rukh and the National Front in particular, and to disadvantage the Communists.
- TV Mist did better, but was hardly faultless. The NDP received almost four times as much coverage in news programmes as any other party. The Communists and Hromada were the main targets of Mist's critical editorial coverage.

Centrists and right-wing political parties were vigorous in their use of television as an advertising vehicle. The heaviest advertisers on Kanal 6 were Rukh, the SDPU (o), the National Front and the Agrarian Party; the most active on TV Mist were the Agrarian Party and the PTU/LPU. Left-wing parties, by contrast, took hardly any advertising time, and there was testimony to the effect that prices were raised to dissuade them from doing so, in contravention of the electoral law. The lack of advertising may also have reflected a decision by the left to concentrate resources elsewhere in the country.

Regarding **print media**, a similar pattern emerged. Editorial coverage favoured parties such as Rukh, the NDP and the SDPU (o), and was negative in tone towards the Communists in particular. *Vysoki Zamok* made the greatest effort to be even-handed: its coverage of the Socialists lagged only marginally behind that devoted to Rukh, and was neutral in tone.

There was generally less advertising in the print media than on television, but right-wing and centrist parties were responsible for virtually all of the promotional material which was placed. The Communists and Socialists took out hardly any advertising between them in the Lviv print media—in the case of *Za Vilnu Ukrainu*, and doubtless others, because the paper was not prepared to carry their materials.

### 6.4 Summary

The bias in the Lviv medias' coverage of the campaign reflected the political status quo in the region. As such, the Communists (in particular) and the Socialists bore the brunt of negative coverage, and were unwilling or unable to place significant quantities of advertising. When asked how he would run the CPU's media campaign, Boris Korpan of Rukh's Lviv

headquarters was adamant that traditional advertising would not work for the Communists in Western Ukraine, because of the prevailing political mood and because of restricted access to media.

By acting as a mirror to the political predilections of the Lviv electorate, the media were consequently of diminished value as a source of independent analysis and opinion. That role was particularly crucial when 30 parties were jostling for voters' attention; when concurrent local elections provided a further distraction; and when so many editors and journalists were themselves participating in the polls (local and national) as candidates. The Lviv media have not yet learnt to act as objective intermediaries between voter and candidate, and as such they failed to represent the interests of the electorate adequately.

These findings broadly echo the results of the Institute's monitoring of the 1994 parliamentary elections in Lviv. Yet if the lot of the voter hadn't improved, the political parties were generally better off than they had been four years ago. The sophistication of the parties' electoral strategies and promotions had developed markedly. Even parties on the centre and right of the political spectrum, such as Rukh and the NDP, tailored much of their campaigning away from local mass media, and towards special events or the distribution of their own materials. And as the example of the previously obscure PZU showed, snappy television advertising alone was sufficient to boost a party's profile significantly. In this sense, parties across the spectrum were less dependent on the media than they had been in 1994.



# 7 The election campaign in Kharkiv

*Margot Light*

## 7.1 Political situation

The most important political event in Kharkiv in the run-up to the election was President Kuchma's decision, following Madeline Albright's visit to Ukraine at the beginning of March, to refrain from supplying turbines for Iran's nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Under the plan, the Kharkiv-based Turboatom plant was to act as a subcontractor to Russia in supplying one or two turbines for Bushehr. The contract had radically improved the employment situation in Kharkiv and its cancellation has severe repercussions on Kharkiv's economy. It did little to improve the electoral prospects of the NDP in Kharkiv.

Even before this decision was taken, however, it had become clear that no political party dominated the political scene in Kharkiv. The local elections and the single candidate majoritarian national elections appeared to preoccupy people rather more than the national party list elections during the election campaign. Moreover, the fact that Kharkiv had been governed by an acting mayor since the resignation of Yevgeny Kushnaryov, the former mayor, in 1996 to become the head of President Leonid Kuchma's administration, gave particular importance to the mayoral election.

Nevertheless, 35 of the approximately 50 political parties registered in Ukraine have regional offices in Kharkiv. The CPU, NDP, SPU-SeIPU, Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc, SDPU(o), SLON and the NEP were particularly active during the election campaign. The CPU, NDP, SDPU(o), Agrarian Party, Hromada, and the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc all fielded candidates for Kharkiv's single-mandate constituencies.

## 7.2 Media situation

A total of 37 state-controlled publications appear in Kharkiv region. Of these the most prominent are the weekly *Gorodskaya gazeta* (circulation 45,000), established by the city council, and *Slobidskii krai* (circulation 33,000), published three times per week, and the weekly *Panorama* (circulation 5,715), both established by the Regional Rada. The commercial papers with the largest circulation are *Vremya* (circulation 26,000), which appears twice or three times per week, *Vechernii Kharkov* (circulation 21,000), which is published four times a week, and the weekly *Sobytiye* (circulation 30,000). Although the population of Kharkiv is predominantly Russian, of the 157 newspapers which are published regularly in the city and region, 52 are published in Ukrainian, 39 in Russian and 66 publish material in both languages.

A striking feature of the Kharkiv print media is the publication of a large number of free newspapers, largely devoted to leisure pursuits and advertising. Because they are free, they are widely read and extremely influential. The weekly *Telenedelya*, for example, has a circulation of 97,000, while *Kharkovskii kur'er*, which appears twice a week, has a circulation of 65,000. In a survey conducted at the beginning of 1997, 46 per cent of the respondents found *Telenedelya* the most interesting Kharkiv newspaper to read, while 14 per cent preferred *Vechernii Kharkov*.

The system of granting TV licenses in Kharkiv is opaque and directors of TV companies reported that they are unable to establish what conditions need to be fulfilled to ensure the renewal of their licenses. Tonis-Centre, for example, which used to broadcast around the clock on Channel 7, lost 6 hours of broadcast time to ATN in 1997 without any explanation. Five other local TV companies broadcast for shorter periods: Simon is on air from 7 a.m. to 3 a.m.; Favorit broadcasts from 7 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 7 p.m. to 1 a.m.; Kharkov ITRK from 10 a.m. to 12.30 p.m., and from 2.30 p.m. to 11 p.m.; Orion from 8 a.m. to midnight; and Fora-TV broadcasts from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 5 p.m. to midnight.

There have been striking improvements since 1994 in production standards in the print media. Many Kharkiv newspapers are modelled on, and are beginning to resemble, western European papers. Television production standards have also improved a great deal since 1994. This is reflected in the quality of documentary programmes, and it was even more strikingly evident in the sophistication of political advertising during the election campaign. On one level, this has led to a professionalization of the media in Kharkiv. The same professionalization cannot, however, be discerned in the way journalists, editors and television directors view their role. In reply to questions on this subject, they generally agreed that the media has a duty to inform the public, but the belief that the media should act as the fourth estate was not widespread.

### 7.3 Performance of the media during the election campaign

The Kharkiv media actively engaged in covering the election campaign both in terms of transmitting political programmes, and in taking advantage of the commercial opportunities presented by the demand for advertising space. There was no limit on the amount of money that could be spent on political advertising for the national elections (there were limits for local elections). Inevitably, therefore, richer parties and candidates had greater opportunities to advertise themselves than poorer. In *Vechernii Kharkov*, for example, SPU-SelPU placed 1,390 cm<sup>2</sup> and the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc placed 763 cm<sup>2</sup> of advertising in the period 01.03 to 28.03. No other parties advertised in this newspaper. *Slobidskii krai*, on the other hand, published 730 cm<sup>2</sup> of advertising from SDPU(o) in the same period, but no other political advertisements. The Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc also advertised heavily on ATN (Tonis) television channel (4,820 seconds, compared to the next heaviest advertisers, NDP, with 1,166 seconds and SLON with 486 seconds) in the period 01.03 to 28.03, and on Simon (4,001 seconds, compared to NDP which placed 120 seconds of advertisements on Simon in the same period).

In Kharkiv, as elsewhere in Ukraine, far more attention was paid in the local media to local elections and the single candidate majoritarian national elections than the national party list elections. A particular feature of Kharkov was the fact that about 30 journalists were candidates in the elections for the city council. It is not surprising, therefore, the local media was particularly partisan in its coverage of the local elections.

Nevertheless, all parties and individual contenders were allotted the free time to which they were legally entitled on state television and radio and were afforded space in state newspapers. The regional electoral commission reported no complaints about free coverage. As elsewhere in Ukraine, television is more influential and far-reaching than the printed media. However, the large number of contenders for each place at all levels of the elections had the inevitable effect of reducing the amount of free time available on air to each individual party and candidate. This both aroused the dissatisfaction of the candidates and overwhelmed the voter with a confusing (and often stupefyingly boring) abundance of candidates, programmes, and political messages.

Editors and directors of television companies had not thought it necessary to give their employees specific instructions about fair and impartial coverage of the election campaign.

Furthermore, they did not accept that they had a responsibility to give full information. Many journalists believed that it was both their duty and a necessity to prevent extremist candidates (whether left or right) from being elected. As a result, only a small number of the thirty parties contending the elections were featured in newspaper articles published by the three papers monitored in Kharkiv. On the other hand, while the NDP was accorded the largest amount of space overall, and had no critical coverage, there was some diversity in the other parties criticised by the three newspapers.

*Vechernii Kharkov*, for example, carried neutral articles about the NEP (203 cm<sup>2</sup>), CPU (173.25 cm<sup>2</sup>), the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (52 cm<sup>2</sup>), and SLON (20.21 cm<sup>2</sup>). It also published positive articles about NDP (546 cm<sup>2</sup>), SPU-SelPU (315 cm<sup>2</sup>), and the Green Party (5 cm<sup>2</sup>), while it gave negative coverage to Rukh (247 cm<sup>2</sup>), SDPU(o) (13.05 cm<sup>2</sup>) and Hromada (5 cm<sup>2</sup>). It did not cover any other parties.

*Vremya* published articles about a slightly larger number of parties, giving neutral coverage to Rukh (64.4 cm<sup>2</sup>), the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (375.6 cm<sup>2</sup>), SLON (229 cm<sup>2</sup>), the Green Party (14 cm<sup>2</sup>), and NEP (12.6 cm<sup>2</sup>). It published a great deal of positive material about the NDP (1685.99 cm<sup>2</sup>), while its coverage of the CPU (782.7 cm<sup>2</sup>), SPU-SelPU (827.9 cm<sup>2</sup>), Hromada (431.04 cm<sup>2</sup>), SDPU(o) (266.6 cm<sup>2</sup>), and UNA (85.35 cm<sup>2</sup>) was rather negative in tone.

*Slobidskii krai*, on the other hand, published very positive articles about the SDPU(o) (226.2 cm<sup>2</sup>) and fairly positive material about Rukh (213.5 cm<sup>2</sup>) and SPU-SelPU (1331 cm<sup>2</sup>). Its coverage of the CPU (791 cm<sup>2</sup>), Hromada (161.2 cm<sup>2</sup>) and SLON (311 cm<sup>2</sup>) ranged from extremely negative to rather negative. But this newspaper gave by far the greatest amount of space to the NDP (3436.2 cm<sup>2</sup>) and a neutral tone was adopted in the coverage. Neutral attention was also paid to the Agrarian Party (44 cm<sup>2</sup>), the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (166.45 cm<sup>2</sup>), the Green Party (35 cm<sup>2</sup>), NEP (14 cm<sup>2</sup>), and UNA (21 cm<sup>2</sup>).

