

BALMUN'25

HUNSC

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STUDY GUIDE

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1. Letter of Co Secretaries

It is our utmost pleasure to be able to serve this year's BALMUN Conference, a gathering where we unite to shape the world through democracy and collective ideas, as the Co-Secretaries General. We are more than prepared to provide you with the best 3 days journey of all your MUN experiences. With our excellent academic team, we greet you with 8 committees in total: 2 of them being General Assembly, 4 of them being Special and 2 of them as Crisis Committees. Let this conference serve as a reminder that leadership is not measured by the volume of one's voice, but by the integrity of people's ideas and the willingness to listen, adapt, and inspire the change.

Sincerely,
Alin Asel Mordeniz & Ceylin Umay Köylü
Secretaries General

2. Letter of Under Secretary General

Dear participants of BalMUN'25,

It is my honor to welcome you to the BalMUN'25 conference as the Under Secretary General of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) . My name is Melis ÖNEZ, and I am a 11th grader at Çapa Highschool of Science. In this edition of BalMUN, as the Under Secretary General of UNSC, it is my responsibility to ensure that you have all the necessary information to engage in productive discussions and develop comprehensive solutions on the agenda items.

At this conference, you will be tackling a pressing issue: ‘Cyprus Conflict’. These topic require your utmost attention, diligence, and critical thinking skills. To guide your research and preparation, I have provided a detailed study guide that outlines the background, current status, and future outlook of each agenda item; and also contains information regarding the rules of procedure of our committee. I encourage you to read the study guide carefully, as it includes valuable information and sources to assist you in your discussions.

This guide contains valuable information and resources to help you research and prepare for your meeting. It contains information about the committees you participate in, including their purpose, composition, and rules of procedure. Also included is a list of topics that will be discussed during the conference, along with background information and key questions for each topic. We highly recommend that you take the time to read this guide carefully and use it as a starting point for your research. Additionally, we encourage you to do your own research to supplement the information in this guide. In this way, you will be able to better understand the issues at hand and formulate effective discussions and solutions during the meeting.

Please note that this guide is intended only as a resource for preparation and does not replace the importance of active research and critical thinking. In addition, this guide is an exhaustive resource. Instead, participants are encouraged to do further research to gain a better understanding of the issue at hand. If you have any questions or concerns about our study guides, feel free to contact us. We will help you prepare and ensure a successful and rewarding conference experience...

If you have any questions about the committee, do not hesitate to ask me, my mail address is melisonez10@gmail.com.

Sincerely,

Melis ÖNEZ

Under-Secretary-General, UNSC

3. Introduction to the Committee : United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, as outlined in Article 24 of the United Nations Charter. The UNSC is one of the six main organs of the United Nations and was established in 1945 in response to the devastation caused by World War II. The primary responsibility of the UNSC is to address threats to international peace and security and to take action to prevent conflict or resolve it when it occurs.

3.1. Mandate

The Security Council has in its mandate to furnish matters pertaining to disarmament, peacekeeping missions, protection of human rights, political deliberations and humanitarian crises.¹ Currently, the mandate of the United Nations Security Council has been modified, especially after inculcating the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) to discuss the parallel between sustainability, peace and security.² The same has been discussed at the meeting on 17 November 2015 as the Security Council focused upon refining its goals post 2015 Sustainable Development Goals.³ United Nations Security Council mainly discusses issues relevant to sustainable development, protection of human rights and protection of civilians during conflict zones, prevention of conflict and prevail peace through protecting humanitarian rights⁴. Security Council decisions are obligatory in nature as Article 25 of the United Nations Charter gives power to the Security Council to draft binding resolutions which become a requisite to be necessarily followed by all the member states or concerned member states⁵. The Council's position may be addressed by the President of the Security Council through Press Release⁶ to address essential concerns and recommend possible solutions concerning the current situation or crisis⁷.

1: Council on Foreign Relations, CFR Backgrounders: The UN Security Council, 2015; Encyclopaedia Britannica, United Nations Security Council, 2014. 2: UN General Assembly, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), 2015; UN DPA, Politically Speaking, Sustaining peace, Conflict Prevention, Human Rights and Sustainable Development High on Agenda for New Security Council Members, 2018. 3: Lebada, UN Security Council Discusses Links with 2030 Agenda, SDG Knowledge Hub, 2015. 4: UN DPA, Politically Speaking, Sustaining Peace, Conflict Prevention, Human Rights and Sustainable Development High on Agenda for New Security Council Members, 2018. 5: UN Security Council, What is the Security Council? 2018; Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Art. 25. 6: NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the United Nations Security Council: Report of the NGOWG Monthly Action Points, 2009-2010, 2010, p. 11. 7: *ibid.* p.15.

3.2. Structure

The United Nations Security Council consists of 15 members. Out of these 5 are permanent members, they are also known as “Veto Owners” or “P5 Nations”. These permanent members are: the USA, France, China, Russia and the UK. Alongside these 5 member states, there are 10 non-permanent member states appointed for the tenure of 2 years by the United Nations General Assembly. These nations represent their region and foreign policies exhibiting leadership on an international platform. The presidency of the Security Council is held by each member for one month in alphabetical order. The Security Council can be convened anytime by the president at the request of the member states. Consequently, the president also holds the power to call upon member states for a meeting in an urgent crisis, emergency or dispute situation. The member states could extend an invitation to the observer nations who are not allowed to vote but could submit their proposals or draft resolutions. The observers are also welcomed to apprise the council regarding any contemporary issue ongoing in their territory.

The United Nations Security Council has established various subsidiary bodies under Article 29 of the UN Charter comprising: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, sanctions committees, and ad hoc committees, such as the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia, etc. The Security Council is also responsible for the supervision of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Each nation is granted one vote, and it requires a special majority (2/3) to pass a resolution. However, if any P5 nation says no, the resolution won't pass, this is known as the exercise of “Veto Power”.

3.3. Functions and Powers

Knowing the functions and powers are extremely important to know what and in which manner could the Security Council perform in order to drive the required possible solution which must also be considered while delegates write their draft resolution. The powers and functions of UNSC are mentioned in Chapter V, VI, VII, VIII and XII of the UN Charter. These could be understood as follows;

- Submit a special annual report to UNGA for consideration to maintain international peace and security. (Art. 24)
- UNSC could investigate any issue which might endanger maintenance of international peace and security. (Art. 34)
- UNSC could call upon the parties to settle disputes amicably through alternative dispute mechanisms, the procedure for such adjustments could also be provided by UNSC. (Art. 33 & 36(1)) The case could again be referred to UNSC and if the dispute still persists, the parties could settle as it may be considered appropriate. (Art. 37)
- UNSC shall determine and make recommendations for threat to peace, breach of peace and act of aggression. (Art.39) UNSC would also ensure the adherence to such measures. (Art. 41) without the use of arms but would include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. (Art. 41) In case of further failure UNSC could take actions such as demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. (Art. 42)
- UNSC may deliberate upon any dispute occurring, and has been reported by member or non-member nations. (Art. 35)
- UNSC could refer legal disputes to the International Court of Justice. (Art. 36)
- Member states of the UN could facilitate UNSC with special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including right of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. (Art. 43)
- UNSC is responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. (Art.26)
- Member states could assist UNSC for employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces in case of necessity of use of force (Art. 44). UNSC could also take Military Measures and application of Armed Forces with assistance from the Military Staff Committee. (Art. 45,46 & 47)
- UNSC could make recommendations for pacific settlement by itself or by regional agencies of dispute in case alternative dispute settlement or legal settlement is not available. (Art. 38 & 52)
- UNSC shall approve the terms of Trusteeship agreements and assist the Trusteeship Council, in return the Trusteeship Council would undertake its obligation towards UNSC. (Art. 83 & 84)
- UNSC could utilize regional arrangements or agencies for their enforcement and ascertain information in such regards to maintain international peace and security. (Art 53 & 54)

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) stands as a paramount force on the global stage, holding significant influence in matters concerning international peace and security. Established as a central organ under the United Nations Charter, the UNSC plays a pivotal role in addressing complex geopolitical challenges. With its inception dating back to the foundation of the United Nations, the UNSC is steadfast in its dedication to maintaining global stability, preventing conflicts, and fostering sustainable development. Covering a spectrum of issues, including diplomatic resolutions, peacekeeping operations, and crisis management, the UNSC strives to uphold its fundamental objective, ensuring peace and security worldwide through collaborative and decisive action.

3.4. Key Terms and Definitions

Security Council: The principal organ of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace and security.

Permanent Members (P5): The five countries with permanent seats on the UNSC - the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom.


Veto Power: The authority of any of the P5 members to block a substantive resolution, regardless of the level of international support for it.

Peacekeepers: Individuals or groups that are tasked with maintaining peace and security in conflict zones through monitoring, protection, and support activities.

4. Introduction to the Agenda Item : Cyprus Crisis

Cyprus has always been one of the most significant regions with the strategic location of the island. This importance meant that it saw constant invasions throughout its history. In the past Cyprus was annexed by the British Empire in 1914. Before that, the Ottoman Empire had control of the island and it can explain the Turkish minority in the island.

