





Forum: Security Council

Issue: Responding to the Threat Posed by Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) to International Security

Student Officer: Elsa Chonia

Position: Deputy-Chair

Structure

1. Introduction
2. Definition of key Terms
3. Timeline of events
4. Background information
5. Stakeholders (Countries, organizations involved etc)
6. Relevant UN resolutions, treaties, and events (Previous attempts)
7. Possible solutions
8. Further reading
9. Bibliography

Introduction

Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) are part of the uprising pressing challenges to international security in the twenty-first century. These armed groups, while not officially recognized as states or part of the state, possess organized military capacity, political influence, and in some cases territorial control. In the modern global security landscape, ANSAs are often opposed to or even exceed state militaries in their ability to destabilize regions, control populations, and disrupt international peace. Their activities range from terrorism and insurgency to piracy, cyberwarfare, and the use of drones and ballistic missiles. This poses a direct threat to the sovereignty of states, to the principles of the United Nations, and to the safety of civilians across the globe.

This study guide focuses on four of the most influential and dangerous ANSAs: **Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis (Ansarallah), and the Wagner Group (also known as Russia's Africa Corps)**. Each represents a different type of non-state threat: Hamas as an armed political movement embedded in the Gaza Strip; Hezbollah as a state-within-a-state actor in Lebanon with regional reach; the Houthis as an insurgent-turned-de facto government force in Yemen wielding long-range missiles and drones; and Wagner as a private military



company operating globally as an extension of Russian influence. These groups pose unique and overlapping threats to international security through asymmetric warfare, terrorism, attacks on civilians and shipping routes, and the erosion of the international rules-based order.¹

The vitality of observing these groups lies in their **impact on global governance**. The Houthis have thrown into disorder the global shipping industry with over 100 missile and drone strikes on Red Sea vessels since late 2023, sinking multiple cargo ships and killing dozens of seafarers, forcing insurance costs to skyrocket and rerouting global trade around Africa.² Through its highly developed arsenal of precision-guided rockets and drones, Hezbollah threatens Israel's security and regional stability, while also carrying out international plots abroad, from South America to Europe.³ Hamas, based in the region of Palestine, continues to fuel one of the world's most uncontrollable conflicts, undermining ceasefire efforts and perpetuating cycles of war in Gaza.⁴ Wagner, finally, has expanded the model of privatized warfare, manipulating fragile states in Africa and the Middle East, destabilizing governments, and giving Russia a deniable but potent projection of power.⁵

From a United Nations point of view, the challenge is twofold: **(1) ensuring international peace and security under the UN Charter while (2) upholding humanitarian principles and protecting civilians**. Armed Non-State Actors do not perfectly fall into traditional frameworks of state sovereignty or international humanitarian law. Some, like the Houthis, exercise control comparable to governments but reject international and definitive norms. Others, like Wagner, operate in legal grey zones where liability is low and minimized. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has passed resolutions addressing aspects of these groups—such as UNSCR 1701 (2006) concerning Hezbollah in Lebanon, UNSCR 2216 (2015) concerning Yemen and the Houthis, UNSCR 2722 (2024) concerning Red Sea freedom of navigation, and UNSCR 2787 (2025) reinforcing navigation

¹ Reuters Staff. "Explainer: How Iran's Network of Middle East Power Faded." *Reuters*, 12 June 2025, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-network-middle-east-power-faded-2025-06-12/.

² Bate, Annabel. "How Houthis Have Mounted Terrifying Return to Scourge Red Sea Again Months after Trump Said They 'Don't Wan..." *The Irish Sun*, 11 July 2025, www.thesun.ie/news/15525676/houthis-red-sea-return.

³ Jones, Seth G., et al. "The Coming Conflict with Hezbollah." *Www.csis.org*, 21 Mar. 2024, www.csis.org/analysis/coming-conflict-hezbollah.

⁴ ---. "Explainer: How Iran's Network of Middle East Power Faded." *Reuters*, 12 June 2025, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-network-middle-east-power-faded-2025-06-12/.

⁵ Egbejule, Eromo. "More Control, Less Deniability: What next for Russia in Africa after Wagner?" *The Guardian*, 21 May 2024, www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/21/what-next-for-russia-in-africa-after-wagner-moscow-influence.



rights—but enforcement and in-practice-work remain difficult to operate and are often dependent on the political will of member states.