Kharkiv television companies also covered a limited range of political parties during news and special election programmes in the period 01.03 to 28.03. Simon, for example, did not carry any news items about the Agrarian Party, the Green Party, NEP or UNA. Tonis also ignored the Agrarian Party, the Green Party and NEP, as well as Hromada and SLON, while ATN (Tonis) carried no news about the Green Party and NEP. As far as those parties which were covered were concerned, ATN (Tonis) was favourably disposed towards the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc to which it devoted 997 seconds in news, and 472 seconds in special programmes, as well as to SPU-SelPU, according it 1,543 seconds of news and 28 seconds in special programmes. ATN (Tonis) also gave favourable coverage to SDPU(o), to which it devoted 708 seconds of news and 416 seconds in special programmes, and to Hromada, the Agrarian Party, and SLON, given 22 seconds, 131 seconds, and 79 seconds of news respectively. The party which received the most airtime on ATN (Tonis) was the NDP (4984 seconds of news and 764 seconds in special programmes) and the tone was neutral. Rukh was also covered neutrally, but it only received 36 seconds of news time and 4 seconds in special programmes. Both the CPU and UNA received very little coverage (14 seconds and 9 seconds of news respectively) and in both cases the tone was negative.

Tonis did not broadcast special election programmes and it covered a smaller number of parties than ATN (Tonis) in its news programmes. SPU-SelPU received by far the most airtime (1754 seconds), compared to the next highest accorded to the CPU (392 seconds), followed by the NDP (238 seconds) and the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (200 seconds). Whereas SPU-SelPU and CPU, as well as the SDPU(o) (54 seconds) and UNA (34 seconds), were criticised, however, the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc and the NDP received neutral coverage.

Simon gave the most (and the most positive) airtime to the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc (2073 seconds in news and 3328 seconds in special programmes, in addition to the 4001 seconds of advertising mentioned above). It was followed by the NDP (1157 seconds in news and 22 seconds in special programmes) which was given neutral coverage. Other parties

which were given neutral coverage on Simon were SPU-SelPU (565 seconds of news and 24 seconds of special programming), SDPU(o) (544 seconds of news and 24 seconds of special programming) and SLON (42 seconds of news and 438 seconds of special programming). Rukh was accorded 50 seconds of news coverage which was slightly positive in tone, while the CPU (217 seconds of news and 50 seconds in special programmes) and Hromada (41 seconds of news) were covered in a negative tone.

During the 1994 election campaign it was frequently said that it was cheaper for political parties and individual politicians to bribe journalists than to buy time on air or space in newspapers. Many journalists and editors in Kharkiv agreed that this had been the case in 1994, but claimed that it was no longer possible in 1998.

Everyone concerned with the media in Kharkiv claimed that quite apart from controlling the state media, the administration (local and national) had many levers through which it could harass the media. However, there had been only one serious complaint concerning harassment from the local media in Kharkiv, by Tonis-Centre television company, and the circumstances were sufficiently controversial to make it impossible to discern whether or not there was political motivation. In an incident which is probably related, a prominent television journalist, Aleksandr Kulikov, who had recently resigned from Tonis-Centre, was beaten up at the entrance to his house in the early hours of 24 March. However, the assailant has not been identified and it can only be speculated that these events were connected to the elections.

The most frequent complaints from political parties in Kharkiv came from smaller and/or poorer parties and concerned their access to the media. Their representatives felt that although they had been allotted the free time and space due to them, the local media favoured some parties, and particularly the NDP, the 'party of power', in news and editorial coverage of the election campaign. Similar accusations were made by representatives of Hromada and the CPU, neither of which are small parties. As we have seen, the quantitative analysis of the media coverage of the election campaign gives considerable support to their allegations.

Both for this reason, and because the programmes and characteristics of all the parties contending the parliamentary elections did not feature in the Kharkiv media, the media's conduct during the election campaign fell short of offering full information to the electorate. Moreover, despite the diversity of parties favoured by the media, the information that it did publish and broadcast was by no means impartial.

## 7.4 Kharkiv election results

The turnout in the single-mandate elections to the Verkhovna Rada on 28 March in Kharkiv region was 64.32%, compared to 70.99% in 1994. Of the deputies elected from the 14 single-mandate constituencies in the Kharkiv region, 11 stood as independent candidates, 2 stood as members of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and one stood as a member of the Agrarian Party.

In the party list elections, the Kharkiv electorate voted as follows for the parties which crossed the 4% threshold:

Communist Party of Ukraine:	35.314%
Rukh:	3.236%
SPU-SelPU:	5.913%
Green Party:	5.453%
Popular Democratic Party:	5.957%
Hromada:	2.483%
Progressive Socialist Party:	9.906%
SDPU-o:	3.483%

# 8 The elections campaign in Simferopol

*Stefaan Verhulst*

## 8.1 Political situation

Simferopol (population: 358,000) is the crossroads of Crimea where the northern plains end and southern mountains end. The autonomous republic of Crimea has historically and demographically strong links with Russia, which explains the popularity of a pro-Russian politics. Moreover, according to Leonid Grach, leader of the Communist Party in Simferopol, most voters wish "to bring the past back", a factor used by his party in their electoral strategy.

In general, the political scene in Crimea is dominated by six political formations or clans:

- 1) The Party of Economic Renaissance (NEP) of which key figures are Anatoliy Gritsenko, head of Crimean Parliament, Anushavan Danelyan, his deputy, Vladimir Shevjov, head of the party and some mayors of Crimea– as a result they have a strong position in local elections.
- 2) Soyuz – supported by parliamentary fraction called "the republicans". Key figures are: Lev Mirimskij, member of Ukrainian parliament and leader of Soyuz, Vladimir Klychnikov, member of Crimean Parliament, Kisiljov, representative of the president in Simferopol and Ermak , mayor of Simferopol.
- 3) Clan of Anatoliy Franchuk and his son Igor. The first is on the list of Agrarian Party and Igor Franchuk is connected with the People's Democratic Party. Vladimir Marchenko, temporary mayor of Yalta and Alexandr Balagura, one of the Crimean Ministers, also belong to this group, of which the main aim is the removal of the Party of Economic Renaissance.
- 4) The People's Opposition Union of Crimea, a non-governmental organisation connected with the Communist Party; with Leonid Grach, First secretary and Lentun Bezaziev, governor of a gas company.
- 5) Crimean Tatars who have a degree of self government are called Mejlis; they are currently internally divided between the Moslim Party and the rest of Crimean Tatars who support Rukh. Mustafa Djemilev is head of Mejlis.
- 6) The People's Democratic Party is especially active in the north of Crimea and in towns such as Yalta, Sebastopol, Evpatoria but is considered to be not as strong as the other blocs mentioned above.

The issues which dominated the pre-electoral campaign were threefold: first, and most important, economic policy (inflation, investment, etc.) Secondly, the tackling of widespread criminal activities (or "mafia practices"). Thirdly, the prevention of an ethnic conflict and civil war. The last was reinforced by a clash between nearly 6,000 Crimean Tatars and militia during a demonstration in Simferopol on March 24. The Tatars were demanding the right to vote in the elections. The problem stems from the fact that some 165,000 Tatars now live in Crimea and 50% have not been granted Ukrainian citizenship, meaning that they cannot vote.

## 8.2 Media situation in Simferopol

### 8.2.1 Broadcasting

There are four TV channels in Simferopol. The first two are also active in other parts of Crimea -- the last two only in Simferopol, but who have an agreement with Inter to transmit some of their programmes to all parts of the Crimea.

- State Television and Radio Company Crimea
- Black Sea Television Company (Chernomorskaya Telecompania)
- Imperia TV (owned by Imperia Corporation)
- Zhisa TV (also controlled by Imperia Corporation)

There are five major radio stations: Radio Assol (Black Sea TV Station), Radio Europa Plus (transnational company), Trans-m radio (private company), Radio Maks (Imperia corporation), Radio Madjor (founded by the state company but now non-governmental) and the State Radio station Crimea.

### 8.2.2 Print media

As elsewhere in Ukraine, the Crimean print media has suffered from the decline in readership and subsequent advertising revenue. There are 300 registered of which 150 are published. Some of them are printed by local authorities, national minorities and political parties. Most regional newspapers are published weekly with the exception of Krymskaya Pravda (non-governmental, chief editor is head of Parliamentary committee of mass media and opposition to government, circulation is 65,000) , Krymskaya Gazeta (founded by Council of Minister of Crimea, called Franchuk's newspaper, circulation is 63,000) and Krymskie Izvestia (founded by Crimean Parliament, 30,000) and Krymskoie Vremya (founder is Imperia Corporation, supports Soyuz, with a circulation of 50,000). Among the weeklies are Krymskaya Svitlitsa (published in Ukrainian, ), Oydacha (distributed free of charge in each postbox in Simferopol, circulation is +/-180,000, and published by Imperia Corporation – supports Soyuz Party) and Communist Crimea.

Important to stress is that there is still only one print company in Simferopol but in other local centres and cities (eg. Sebastopol) there are competitors. As a result of the competition it is cheaper for some newspapers of Simferopol to print in Sebastopol.

## 8.3 Background

Most sources confirm that independence of the media in Crimea is almost non existent. According to Lilya R. Budzhurova, director of the Crimean Association of Free Journalists: "Economics is at the heart of the crisis". First, newspapers were forced to find outside investors, because of the rising costs, who often manipulate their investments to political advantage. Second, unemployment among journalists (especially TV) is high and because of the potential risk to be sacked (the so called "reduction of staff" strategy) journalists accept the "rules of the game" and support the political interests of their employer. In order to tackle these problems the Crimean Association of Free Journalists has issued a Memorandum in which they underline the importance of political independence and state that: "The elections are not their war," (i.e. journalists should cover but not participate in the elections). Another positive development is the creation of a Press Club, an initiative of the radio station Assol with the support of the Soros Foundation, where journalists and politicians can meet in an open environment. Similarly, IREX ProMedia opened a Press Center in September 1997 which supports the development of independent media in Simferopol (by creating access to several sources such as newspapers, Internet, etc and organising conferences to increase the awareness of journalistic ethics). Tatiana Krasikova of Black Sea Television station also mentioned that due to competition, news coverage and quality of programming in general has improved.

However over the last two years, Crimea has seen an increasing amount of court cases against journalists. Most of them deal with so-called violations of respect. A criminal case was for instance opened against Crimean journalist Tatyana Korobova on charges of libelling Ukrainian parliamentarian Lev Mirimskiy who objected to her writing about his criminal connections, although she presented the court with documents (given by the police) in support of her allegations. Numerous other examples were given. Article 7 of the Civil Code allows anyone, including public officials, to sue for damages if circulated information, including a publication, is untrue or if it insults a person's honour or dignity. Journalists complain that the law is biased against them because it does not limit damages.