Indeed it's possible to consider that the island is inhabited by the Greek population as majority and Turkish population as minority .



Map of Ethnographic Distribution in Cyprus , 1960

The British Empire only ruled the land until 1960, when the island proclaimed its independence. Since Turkish communities and Greek communities had different plans and expectations for the island, independence of Cyprus was far away from being peaceful. The Greek population had an idea: enosis. Which is an ideology aiming to incorporate Cyprus into Greece. On the other side Turkish

Cypriots wanted “Taksim”, the partition between Greece and Türkiye. Even Though Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriot had different ideologies and aims about the island, they signed London and Zurich Agreements, which are supporting independence of the island.

In 1963, both of the agreements (London and Zurich) turned out unsuccessful with the reforms introduced by the island’s president, Makarios III, that were exceedingly prejudicial to the interests of Turkish Cypriots. Casualties ran high in the ensuing violence between Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries and Greek Cypriot forces. The escalated tension between sides turned into an armed conflict which had both sides military involvement in the aftermath.

4.1. Key Terms and Definitions

Enosis : Ideology that was supported by Greeks and Greek Cypriots with the aim of incorporating Cyprus into Greece. Enosis was one of the root causes of escalated tensions in the region and the conflict.

Taksim : Ideology that formed as a response of the Enosis ideology of Greeks Cypriots. It is possible to explain the Turkish nationalist and secessionist movement of Turkish Cypriots advocating for the independence and recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus under a two-state solution. Also the primary ideology behind the Turkish involvement in 1974.

Buffer Zone : Neutral areas which are generally between countries, most of the time in borderline areas, to be able to prevent possible or ongoing conflicts and ensure a safe corridor for civilians or as a different example of purposes buffer zones can be used for protecting the environment. Depending on the type of buffer zone, it may serve to separate regions or conjoin them.

Greek Cypriots : Greek population (majority) on the island.

Turkish Cypriots : Turkish population (minority) on the island.

EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston): Greek Cypriot nationalist guerrilla organization between 1955 to 1959, had Enosis as its main ideology. Primary objective of Enosis was end British colonial rule in the island and had a significant role in the independence of the island .Enoka got disbanded in 1950 but inspired EOKB .



EOKB : EOKA-B or Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston B ('National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters') was a Greek Cypriot paramilitary organisation formed in 1971 by General Georgios Grivas . It followed an ultra right - wing nationalistic ideology and had the ultimate goal of achieving the *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. During its short history, the organisation's chief aim was to block any attempt to enforce upon the Cyprus people what the organisation considered to be an unacceptable settlement to the Cyprus issue. In addition, the organisation drafted various plans to overthrow President Makarios. The organisation continued its activities until it officially declared its dissolution and disbanded on 11 February 1978.

4.2. Historical Background

4.2.1. Historical Background Before 1960

It all started about 9000 BC when first settlers came to Cyprus: early farming communities, who built circular houses with terrazzo floors. The first urban centers were established during the Bronze Age; Eteocypriot language was spoken by the indigenous peoples until about the 4th century BC. During the late Bronze Age, Cyprus joined the Hittite Empire by way of an association with the Kingdom of Ugarit---until two big waves of Greek immigration turned the island into a Greek demographic and cultural sphere.

Greek immigration into the island was basically a gradual process starting with the arrival of the Mycenaeans in about 1400 BC as seen through their introduction of long dromos-type tombs. This Greek identity continued regardless of foreign dominations, including those of Egypt and Persia. Cyprus was conquered in the 4th century BC first by Alexander the Great and then by the Ptolemaic dynasty of Egypt. In 58 BC, it was incorporated into the Roman Empire, which on its division in the 4th century AD, absorbed Cyprus into the Greek-speaking Byzantine Empire.

Roman rule was suddenly interrupted for a few years in 649 AD when the Umayyads launched an attack. The constant fighting between the Byzantines and Arabs led to a condominium arrangement in 668, whereby both empires governed the island jointly.

This dual rule lasted until around 965, when Byzantine forces reconquered Cyprus and turned it into a theme until the late 12th century.

In 1192, after short phases of control by the Knights Templar and Isaac Komnenos, James I of Lusignan established the medieval Kingdom of Cyprus under the House of Lusignan. In 1489 firsthand, the Republic of Venice acquired the island. Between 1570 and 1571, the Ottoman Empire conquered Cyprus, instituting nearly three centuries of Turkish rule.

During the nineteenth century, with growing vigor, the Grecian inhabitants hastened to overthrow the Turkish rule so as to unite with Greece (enosis). Thus, in 1878, under the Cyprus Convention, Britain entered into a modus vivendi with Turkey with regard to Cyprus and took administrative control of the island, fresh from its concern about Russian obscurities in the area. However, though Cyprus was de jure Ottoman, de facto British rule encouraged Greek Cypriots to unabashedly articulate their desire for enosis.

The British were empowered to annex Cyprus voiding the agreements made since the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central Powers in the Great War and repudiated Turkish claims thereon. Notwithstanding this annexation, the British even offered Cyprus to King Constantine I of Greece in 1915, on condition that Greece entered the war on the side of Britain, an offer that was rejected.

4.2.2. 1918–1955: British Colonial Rule and Rising Tensions

While Cyprus, under British administration during the early 20th century, was far removed from the events that transpired in Greece and Turkey, among others, the Greco-Turkish War, and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923-the conflict amongst the islanders never actually went away-and while the Greek Cypriots were moving toward enosis-union with Greece-Turkish Cypriots opposed this with a great deal of firmness.

In 1925 Cyprus was proclaimed a British crown colony. The Greek Cypriot demands for union grew stronger, leading to an uprising in 1931. In this revolt, nationalist sentiments were paramount; six innocent civilians lost their lives, others were injured, and the British Government House in Nicosia was razed. The British immediately struck back: almost 2,000 persons were convicted of offences connected with the disturbances.

The British authorities took even more stringent measures for the restoration of law and order. Military reinforcements were sent, the constitution was suspended, and political parties were banned. A special reserve police force made up only of Turkish Cypriots was established; press freedoms were curtailed; and public display of either Greek or Turkish flags or pictures of national heroes was forbidden. Two bishops and eight others involved in the insurgency were sent into exile.

Local elections were put on hold, and between 1931 and 1943, local leaders were chosen by the colonial government instead of through public voting. During this period, the government set up an Executive Council and later an Advisory Council. However, all members of these councils were appointed by the colonial rulers, which meant that local residents had no say in their selection. These councils had authority, but it was limited only to a few local matters.

4.2.3. 1940s–1955: Escalating Tensions and the Path to Conflict

The Greek Cypriot campaign for enosis (union with Greece) was temporarily set aside during World War II. In 1946, the British government proposed the creation of a Consultative Assembly to draft a

new constitution for Cyprus and permitted the return of those exiled in the 1931 uprising. However, this proposal was poorly received by Greek Cypriots, as it made no reference to enosis. The Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership, including the influential Orthodox Church, rejected the initiative, declaring that union with Greece remained their only political objective.

Support for enosis intensified after the war, led primarily by the Church of Cyprus, which held significant political influence. Yet it was not the sole representative of Greek Cypriot aspirations. The Communist Party of Cyprus, officially known as AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People), also backed the enosis movement, although the British authorities were reluctant to work with the Soviet-aligned organization.

Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriot resistance to enosis grew stronger. Throughout the 1940s, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot writers, including Dursun Cevlâni, promoted narratives that denied the Greek cultural identity of Cyprus and advocated for a Turkish future for the island. By the mid-1950s, the slogan “Cyprus is Turkish” had gained momentum both on the island and in Turkey. In a 1954 editorial, Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük stated that Turkish youth had been raised to believe that once Britain left Cyprus, it would rightfully belong to Turkey—and that Turkey would not accept any other outcome.

Turkish mainland institutions, such as the National Federation of Students and the Cyprus Turkish Association, became increasingly involved in Cyprus affairs. Turkish trade unions also played a role in fostering support for Taksim (the division of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish zones), a solution that would preserve British military interests on the island. Around this time, the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) was formed as a paramilitary group to counter the Greek Cypriot nationalist group EOKA, which was preparing for armed struggle.

In 1950, Bishop Makarios of Kition was elevated to Archbishop Makarios III, becoming a central figure in the Greek Cypriot movement. In his inaugural speech, he pledged to pursue enosis with “mother Greece.” Meanwhile, Colonel George Grivas, a Cypriot-born officer living in Greece, became known for his militant stance on the issue. He visited Cyprus in 1951 to coordinate efforts with Makarios but was disappointed by the Archbishop’s preference for diplomatic rather than military action. Their uneasy partnership quickly deteriorated into rivalry and hostility. On 16 August 1954, the Greek government formally submitted a request to the United Nations advocating for the Cypriot people’s right to self-determination. Turkey opposed this move, viewing enosis as a threat to Turkish Cypriots, who had enjoyed protected minority status under British rule. As Greek Cypriot nationalism intensified, Turkish Cypriot identification with Turkey also deepened, and the Turkish government became increasingly active in the Cyprus issue.