For delegates in this committee, understanding the role of ANSAs in undermining global peace is vital to formulating realistic and creative solutions.

This document will serve as the foundation for your debates, draft resolutions, and **diplomatic** interactions during the 3-day conference. It will equip you with a comprehensive overview and multiple avenues for research. Delegates are strongly encouraged to supplement this guide with additional sources, including UN reports, NGO studies, academic research, and **the latest international news**. By doing so, you will be prepared to not only understand the threats posed by ANSAs but also to craft solutions that reflect both the principles of the United Nations and the realities of contemporary conflict.

Definition of key terms

Armed Non-State Actor (ANSA) / Armed Group

An armed non-state actor (ANSA) is generally defined as an organized group that is not part of the formal state military but has the ability to use violence and warfare to achieve political, ideological, or territorial aims and scopes. Under international humanitarian law, ANSAs may include rebel groups, insurgents, paramilitaries, militias and terrorist organizations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stresses that ANSAs are significant parties in non-international armed conflicts, and as such, they are legally bound by the core principles of international humanitarian law, such as the prohibition on targeting civilians, even if they are not signatories to treaties like the Geneva Conventions.

Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)

The term “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO) is a legal designation used by the United States Department of State under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This designation enforces financial restrictions, criminalizes material support, and restricts immigration access for members of such organizations. Being listed as an FTO carries severe implications, as it isolates the group internationally and cuts off its funding streams through global financial monitoring systems. Hamas and Hezbollah have long been included in the U.S. FTO list, reflecting their involvement in terrorist acts against civilians and states.⁶ On March 4, 2025, the United States re-designated Yemen’s Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, citing their repeated attacks on international shipping, civilian airports, and U.S. partners in the

⁶ “Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism.” *United States Department of State*, www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-and-state-sponsors-of-terrorism.



Middle East.⁷ This re-designation highlights how the FTO framework is not static but evolves with the behavior of armed groups, signaling to the international community that certain actions cross the threshold into global terrorism.

Private Military Company (PMC) / State-Linked Formations

Private military companies (PMCs) represent a significant and complex feature of the contemporary global security landscape. These corporate entities provide armed combat and security services to state and non-state clients, frequently operating in conflict zones where they occupy an ambiguous legal and operational space. By outsourcing military functions, states can project power and pursue strategic objectives without the formal deployment of national armed forces, thereby complicating mechanisms for international accountability. A PMC could serve as a versatile, deniable proxy for state interests.

Timeline of events

Date	Description of event
25 January 2006	Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, cementing its position as both a political and military actor in Gaza while maintaining its armed wing. ⁸
12 July 2006	Hezbollah, having fought Israel in southern Lebanon throughout the 1990s, triggered the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War when it launched a cross-border raid, killing three Israeli soldiers and capturing two others. This led to a 34-day war.
11 August 2006	Adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, calling for a cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon. ⁹
19 September 2014	Eruption of the Yemeni civil war, caused by Houthi forces which stormed into the capital, Sana'a, and forced President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi into house arrest.

⁷ Lamothe, Dan, and Missy Ryan. "U.S. Designates Houthis a Terrorist Organization, Reversing Biden Move." *The Washington Post*, 4 Mar. 2025, www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/04/houthi-trump-rubio-foreign-terrorist-designation.

⁸ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." *United States Department of State*, www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations.

⁹ "SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS for END to HOSTILITIES between HIZBOLLAH, ISRAEL, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1701 (2006) | UN Press." *Press.un.org*, press.un.org/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm.