Other difficulties given are the lack of legal support and the fact that judges can be influenced. As a result there are until now no precedents in which a journalist has won a case. The only strategy that can be used according to Lilya Budzhurova is making journalists and the public aware of the irregularities. This has proven to be successful. For example, the case mentioned above was dropped only after the local journalistic community appealed to the President. In June 1997 police confiscated equipment of the Vecherniy Sevastopol newspaper in Crimea after it accused the local mayor of corruption and criticised the city court. The editor of the paper was sentenced to 10 days in jail for refusing to publish an apology, but was released after journalists' protests.

However, a constitutional court decision has undermined further press freedom, according to the Crimean Association of Free Journalists. In October 1997, the court interpreted Ukraine's Law on Information to prohibit not only the collection, but also the storage, use and distribution of personal information gathered without an individual's consent. Among the data classified as "confidential information" that can not be gathered without one's consent is e.g. an individual's education and marital status, religious affiliation, health, assets and even date and place of birth.

Thus both economical and legal pressures are influencing the independence of journalists and the media. In Crimea however a third pressure can be identified: mafia hoods and corrupt officials are also working together to stifle the press. All persons interviewed mentioned the infiltration of "criminals" into the media. As a result reporting on organised crime and corruption in the Government, including misconduct by selected high-ranking cabinet and administration officials, is becoming increasingly bold. Four financial clans were identified by most interviewees as having pronounced political interests:

- Imperia Corporation, which is seen in the general public to have links with the clan "Bashmaki" and to be Party Soyuz orientated. It controls (cfr. Above) almost 5 newspapers, 2 TV companies, a radiostation and their own advertising company,
- the group of companies such as Intercont Bank, Stock company Selena, etc. linked to the clan "Salem" and connected with the Party of Economic Renaissance, which is in charge of state TV and radio, and has interests in press and publishing,
- the Tatar clan, connected with Mejlis, which dominates the Tatar edition of the state broadcasting and five newspapers, such as the newspaper Avdet, Golos Crima, etc (two of them are published in Tatar). It also is financially supported through their own bank (Krym-Yurt) and foundation ("Krym") created by the leader of Mejlis, Mustafa Jemilev.
- a group of allegedly corrupt politicians and representatives of the executive power, linked with Kiev politicians, which influences the state media.

This oligopolistic ownership structure of the media and its political network in Simferopol was cited as one of the main reasons of the biased pre-election campaign.

## 8.4 Pre-election campaign

Leonid Grach, leader of the Communist party described the pre-election campaign in Simferopol as an information war with the *leitmotiv* "whoever pays the piper, calls the tune". His conclusion was that the informational field was destroyed because of the presence of financially backed power blocs ("criminals") who can afford political advertising on tv and at the same time through their political and business network have easy access to the (state) media. As a result the media coverage is polarised between left and right.

The most significant media-related event in Simferopol was the temporary closure of the Black Sea TV Station. Under the Decree of the president of Ukraine of January 3, 1995, *The Radio Broadcasting, Radio Communication and Television Concern (RRT)*, is the sole entity running communication channels and major transmitters. They act as a gatekeeper to the airwaves. The regional branch of RRT in Crimea decided to refuse access to its transmitting systems to Black Sea TV station a few weeks (3rd of March) before the elections. The official reason was that they had not signed a treaty with the Crimean Branch of RRT and their so-called absence of technical possibilities. According to Tatjana Krasikova, director of Black Sea TV, the main reason lay in their political independence. They are the only non-governmental organisation that gives equal access to all parties, at least those who can afford political advertising. This internal freedom resulted in political pressure and consequent closure. After campaigning by the Crimean Association of Free Journalists and the whole of the Crimean media, together with some official efforts the Black Sea TV Station was again turned on without any explanation. The situation will however be re-evaluated after the elections, which put the channel in an insecure position with negative consequences for their advertising revenue. Tatjana Krasikova described it as "qualified rude political pressure". Other indirect mechanisms for exerting pressure consisted of politically motivated visits by inspectors (tax, broadcasting, etc.) and the threat to close down the station because of late payments of the licence fee. The last seemed to be unequal and not regulated.

Another violation was the distribution free of charge to most voters of the newspaper Oydacha, transformed into an almost "political advertising sheet", supporting the candidate Mirimsky (Party Soyuz), owner and founder of Imperia Corporation of No 8 and 10 in February 1998. The latter is a violation of article 35, point 11 of the Election Law. The same article was used for closing down Pravda Ukrainy, but in Simferopol no action was taken.

## 8.5 Media performance (quantitative)

During the last month before the elections, PTU/LPU was more present in the news coverage of the State Television and Radio Company Crimea than any other party. The difference with Soyuz was however not that significant except that Soyuz was together with the Agrarian Party covered more positively. SDPU was the major advertiser but at the same time appeared less in the news than any other party except for Bloc Sion and UNA, which were completely absent. On All Black Sea Television Company (Chernomorskaya Telecompania) Hromada was significantly dominant but rather negative, followed by Soc/SelPU and NDP (both neutral) which was the second largest advertiser. The main advertiser was the Bloc SLON which partly explains partly the overwhelming positive tonality towards SLON.

In the print media Krymskaya Pravda contained no outspoken advertising for any party but was clearly pro-Agrarian Party. In contrast, NEP also received also a lot of attention but it was significantly negative. It was interesting that all parties were mentioned, be it positive – such as CPU, NRU, SDPU(u) and PZU or negative – such as Soyuz, NDP and Hromada, or more neutral – such as Soc/SelPu, Bloc SLON, UNA and PTU/LPU. The same tendencies were monitored in Krymskaya Gazeta with the Agrarian Party as the dominant player – the

difference however lay in the significant positive coverage of NDP. The latter was certainly the case in Krymskie Izvestia where the NDP was dominant in a positive way. Here Soc/SelPu, CPU (despite its major advertising) and NEP were the targets for negative coverage followed by the Agrarian Party and NRU. Hromada, PTU/LPU and SDPU (u) were tackled less and received a positive press. UNA however was completely absent, as in Krymskoie Vremya. Here the Soyuz Party received an overwhelming positive treatment in contrast with all other parties, with the exception of the Agrarian Party.



# 9 The election campaign in Odesa

*Stefaan Verhulst*

## 9.1 Political situation

Odesa (population: 1,1 million) is the country's biggest commercial Black Sea port. It is a cross roads of cultures, languages and trade, and a leading centre of entrepreneurial and black-market activity. The political situation during the elections was dominated by the feud between two long-time antagonists of Odesa, which made the parliamentary elections seem unimportant. On the one side stands the mayor and anti-communist, Eduard Gurvits. The other is the head of the Regional State Administration, Ruslan Bodelan, former First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party and now closely associated with the People's Democratic Party and the national government. He also led the pack of candidates aiming to unseat Gurvits and ran for both mayor and governor, an unconstitutional activity in itself. Both accused each other of having links with local criminal groups, each claiming that a series of slayings in Odesa were consequences of the power struggle. For instance, in August 1997, Vechernyaya Odessa editor and publisher, Boris Derevyanko, an outspoken Gurvits critic, was gunned down on his way to work. Chief editor of the newspaper "Slon", L. Kapelyushny was assaulted as was the mayor Gurvits. On February 16, the City Election Commission chairman Leonid Kapelushin, a Gurvits appointee, was shot twice by thugs. Another Gurvits protegee, Igor Svoboda, disappeared on February 28 in what police suspect as a kidnapping or murder.

Furthermore the battle between the city council and regional state administration escalated a few days before the elections. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of March members of an elite police unit attempted to take Anatoly Vorokhaev, who is in charge of privatisation in Odesa, into custody after he failed to respond to repeated subpoenas. However, a blockade of city employees refused them entry. All this was covered in real time by the municipal TV companies ART and Odesa Plus. According to several observers ART urged action against the police which led to a court-order and subsequent shutdown. The event was followed by several demonstrations of which half were supporting Gurvits, and the other half Bodelan.

## 9.2 Media situation

### 9.2.1 Broadcasting

Odesa has 10 regional and local TV channels of which the most popular are: Odesa State TV (OTV1 programmed on Inter), UT 2 (1+1), the municipal Channel 7 (of which broadcasting time is divided over two companies: RTR (with ART and STD) and RIAK (RIO, KOMPAS, City and TV Rosh.)). They can be received by a large part of the population and reflect the two political camps in Odesa with OTV1 and RIAK supporting the regional state administration and RTR the city council. Other channels, less receivable and consequently less popular are: OTV 2 (private and representative office of Inter channel), Odesa Plus (Channel 26 – owned by Video Service TV Company), Channel 45 (GLAS company), MOST (24 Channel – commercial) and Channel 31 (NTV).

Radio is dominated by Regional State Broadcasting, but several commercial radio stations are received as well. These are: Radio Glas, Prosto Radio, Russkoe Radio, Nostalgie, Primorea and others. An important feature of the commercial radio stations is their re-broadcasting of popular Russian radio programmes accompanied by advertising. The Regional State

Broadcasting company is considered to be the most politicised and takes active part in the elections with a pro-regional administration stance and political advertising.

## 9.2.2 Print media

In the Odesa region 98 newspapers are registered. And again the print media can be divided according to the political colour they reflect. The major print outlets belonging to the city council camp are: *Odesskiy Vestnik* (55,000 circulation with 1000 paid, organ of the City Council) and *Dumska Ploscha* (same Editor in Chief of *Odesskiy Vestnik*: Vjatshevslav V. Voronkov - published in Ukrainian), *Slovo* (Editor in Chief is Leonid Kopelyushny – who survived an attempt to kill him. It is distributed free of charge, 40,000 circulation), *Yug* (private newspaper which supports the city council, Russian and more national orientated, 16,000 circulation), *Chornomorski Novyny* (national extremists, 15,000).

The regional administration camp is supported by:

*Odesskie Izvestia* (organ of the regional state administration and published simultaneous in Russian and Ukrainian 90,000 during election campaign), *Vechernyay Odessa* (30,000 circulation during week, and 70,000 on Saturdays) and *Vestnik Regiona* (100,000 circulation - according to the publishers).

Finally, *Porto Franco* is considered to be neutral and has a 37,000 circulation.

## 9.3 Media performance

Everyone in Odesa emphasised the fact that Odesa was different from any other city or region in Ukraine. It was certainly true that the general tendencies of the pre-election coverage and campaign were more profoundly present. Furthermore, Bodelan versus Gurvits, and all the scandals linked to this feud, dominated the coverage of all regional media. As a result media access to and coverage of the political parties and their issues was limited. Moreover several outlets played an active role in the whole debate and were consequently biased towards one of the two opponents. This also led to prosecutions and court cases initiated by the candidates against the media of their opponent and in some cases to the closure of newspapers (e.g. *Yug*) or television stations during the pre-election period. The most important example of this was the decision by the Court of Arbitrage of the Oblast of Odesa at the 24th of March 1998, (Case No 1583/7), to stop the transmissions of ART Company on Channel 7 (PTB 7). The basis of the lawsuit was the call to citizens to act against the police by ART, which is a violation of Art 2 of the Broadcasting Law and of Art 46 of the Law on Information. Observers mentioned the fact that ART supported Gurvits in its coverage as the main reason. Finally several crimes against journalists were registered, which had the effect of increasing self-censorship. In most cases it was alleged that the election was the cause, but there were usually controversial circumstances which made it difficult to judge whether there was a link.