Tensions escalated further in late 1954. The British colonial government responded to growing unrest by threatening imprisonment for publishers of “seditious” materials. In December, the UN General Assembly declined to take further action on the Cyprus issue, citing that the time was not appropriate to adopt a resolution. The announcement triggered violent protests on the island—the worst since the 1931 uprising.

4.2.4. 1955–1959: EOKA, TMT, and the Road to Independence

In January 1955, Colonel George Grivas founded the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston, or EOKA) with the goal of ending British colonial rule and achieving enosis—union with Greece. On 1 April 1955, EOKA launched a coordinated armed campaign, targeting police stations, military installations, and other government facilities in major cities such as Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Limassol. The attacks resulted in the deaths of 387 British military personnel, along with several Greek Cypriots accused of collaborating with the British.

These developments led many Greek Cypriots to resign from the colonial police force. However, the force's effectiveness was not diminished, as the British had already established the "epicourical" (reserve) unit, composed solely of Turkish Cypriots, to counter EOKA's activities. Tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities began to rise.

In response to the violence and the growing momentum behind enosis, Turkish Cypriots felt increasingly threatened. By 1957, the Turkish Resistance Organisation (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, or TMT) became active. Formed to defend Turkish Cypriots against EOKA, TMT began advocating for taksim—the partition of Cyprus into separate Greek and Turkish zones—as the only way to safeguard Turkish Cypriot interests in the event of union with Greece. The idea of partition gained traction, supported by elements in both Cyprus and Turkey.

Path to a Compromise

By the late 1950s, Cyprus was teetering on the brink of civil war. Several attempts at compromise had failed. In December 1958, negotiations involving Greece and Turkey—considered the "motherlands" of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots—began. For the first time, the concept of an independent Cyprus, rejecting both enosis and taksim, was seriously discussed.

These discussions, led by Britain, culminated in a compromise agreement favoring independence. Negotiations moved to London, where Greek and Turkish representatives were joined by Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios III, Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and British officials. Though Makarios and Küçük had limited decision-making power, their presence symbolized local participation.

The resulting Zürich-London Agreements became the foundation of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus. They were supplemented by three key treaties:

Treaty of Establishment – Britain retained sovereignty over two military base areas: Dhekelia (northeast of Larnaca) and Akrotiri (southwest of Limassol), totaling 256 square kilometers.

Treaty of Guarantee – Greece, Turkey, and the UK pledged to uphold Cyprus's independence and constitutional order.

Treaty of Alliance – Established military cooperation between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. While some Greek Cypriots, particularly EOKA supporters, were disillusioned by the failure to achieve enosis, and some Turkish Cypriots in TMT were frustrated by the delay of Taksim, the broader population—less influenced by external powers—welcomed the agreement as a peaceful resolution.

On 16 August 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was officially established as an independent state.

4.3. 1974 Cypriot coup d'état

On 15 July 1974, a military coup took place in Cyprus, executed by the Cypriot National Guard with direct backing from the Greek military junta. The coup ousted President Archbishop Makarios III and installed Nikos Sampson, a pro-Enosis (union with Greece) nationalist, as the new leader. The Sampson government was widely regarded as a puppet regime of the Greek junta, with the ultimate objective of annexing Cyprus to Greece. In the immediate aftermath, the coup leaders declared the formation of the “Hellenic Republic of Cyprus.” The United Nations condemned the coup as illegal.

4.3.1. Background

The Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 under the London and Zurich Agreements, establishing Greek and Turkish Cypriots as co-founding communities. However, after President Makarios proposed constitutional amendments that were rejected by Turkish Cypriots, intercommunal violence erupted across the island. This violence, coupled with mutual distrust, led to the effective withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from the government and their subsequent confinement to ethnic enclaves. Since the 1950s, the Greek government had pursued a national policy of enosis. By 1964, Athens attempted to exert greater control over Makarios, whose increasingly independent policies frustrated Greek authorities. When a military junta seized power in Greece in 1967, its leadership began supporting the far-right EOKA-B, an armed nationalist group opposing Makarios. The junta's shadow leader, Dimitrios Ioannidis, came to believe that Makarios had abandoned enosis and suspected him of communist sympathies. Between 1971 and 1974, five separate coup plans were drafted to overthrow his government.

4.3.2. The Coup

On 15 July 1974, under orders from Ioannidis, the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers, stormed the Presidential Palace in Nicosia. The building was heavily damaged and nearly destroyed. Makarios narrowly escaped through a rear exit and fled to Paphos. From there, British forces helped him reach Akrotiri and then flew him to Malta and onward to London. On 19 July, Makarios addressed the United Nations Security Council in New York, declaring that Cyprus had effectively been invaded by Greece.

The Sampson regime quickly asserted control over state media, falsely announcing that Makarios had been killed. However, Makarios soon countered with a radio broadcast from Paphos, confirming he was alive. The new junta imposed strict press censorship, halting the publication of left-wing newspapers. Only nationalist, right-wing newspapers such as *Machi*, *Ethniki*, and *Agon* remained in circulation, publishing heavily propagandized content. Sampson did not immediately declare enosis but focused on silencing Makarios supporters and legitimizing his rule.

4.3.3. Turkish Cypriot Reaction and Tensions

Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş urged his community to stay indoors and called on UN peacekeepers (UNFICYP) to enhance security. Although the Cypriot National Guard did not attack Turkish Cypriot enclaves, it conducted weapons raids in both Greek and Turkish Cypriot homes in

mixed villages. Turkey later alerted UNFICYP about suspicions that arms shipments were being flown into Cyprus by Olympic Air.

While the direct impact of the coup on Turkish Cypriots remains debated, Sampson's reputation—particularly his alleged involvement in violent acts against Turkish Cypriots during the 1963 intercommunal clashes—fueled fears. His extremist views and pro-enosis stance made him a deeply polarizing figure.

4.3.4. Aftermath and Violence

The coup sparked a harsh crackdown on Makarios supporters. Numerous individuals were detained, and deaths occurred, though estimates vary. According to EU legal scholar Frank Hoffmeister, many were imprisoned, while historian Haralambos Athanasopoulos suggests that at least 500 of the 1,617 Greek Cypriots officially listed as missing from the subsequent Turkish invasion were actually killed during the coup but falsely attributed to Turkish forces.

Reports from the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* on 19 July 1974 indicated heavy fighting in Paphos. Excluding Paphos, the Greek Cypriot death toll from internal conflict was reportedly around 300 civilians and 30 Greek soldiers, whose bodies were later transported to Athens.

In response to the coup, Turkey launched a military invasion of Cyprus on 20 July 1974, citing its right to intervene under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which allowed guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece, and the UK) to act in defense of Cyprus's constitutional order. Turkish forces quickly took control of the northern part of the island, eventually occupying about one-third of its territory. This resulted in the island's division along what became known as the Green Line, a United Nations-monitored buffer zone separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Following the invasion, Nikos Sampson resigned, and the Greek-backed junta in Cyprus collapsed. Archbishop Makarios III returned to power, restoring the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus.

In the north, the Turkish Cypriots established a separate administration called the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) in 1975, with Rauf Denktaş as its president. In 1983, this entity declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which remains a self-declared state recognized only by Turkey. The island remains divided to this day, with reunification efforts ongoing but unresolved.

5. Turkish involvement to Cyprus

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus began on 20 July 1974 and unfolded in two phases over the following month. It was launched in response to the military coup orchestrated just five days earlier by the Greek junta and carried out by the Cypriot National Guard in coordination with the EOKA B paramilitary group. The coup deposed President Archbishop Makarios III and installed Nikos Sampson, a known supporter of enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece. The ultimate goal was to declare a Hellenic Republic of Cyprus.

Amid rising intercommunal tensions and violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Turkey invoked its rights as a guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and launched a military intervention. Turkish forces landed on the island on 20 July, quickly securing a 3% foothold before a ceasefire was declared.

However, peace negotiations quickly broke down. In August 1974, Turkey launched a second military offensive, dramatically expanding its control to approximately 36% of the island's territory. This advance solidified the ceasefire line, which became the United Nations Buffer Zone, commonly known as the Green Line, and remains the dividing line between the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish Cypriot north.

The invasion triggered a massive humanitarian crisis. Approximately 150,000 Greek Cypriots—over one-quarter of the island's total population and roughly one-third of the Greek Cypriot population—were displaced from the north, where they had previously formed the majority. In the following year, around 60,000 Turkish Cypriots, about half of their population, relocated from the south to the north, completing the de facto ethnic partition of the island.