26 March 2015	Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm, an intervention against the Houthis.
14 April 2015	The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2216, imposing an arms embargo on the Houthis and demanding their withdrawal from seized territory. Despite this resolution, the Houthis maintained control over northern Yemen and expanded their arsenal. ¹⁰
19 November 2023	Houthi forces hijacked the Bahamian-flagged, Japanese-operated vehicle carrier <i>Galaxy Leader</i> in the Red Sea, seizing 25 crew members of various nationalities. This act marked the beginning of their systematic maritime campaign targeting commercial shipping.
6 March 2024	The Houthis struck the bulk carrier <i>True Confidence</i> with an anti-ship ballistic missile, killing three crew members (two Filipino and one Vietnamese national) and severely injuring several others. The ship was later abandoned and sank, marking the first fatal attack on international shipping in this campaign.
10 January 2024	The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2722, condemning Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and affirming the right to freedom of navigation under international law.
6–7 July 2025	The Houthis launched a missile that hit the bulk carrier <i>Magic Seas</i> , damaging the ship and forcing it to divert. ¹¹
7 July 2025	Another Houthi missile sank the bulk carrier <i>Eternity C</i> , killing three Filipino seafarers.
18 June 2025	A high-level debate at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) saw Israel and Iran trade accusations over responsibility for the crisis, underlining how the Red Sea conflict had become a global diplomatic flashpoint. ¹²

¹⁰ "Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 2015 | Security Council." *Un.org*, 2015, [main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2015](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2015).

¹¹ ---, "How Houthis Have Mounted Terrifying Return to Scourge Red Sea Again Months after Trump Said They 'Don't Wan..." *The Irish Sun*, 11 July 2025, www.thesun.ie/news/15525676/houthis-red-sea-return/.

¹² ---, "Explainer: How Iran's Network of Middle East Power Faded." *Reuters*, 12 June 2025, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-network-middle-east-power-faded-2025-06-12/.



Background information

Hamas

Hamas, based in the region of Gaza, and formally known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, was founded in December 1987 during the First Intifada as a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.¹³ It steadily developed and distinguished itself as both a militant organization and a caregiver of social services, building support through schools, hospitals, and welfare programs, especially among marginalized groups in Gaza. The operation of Hamas is done through two interconnected wings: the political leadership which supervises governance and diplomacy and the military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which conducts armed operations mostly against Israel.¹⁴

Since its domination of Gaza, on 14 June 2007, Hamas has run a parallel government structure while clashing with Israel, exercising de facto control of the Palestinian territory.¹⁵ The military strategy of Hamas includes the use of both short and long- range rockets, tunnels for infiltration, and increasingly- advanced- technology drones. Hamas is officially recognized as an FTO by the United States, the European Union, and other countries which is an obstacle to its international legitimacy and financial networks.¹⁶

The most striking and tense escalation in recent modern history came on October 7th 2023, when Hamas launched an extreme cross-border attack into Israel, killing over 1,200 people and taking more than 200 hostages. This attack awakened a full-scale Israeli military campaign in Gaza, provoking tens of thousands of casualties and massive destruction. By mid-2025, Hamas's military wing had been severely degraded by continuous Israeli strikes, yet it retained its ability to conduct asymmetric attacks and inspire resistance across the Palestinian territories.¹⁷

Hamas's ties to Iran and Hezbollah remain central to its survival, as Tehran provides funding, weapons, and training. However, the weakening of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" by

¹³ Robinson, Kali. "What Is Hamas?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, 17 Oct. 2024, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas.

¹⁴ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." *United States Department of State*, www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations.

¹⁵ BBC. "Hamas: The Palestinian Militant Group That Rules Gaza." *BBC News*, 1 July 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13331522.

¹⁶ "Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism." *United States Department of State*, www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-and-state-sponsors-of-terrorism.

¹⁷ Reuters Staff. "Explainer: How Iran's Network of Middle East Power Faded." *Reuters*, 12 June 2025, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-network-middle-east-power-faded-2025-06-12/.

Gaza war

- Gaza Strip under Palestinian control
- Gaza Strip under Israeli control and furthest Israeli advance in Gaza Strip
- Evacuated areas inside Israel
- Areas inside Gaza Strip ordered to be evacuated by Israel
- Maximum extent of Palestinian advance

0 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15 km

The map shows the Gaza Strip and surrounding areas in Israel. Key locations include Ashkelon, Kiryat Gat, Sderot, Gaza City, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Be'er Sheva. The map highlights the Gaza Strip under Palestinian control (red), areas under Israeli control and furthest Israeli advance (blue), and evacuated areas inside Israel (yellow). It also shows areas inside Gaza Strip ordered to be evacuated by Israel (dashed blue) and the maximum extent of Palestinian advance (dashed red). The map includes a scale bar from 0 to 15 km.