The quantitative analysis supported these observations. Printed mass media were consistently biased in presenting information on political parties and their candidates. In all the outlets the Agrarian party, the party of Bodelan, was dominantly present. However despite the fact that articles referring to Bodelan and his party occupied almost six times more space than the PTU/LPU in *Odesskiy Vestnik*, the coverage was mainly negative in contrast with PTU/LPU. The opposite took place in the newspapers *Odesskiye Izvestiya* and *Vechernyaya Odessa*, which both supported the Agrarian Party by giving it an overwhelming positive coverage (SEE GRAPHIC). Bloc Slon, PZU, NEP and UNA were almost completely absent in all monitored newspapers. The electronic media of Odesa, particularly channel 7, paid attention to all parties. Again, the Agrarian party was here among the most frequently mentioned, but was mostly negative. Hromada, SPU - SelPU and SDPU (u) coverage via information and news programs on Channel 7 was also negative. The other parties were shown on channel 7 through political promotions. The NDP was the major advertiser and Therefore succeeded in creating a pro-NDP context on Channel 7 (SEE GRAPHIC). The NDP also dominated the

news on Channel 4 once again with positive references, followed by NEP and CPU who were also major advertisers. Soc/SelPU and SPDU(o) were covered equally and Hromada was also present mainly through political advertising. No other parties were mentioned.



# 10 The election campaign in Dnipropetrovsk

*Gillian McCormack*

## 10.1 Political situation

Dnipropetrovsk is a large provincial town with approximately 1,200,000 inhabitants in the East of Ukraine. The region is largely Russian speaking, with the result that many local news publications and television programmes are in Russian and the politics of the nationalist parties do not have much purchase.

The 'Dnipropetrovsk Clan' includes President Kuchma, secretary of the National Security and Defence Council Gorbunin, Prime Minister Pustovoitenko and Vice-Premier Tygypko, in addition to other ministers and presidential advisors. Pavlo Lazarenko, also from Dnipropetrovsk, caused a split in the 'Dnipropetrovsk Clan' when he retired from his position as Prime Minister and formed a group around the Hromada party. Soon afterwards, Hromada declared itself in opposition to the 'party of power' and launched a highly active pre-election campaign. Therefore the local conflict between representatives of Hromada and the NDP (where members of the 'Dnipropetrovsk Clan' are also well represented) took on a national perspective. The fact that Dnipropetrovsk was the base of so many powerful political players on the national election scene goes some way to explaining many of the peculiarities of the region, such as the predominance of the national elections over the regional ones.

In a poll taken in November 1997, however, when people were asked to select parties for which they might vote in the elections, Dnipropetrovsk residents expressed a preference for the Communist Party and the Socialist and Peasant Party bloc over any of the centrist parties.

## 10.2 Media situation

Dnipropetrovsk, with 300 regional publications, is second only to Donetsk in the number of newspapers which are published there. Out of the daily newspapers which are published regularly, four dominate the local market: 'Nashe Misto' (circulation 72,000) which was founded by the City Council, 'Dnepr Vecherny' (circulation 80,000) which is owned by the journalistic collective, 'Zorya' (circulation previous to the elections 19,800) founded by the regional administration and the journalistic collective and 'Dneprovskaya Panorama' (circulation 13,500 during the week and 47,000 on Saturdays) which is independent. In July 1997, a survey carried out to discover which newspapers Dnipropetrovsk residents had read in the last year, indicated that the most widely read newspapers were 'Nashe Misto' and 'Dnepr Vecherny'.

Dnipropetrovsk is no stranger to scandals surrounding the media. In November last year, an incident occurred connected with the local newspaper 'Sehodnya'. The newspaper's office was set on fire and the Chief Editor, Vyacheslav Kovtun, linked the incident with the theft of office equipment and computers from the office in the summer. Allegations were made at the time that these events were related to the newspaper's criticism of the local authorities.

There are 5 local television companies serving Dnipropetrovsk: 'Sterkh', which goes out on Channel 11 and is a private company owned by the advertising agency 'SOBOR', 'Skifiya' -- a private company producing only two hours a day on Channel 9, 'Privat-TV', which also uses

Channel 9 and was founded by Privatbank, 'Vostok-Tsentri' on Channel 9 which was founded by the 'Brothers Dubinsky' trading company and 'TCD' on Channel 34, whose founders include UkrSotsbank, Dnipropetrovsk City Council and the 'Dnipropetrovsk City' Television Studio.

### 10.3 Media situation during the elections

The direct alignment of local forces supporting either the President or Pavlo Lazarenko was extremely evident in the behaviour of the local media during the election period. Vice-Premier Tygypko was formerly head of the Dnipropetrovsk office of Privatbank, (the biggest banking organisation in Ukraine nationally) which is the founder of 'Privat-TV'. This is headed up by a former team member of Kuchma's original campaign, Vladimir Velichko.

Velichko was one of the few directors of television companies interviewed who had in fact given specific instructions on fair coverage to his editorial team in the form of a code of conduct. Overall, this channel was quite professional in its election coverage. Almost all parties received some coverage on the news, however the tone of coverage of stories about SLON was noticeably more positive than the others. The fact that SLON was the largest advertiser on 'Privat-TV' may explain the disproportionately high amount of coverage of SLON in news items, where it received twice as much time as the closest runner up -- Hromada, (which received neutral coverage).

One of the other local television companies monitored was 'Sterkh' on Channel 11, which was founded by an advertising company which is owned by Pavlo Lazarenko. This fact was confirmed by Sergei Mikhailenko, local Hromada candidate in Dnipropetrovsk, although Elena Kislevich, editor of the 'Sterkh' Information Service claimed she had no knowledge of it. Quantitative research indicated, however, that Hromada was mentioned disproportionately often in a positive way (over 5 hours of coverage during the election campaign, compared to the next most frequently mentioned party, Soc/SelPU with only 8.31 minutes) on Channel 11.

Local newspapers reflected a tendency to side with one of these camps. This was most notably demonstrated by a dispute between Hromada and 'Nashe Misto', the newspaper founded by the City Council. Accusations have been flying over an acid attack on the Chief Editor of the newspaper in December last year, after a series of articles critical of Lazarenko were printed in 'Nashe Misto'. Lazarenko is suing the Deputy Editor, Vadim Klimentiev, on the basis of an interview Klimentiev gave to the programme 'Sem Dnei' on UT-1, in which Lazarenko felt that Klimentiev had implicated him personally in the attack. During a press conference, Lazarenko accused Klimentiev of organising the attack himself in order to become Chief Editor and Klimentiev is countersuing. According to Klimentiev, the newspaper's relationship to the City Council is entirely incidental to their dispute with Lazarenko, which arose purely from their own editorial views.

### 10.4 Media performance

In Dnipropetrovsk, the fact that the Communist Party was likely to win the most local votes was not reflected in the information provided by the mass media. Only those marginal parties which had serious financing, like SLON, could afford to publicise their campaign either in the news, in information programmes or in advertising. The broad left and right of the political spectrum were excluded by the cost of local advertising, which television executives admitted was more expensive than commercial advertising. When SLON asked for advertising space on the Hromada controlled 11th Channel, they were quoted a price which was twice as much as what they were paying on any other local channel, which made it unfeasible.

In general, the national election campaign was not so much overshadowed by the local one as conflated with it, since the major players of the centrist pro and anti-presidential groups are located in Dnipropetrovsk. A realistic portrayal of the broader political spectrum existing in this area was prevented either for commercial reasons or political ones -- which in many cases were one and the same thing.



# 11 The election campaign in Donetsk

*Gillian McCormack*

## 11.1 Political situation

Donetsk is traditionally understood to be the political and economic rival of Dnipropetrovsk. Also located in Eastern Ukraine, it has a population of 1,100,000, is largely Russian speaking and is, like Dnipropetrovsk, a large industrial centre. Contrary to Dnipropetrovsk, however, local coal and energy magnates invested huge resources into the Liberal Party of Ukraine. The Liberal Party is even larger than the Communist Party in Donetsk with 10,000 members in the regional affiliation, compared to 9,000 members of the CPU locally. The Labour Party has the next biggest membership with 4,000.

The leader of the Liberal Party of Ukraine and subsequently leader of the Liberal and Labour Party bloc (which joined together to fight the national elections), Vladimir Scherban, fought his campaign from Donetsk, which is his home base. He was head of the local administration before being sacked while Pavlo Lazarenko was Prime Minister and there were other open demonstrations of their hostility to each other. Local observers believed that the underlying reasons for the animosity between the two political leaders were in fact disputes over business territory.

Other major local politicians include the Mayor, Vladimir Rybak, chairman of the party 'Regional Renaissance of Ukraine', and Yefim Zvyalgisky, an independent candidate who signed up on the party list of NEP during the national elections.

This led to the predominance of the Liberal and Labour Party and other centrist parties in local politics, and since the important local figures were competing in the national elections as well as the local ones, it was generally the national elections which achieved greater significance. A major political dispute erupted when the local National Front made an official complaint about the registration of Yefim Zvyalgisky as a candidate for the national elections. The Election Law states that a candidate must have been resident in Ukraine for 5 years preceding their application to stand in elections. Zvyalgisky, a prominent local businessman, as well as politician, had spent two of the last five years in Israel. He left the country after some business problems led to the murder of one of his associates and a criminal investigation was levelled against him personally. He returned once all charges against him had been dropped and when he felt it was safe to resume his business operations. The National Front campaigned passionately against his candidacy, claiming to be motivated not by anti-Semitism but by a desire to defend the Ukrainian constitution. The National Front did not suggest as much in relation to Zvyalgisky, but in general cynical conclusions were drawn from the interest of so many businessmen in becoming Verkhovna Rada members, which would have given them immunity from any criminal charges. The local Election Commission refused to revoke Zvyalgisky's candidacy, a circumstance which both infuriated the local arm of the National Front and convinced them that the election system was biased in favour of the richer parties and candidates.

Despite the local strength of the Liberal Party, though, the Communist Party was set to win the greatest amount of seats.

## 11.2 Media situation

In terms of the number of periodical publications, Donetsk region takes first place in the country with 380 newspapers published locally. Over the past 5 years, the number of regional publications has risen three times. A noticeable tendency was the survival of publications founded by Soviet organs under the ownership of newly formed state organisations which continue to subsidise them out of the state budget. Many commercial banks, industrial companies and private firms also finance local publications in Donetsk. Among the daily newspapers which have some popularity are 'Donbass' (circulation 75,000) founded by the Regional Council of People's Deputies, 'Zhisn' (circulation 42,000) founded by the Regional State Administration and the independent 'Vecherny Donetsk' (circulation 35 000).

In Donetsk itself, there are 5 television companies sharing two channels. 'Donetsk TRK' goes out on Channel 4 and is an independent company. 'Ukraina' and 'ASKET-7\*7' are also private companies using Channel 7.

Recently, the Donetsk Association of Mass Media was founded as part of an initiative begun in Kyiv to protect the interests of private media companies. The idea was to unify their creative and financial resources, to increase the effectiveness of their work and to work on the division of advertising. At a round table meeting in March, local members who had been part of this initiative noted that so far only one meeting had been held and were uncertain as to its future.