In the north, the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration was established, and in 1983, it declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). To this day, only Turkey recognizes the TRNC. The international community, including the United Nations and European Union, considers the northern part of Cyprus to be occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The occupation is widely regarded as illegal under international law, and since Cyprus's EU accession in 2004, it is also viewed as the occupation of European Union territory.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus began on 20 July 1974 and unfolded in two phases over the following month. It was launched in response to the military coup orchestrated just five days earlier by the Greek junta and carried out by the Cypriot National Guard in coordination with the EOKA B paramilitary group. The coup deposed President Archbishop Makarios III and installed Nikos Sampson, a known supporter of enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece. The ultimate goal was to declare a Hellenic Republic of Cyprus.

Amid rising intercommunal tensions and violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Turkey invoked its rights as a guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and launched a military intervention. Turkish forces landed on the island on 20 July, quickly securing a 3% foothold before a ceasefire was declared.

However, peace negotiations quickly broke down. In August 1974, Turkey launched a second military offensive, dramatically expanding its control to approximately 36% of the island's territory. This advance solidified the ceasefire line, which became the United Nations Buffer Zone, commonly known as the Green Line, and remains the dividing line between the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish Cypriot north.

The invasion triggered a massive humanitarian crisis. Approximately 150,000 Greek Cypriots—over one-quarter of the island's total population and roughly one-third of the Greek Cypriot population—were displaced from the north, where they had previously formed the majority. In the following year, around 60,000 Turkish Cypriots, about half of their population, relocated from the south to the north, completing the de facto ethnic partition of the island.

In the north, the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration was established, and in 1983, it declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). To this day, only Turkey recognizes the TRNC. The international community, including the United Nations and European Union, considers the northern part of Cyprus to be occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The occupation is widely regarded as illegal under international law, and since Cyprus's EU accession in 2004, it is also viewed as the occupation of European Union territory.

5.1. Background: Ottoman and British Rule

In 1571, following the Ottoman–Venetian War (1570–1573), the Ottoman Empire conquered Cyprus, an island then populated mostly by ethnic Greeks. For the next three centuries, Cyprus remained under Ottoman rule.

In 1878, during the Congress of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire leased Cyprus to Britain through the Cyprus Convention, while still retaining nominal sovereignty. However, this changed in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in World War I. In response, Britain formally annexed Cyprus, declaring it a protectorate, and later turning it into a Crown colony, officially known as British Cyprus.

The Ottoman Empire formally renounced its claims to Cyprus with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Under Article 20, Turkey gave up all rights to the island, and Article 21 allowed Turkish nationals residing in Cyprus to either leave within two years or stay and become British subjects.

At the time, the island's population consisted primarily of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, who culturally identified with Greece and Turkey, respectively. Despite these affiliations, elites in both communities saw themselves as more modern and educated than their mainland counterparts, fostering a unique Cypriot identity—though this gradually gave way to increasing ethnic nationalism.

For many years, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived in relative peace, but over time, several factors contributed to growing ethnic division. These included:

Education – Schooling became a powerful tool in shaping identity from a young age. Education systems in both communities increasingly emphasized ethnic nationalism, contributing to growing hostility.

British Colonial Policy – The British employed a “divide and rule” strategy, often reinforcing communal divisions to maintain control. A notable example occurred in the 1950s, when Greek Cypriot demands for enosis (union with Greece) led to rebellion. In response, the British expanded the Auxiliary Police and, in 1955, established the Special Mobile Reserve, staffed entirely by Turkish Cypriots, to

combat the Greek Cypriot paramilitary group EOKA. Such policies deepened mistrust between the communities.

Religious and Nationalist Influences – Though modernization and education diminished the overtly religious nature of the two communities, growing nationalism in Greece and Turkey sharpened their cultural and political differences.

In Turkey, the revolutionary policies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923–1938) significantly influenced Turkish Cypriots. Atatürk's Six Arrows, including secularism and nationalism, reshaped Turkish identity. Religion was relegated to the private sphere, and a secular, Turkish nationalist identity took precedence. This shift in Turkish Cypriot self-perception—from a primarily religious Muslim identity under the Ottomans to a secular, ethnic Turkish identity—further distanced them from their Greek Cypriot neighbors.

5.2. 1950s: Rise of Nationalist Movements and Intercommunal Violence

In the early 1950s, a Greek Cypriot nationalist group called the Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (EOKA)—meaning the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters—was formed. Its main goal was to end British colonial rule and subsequently achieve enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. Under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios III, secret planning began in Athens on 2 July 1952, and a “Council of Revolution” was established on 7 March 1953 to coordinate future operations.

In 1954, covert weapons shipments began arriving in Cyprus, with the tacit approval of the Greek government. On 9 November 1954, retired Greek army officer Georgios Grivas, codenamed “Digenis”, secretly arrived on the island to lead the armed struggle. EOKA soon launched attacks against British military and administrative targets, marking the start of a sustained anti-colonial insurgency.

However, the conflict escalated beyond anti-colonial objectives. EOKA's early campaign also targeted Greek Cypriot leftists, especially members of the Communist Party (KKK), viewing them as political rivals. The first Turkish Cypriot victim of EOKA violence was a policeman, killed on 21 June 1955. Following the Istanbul Pogrom in September 1955, tensions increased, and EOKA turned its attention toward Turkish Cypriots as well.

In 1956, Turkish Cypriots were recruited by the British into the Auxiliary Police Force to help combat EOKA. Initially, EOKA avoided direct confrontation with Turkish Cypriots to avoid opening a second front. However, by January 1957, EOKA deliberately began targeting Turkish Cypriot police officers, aiming to provoke riots in Nicosia. These confrontations were meant to divert British military forces from EOKA strongholds in the mountains. In the resulting riots, at least one Greek Cypriot was killed; this was portrayed by Greek Cypriot leaders as an act of Turkish aggression.


In response to growing fears about enosis, Turkish Cypriots formed the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT), which sought to prevent union with Greece, seeing it as a threat to their community. Their concerns were influenced by the displacement of Cretan Turks following Crete's union with Greece earlier in the century. While TMT started as a local initiative, it soon received direct support and organization from the Turkish government. TMT eventually declared open war on EOKA and its efforts.

Tensions reached a peak on 12 June 1958, when eight Greek Cypriot men from the village of Kondemenos—allegedly part of a group planning an attack on the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Skylloura—were killed by TMT near Gönyeli, after being dropped there by British authorities. TMT also engaged in false flag operations, including the bombing of the Turkish press office in Nicosia to stir outrage against Greek Cypriots.

TMT further targeted Turkish Cypriots who supported a unified, independent Cyprus, assassinating several prominent figures. In 1959, following the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements, which laid the foundation for Cypriot independence, the Turkish Navy attempted to smuggle arms to TMT. The operation was foiled in what became known as the “Deniz Incident,” during which the smuggling ship was intercepted and its crew captured.

5.3. 1960–1963: Independence and Constitutional Breakdown

British rule in Cyprus officially ended in August 1960, when the island became an independent republic under the terms of the London and Zürich Agreements. These agreements had been brokered by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, and they formed the basis of a power-sharing constitution aimed at balancing the interests of the Greek Cypriot majority and Turkish Cypriot minority.



Ethnic map of Cyprus according to the 1960 census

Despite these efforts, the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus quickly proved unworkable, lasting only three years before breaking down. Tensions emerged over several key issues:

- **Separate Municipalities:** Under the 1960 arrangements, Turkish Cypriots were allowed to operate separate municipal councils, a system originally introduced by the British in 1958. Many Greek Cypriots viewed this as a step toward partition (*taksim*), which they opposed. They instead favored *enosis*, or union with Greece.
- **Disproportionate Representation:** Greek Cypriots grew resentful of what they perceived as overrepresentation of Turkish Cypriots in government. Though Turkish Cypriots made up about 18.3% of the population, they were constitutionally allocated 30% of civil service positions. Furthermore, the vice presidency was exclusively reserved for a Turkish Cypriot, while the presidency was held by a Greek Cypriot. Both positions were granted veto powers over key legislation, which often led to governmental deadlock.

These structural issues, combined with mutual distrust and competing national aspirations (*enosis* for Greek Cypriots and *Taksim* for Turkish Cypriots), laid the groundwork for the collapse of the power-sharing arrangement. By 1963, tensions had escalated into open conflict, marking the beginning of a prolonged intercommunal crisis in Cyprus

5.4. 1963–1974: Constitutional Collapse, Intercommunal Violence, and International Involvement

In December 1963, Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III proposed thirteen constitutional amendments, frustrated by frequent governmental deadlocks due to Turkish Cypriot vetoes and institutional design. Believing the 1960 Constitution was an obstacle to *enosis* (union with Greece), Makarios and the Greek Cypriot leadership sought to revise power-sharing arrangements. These proposed changes aimed to remove many of the protections granted to the Turkish Cypriot minority, including ethnic quotas in government and the vice president's veto authority.

Behind this political effort was the controversial *Akritis Plan*, a Greek Cypriot strategy that sought constitutional reform and—if needed—forceful suppression of Turkish Cypriot resistance. Turkish Cypriots rejected the amendments, viewing them as a threat to their status and safety. Their representatives withdrew (or were possibly forced out) from the government, depending on differing historical interpretations.