Hezbollah

¹⁸ Saad, Amal. "Iran's Proxies Aren't Really Proxies." *TIME*, Time, 7 Feb. 2024, time.com/6692282/iran-doesnt-have-proxies.

¹⁹ Figure 1 – Map of Gaza Strip showing Hamas-controlled areas



party in Lebanon is simultaneous, it works as a social services provider, as well as a powerful militia.

Militarily, Hezbollah fields an arsenal that rivals or exceeds that of many national armies. As far as we know, it possesses over 100,000 rockets and missiles, many of them precision-guided, as well as advanced drones, anti-ship missiles, and hardened bunkers throughout southern Lebanon.²⁰ Hezbollah has fought in multiple regional conflicts, including the Syrian civil war, where it gained extensive combat experience alongside the Assad regime.

Just like Hamas, Hezbollah has been designated as a FTO by the United States since 8 October 1997.²¹ Its reach is beyond Lebanon, it is international. It has carried out or attempted international terrorist attacks, including assassination plots in Europe and Latin America.²² In **May 2025**, Brazilian authorities disrupted a Hezbollah-linked plot targeting Jewish and Israeli individuals in São Paulo, underscoring the group's global expansion.

As of 2025, the position of Hezbollah has been weakened and undermined heavily by Israeli strikes following the Hamas attack of October 2023. Israeli airstrikes throughout southern Lebanon have degraded parts of its command and control, while Iran's broader regional network has faced setbacks.²³ Nevertheless, Hezbollah remains the most capable Iranian-aligned group, with the ability to open a northern front against Israel at any time.

²⁰ Jones, Seth G., et al. "The Coming Conflict with Hezbollah." *Www.csis.org*, 21 Mar. 2024, www.csis.org/analysis/coming-conflict-hezbollah.

²¹ U.S. Department of State. "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." *United States Department of State*, www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations.

²² Wikipedia Contributors. "Hezbollah in Latin America." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation,

²³ ---. "Explainer: How Iran's Network of Middle East Power Faded." *Reuters*, 12 June 2025, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-network-middle-east-power-faded-2025-06-12/.



Figure 2²⁴

Houthis / Ansarallah

The Houthis, formally known as Ansarallah, originated in northern Yemen in the 1990s as a revivalist Zaydi Shia movement but became a major armed group in the 2000s. They seized the Yemeni capital Sana'a on **21 September 2014**, triggering a civil war that continues to this day.

On 14 April 2015, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2216, imposing an arms embargo and demanding Houthi withdrawal, but the group consolidated control over northern Yemen and key ports, giving them leverage over humanitarian aid flows.²⁵ Over time, the Houthis have developed advanced missile and drone technology, heavily dependent on Iranian assistance enabling them to strike Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and by 2025, even Israel.

Ever since the 19th of November 2023, which was when the Houthis hijacked the *Galaxy Leader* in the Red Sea, they have conducted over 100 missile and drone attacks on commercial shipping. On **6 March 2024**, they killed three sailors in the *True Confidence* strike. On **6–7 July**

²⁴ Figure 2 – Hezbollah's rocket ranges covering Israel (Map 2023)

²⁵ "Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 2015 | Security Council." *Un.org*, 2015, main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2015.



2025, their strikes on the *Magic Seas* and *Eternity C* further escalated the crisis, killing three more seafarers and disrupting global supply chains.²⁶

Just like the two previous groups, the Houthis were re-designated as an FTO by the US, signaling growing recognition of their global terrorist threat.²⁷ In May 2025, the world was shocked by the Houthis launching a ballistic missile at Israel's Ben Gurion Airport, injuring eight and halting flights—an unprecedented move by an ANSA in targeting civilian aviation infrastructure.²⁸

The maritime campaign conducted by the Houthis, has possibly made them the most disruptive ANSA in 2025, directly threatening the Suez Canal which carries 12% of global commerce. Their actions have turned a civil war into a global economic and security crisis.

²⁶ "Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 2015 | Security Council." *Un.org*, 2015, [main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2015](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2015).

²⁷ Lamothe, Dan, and Missy Ryan. "U.S. Designates Houthis a Terrorist Organization, Reversing Biden Move." *The Washington Post*, 4 Mar. 2025, www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/04/houthi-trump-rubio-foreign-terrorist-designation/.