In November 1997, journalists in the Luhansk region of Donetsk went on hunger strike. Seven journalists from 'XXI Century' began the hunger strike to draw attention to what they felt was the inactivity of local authorities, who were failing to defend them against persecution in the form of intimidation and violence, which they frequently fell victim to in the course of their work. The protest was called off after the Chief Editor received assurances from the Head of the Board of Internal Affairs in Luhansk that the situation would improve.

### 11.2.1 Media situation during the elections

In the weeks leading up to the elections, little open advertising was noticeable in Donetsk newspapers monitored -- however article space was devoted to a small selection of the major parties participating in the elections, all of them centrist. Local newspapers affiliated to state organs were seen to be preferential to the NDP, in fact a rather small force regionally, and the SPDU(o), also small, while the independent newspapers received financing from Hromada and reflected this in the character of articles printed during the pre-election campaign.

Regional State Television mirrored the behaviour of national state-controlled television in excluding Hromada from televised appearances and political advertising. A dispute arose locally between the state television channel and the Hromada campaign office, after a television programme commissioned by Hromada about its local campaign was not transmitted by the channel. Although it had been made and paid for and the channel was contracted to show it, representatives of the channel claimed that there were technical obstructions to showing it. Hromada filed suit after the same TV channel advertised a televised debate between the Liberals and Hromada and claimed on air that Hromada had been informed but had failed to show up. According to the Hromada office, this was a lie which served a double purpose; the Liberals were made to look good, while Hromada were painted as cowards. The television presenter claims she phoned the Hromada office and that they accepted the invitation, a claim that Hromada campaigners vigorously deny.

Television was coloured by the predilection of local companies for the Liberal Party and the activity of Hromada campaigners in attempting to overcome what they called the 'negative attitude' to Hromada at the local level by buying up as much air time as possible on sympathetic channels. This was a noticeable feature of newspapers as well. Campaigners claimed that they paid newspaper owners, television company directors, editors and journalists

for every single piece of information aired or printed about the party, whether positive or neutral in whatever section, news or advertising.

### 11.3 Media performance

The Donetsk mass media concerned themselves with profiting from the advertising requirements of the sparring centrist parties, and with very few exceptions, were divided into camps either supporting the 'party of power' or attacking it. The Liberal Party figured extensively in the region due to its base in Donetsk and the local financial support behind it. In general, the national elections were considered to be just as important as the regional ones -- the interests of these Eastern areas are closely tied with the desire for centrally located power.

Commercial and sectional interests once again superseded a proper examination of local politics; the Communists and the Nationalists complained that they were completely left out of any debate, either critical or supportive. In these circumstances, the imminent Communist victory appeared to be regarded by the local media as an irrelevance in the battle for money and power in Donetsk. The fact that the Communists and the Nationalists have no financial weight was considered sufficient reason to leave them out of any critical debate. This, combined with a general animosity towards the politics of the Communist Party in particular on the part of regional newspapers and television companies, ensured an almost total moratorium on information about its programme. The sense that the media should act as neutral informers about the complex political choices open to the public was completely absent.



## 12 Summary and recommendations

### 12.1 Political situation

The constitution of Ukraine provides for freedom of speech, a voice for every party through the mass media and freedom of interference from the state. The right to freedom of speech should enable the media to operate in an free and independent way, both politically and financially. It is generally understood that in democracies, the responsibility of the media is to provide fair commentary on the pre-election process in order to inform the electorate about the choices which are available to them. In addition the media should act as a watchdog of infringements made by those in power. Moreover, the media should provide clarifications of the election system. The main task of this mission was to evaluate whether the Ukrainian media performed according to these principles.

This was the first election in Ukraine under the new electoral law adopted in November 1997. Concurrently with the national election, voters had to select candidates for regional, local and city councils, governors and mayors.

It is not an understatement to say that this situation resulted in considerable voter confusion. Neither the governmental authorities, nor the media sufficiently clarified the new mechanisms of voting. For its part, a lack in the legal sphere resulted in the fact that the Central Election Commission was not obliged to inform voters. So they did not. Likewise, the mass media neither provided voters with full and impartial information about the choices available to them, nor provided a service designed to help them understand the complexities of the new voting practice (the affirmative voting required in this election is the diametric opposite of the previous system of striking out candidates to which Ukrainian citizens are accustomed). The variety of ballots voters would have to cast (some had as many as seven ballots for various levels of elections) was not elucidated.

This election was dominated by personalities rather than political issues. Despite the new election system which was designed to make political parties more important, individuals played a more significant role during the election campaign than party affiliation. Most of what was seen in the media was the struggle between economic clans, many of whom control particular sections of the media, rather than between political programmes.

In the regional media, local elections were generally given more emphasis than the parliamentary election. In Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk, however, more attention was paid to the national elections. In Donetsk, this was because one of the candidates, Volodymyr Shcherban, leader of the Liberal Party and first candidate in the list of the Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc, has local roots. The leaders of both the main centrist clans in the national elections come from Dnipropetrovsk. The regional elections in that city, therefore, were a reflection of the national and this was mirrored in the media too.

A noticeable change since 1994 was the increasing professionalisation both of political parties and of some sections of the media. This was due particularly to the far greater technical possibilities of media production. Political parties became much better at the business of campaigning. They produced slicker promotional materials, organised special events and used the media more effectively. Standards of television production also improved a great deal. This was reflected in the technical quality of documentary programmes, and it was strikingly evident in the sophistication of political advertising. In part this was the result of competition, in part it reflected increasing access to modern technology such as the Internet. This resulted in more diversity in the media.

The fact that the national TV channels are controlled by political and economic groupings which support the president and the government coloured the election campaign. Moreover, in Ukraine, where only about 20% of people read newspapers regularly, television was the most influential means of communication during the election campaign. When people do buy newspapers, they are far more likely to read local publications than national ones. Conspiracy theories and rumours abounded during the election campaign. While the media did not always publish them, it also did little to dispel the anxiety they caused.

## 12.2 Regulatory framework

In allotting free time and space, the law was adhered to, but the number of candidates meant that the amount of time and/or space available was limited, and insufficient to enable candidates to explain their policies and views.

Moreover, the amendments to the Ukrainian Statute on television and radio broadcasting which were published on 26 March 1998, while representing significant improvements, were too little, too late. These amendments had been adopted by the the parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, in the autumn of 1997 and had they been signed into law earlier, they would have significantly improved the performance of the media. These changes prohibit radio and television companies from broadcasting advertisements without payment. They also prohibit the organisations which provide radio and television broadcasting from refusing available technical broadcasting means to licensed radio and television companies which have not defaulted on payment. Heads of television and radio companies are no longer liable for statements made in political programmes transmitted on their channels during campaigns for elections or referenda (unless the statements violate the constitution). From the moment an election date has been announced, no television or radio company can be deprived of the right to transmit its programmes without a court order.

The Central Election Commission performed poorly in its role as arbitrator in cases of alleged media abuse. It monitored the implementation of the electoral law but had neither the financial resources, nor the expertise, nor the power to deal adequately with the enforcement of the election law.

In a number of cases segments of the public authorities were perceived to use the law in order to manipulate the election campaign: several violations were observed of articles 34 (use of mass media) and 35 (pre-election campaign publicity) of the Election Law. However, the enforcement seemed confused and inconsistent. For instance, paragraph 11 of article 35 states that free-of-charge services are prohibited. This was one of the charges against *Pravda Ukrainy*, although several regional newspapers used the same strategy without legal consequence. A strict enforcement of the rules of the legislative framework for the media (broadcasting law, press law, etc.) led to several court cases relating to past violations during the election campaign. These cases dealt mainly with registration and licensing issues (for example, the case of Chernomorskaya Telekompaniya in Simferopol). An increased number of media libel suits led to the closure of some newspapers and to a chilling effect, with a resulting self-censorship. Close scrutiny from government officials, especially at the local level; and politically motivated visits by tax inspectors were also observed. The absence of a legal framework for political advertising was an important inadequacy.

## 12.3 Media performance

### 12.3.1 General

Although there was general agreement that the media has a duty to inform the public, the belief that the media should act as the fourth estate was not widespread. Editors and directors

of television companies, by and large, had not thought it necessary to give their employees specific instructions about fair and impartial coverage of the election campaign. Furthermore, media personnel did not accept that they had a responsibility to give full information. Many believed that it was both their duty and a necessity to prevent extremist candidates (whether left or right) from being elected.

The integrity of news and editorial programmes was compromised to such an extent that in many news items the distinction between political advertising and news coverage was blurred, as was the distinction between news coverage and editorial comment.

Moreover, the rates charged for political advertisements were extremely high. This both disadvantaged poorer parties and candidates, and indicated that the media was guided by commercial rather than civic considerations. This was as true of the state media as of the private. Senior media personnel (directors of television companies, chief editors, and journalists) were themselves candidates in elections at various levels. This further blurred the role of the media as independent, neutral observers. Not surprisingly, it added to the partisan nature of the coverage of the elections.

### **12.3.2 Broadcasting**

The national television companies as a whole covered only those centrist parties which were not opposed to the party of power. At best they criticised, or even worse, remained silent about the remaining parties contending the elections.

The cancellation of the analytical programme Pislyamova, made by Studio 1+1 on UT-2, in December and the resignation of its editor, Oleksandr Tkachenko, was generally thought to be the result of political pressure. Similarly, the choice of parties to participate in 5 by 5, also on UT-2, a programme of political debate, though claimed to be the result of random computer selection, was widely believed to be politically motivated. In both cases, it was generally thought that the party of power was the driving force behind the pressure.

Two parties dominated the news coverage over UT 1, the main state television broadcaster, for most of the month of March -- Hromada and the NDP. While there was slightly more coverage of Hromada (almost 28 minutes) than the NDP (almost 24 minutes) the references to the former were almost entirely negative, while the references to the latter, overwhelmingly positive.

News coverage of other parties -- such as the CPU, Rukh, SDPU(o), SPU- SelPU, and the Agrarian Party -- was insignificant, as all clocked in less than three and a half minutes each. UNA, the Green Party, NEP and SLON were not mentioned in news coverage at all.

On UT-2, no party received more than half an hour's coverage from 2 to 25 March. Moreover, the total of advertising time (93.28 minutes) exceeded both news and special election programming put together.

The party that received the most coverage on UT2 was Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc with just under 27 minutes, of which over two thirds was advertising. An interesting observation is that NEP only got access to UT-2 via advertising since no news coverage or special election programming was noted.

Inter's coverage was dominated by the SDPU(o). Total coverage of all election programming came to less than 3 hours, of which almost 70 per cent was concerned with advertising one party, the SDPU(o). News programmes made up only 40 minutes and again the SDPU(o) dominated with 17 minutes.

On ICTV, less than 12 minutes of news programmes were devoted to the elections, of which almost half the stories dealt with the SDPU(o). The CPU, NDP and Hromada had more or

less 1.5 minutes each. Two-thirds of all coverage was advertising and Rukh dominated with almost 76 per cent of all advertising time (22 minutes).