On 21 December 1963, violence erupted in Nicosia when two Turkish Cypriots were killed during an encounter with Greek Cypriot police. The incident ignited widespread intercommunal clashes, resulting in calls for peace from both President Makarios and Vice President Fazıl Küçük, but to no avail. The crisis led to the collapse of the 1960 power-sharing system and triggered serious international concern.

Within days, the Turkish army contingent in Cyprus moved out of its barracks and seized the strategic Nicosia–Kyrenia road, maintaining control over it until the 1974 Turkish invasion. Access for Greek Cypriots to the area was only allowed with UN military escorts.

The violence quickly escalated. Around 700 Turkish Cypriot civilians, including women and children, were taken hostage in northern Nicosia. By early 1964, 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots had been killed, and 109 Turkish or mixed villages were destroyed. Between 25,000 and 30,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced, forced into enclaves with limited access to supplies and movement. The Daily Telegraph later described the episode as an “anti-Turkish pogrom.”

A British-brokered truce on 26 December 1963 led to the temporary deployment of peacekeepers. In March 1964, the United Nations formally intervened with UN Security Council Resolution 186, establishing the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and appointing a UN mediator.

Meanwhile, Turkey threatened military intervention, coming close to acting in 1964. However, a strong warning from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson on 5 June 1964—known as the Johnson Letter—dissuaded Ankara. Johnson made it clear that the U.S. would not support Turkey if an invasion led to conflict with the Soviet Union.

The U.S. took a more direct role in the diplomacy that followed. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson led UN-mediated negotiations in Geneva in July 1964, aiming to broker a long-term settlement. The Acheson Plan, which proposed a partition of the island under NATO oversight, became a key framework in later discussions, although it was ultimately rejected by President Makarios, who saw it as a threat to Cypriot independence.

As Turkish Cypriots withdrew from formal government participation, they claimed that the Republic of Cyprus had lost legitimacy. While some Turkish Cypriots left willingly under leadership direction, others were blocked from participating by Greek Cypriot forces. Turkish Cypriots established enclaves across the island, often surrounded and blockaded by the Greek Cypriot National Guard, receiving direct support from Turkey. Nicosia was formally divided by the UN-monitored “Green Line”, which still exists today.

In 1967, another round of violence broke out when Turkish Cypriots attempted to ease restrictions on their movement. As tensions escalated, Turkey again threatened to invade, citing the need to protect Turkish Cypriots from ethnic cleansing. A diplomatic solution was reached: Greece withdrew some troops, EOKA leader Georgios Grivas was forced to leave Cyprus, and some blockades on Turkish enclaves were lifted, easing tensions temporarily.

5.5. First Turkish Involvement – July 1974

On 20 July 1974, Turkey launched a military invasion of Cyprus, citing its rights under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to protect the Turkish Cypriot community and preserve the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish forces landed near Kyrenia (Girne) on the island’s northern coast just before dawn, engaging in combat with Greek Cypriot and Greek forces.

By the time the UN Security Council was able to implement a ceasefire on 22 July (under Resolution 353), Turkish troops had secured a narrow corridor linking Kyrenia to the capital, Nicosia, controlling roughly 3% of the island. Despite the ceasefire, Turkish forces continued their advance, violating the agreement and gradually expanding their hold.

During this period, significant violence occurred against Turkish Cypriots in areas under Greek Cypriot control. In Limassol, the Turkish Cypriot quarter surrendered to the Cypriot National Guard. According to both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot eyewitnesses, the aftermath saw the neighborhood burned, civilians—including women and children—reportedly raped or killed, and around 1,300 Turkish Cypriots detained in a makeshift prison camp. In Famagusta, the Turkish enclave came under artillery fire, and the Turkish Cypriot town of Lefka was also occupied by Greek Cypriot troops.

According to data from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the early stages of the conflict resulted in the imprisonment of 385 Greek Cypriots (sent to Adana), 63 held in Saray Prison, and 3,268 Turkish Cypriots detained across various camps in Cyprus.

On the night of 21–22 July, Greek commandos were secretly flown from Crete to Nicosia in a clandestine airlift to reinforce Greek Cypriot defenses.

Collapse of the Greek Junta and Geneva Peace Talks

The events in Cyprus triggered the collapse of the Greek military junta on 23 July 1974. In its aftermath, exiled political leaders returned to Greece, and Constantine Karamanlis was brought back from Paris to lead the country as Prime Minister. Though Karamanlis managed to prevent a wider war between Greece and Turkey, some critics viewed his restraint as an act of betrayal.

Shortly after, Nikos Sampson resigned from the presidency of Cyprus. Glafcos Clerides—Speaker of the House of Representatives—took over as acting president, restoring some constitutional legitimacy.

The first round of peace talks convened in Geneva from 25 to 30 July 1974, organized by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and attended by the three guarantor powers: the UK, Greece, and Turkey. The conference resulted in a declaration that:

- Turkish forces should not expand beyond their current positions,
- Greek forces should withdraw from Turkish enclaves,
- A second conference would be held with participation from both Cypriot communities.

Notably, the declaration called for the Turkish Vice-President (Fazıl Küçük) to resume his constitutional role, while also acknowledging the existence of two de facto autonomous administrations, effectively reflecting the divided reality on the ground.

Second Geneva Conference – August 1974

By the time the second Geneva Conference opened on 14 August 1974, global sentiment had shifted. While Turkey had initially enjoyed some international support due to its legal justification under the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece's return to democracy had restored its standing.

At the talks, Turkey demanded the creation of a federal state and formal population exchanges. Glafcos Clerides, as acting president of Cyprus, requested 36 to 48 hours to consult with Athens and Greek Cypriot leaders. However, Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş denied the request, fearing that Makarios and other leaders would use the delay to stall negotiations.

With talks failing, Turkey launched a second military operation—the Second Turkish Invasion—on 14 August, which would lead to the occupation of approximately 36% of the island and solidify the de facto division of Cyprus.

5.6. Second Turkish Involvement – 14–16 August 1974

After the failure of peace talks in Geneva, Turkey launched a second military offensive on 14 August 1974, codenamed the “Second Peace Operation.” The operation was initiated with a coded message from Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş to Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, saying: “Ayşe should go on vacation” (“Ayşe Tatile Çıksın”), a prearranged phrase signaling readiness for military action.

The second phase of the invasion resulted in Turkey occupying approximately 37% of Cyprus's territory, including a southward advance reaching the Louroujina Salient, significantly expanding upon the initial beachhead established in July. The offensive triggered mass displacement, with an estimated 140,000 to 160,000 Greek Cypriots fleeing from the north and becoming refugees.

Following the military operation, Cyprus became effectively partitioned. A ceasefire line, still in place today, was established under UN supervision and came to be known as the Green Line, physically dividing the island between the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish Cypriot north.

In the aftermath, the United Nations facilitated the voluntary relocation of the remaining 51,000 Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north. Though presented as a humanitarian measure, this movement further solidified the demographic and political division of the island.

The legality of Turkey's actions was later challenged by the United Nations, which argued that Article Four of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee permitted intervention only to restore constitutional order, not to enforce partition or territorial occupation. Rather than safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, the invasion led to the creation of a separate political entity in the north.



Location of Turkish forces during the late hours of 20 July 1974

On 13 February 1975, Turkey declared the occupied area as the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”, an action met with widespread international condemnation, including UN Security Council Resolution 367, which reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

To this day, the United Nations recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as the legitimate government of the island. The division of Cyprus remains unresolved, continuing to strain Turkey’s relations with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, and the European Union.

6. Human Rights Violations

6.1. Violations Against Greek Cypriots

Following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, numerous human rights abuses against Greek Cypriots were reported and later confirmed by international bodies.

- The European Commission of Human Rights found Turkey guilty of serious violations of the European Convention on Human Rights, including:
 - Displacement of persons
 - Arbitrary detention
 - Ill-treatment
 - Deprivation of life and propertyThese violations were found to be systematically directed against the Greek Cypriot population, amounting to ethnic discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention.
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- The forced displacement of approximately one-third of the island’s Greek population from the occupied north and the prevention of their return has been described by scholars and human rights organizations as a form of ethnic cleansing. Turkey has also been condemned for resettling Turkish nationals from mainland Turkey in these areas.
- In its 2001 judgment in *Cyprus v. Turkey* (Application No. 25781/94), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found Turkey guilty of violating 14 articles of the Convention. This included the mistreatment of enclaved Greek Cypriots in the Karpass Peninsula, where fewer than 600 remained by 2001 due to intimidation and rights abuses.

- The ECHR and European Commission also accepted evidence of widespread rape of Greek Cypriot women by Turkish soldiers during the invasion. These included systematic and gang rapes, with victims ranging from teenage girls to elderly individuals. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus reportedly permitted abortions in rape cases, a rare exception to its policy.
- Author Paul Sant Cassia and other scholars have characterized such acts as part of a broader campaign of terror, aimed at undermining resistance through fear. Some atrocities were reportedly committed by Turkish Cypriot fighters in uniform, leading to confusion over accountability.