²⁸ Wikipedia Contributors. "2025 Houthi Attack on Tel Aviv Airport." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 3 June 2025.

Houthi rebel attacks on Red Sea shipping vessels

Incidents from Nov. 19, 2023–June 15, 2024




Figure 3²⁹

Wagner Group → Russia's "Africa Corps"

The Wagner Group emerged in **2014** as a shadowy Russian paramilitary force, first seen during Russia's annexation of Crimea.³⁰ The group had a rapid expansion, and finally became Moscow's main proxy tool in Syria, Libya and across Africa. Wagner provided security to regimes, fought rebels, and secured natural resource concessions, often leaving behind a trail of human rights abuses.

Sometime after the failed Wagner mutiny 23-24 June 2023, in which leader Yevgeny Prigozhin briefly challenged the Kremlin, the future of Wagner came into question. Following the death of Prigozhin in August 2023, Russia attempted to move Wagner under the Ministry of Defense's control. By **January 2024**, reports confirmed the creation of the "Africa Corps," which was basically a rebranded structure made to absorb Wagner's fighters and continue its overseas operations.

²⁹ Figure 3 – Map of Red Sea shipping routes and Houthi missile/drone attack zones

³⁰ BBC. "What Is Russia's Wagner Group of Mercenaries in Ukraine?" *BBC News*, 6 Sept. 2023, www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877.

The Africa Corps maintenance of presence in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Libya, has achieved to guard mines, oil fields and political leaders. For Russia's benefit, this offers deniable force projection and influence-building in Africa at a low cost, but for the international community, it raises acute questions about how to regulate private military companies and hold states accountable for their proxies.

By now, the Wagner Group continues to play a vital destabilizing role, more specifically in Sudan where its fighters have reportedly supported factions in the ongoing civil conflict complicating UN humanitarian operations. It is one of the hardest ANSAs to regulate, due to its ambiguous legal status, blurring the line between private enterprise and state policy.




Figure 4³¹

Stakeholders

Israel

Israel, due to its geographical location, is at the heart of both the Hamas and Hezbollah threats. Since the October 7th 2023 Hamas attack, the country has been facing one of the

³¹ Map of Wagner/Africa Corps operations in Africa (2024–25)



deadliest conflicts in history, resulting in a sustained Gaza war and a tense atmosphere along its northern border with Hezbollah. According to reports and statements, Israel openly views Hamas and Hezbollah as existential threats and has conducted pre-emptive and retaliatory military operations against both. The Houthis, also, directly affect Israel because of their expansion in their missile range which stroke Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport on **4 May 2025**.³²

Lebanon

Lebanon is the home of the Hezbollah, which serves as both a political party and an armed militia. The Lebanese government has stated multiple times, that it lacks the capacity to disarm Hezbollah, leaving the state vulnerable to escalation with Israel and entangled in Iran's regional strategies.

Yemen

Yemen is the Houthis' base of operations. Since their outbreak in 2014, the Houthis have captured and controlled the capital, Sana'a and larger regions of northern Yemen. The Houthis operate in a direct competition with the internationally recognized Yemen government, which is supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Yemen, due to its geographical location, is at the heart of global shipping, making any domestic complications a global concern.

Red Sea and Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Djibouti, Eritrea)

Once again, due to their geographical location, these states, sit along the Red Sea corridor (the Suez Canal) and are directly threatened by Houthi attacks on shipping. Specifically, Egypt, is economically dependent on the Suez Canal, which has seen reduced traffic to its location: being in a direct Houthi attack zone. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have been fighting the Houthi threat in Yemen for the past years, but by today, they have shifted a towards a safer approach: maritime defense and international lobbying for stronger sanctions. Djibouti and Eritrea host foreign military bases that are key to international naval patrols, including those by the United States and European navies.

Iran

Iran, as the top external sponsor of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, has been providing weapons, training and funding to all three organizations. Its Quds Force has cultivated what it calls the "Axis of Resistance." The Tehran remains a key actor, as these groups still depend on Iranian support for strategic capabilities.³³

³² Wikipedia Contributors. "2025 Houthi Attack on Tel Aviv Airport." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 3 June 2025.