STB covered the elections mainly by news programming (50 minutes) and over a half-an-hour of advertising. 40 per cent of total news coverage was devoted to Rukh (20 minutes). The Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc took up most of the advertising time.

Regional state controlled television mirrored the behaviour of national television in excluding Hromada, the Communist Party, right-wing parties and many small parties from televised appearances and political advertising. In short, the struggle waged by parties for votes in the broadcast media was primarily a battle for television air time. As a result, the competition between „image-makers“ acquired as much importance as the competition between candidates.

### 12.3.3 Print

There is a diversity of print media available in Ukraine today, which provides alternatives to political parties to the scarcer and consequently more expensive broadcast air time. Likewise, the proliferation of print media owned by a variety of interest groups does constitute a degree of pluralism. The political orientation of many papers, however, reflected financial ties with political parties. Those ties not only risked damaging the long-term credibility of the papers concerned, but also during the course of the campaign, disabled their ability to act as independent observers. Thus, for example, *Vseukrainskye Vedomosti* was clearly identifiable with Hromada, *Golos Ukrainy* with the SPU/SelPU and Hromada. *Den* with the SDPU(o) and *Uryadovy Kurier* with the NDP. The same was true, by and large, at the regional level. In addition, some political parties underwrote the cost of producing particular papers, in some cases enabling them to be given away free of charge. The quantitative analysis supported these assertions.

As far as advertising was concerned, there was a significant trend towards hidden advertising in the form of articles, since no clearly defined advertising was noted in various papers monitored. For instance, *Fakty*, *Den* and *Kyivskie Vedomosti* carried no direct advertising in the period monitored. *Silski Visti* carried only direct advertising for the SPU/SelPU, and *Vseukrainskye Vedomosti* advertised Hromada exclusively.

On the other hand, state papers were careful to comply with the electoral law on equal access. Statistics show that *Golos Ukrainy* and *Uryadovy Kurier* did give an approximate 450 cm<sup>2</sup> advert space to all participating parties on the dates arranged between February and March. Moreover, at a national level, advertising space was available to the full range of political parties. By reading a range of papers, therefore, voters could tap into a broad range of political views. At a regional level, however, some editors prided themselves on their refusal to accept political advertising from some political parties.

The roots of this situation lie deep in Ukraine's economic implosion. Most papers are unable to fund themselves through advertising, and require outside financial support which political parties were only too happy to provide. In these circumstances, independence usually remains a fuzzy ideal rather than a practical objective.

Yet even financial dependence is not the most direct threat to the Ukrainian press. There were repeated allegations that the country's power structures, and in particular the government and the presidential administration, or, in the regions, local administrations, exercised leverage over newspapers. There were also assertions that tax inspections were used as a device to unsettle opposition papers, and that individual journalists were warned to follow a particular editorial line.

The suspension of *Pravda Ukrainy* at the end of January caused particular concern. According to different media sources, such as Yulia Mostovaya (Deputy Editor of *Zerkalo Nedeli*) and

Aleksandr Tkachenko (TV programme *Pislyamova*), *Pravda Ukrainy* was connected to Hromada. The paper was shut on the grounds of registration irregularities and a breach of the electoral law. Yet there are worrying questions over the legal competence of the Ministry of Information to order the suspension. Nor is it clear that every possible step had been taken before suspension. Most worrying of all is the timing of the suspension, given that the dispute over the paper's registration stretched back several months.

A notable feature in Kharkiv was the large number of free newspapers, largely devoted to leisure pursuits and advertising. Although most reports and analyses on the media coverage of the election campaign ignored them entirely, many of them devoted space to politics, paying particular attention to the local elections. Because they were free, they were widely read and extremely influential. They tended to support local, business-oriented candidates.

Attacks and harassment of journalists and editors took place in all the regions monitored. In all cases it was alleged that the election was the cause, but there were usually controversial circumstances which made it difficult to judge whether there was a link.

To sum up, the print media played a vigorous part in the election campaign. However, it failed to act as a source of independent analysis and evaluation.

## 12.4 Conclusions

This general state of affairs must lead us to the conclusion that the political interests of various dominant economic clans in Ukraine in one way or another diverted the attention of the vast majority of the mass media away from an accurate view of the real political situation in the pre-election period.

This was demonstrated by the dominance of personalities, the limited access to television air time due to economic considerations and the pervasive influence of the party of power, biased newspaper coverage linked to political manipulation of investment and a consequent lack of independent analysis, resulting in a skewed picture of the Ukrainian political scene in the run-up to the elections.

Recent electoral changes created confusion over new voting processes. On the other hand, new legislative changes laid the basis for a potential improvement in access to the media in future elections. This legislation came too late, however, to have an impact on the current situation.

In comparison to 1994, the technical performance of the media during the pre-election campaign was generally observed to be of a higher standard. However, political pressure was considered to be of greater significance in determining the role of the mass media in the campaign.

The national elections were usurped by regional ones in media coverage in most areas monitored with the exception of some parts of eastern Ukraine. Also, the activities of the Communist Party and the more nationalist parties were largely ignored by both national and regional media. As a result of these factors, the mass media were broadly unsuccessful in providing accurate and fair information on the political processes at work during the parliamentary campaign in Ukraine.

When the European Media Institute monitored the last series of major elections in Ukraine in 1994, the team made a number of recommendations relating to potential methods of improving the situation for election coverage and the structure of the media. These concerned suggestions to offer a more precise legal definition of the medias' obligations, the creation of a

specific independent electoral body to supervise the fulfilment of media-related clauses of electoral law and an attempt to address the problem of subsidy to the media.

The media landscape in Ukraine has altered considerably since 1994; new laws specifically relating to the media during elections have been put in place, the privatisation of radio and television companies eventually resulted in an increase in the number of available outlets and the print media have become representative of a plurality of political viewpoints. In addition, the level of technical and journalistic professionalism in certain areas has also improved.

Despite these inroads into the development of a more positive media environment, the EIM team monitoring the Ukrainian media in 1998 would nevertheless make some observations regarding problems which arose during this period.

\* The conflation of news, interview and political advertisement was a notable feature of the presentation of electoral information in the 1998 elections, so that the voter was not adequately alerted to the type of information being offered. As in 1994, the team recommends that the difference between editorial and paid space and time be made as clear as possible, for instance, by applying different type-faces.

\* The team also welcomes the implementation of the amendment to the electoral law passed on March 26 regulating paid political advertising on Ukrainian state television and radio. Adhering to this law in future elections, particularly the upcoming presidential ones, would serve to avoid some of the problems created by its absence in March 1998.

\* Acknowledging that laws and regulations can only be effective if there are institutions to enforce them in a proper way, the team recommends a new stress on the importance of regulatory authorities and the development of independent institutions. In this capacity, the Central Electoral Commission could become more proactive in informing the electorate on the mechanism of voting and in monitoring and regulating cases of abuse perpetrated by or against the media.

\* Television was the most important medium of information for the electorate during these elections, and while state television fulfilled its obligations in a narrow sense, to provide free air time to all major candidates, it failed in the broader definition of fully and fairly informing the viewers of choices available to them. Particular effort should be made in public service broadcasting in the future to firstly, de-couple it from government control and secondly, introduce policies within public service broadcasting that comply with both the spirit and the letter of the law regarding fair and full election coverage.

\* Further methods of accountability could be recommended for the private broadcast media especially, to alter the notion that television stations must be the personal platforms of the businesses or private individuals who invest in them. This is not a circumstance unique to Ukraine of course, however agreed codes of conduct and professional civic associations working in accordance with the legal system currently in place could afford some protection against future manipulation.

\* The existing plurality of the media, both on the level of the number of actual outlets and in terms of the variety of information provided by them, should be encouraged even further, as a competitive marketplace will be the ultimate force heralding change for the better. In particular, the introduction of media outlets employing new technologies, like the Internet, should be promoted, along with the regulatory and legal infrastructure which will allow them to be established.

Many of the problems affecting the media in Ukraine are part and parcel of the problems created by the wider political and economic climate, and therefore an improvement in conditions for the media will follow from more general developments. Nonetheless, certain basic assumptions about the role of the media during the elections, (including the enduring belief that the more time and space given to a political outlook, the more success must

naturally follow in the ballot box) remain unchallenged at a fundamental level. Such assumptions, taken in the context of the March 1998 elections in Ukraine, are most problematic . The Communist Party of Ukraine was the most excluded from political and other discussion in the media in the run up to the elections; despite this, it was the most successful on polling day.

With the further development of civil society in Ukraine, the media may be able to begin to give more credence to the notion that they bear a responsibility not just to their financial backers, but also to their audience, and perhaps more broadly define for themselves in the Ukrainian context, wherein that responsibility lies.



## 13 Annex 1

### Revenues declared by registered parties and electoral blocs on 26 March 1998

<b>PARTY</b>	<b>FUNDS</b>
Popular Democratic Party (NDP)	Hr 1,915,936.30
Green Party	Hr 1,128,487.50
Regional Rebirth of Ukraine	Hr 793,568.90
DemPU-NEP	Hr 742,000.00
Labour and Liberal Party Bloc	Hr 705,935.00
National-Economic Development of Ukraine	Hr 700,000.00
SDPU-o	Hr 529,900.00
Working Ukraine	Hr 406,600.00
Christian-Democratic Party of Ukraine	Hr 217,062.00
Hromada	Hr 190,132.00
Slon	Hr 131,483.20
Agrarian Party	Hr 125,000.00
SPU-SelPU	Hr 106,967.00
Workers Party	Hr 56,558.10
Forward, Ukraine	Hr 35,000.00
Ukrainian National Assembly	Hr 30,000.00
Women's Initiatives	Hr 28,240.00
Communist Party of Ukraine	Hr 24,934.00
National Front	Hr 7,401.00
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine	Hr 5,550.00
Party of Spiritual, Economic, & Social Progress	Hr 3,771.70
Less Talk	Hr 728.00
Moslem Party	Hr 0.00

The remaining parties and blocs reported that they had not opened campaign fund accounts.