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6.2. Violations Against Turkish Cypriots

While much of the international focus has been on the invasion and its aftermath, Turkish Cypriots also suffered brutal acts of violence, primarily during Greek Cypriot reprisals and EOKA B operations:

- On 14 August 1974, the Maratha, Santalaris, and Aloda massacres occurred, where 126 Turkish Cypriots were murdered by EOKA B forces. The United Nations described the act as a crime against humanity.
- In Tochni, 85 Turkish Cypriot civilians, including teenagers, were rounded up and killed by Greek Cypriot extremists.
- Other massacres included the Alaminos incident, where 14 Turkish Cypriots were reportedly buried by bulldozer, and a mass killing near Limassol, where 36 villagers were allegedly executed during a Greek Cypriot raid.
- In Limassol, eyewitnesses from both communities described the burning of the Turkish Cypriot quarter, the rape of women, and the killing of children. Around 1,300 Turkish Cypriots were taken to a detention camp.

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6.3. Missing Persons

The Cyprus conflict left a legacy of missing persons on both sides:

- The Republic of Cyprus lists over 2,000 Greek Cypriots and Greeks as missing, many of whom were taken to detention camps in Turkey after the invasion and never returned.
- The Turkish Cypriot community reports at least 83 individuals missing from the village of Tochni, and others from surrounding areas.
- The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP), established under UN auspices, began identifying and returning remains starting in 2006. The process is conducted by bi-communal scientific teams, and by 2007, 57 individuals had been identified and returned to their families. The effort remains ongoing.

6.4. Cultural Heritage and Looting

The 1974 invasion and subsequent occupation also led to widespread looting and destruction of cultural heritage sites:

- Numerous churches and monasteries in Northern Cyprus were vandalized, looted, or repurposed. According to Greek Cypriot sources, at least 55 churches were converted into mosques, and around 50 more were used as stables, stores, museums, or destroyed entirely.
- A major case involved the looting of 6th-century Byzantine mosaics from the Kanakaria Church, later recovered in the U.S. after a legal battle.
- In 1997, Turkish art dealer Aydın Dikmen was arrested in Germany with a cache of religious art valued at over \$50 million, including icons, mosaics, and frescoes from multiple Cypriot churches.
- In 2011, British singer Boy George returned an 18th-century icon of Christ to the Church of Cyprus. He had unknowingly purchased the looted item, which was later identified during a televised interview.

7. Perspectives and Aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus Conflict

After the conflict, Cyprus was divided by the United Nations' Green Line, which is a buffer zone, into two. Türkiye formed the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration in the North and in 1983 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) declared independence, although Türkiye is the only country that recognizes it. Turkish involvement is seen as an occupation by international law and the international community. On the west side, Greek Cypriots are living in the Republic of Cyprus which is controlled by the Greek government.



The divided island, 1974–1997:

At the Second Geneva Conference, which commenced on 9 August 1974, diplomatic efforts to resolve the Cyprus crisis resumed in the shadow of escalating military action. During this critical phase, Turkey strongly advocated for a federal solution, a stance that faced increasing resistance from the Greek Cypriot delegation and concern from the international community.

The Turkish Cypriots, who had long argued for a bi-zonal federal arrangement, envisioned a structure in which each community would administer its own zone with substantial autonomy. However, Turkey, acting in coordination with American advisors, initially proposed a cantonal model. This approach involved the creation of multiple non-contiguous Turkish Cypriot enclaves, scattered across the island. While designed to reflect Turkish Cypriot demographic concentrations, the plan was strategically and politically unattractive to many Turkish Cypriots, who were deeply concerned about security vulnerabilities inherent in such fragmentation. Both models—bi-zonal and cantonal—sought to place roughly 34% of the island's territory under Turkish Cypriot administration.

On 13 August 1974, Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş formally presented Turkey's proposals to the Geneva delegates. In response, Glafcos Clerides, representing the Greek Cypriot side, requested 36 to 48 hours to study the detailed plans and formulate a response. However, Güneş insisted on an immediate decision, a demand that was viewed as unrealistic and confrontational by not only the Greek Cypriots but also by the British and American delegations, who had been closely monitoring the negotiations. The urgency imposed by Turkey was seen by many as undermining the very purpose of the peace talks.

The situation escalated quickly. On 14 August, without awaiting a formal reply from the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish military launched a second offensive, expanding their control to approximately 36% of Cyprus, extending from Kyrenia to Famagusta and encompassing key urban and agricultural areas. The move was seen by many as an effort to create facts on the ground before international pressure could coalesce in opposition to Turkish demands.

The decision to advance militarily had serious consequences for Turkey's international standing. The British Prime Minister criticized the Turkish ultimatum as unreasonable, arguing that a lack of adequate time for consideration revealed a pre-determined agenda rather than a genuine attempt at negotiation. In the view of the Greek Cypriots, the proposals presented by Turkey were constructed in such a way that rejection was inevitable. They perceived the move as an excuse for territorial expansion and the establishment of a permanent Turkish military presence on the island.

Despite the tense atmosphere, the Greek Cypriot delegation did not reject compromise outright. Their counter proposals recognized Turkish Cypriot administrative areas and even acknowledged clusters of Turkish villages as potential bases for localized autonomy. However, the Greek Cypriots insisted that any political settlement must preserve the unitary and sovereign nature of the Republic of Cyprus, while maintaining the bi-communal character of the state as originally enshrined in the 1960 Constitution. Their vision was one of co-existence and integration, rather than geographical division and political separation.

In essence, the Turkish proposals emphasized geographical consolidation, substantial political autonomy, and territorial separation—demands that the Greek Cypriot side considered excessive and irreconcilable with the idea of a unified Cypriot state. The breakdown of the conference marked a turning point, solidifying the division of the island and paving the way for the de facto partition that continues to define Cyprus to this day.

1975–1979:

Following the second Turkish military intervention in 1974 and the resulting de facto partition of Cyprus, the United Nations resumed its diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful resolution. On 28 April 1975, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim launched a renewed mission of good offices, aimed at facilitating dialogue between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership. The talks began in Vienna, where over a span of ten months, Glafcos Clerides (representing the Greek Cypriots) and Rauf Denktaş (representing the Turkish Cypriots) met to address urgent humanitarian issues, such as missing persons, the plight of refugees, and population exchange matters arising from the previous year's conflict.

While some limited progress was made in these humanitarian discussions, negotiations on core political issues—especially territorial adjustments and the structure of a future central government—remained deadlocked. After five rounds of talks, with little indication of substantive progress, the Vienna discussions collapsed in February 1976.

A breakthrough came a year later. In January 1977, the UN facilitated a high-level meeting in Nicosia between President Archbishop Makarios III and Rauf Denktaş. This culminated on 12 February in the signing of the 1977 High-Level Agreement, a pivotal document in the Cyprus peace process. The agreement laid down four foundational principles for a future settlement:

1. Cyprus would become a bicommunal, federal republic;

2. The size and boundaries of the federal states would be determined on the basis of economic viability and land ownership;
3. A strong central government would be established to safeguard the unity and sovereignty of the state;
4. Key issues such as freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and property rights would be addressed through continued negotiation.

This agreement was widely regarded as a step forward, though much remained unresolved. Tragically, Archbishop Makarios died in August 1977, only months after the agreement was signed. He was succeeded by Spyros Kyprianou, the then Foreign Minister, who took over leadership of the Greek Cypriot administration.

In 1979, efforts to find a lasting political solution intensified. That year saw the presentation of the so-called ABC Plan (named after the American, British, and Canadian involvement in its drafting), which proposed the establishment of a bicomunal, bizonal federation with a strong central government. The plan was designed to strike a balance between autonomy for each community and the maintenance of Cypriot sovereignty. However, it faced immediate political resistance. Spyros Kyprianou initially rejected the proposal, citing concerns about the degree of autonomy it would afford the Turkish Cypriot constituent state and the implications for Cyprus's territorial integrity. Turkey would later also reject the plan, citing similar but opposing concerns regarding the limitations it placed on Turkish Cypriot governance and security.

Despite the rejection of the ABC Plan, Kurt Waldheim made another visit to Cyprus in May 1979, which yielded a second significant development. He succeeded in extracting a Ten-Point Agreement from both sides. This reaffirmed the 1977 High-Level Agreement and added further commitments, including:

- The demilitarisation of Cyprus,
- A mutual agreement to refrain from actions or rhetoric that could escalate tensions,
- A renewed pledge to resume structured negotiations under UN auspices.

A new round of intercommunal talks began in Nicosia shortly afterward. However, they too stalled quickly, plagued by enduring points of contention. One major stumbling block was the future of Varosha, a once-prosperous resort district in Famagusta that had been abandoned by its Greek Cypriot population during the 1974 Turkish advance. Greek Cypriots demanded its return as a sign of goodwill, while Turkish Cypriots resisted any such concession without broader agreements.