³³ Reuters Staff. "Explainer: How Iran's Network of Middle East Power Faded." *Reuters*, 12 June 2025, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-network-middle-east-power-faded-2025-06-12/.



United States of America

The US, due to its large ability of influence, plays multiple roles: defending Israel both morally and economically, leading naval coalitions in the Red Sea, sanctioning ANSAs through FTO designations and pushing international diplomacy.³⁴ U.S. naval forces also participate in Operation Prosperity Guardian, tasked with protecting Red Sea shipping.

Russia

Russia is the home of the Wagner Group/ Africa Corps. Through the rebranding of Wagner into Africa Corps in the January 2024, Russia carefully calculated its capacity to project power internationally and specifically across Africa and compete with Western influence. Moscow might deny might deny state responsibility for Wagner's actions, however its Ministry of Defense now coordinates Africa Corps, making Russia a hybrid stakeholder-both state and proxy sponsor.

European Union

The EU, due to its networking, is deeply invested in maritime security, counter-terrorism, and sanctions enforcement.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

The UNSC has been the main multilateral body addressing these crises. It passed UNSCR 1701 (2006) on Lebanon, UNSCR 2216 (2015) on Yemen, UNSCR 2722 (2024) on Red Sea shipping, and UNSCR 2787 (2025) reinforcing navigational rights.³⁵

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

The past years, the IMO has started becoming a crucial venue for debates on Houthi shipping attacks. On 18th June 2025, Israel and Iran, reportedly clashed diplomatically at an IMO session, highlighting its growing importance in maritime security.³⁶

³⁴ Lamothe, Dan, and Missy Ryan. "U.S. Designates Houthis a Terrorist Organization, Reversing Biden Move." *The Washington Post*, 4 Mar. 2025, www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/04/houthi-trump-rubio-foreign-terrorist-designation/.

³⁵ "Russian Federation's War Having "Appalling Impact" on Ukraine's Children, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council | UN Press." *Press.un.org*, press.un.org/en/2024/sc15559.doc.htm.

³⁶ Reuters Staff. "Explainer: How Iran's Network of Middle East Power Faded." *Reuters*, 12 June 2025, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-network-middle-east-power-faded-2025-06-12/.



Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

These regional bodies have condemned Houthi attacks, calling for solidarity with the Red Sea states and supporting sanctions.

African Union (AU)

The AU is increasingly involved in responding to Wagner/Africa Corps, particularly in states like Mali and the Central African Republic.

Relevant UN resolutions, treaties, and events (Previous attempts)

UNSCR 1373 (28 September 2001)

- Adopted in the wake of 9/11 attacks
- Remains the cornerstone of the global counter-terrorism regime
- Obliges all member states to criminalize terrorism financing, deny safe haven to terrorists and enhance international cooperation against terrorist groups
- Does not directly address Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis or Wagner but establishes the binding legal framework later applied to these groups

UNSCR 1701 (11 August 2006)

- Ended the Israel-Hezbollah war
- Called for the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon
- Authorized an expanded UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) deployment, which continues to monitor the Israel–Lebanon border³⁷
- Hezbollah still retained and even expanded its arsenal, underscoring the limits of SC enforcement

UNSCR 2216 (14 April 2015)

- Imposed an arms embargo on the Houthis in Yemen
- Demanded their withdrawal from seized territory
- Authorized maritime inspections³⁸

³⁷ “SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS for END to HOSTILITIES between HIZBOLLAH, ISRAEL, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1701 (2006) | UN Press.” *Press.un.org*, press.un.org/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm.

³⁸ “Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 2015 | Security Council.” *Un.org*, 2015, main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2015.



- Proved difficult to enforce
- Did not prevent the group from expanding its control

UNSCR 2624 (28 February 2022)

- Designated the Houthis as a terrorist group under the Yemen sanctions regime
- Tightened restrictions on arms and financing³⁹

UNSCR 2722 (10 January 2024)

- Addressed Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping
- Condemned the attacks as violations of international law
- Reaffirmed the right to freedom of navigation

UNSCR 2787 (15 July 2025)

- Reinforced international condemnation of Houthi maritime attacks
- Urged compliance with embargoes
- Reaffirmed commitments to protect commercial shipping lanes

Possible solutions

Maritime Security and Freedom of Navigation

Having the Houthis' campaign against Red Sea shipping as a given, it is essential to strengthen multilateral naval protection. It is possible to expand international initiatives such as Operation Prosperity Guardian, where more states could contribute assets to patrol vulnerable shipping lanes.⁴⁰ Delegates are encouraged to propose a Security Council mandate for coordinated naval escorts, supported by information-sharing platforms like UKMTO and the Combined Maritime Forces. In addition, regional coast guards in the affected countries should receive UN capacity-building support to deter attacks near shorelines.