## 14 Annex 2

### Parties which participated in the national elections

1. **Agrarian Party** (Ahrarna Partiya Ukrainy) nominated 188 candidates. Primarily concerned with rural development, the party insists on state control of economic 'priority spheres' and energy resources; free education, medical care, and pensions, and full employment. It is ambivalent about land ownership. Its first 5 candidates are Katerina Vashchuk; Yuriy Karasik; Viktor Semenchuk; Vasyl Stepenko and Ruslan Bodelan. [check] It gained 3.68% of the vote in 28 March election.
2. **Christian-Democratic Party of Ukraine** (Khrystyiansko- Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy) nominated 100 candidates. It is committed to Christian democratic ideals. Its first 5 candidates: Vitaliy Zhuravskyy; Ivan Timoshenko; Yuriy Gaisinskiy; Serhiy Kirichenko; Mykhailo Hutor. It gained 1.29% of the vote in 28 March election.
3. **Communist Party of Ukraine** (Komunistychna Partiya Ukrainy). Ukraine's strongest party, the CPU nominated a full slate of 225 candidates. The party programme calls for the re-establishment of the USSR and Ukrainian membership of the Russia-Belarus union. It advocates abolishing the presidency and turning Ukraine into a parliamentary system, reversing privatisation and restricting the access of Western capital to Ukraine's economy. Its first 5 candidates included: CPU First Secretary Petro Symonenko; Omelian Parubok; Anatoliy Nalivaiko; Boris Olynik; and Valeria Zaklunna. It gained 24.65% of the vote in 28 March election.
4. **DemPU-NEP** (Vyborchyy Blok Demokratychnykh Partiy NEP—Narodovladdya, Ekonomika, Poryadok) was formed by the Democratic Party (Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy—DemPU) and the Crimean-based Party of Economic Rebirth (Partiya Ekonomichnoho Vidrodzhennya). Its programme promises economic freedom, the promotion of entrepreneurial activity, a simplified tax system, state support for selected sectors of the economy, the payment of wage arrears. Its first 5 candidates included: Volodymyr Yavorivskyy; Anatoliy Gritsenko; Vitaliy Radetskiy; Volodymyr Bortnik; and Lyubov Mayboroda. It gained 1.22% of the vote in 28 March election.
5. **European Choice** (Vyborchyy Blok "Yevropeyskyy Vybir Ukrainy") united the Liberal-Democratic Party (Liberalno-Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy) with the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party (Ukrainska Selyanska Demokratychna Partiya) to promote the "Europeanisation" of Ukraine. A centrist party favourably disposed to President Kuchma, it calls for stronger local government, and the demonopolization of all economic sectors. The first 5 candidates on its list were Viktor Prsyazhnyuk; Andriy Koval; Mykola Shkarban; Serhiy Baklan; and Roman Omelchuk. It gained 0.14% in the 28 March election.
6. **Forward, Ukraine** (Vyborchyy Blok "Vpered, Ukrainol!"), formed by the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (Ukrainska Khrystyiansko-Demokratychna Partiya) and Party of Christian-Popular Union (Partiya Khrystyiansko-Narodnyy Soyuz). The programme of the bloc supports the development of private property, together with strict supervision of the privatisation process, anti-corruption legislation and social protection of the elderly and vulnerable. Its first 5 candidates were: Viktor Musiyaka; Grigoriy Omelchenko; Serhiy Holovatiy; Volodymyr Stretovych; and Viktor Shyshkyn. It gained 1.73% of the vote in the 28 March election.
7. **Green Party** (Partiya Zelenykh Ukrainy) nominated only 77 candidates. As its names suggests, it concentrates on the environment, particularly opposition to nuclear power and

support for alternative energy sources. Its programme also supports decentralised decisionmaking and a neutral foreign policy. Its first five candidates were: Vitaliy Kononov; Oleh Shevchuk; Vasyl Khmelnytskyi; Serhiy Kurikin; and Yuriy Samoilenko. It gained 5.43% of the vote in the 28 March election, giving it the fourth largest number of proportional representation seats in the Rada.

8. **Hromada** (Vseukrainske Obyednannya "Hromada") nominated a full slate of 225 candidates. Its programme included minimizing corruption, allowing citizen participation in government administration; guaranteeing equality of all forms of property; reviving production, increasing employment and ensuring the payment of wage and pension arrears. Its first 5 candidates were: Pavlo Lazarenko; Yuliya Tymoshenko; Petro Tolochko; Дмитро Дворкіс; and Дмитро Гнатюк. It gained 4.67% in the 28 March election.
9. **Party of Labour and Liberal Party Bloc** (Vyborchyy Blok "Partiya Pratsi ta Liberalna Partiya-Razom"), formed by Liberal Party head and former Donetsk Governor Volodymyr Shcherban and Labor Party head and former Deputy Premier Valentyn Landyk, fielded an almost full slate -- 219 candidates. A centrist party, its programme supported the purchase and sale of private property as well as state protection for vulnerable groups of society. Its first 5 candidates were Volodymyr Shcherban; Valentyn Landyk ; Vyacheslav Boguslav; Mikola Zhulynskiy; and Ada Rogovtseva. It gained 1.84% of the vote in the 28 March election.
10. **Less Talk** (Vyborchyy Blok "Menshe Sliv") put up 44 candidates. It is opposed to violence, crime and amorality, and is in favour of order and strict anti-corruption legislation. Its first 5 candidates were Ludmila Vansovska; Yaroslav Andrushkiv; Roman Koval; Irina Kalinets; and Vasyl Marinchenko. It gained 0.17% of the vote in the 28 March election.
11. The **Moslem Party** (Partiya Musulman Ukrainy) nominated 19 candidates. It supported the interests of the Crimean Tatars and other national minorities in Ukraine and favours their equal participation in the social and political life of the country. Its first 5 candidates were Rashid Bragin; Niyazi Selimov; Firuddin Mamedov; Rashid Ivankov; and Arslanali Abduljanov. It gained 0.19% of the vote in the 28 March election.
12. The **National Front** (Vyborchyy Blok Partiy "Natsionalnyy Front"), formed by the Ukrainian Republican Party (Ukrainska Respublikanska Partiya—URP), the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (Kongres Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv—KUN), and the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (Ukrainska Konservativna Respublikanska Partiya), nominated 181 candidates. It advocated 'the harmonious development of society', with a leading role for the church, the promotion of 'national consciousness', cultural autonomy for national minorities, and closer ties with the West. The first 5 candidates on its list were Levko Lukyanenko; Yaroslav Stetsko ; Stepan Khmara ; Ivan Bilas; and Bohdan Yaroshynskiy. It gained 2.72% of the vote in the 28 March election.
13. The **Party of Defenders of the Fatherland** (Partiya Zakhysnykiv Vitchyzny) is anti-West in orientation. It advocates state-supervised reforms, and Ukraine's full integration into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It nominated 43 candidates. The first 5 candidates on its list were Vitaliy Kazakevich; Oleksandra Kozhel; Anatoliy Pakhlya; Volodymyr Kolomytsev; and Serhiy Tsukanov. It gained 0.31% of the vote in the 28 March election.
14. **Party of National-Economic Development of Ukraine** (Partiya Natsionalno-Ekonomichnoho Rozvytku Ukrainy) is a party of bankers. It supports economic reform and social protection and it nominated 53 candidates. Its first 5 candidates were Volodymyr Matviyenko; Valeriy cherep; Grigoriy Malyuk; Volodymyr Severnyuk; and Ihor Bakay. It gained 0.95% of the vote in the 28 March election.

15. **Party of Regional Renaissance of Ukraine** (Partiya Rehionalnoho Vidrodzhennya Ukrainy) is oriented towards Russia. It advocates strong regions and supports the devolution of power from the centre. It nominated 104 candidates. The first 5 candidates on its list were Donetsk Mayor Volodymyr Rybak; Petro Lebid; Volodymyr P:ekhota; Valeriy Ermak; and Genadiy Samophalov. It gained 0.91% of the vote in the 28 March election.
16. **Party of Spiritual, Economic, and Social Progress** (Partiya Dukhovnoho, Ekonomichnoho I Sotsialnoho Prohresu) nominated 60 candidates. It supports the revival of the industrial and agrarian sectors of Ukraine's economy. The first 5 candidates on its list were Ivan Burdak; Oleksiy Onipko; Mykhailo Volinets; Valeriy Peshiy; and Yuriy Tsemakh. It gained 0.20% of the vote in the 28 March election.
17. **The Popular Democratic Party** (Narodno-Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy—NDP) nominated 189 candidates. Known as the 'party of power', its programme supports economic reform and it laid out a ten-step programme to deal with Ukraine's economic crisis. A large number of government officials are members of the party. Its list was headed by Premier Valeriy Pustovoytenko, followed by Vinnytsia Governor Anatoliy Matviyenko; former Verkhovna Rada Chairman Ivan Plyushch; Mykhailo Sirota; and Anatoliy Kinakh. It gained 5.01 of the vote in the 28 March election.
18. **The Progressive Socialist Party** (Prohresyvna Sotsialistychna Partiya) is the most extreme of the left-wing parties. It aims to build a Soviet Socialist Ukraine, independent of Russia. It calls for the invalidation of the constitution and the transfer of power to Soviets. It also wants the economic reforms to be reversed, to be replaced by state regulation of the economy and a state monopoly of foreign trade. In foreign policy it supports Ukraine's deeper integration in the CIS. The first 5 candidates on its list were Natalya Vitrenko; Volodymyr Marchenko; Oleksandr Charodeev; Petro Romanchuk; and Mikhail Savenko. It gained 4.04% of the vote in the 28 March election.
19. **The Reforms and Order Party** (Partiya "Reformy I Poryadok") is an alliance of economic reformers who propose to create conditions for economic growth, the increase salaries and pensions, to stabilize the currency, to balance the budget, pay salary and pension arrears while also reforming the education system, providing child care, introduce medical insurance and increase social assistance to vulnerable groups. It nominated 191 candidates and the first 5 candidates on its list were former Deputy Premier Viktor Pynzenyk; head of the "Reforms" faction in the Verkhovna Rada, Serhiy Sobolev; Anatoliy Lopata; Mykhaylo Pozhyvanov; and Serhiy Terekhin. It gained 3.13% of the vote in the 28 March election.
20. **The Republican Christian Party** (Respublikanska Khrystyanska Partiya) is Christian democratic and strongly supports the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It nominated 98 candidates. The first 5 candidates on its list were Mikola Porovskiy; Mykhailo Horyn; Levko Gorokhivskiy; Oleh Bakay; and Ihor Banakh. It gained 0.54% of the vote in the 28 March election.
21. **Rukh** (Narodnyy Rukh Ukrainy) had not only 224 candidates. It also had 194 candidates running in single-mandate constituencies. Its programme concentrated on social issues and corruption and it appealed to other centrist and nationalist parties to withdraw to avoid splitting the vote. The first 5 candidates on its list were Vyacheslav Chornovil; Volodymyr Chernyak; Genadiy Udovenko; Ivan Drach; and Yuriy Kostenko. Rukh gained 9.4% of the vote in the 28 March election, to become the second largest party in the Rada.
22. **Slon** (Vyborchyy Blok "SLOn-Sotsialno-Liberalne Obyednannya") nominated 62 candidates. Formed by the Interregional Bloc of Reform (Mizhrehionalnyy Blok Reform—MBR) led by Volodymyr Hrynyov and the Constitutional Democrats (Konstytutsiyno-Demokratychna Partiya) led by, it campaigned on a programme of cooperation with reformist parties on questions of economic reform, and with parties on the left on the status

of the Russian language and the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine. The first 5 candidates on its list were Volodymyr Grinyov; Volodymyr Zolotaryov; Natalya Kozhevina; Mikhailo Umanets; and Volodymyr Bistryakov. Slon only gained 0.91% of the vote in the 28 March election.