Another fundamental disagreement arose over the interpretation of 'bicomunalism'. The Turkish Cypriot side argued for a strict division in which each federal state would be exclusively composed of and administered by its respective ethnic community—Turkish Cypriots in one, Greek Cypriots in the other. By contrast, the Greek Cypriot position allowed for predominantly Greek or Turkish Cypriot states, but insisted on freedom of settlement and movement, opposing outright ethnic segregation.

These deep-rooted disagreements underscored the fragility of the negotiation process. Despite the progress in establishing shared frameworks and guiding principles, mistrust between the two communities, divergent interpretations of key concepts, and conflicting political objectives continued to block a comprehensive settlement. The period ended much as it began: with optimism dampened by intractable divisions and with the island's division solidified further by the passage of time.

Turkish Cypriots' declaration of independence:

In May 1983, a renewed initiative by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to resolve the Cyprus dispute faltered after the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces from the island. The resolution was met with strong opposition from the Turkish Cypriots, who viewed it as biased and inflammatory. In response, they began threatening to declare independence, a move that would escalate tensions further.

Despite the rising tensions, in August 1983, Pérez de Cuéllar put forward a comprehensive set of proposals aimed at restarting substantive negotiations. These included:

- A rotating presidency between the two communities;
- The creation of a bicameral legislature, as previously discussed;
- 60:40 representation in the central executive in favour of Greek Cypriots;
- A territorial adjustment, where Turkish Cypriots would cede 8–13% of the territory they then controlled.

In exchange, Turkish Cypriots would gain enhanced representation within the central government framework. Both Spyros Kyprianou, the Greek Cypriot leader, and Rauf Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot leader, accepted the framework as a basis for further negotiation.

However, these efforts were soon derailed. On 15 November 1983, amid post-election political instability in Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independence, proclaiming the formation of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC). The declaration was swiftly

condemned by the international community. Within days, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 541 by a 13–1 vote (with only Pakistan opposing), declaring the move legally invalid and a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive settlement.

Denktaş defended the declaration, arguing in a letter to the Secretary-General that the move was intended to ensure that any future agreement would be genuinely federal in nature. Nevertheless, only Turkey formally recognised the TRNC, while the rest of the world, including the United Nations, refused to acknowledge the breakaway state. In Resolution 550, passed in 1984, the Security Council condemned the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the TRNC, reaffirming the stance that the secession was unacceptable.

Despite the international outcry, talks resumed in September 1984. After three rounds of negotiations, both sides once again agreed in principle to a bi-zonal, bi-communal, non-aligned federation, with the Turkish Cypriot constituent state retaining 29% of the island's territory and a complete withdrawal of foreign troops.

In January 1985, the two leaders met face-to-face for the first time since the 1979 High-Level Agreement. There was widespread hope that this meeting would produce a final settlement. However, Kyprianou approached the meeting as a preliminary discussion, not as a final negotiation. This disconnect in expectations led to the collapse of the talks. In the aftermath, Kyprianou and the Greek Cypriot leadership faced widespread criticism, both domestically and internationally, for missing what many saw as a viable opportunity for resolution.

Frustrated by the outcome, Denktaş announced he would not offer the same concessions in future negotiations. Nonetheless, the UN remained committed to facilitating a settlement. In March 1986, Pérez de Cuéllar presented a Draft Framework Agreement, once again outlining the establishment of an independent, non-aligned, bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the proposal, raising several concerns:

- It failed to address the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus;
- It did not provide for the repatriation of Turkish settlers, whose numbers were steadily increasing;
- There were no clear guarantees regarding the three fundamental freedoms—movement, settlement, and property rights;
- They believed the structure of the proposed state resembled a confederation, rather than a unified federation.

With these deep divisions still unresolved, the UN's efforts during this period once again ended in stalemate, as both sides remained firmly entrenched in their respective positions. The declaration of the TRNC and subsequent diplomatic developments hardened the political reality of Cyprus's division, making future negotiations increasingly complex.

7.1. Greek Cypriot Perspective

Greek Cypriots view the 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation as a violation of international law and human rights, arguing that the intervention was part of a broader Turkish expansionist agenda influenced by ultranationalist ideologies such as Pan-Turkism.

They assert that:

- Turkey's justification—to restore the Republic's sovereignty and protect Turkish Cypriots—was undermined by the second invasion wave in August 1974, which occurred after the fall of the Greek military junta and the restoration of democratic governance under Glafcos Clerides.
- The continued presence of approximately 40,000 Turkish troops in the north violates UN Security Council Resolutions 353 and 360, which call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and respect for Cyprus's territorial integrity.
- Turkey was convicted in 1976 and 1983 by the European Commission of Human Rights for numerous violations, including displacement, torture, rape, and property deprivation, specifically targeting Greek Cypriots.
- The brutality of the invasion, including rape (including child rape) and torture, is widely condemned and considered by some as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign.

7.2. Turkish Cypriot Perspective

Turkish Cypriots highlight the 1974 coup against President Makarios III, orchestrated by the Greek military junta, as the catalyst for Turkish intervention. Makarios himself described the coup at the UN as “an invasion by Greece” and warned there was no path to resolution while the coup leaders remained in power.

Turkish Cypriots argue that:

- The first wave of the Turkish intervention was legally justified under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which allows Turkey, Greece, and the UK to unilaterally intervene to restore the constitutional order if collective action fails.
- The Council of Europe's Resolution 573 supported the legality of Turkey's initial military action.

Political Developments and International Response

Public Unrest and Assassination

Anger over the U.S.'s failure to prevent the Turkish invasion led to widespread protests in Cyprus. During a demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, U.S. Ambassador Rodger Davies was assassinated by a sniper from the EOKA-B group.

Declaration of the TRNC

On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot administration unilaterally declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

- The UN Security Council swiftly condemned the move in Resolution 541, declaring the declaration legally invalid.
- A year later, Resolution 550 also condemned any attempts to settle Varosha, a fenced-off suburb of Famagusta, with populations other than its rightful Greek Cypriot residents. Despite this, Turkey and the TRNC did not comply. In 2017, the beach at Varosha was reopened exclusively for Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationals.

In 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that international law does not prohibit declarations of independence. However, EU leaders, including Germany's Foreign Minister, emphasized that this ruling did not apply to Cyprus, while some scholars suggested it could offer legal leverage for Turkish Cypriots.

7.3. Peace Process and the Annan Plan

Numerous negotiations for reunification have taken place since 1964. From 1974 to 2002, Turkish Cypriots were widely perceived as the obstacle to compromise. However, since 2002, many international observers argue that Greek Cypriots began obstructing solutions.

In 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a comprehensive reunification plan, proposing a federal structure with Greek and Turkish Cypriot constituent states. It included:

- Return of property to over half of the displaced Greek Cypriots or compensation for those whose properties couldn't be returned.
- A United Cyprus Republic, allowing the entire island to benefit from EU membership.

In simultaneous referendums:

- Turkish Cypriots approved the plan by two-thirds.
- Greek Cypriots rejected it by a three-to-one margin, following opposition from their government and the Greek Orthodox Church.

Despite the rejection, Cyprus joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, though EU law is suspended in areas under Turkish military control. Turkish Cypriots who hold Republic of Cyprus citizenship are entitled to full EU rights.

Turkish Settlers and Demographic Change

Since the 1974 invasion, Cyprus and international observers have expressed concern about Turkey's settlement policy in Northern Cyprus:

- The Council of Europe and UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights criticized Turkey for deliberately altering the demographic structure, calling it a form of colonialism and a violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which forbids the transfer of an occupier's civilian population into occupied territory.
- Estimates suggest over 120,000 settlers from Turkey have relocated to the north.
- According to a PRIO report by Mete Hatay, around 37,000 Turkish settlers in the north have been granted voting rights, while approximately 105,000 more remain as non-voting transients. These figures exclude settlers married to Turkish Cypriots or their children.

United States Arms Embargo on Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus

Following the 1974 conflict in Cyprus, the United States imposed an arms embargo on both Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. The embargo was intended to express disapproval of the military actions taken during and after the invasion.

- The embargo on Turkey was lifted in 1978—three years later—by President Jimmy Carter, despite opposition from the U.S. Congress and Greek-American communities.
- In contrast, the embargo on Cyprus remained in effect for much longer, with one of its most notable enforcements occurring on 18 November 1992.

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7.4. Lifting of the Cyprus Arms Embargo

- In December 2019, the U.S. Congress voted to lift the decades-long arms embargo on Cyprus entirely, marking a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- On 2 September 2020, the United States officially lifted its ban on the export of “non-lethal” military goods to Cyprus for an initial period of one year, starting 1 October 2020.
- This decision has been renewed annually, with the most recent extension occurring in September 2024.

Each renewal of the arms exemption has been strongly criticized by Turkey, which argues that it disrupts the military balance on the island and undermines regional stability.

U.S.–Cyprus Defense Cooperation

- In August 2024, the United States and the Republic of Cyprus signed a five-year defense cooperation agreement, aimed at strengthening military ties and regional security.
- Turkey condemned the agreement, claiming it further militarizes the Cyprus issue and violates the spirit of neutrality in the region.