³⁹ Akram, Munir, and Pakistan. "Record #3958283." *United Nations Digital Library System*, 6 Oct. 2021, digitallibrary.un.org/record/3958283.

⁴⁰ "Red Sea Project." *Imo.org*, 2021, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/RedSeaProject.aspx.



Sanctions and Designations Compliance

The enforcement of sanctions needs to be critically strengthened. UNSC Resolutions 2216, 2624 and 2722 might have established embargoes on the Houthis but implementation has been weak due to incompatible member states. Delegates are encouraged to call for a centralized UN maritime inspection regime, focusing in the Red Sea, modeled after existing sanctions monitoring mechanisms.⁴¹ However, since the problem seems to be escalating quickly, it is important to act beyond Yemen. The SC will also be accepting proposals such as ensuring compliance with terrorist designations for Hamas and Hezbollah (particularly by freezing assets and restricting fundraising through front charities)⁴².

Counter-Financing and the Crime–Terror Nexus

Many ANSAs rely on illicit financing, including smuggling, drug trafficking and resource exploitation. Hezbollah is known to operate in Latin America's narcotics trade, while Wagner/Africa Corps profits from gold and diamond mining in Africa. Delegates are encouraged to propose enhanced cooperation with UNODC (United Nations Organization of Drugs and Crime) and INTERPOL to track illicit trade.

Humanitarian Engagement and IHL Compliance

Sanctions and military presence might be key, however direct engagement with ANSAs on humanitarian grounds remains as vital. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has demonstrated that even designated terrorist groups can be engaged in dialogue on issues such as detention standards, civilian protection and humanitarian access. Delegates are encouraged to propose formal guidelines for UN agencies and NGOs to safely engage with ANSAs without legitimizing them politically.

Political Dialogue and Conflict Resolution

In order for political dialogue to work, military and legal tools are needed to be paired with. For Hamas and Hezbollah, efforts to revive negotiations on Israeli–Palestinian peace and Lebanese sovereignty are critical. For Yemen, renewed talks under UN Special Envoy mediation could address the Houthis' maritime campaign as part of a broader settlement.

⁴¹ "Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 2015 | Security Council." *Un.org*, 2015, main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2015.

⁴² U.S. Department of State. "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." *United States Department of State*, www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations.



Delegates should recognize that addressing the root causes of conflict—state weakness, governance failures, and regional rivalries—is key to preventing ANSAs from filling the vacuum.

Further reading

- **UN Security Council Documents** – Full texts of UNSCR 1373, 1701, 2216, 2624, 2722, and 2787, available through the UN Digital Library.
<https://digitallibrary.un.org/>
- **International Maritime Organization (IMO) – Red Sea Attacks Resource Hub** – Regularly updated incident reports and press briefings on Houthi maritime attacks. <https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/red-sea.aspx>
- **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)** – Resources on engagement with armed groups and international humanitarian law obligations.
<https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2023/10/10/icrc-engagement-with-armed-groups-in-2023/>
- **U.S. Department of State – Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) List** – Updated list and designations, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
<https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations>
- **Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Backgrounders:**
 1. Hamas <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas>
 2. Hezbollah <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah>
- **Reuters / AP Field Reporting** – Coverage of Red Sea shipping attacks and IMO debates <https://www.reuters.com/> , <https://apnews.com/>
- **CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies)** – Analyses of Hezbollah's military capabilities and Wagner/Africa Corps operations <https://www.csis.org/>
- **The Guardian – Wagner/Africa Corps Reporting** – Investigative coverage of Russia's PMC rebranding and operations in Africa
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/21/what-next-for-russia-in-africa-after-wagner-moscow-influence>