23. **Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine** (Sotsial-Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy—SDPU) nominated 127 candidates. Its programme includes stimulating local production, ensuring social protection. Its first 5 candidates were Verkhovna Rada deputy Yuriy Buzduhan; Mikola Karnaukh; Yuriy Tikhonov; Volodymyr Zlenko; and Vladislav Bilchich. It gained 0.32% of the vote in the 28 March election.
24. **SPU-SelPU** (Vyborchyy Blok Sotsialistychnoi Partii ta Selyanskoi Partii Ukrainy “Za Pravdu, Za Narod, Za Ukrainu”). An alliance of the prominent Socialist Party (SPU) and leftist Peasant Party (SelPU), it nominated 224 candidates, as well as 102 single-mandate candidates. It favours amending the constitution to restrict presidential powers, strengthening state control over key industries and ensuring social protection. The first 5 candidates on its list were Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksandr Moroz; Ivan Chizh; Serhiy Dovhan; Viktor Suslov; and Ivan Bokiy. It gained 8.55% of the vote in the 28 March election.
25. **Ukrainian National Assembly** (UNA) (Ukrainska Natsionalna Asambleya) is known for its extremist rhetoric and it advocates the pursuit of Ukrainian economic, cultural and military dominance in East and Central Europe. The party campaigned on the twin issues of social equity and lower food prices. Its first 5 candidates were Oleh Vitovych; Yuriy Tyma; Yaroslav Ilyasevych; Vilen Martirosyan; and Anatoliy Lupinis. It gained 0.32% of the votes in the 28 March election.
26. **Union Party** (Partiya “Soyuz”) was created by Crimean deputies and it nominated only 30 candidates, 19 of whom are from Crimea. It is pro-Russian, and advocates the formation of a Ukraine-Belarus-Russia union and a federal Ukraine. The first 5 candidates on its list were Svitlana Savchenko; Lev Mirimskiy; Sofia Rotaru; Oleksandr Plyuta; and Valentyn Ulyanov. It gained 0.70% of the vote in the 28 March election.
27. **United Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine** (Sotsial- Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy (Obyednana)--SDPU-o) nominated 185 candidates and had 105 members running in single-mandate constituencies. Created by former Justice Minister Vasyl Onopenko, its platform is the creation of a ‘socially efficient market economy’. It supports restructuring the Cabinet of Ministers and other executive bodies and the development of a civic code. The first 5 candidates on its list were former President Leonid Kravchuk; former Premier Yevhen Marchuk; Vasyl Onopenko; Viktor Medvedchuk; and Hryhoriy Surkis, head of Kiev’s Dynamo soccer club. It gained 4.01% of the vote in the 28 March election.
28. **Women’s Initiatives** (Vseukrainska Partiya “Zhinochi Initsiatyvy”) supports the equal representation of women, particularly in government. Its programme includes women’s issues, health care and social protection for mothers and children. It nominated only 27 candidates, 22 of whom were women. The first 5 candidates on its list were Valentina Datsenko; Oleksandr Dobroskok; Valentyn Zadorenko; Klavdia Sikoletska; and Kapitolina Gurova. It gained 0.58% of the vote in the 28 March election.
29. **Workers Party** (Vseukrainska Partiya Trudyashchykh) nominated 87 candidates. Its campaign concentrated on wage arrears. The first 5 candidates on its list were Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions Oleksandr Stoyan; Leonid Vernigora; Anatoliy Pozhidayev; Oleh Bondarchuk; and Vasyl Zubkov. It gained 0.79% of the vote in the 29 March election.

30. **Working Ukraine** (Vyborchyy Blok "Trudova Ukraina") put up a slate of 117 candidates. Its programme is similar to that of the Communist Party of Ukraine, calling for power to be restored to the Soviets, a state-regulated economy, the reversal of privatization, integration in the CIS and official status for the Russian language. The first 5 candidates on its list were Oleksandr Omelchenko; Ivan Gerasimov; Oleksandr Bazilyuk; Serhiy Chervonopiskiy; and Yuriy Andreev. It gained 3.06% of the vote in the 28 March election.



## 15 Annex 3

### Parties which crossed the 4% threshold in the national elections

<b>PARTY</b>	<b>% OF VOTE</b>	<b>NO OF SEATS</b>
<b>Communist Party of Ukraine:</b>	24.68%	84 seats
<b>Rukh:</b>	9.40%	32 seats
<b>SPU-SeIPU:</b>	8.64%	29 seats
<b>Green Party:</b>	5.46%	19 seats
<b>Popular Democratic Party (NDP):</b>	4.99%	17 seats
<b>Hromada:</b>	4.68%	16 seats
<b>Progressive Socialist Party:</b>	4.04%	14 seats
<b>SDPU-o:</b>	4.02%	14 seats



## 16 Annex 4

### Meetings/interviews conducted by the monitoring team

#### Kiyv

Mikhail Batiq, general director, *UNIAN news agency*  
Oleg Bay, deputy minister of information  
Anatoly Gorlov, first deputy editor-in-chief, *Golos Ukrainy*  
Larysa Ivshnya, Editor-in-Chief, *Den*  
Grigory Kutsenko, Kiev campaign team, NEP  
Oleksandr Lyashko, home affairs dept, *DINAU news agency*  
Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, presenter of 5x5 and the Fifth Corner on *Studio 1+1*  
Svetlana Pisarenko, head of parliamentary department, *Golos Ukrainy*  
Sergey Rakhmanin, deputy editor-in-chief, *Kievskie Vedomosti*  
Volodomyr Ruban, editor-in-chief, *Vseukrainskie Vedomosti*  
Sergei Tolstov, political analyst  
Vladimir Mostovoi, Editor in Chief, *Zerkalo Nedeli*  
Oleksandr Tkachenko, Producer and Journalist, Nova-Mova  
Sergei Naboka, General Director, Ukrainian Independent Information Agency, (UNIAR)  
Oleg Baiy, Deputy Minister of Information of Ukraine  
Sergeiy Aksenenko, Member of Parliament, Head of Under-commission of TV & Broadcasting of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, Head of the Temporary Research Commission on Mass Media in Ukraine  
Nelga Alexandr, Central Election Commission  
Rornan Zinchenko, Press Service, Reform and Order Party  
Larissa Lohvitskay, Liberal and Labor Party Bloc  
Vinski Losif Vikentyevich, SPU-SEIPU  
Roman Zinchenko, Press Service, Reform and Order Party  
Larissa Lohvitskay, Liberal and Labor Party Bloc  
Vinski Losif Vikentyevich, SPU-SEIPU

#### Lviv

Mykhailo Khvoynitsky, general director, *TV Meest*  
Boris Korpan, Lviv campaign team, *Rukh*  
Stepan Kourpil, editor-in-chief, *Vysoki zamok*  
Igor Pochynok, editor-in-chief, *Ekspres*  
Andrei Statskiv, Lviv campaign secretariat, NDP  
Yuri Zelyk, Lviv Wave radio station  
Ilyya Kolodiy, deputy editor-in-chief, *Za Vilnu Ukrainu*

#### Dnipropetrovsk

Andrei Valentinovich Pomaz -- Deputy Director of the television company '*Vostok-Tsentr*', *Channel 9*  
Valentin Tarachenko -- Chief Editor of the newspaper '*Dnepr Vecherny*'  
Alexander Taranenko -- Deputy Editor of the newspaper '*Zorya*'  
Elena Kislevich -- Editor of the Information Service of the television station, *Channel 11*  
Sergei Mikhailenko -- Candidate for election, Hromada  
Lydia Topyuk -- Head of the Regional Electoral Commission  
Boris Braginsky -- Journalist at the newspaper '*Nashe Misto*'  
Vadim Klimentiev -- Deputy Editor of the newspaper '*Nashe Misto*'  
Vladimir Velichko -- General Director of the television company '*Privat-TV*', *Channel 9*  
Victor Borshevsky -- 1st Party Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk Communist Party  
Gennady Balashov -- Candidate for election, SLON

## Donetsk

Alexander Solomko -- Deputy Editor of the newspaper 'Zhisn'  
Alexander Fenchenko -- Deputy Editor of the newspaper 'Donbass'  
Nikolai Zagoruiko -- Candidate for election, Liberal-Labour Party bloc  
Galina Boiko -- Deputy Head of the Local Electoral Commission  
Sergei Larin -- Deputy Head of the Donetsk NDP  
Anatoli Klochkov -- Deputy Head of the Donetsk organisation of Hromada  
Maria Oliinik -- Candidate for election, National Front of Ukraine

## Simferopol

Leonid I. Grach, Deputy, Member of the Standing Committee on Local Self-Government and State System, Supreme Soviet of the Crimea - Communist Party  
Valentina Samar, Radio Assol, Simferopol  
Tatiana Krasikova, Chernomorskaya Telecompania, Simferopol.  
Lilya R. Budzhurova, Crimean Association of Free Journalists  
Vladimir Prytula, director Crimean Centre of Independent Journalists and Researchers  
Valentin Kozubsky, director Crimean Information Agency


## Odessa

Galyas Alexander V., Head of "new wave" association of young journalists  
Tatjana Zhakoua, leading observer of *Vechemyay Odessa*  
Victor Vasilets, editor-in-chief *Odesskie Izvestia*  
Vjatshevslav V. Voronkov, editor-in-chief *Odesskiy Vestnik*  
Irina Lukina, Director of Foreign Affairs and Information Office, Executive Committee of Odessa  
City Council  
Shklaruk Zoya Modestovna, City Election Commission  
Volodyrnyr F. Bovkun, deputy director Odessa Municipal Broadcasting Tele-Radio-Centre  
Rabotin Yuriy Anatoliyovich, Head of Journalist Union of Ukraine, Odessa region  
Molchanov Alexander Eugenievich, Journalist Information Agency "Repor"  
Serov Igor Pavlovich, General Director of RIAC  
Dozent Victor Primatov, Shirtut Boris, Sovenko Pyotr Petrovich, Socialist Party  
Gudkov Lev Victorovich, second secretary of Odessa regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine  
Levitskiy Valeriy Vladimirovich, the member of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine  
Vladimir Kurennoy, Member of the Executive Committee, Head of Odessa Regional Organisation, Liberal Party-Labour Party  
Yarmilov Grigoriy Anatolievich, Head of Regional Election Commission  
Anashenkova Svetlana Georgievna, Secretary to the Regional Election Commission

Time devoted to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates


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### Directions to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates


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
Time devoted to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates

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
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
Directions to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates  
UT-2  
02.03.98 - 28.03.98



Devoted time to political parties  
INTER  
02.03.98 - 28.03.98




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Devoted time to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates


ICTV  
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Directions to political parties

ICTV


02.03.98 - 28.03.98



Devoted time to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates

STB


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Directions to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates


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02.03.98 - 28.03.98





Distribution of positive and negative references to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates


Den  
01.03-28.03 1998




Distribution of space devoted to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates 01.03-28.03 1998












Distribution of space devoted to political parties/coalitions/  
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Golos Ukrayny




Distribution of positive and negative references to political parties/  
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


Distribution of space devoted to political parties/  
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


Distribution of positive and negative references to political parties/  
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Uryadovy kurier






Distribution of positive and negative references to political parties/  
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 Vseukrainskie vedomosti




Distribution of space devoted to political parties/  
 coalitions/independent candidates 01.03.-28.03.1998  
 Vseukrainskie vedomosti



Distribution of positive and negative references to political parties/coalitions/independent candidates

Fakty  
01.03-28.03 1998



Distribution of space devoted to political parties/  
coalitions/independent candidates 01.03.-25.03.1998