8. United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Cyprus Crisis

- Resolution 186, 4 March 1964, Calls all member states to refrain from any action that would worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus. Asks the Government of Cyprus to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Republic of Cyprus, of a U.N peace keeping force.
- Resolution 187, 13 March 1964, Calls all member states to refrain from any action that would worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus. Noting the progress in regards to the establishment of a UN peace Keeping Force in Cyprus.
- Resolution 192, 20 June 1964, Calls all member states to comply with resolution 186 and 187. Expresses appreciation to all members that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support. With the consent of the Republic of Cyprus extends the presence of UN Force.
- Resolution 193, 25 September 1964, Reaffirms resolutions 186 and 187. Reaffirms the appeal by the President of the Security council worded as follows: "The Security Council has authorized me to make an urgent appeal to the Government of Turkey to cease instantly the bombardment of and the use of military force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Government of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to cease firing immediately".
- Resolution 194, 25 September 1964, The council notes with satisfaction the cease fire being observed throughout Cyprus; asks all governments to stop all flights over the territory of the Republic of Cyprus in violation of its sovereignty. Asks all member to comply with resolution 193. Noting that the Republic of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of UN be extended; extends the presence of the Force.
- Resolution 198, 18 December 1964, Noting with satisfaction that the situation in Cyprus has improved and significant progress has been made. Noting that the Republic of Cyprus has indicated its desire that the stationing of UN be extended; extends the presence of UN Force.
- Resolution 353, 20 July 1974 Timeline of the 1974 Invasion of Cyprus, Deeply deploring the outbreak of violence and the continuing bloodshed. Gravely concerned about the situation which has led to a serious threat to international peace and security and which has created a most explosive situation in the whole of Eastern Mediterranean area. Equally concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus established and guaranteed by international agreements. Recalling resolution 186 and its subsequent resolutions on this matter:

Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Calls all parties to cease fire.

Demands an immediate end to the foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of point 1 above.

Requests the withdrawal of military personnel, Calls upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiations for a peace settlement without delay.

9. Opinion on Solutions to the Cyprus Conflict

Peace scholars have argued that any lasting solution to the Cyprus conflict must involve broad-based participation from society rather than relying solely on political elites. They contend that elites on both sides have historically treated the conflict as a source of power and resources, rather than prioritizing genuine reconciliation and coexistence.

One frequently proposed solution is the reunification of Cyprus. An international panel of legal experts recommended the establishment of a Constitutional Convention under the auspices of the European Union, based on the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus. This initiative would aim to bring together all directly involved parties to negotiate a settlement in line with fundamental democratic principles. In a statement released on 8 June 2016, then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım reiterated strong support for a solution that would reunify Cyprus as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. However, following the collapse of the Crans-Montana Summit in 2017, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, backed by Turkey, shifted its position in favor of a two-state solution instead of a federated model.

The United Nations Security Council has consistently endorsed a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality as the ideal resolution to the conflict, maintaining this position at least since 1991. This approach remains the official stance of the UN, as reaffirmed most recently in January 2025, with the Security Council reaching a unanimous consensus on the issue.

Meanwhile, the two-state solution has gained increased support from Turkish officials, especially from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who voiced his endorsement during a visit to Northern Cyprus in 2020. Some international analysts and policy observers argue that formal partition may be the most practical outcome given decades of failed negotiations and deep-seated mistrust.

Public opinion polls have revealed varying levels of support for different solutions. A 2009 poll conducted for CyBC indicated that a majority of Greek Cypriots supported partition at that time. In a 2010 survey, 84% of Greek Cypriots and 70% of Turkish Cypriots believed that the other side would never accept the compromises necessary for a fair and viable settlement.

In January 2020, a Gezici poll found that 81.3% of Turkish Cypriots supported the two-state solution. According to a May 2021 CyBC poll, 36% of Greek Cypriots favored a bi-zonal,

bi-communal federation, 19% preferred a unitary state, and only 4% supported two separate states. A 2022 CyBC-commissioned poll conducted by Cypronetwork found similar results: 36% favored federation, 18% supported two states, 19% supported a unitary state, and 13% preferred maintaining the status quo.

9.1. Relevant Court Cases on the Legal Status of Northern Cyprus

While international law does not explicitly prohibit declarations of independence, the recognition of a state remains a political decision made at the discretion of individual nations. Consequently, although the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) lacks widespread international recognition, several judicial bodies have addressed its legal and administrative standing in nuanced ways for practical and human rights-related purposes.

On 2 July 2013, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) acknowledged that, despite the absence of international recognition, the TRNC's domestic acts and laws may require de facto recognition in practice. The Court stated that civil, administrative, or criminal measures enacted by TRNC authorities, and their enforcement within the territory, could be considered to have a legal basis under domestic law for the purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In the United States, a decision by the District Court for the District of Columbia on 9 October 2014 noted that the TRNC "purportedly operates as a democratic republic", with functioning executive, legislative, and judicial branches, including a president and prime minister. Although the decision did not constitute formal U.S. recognition, it illustrated a practical acknowledgment of the TRNC's internal governance structure.

The ECtHR reaffirmed its position on 2 September 2015, ruling that the court system within the TRNC was to be considered as having been "established by law," based on a constitutional and legal framework. The Court rejected claims that TRNC courts, as a whole, lacked independence or impartiality, thereby reinforcing the legal acceptability of the judicial process in Northern Cyprus in the context of human rights litigation.

On 3 February 2017, the United Kingdom's High Court ruled that there was no legal obligation under British law preventing the government from recognizing Northern Cyprus. The judgment revealed that UK law enforcement authorities had legally cooperated with their TRNC counterparts. The Court acknowledged that even the United Nations works with TRNC law enforcement agencies, facilitating cross-community cooperation on the island, despite the lack of formal recognition.

Most recently, on 25 June 2024, the European Court of Human Rights made a significant distinction between the legal status of Northern Cyprus and other unrecognized regions such as Crimea, Transnistria, and Abkhazia. In its decision, the Court observed:

“Whereas the Court held that ‘TRNC domestic law’ was based on the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition and was therefore accepted as ‘law’ for the purposes of the Convention, in cases

concerning Transnistria (the 'MRT'), the Court found 'no basis for assuming that [in the MRT] there is a system reflecting a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention similar to the one in the remainder of the Republic of Moldova.'"

The ruling emphasized that the TRNC's legal system was not essentially different from the courts operating in the southern part of Cyprus before 1974, which made it distinct from cases involving Russian-controlled Crimea or Abkhazia, where new legal systems replaced previously recognized national laws. Specifically, in *Cyprus v. Turkey* (merits), the Court ruled that the continuation of pre-1974 Cypriot law in the TRNC territory lent substance and credibility to its legal system in contrast to other disputed regions where the local legal systems were deemed incompatible with European standards.

This comparative judgment further solidified the ECtHR's position that, while the TRNC remains internationally unrecognized, its legal institutions may nonetheless be regarded as valid for practical and human rights adjudication purposes, setting it apart from other unrecognized or separatist territories under international law.

10. International Policies

Soviet Union :

Cyprus crisis had risen while the Cold War was still going so Soviet Union remained close to the issue with a strategic perspective. The main goal of the SSCB is to benefit from the crisis between Türkiye and Greece and reduce the effect of NATO by separating Western alliance. SSCB supported the liberty of Cyprus and also Makarios since they considered him as an independent leader especially from the West effect. SSCB against the Türkiye and Greece's guarantorship and considered it as imperialism. In 1974 SSCB remain silent to the Türkiye's operation, they directly did nothing because it caused a little crisis in NATO. Then SSCB started to emphasize the independence and liberty of Cyprus without cutting networks between both sides.

China :

In 1971 People's Republic of China had just had their right to representation (instead of Thailand) so it was paying attention to avoid any kind of movement in favour or against. In 1974, when Türkiye started the operation, China kept silent even if it was one of the permanent countries at that time. China's policies are basically based on liberty, therefore it had a distance with Türkiye and also Greece since it was agreed to solve the crisis in peace. China did not recognise Cyprus as separated but only recognised the Cyprus Republic which is also recognised by other countries, and developed political relations.

France :

Although France was in the west bloc, it was trying to pursue an independent foreign policies. France did not give support to the operation of Türkiye but declared that Türkiye's usage of military power made the country anxious. France argued the sovereignty of Cyprus, after the operation in 1974 France called for ceasefire should be done. After that, France continued to have political interactions with the Greek Administration of Cyprus.

United Kingdom:

In the crisis, the United Kingdom has had a specific location since it was colonial administrator of Cyprus until 1960 and in 1960 it had guarantorship with Türkiye and Greece with the Treaty of Zurich-London. Also the UK has had two military bases on the island (Akrotiri and Dikelya). Operation in 1974, the United Kingdom was away from the crisis and refused to do anything even if it had a special role about the island. The United Kingdom tried to role as mediation between both sides but this did not work. It supported to solve the crisis in a peaceful way. The UK government had been criticised on the grounds 'UK ignored the Cyprus citizens because it was busy with Britains in island' by the press and public.

United States of America :

1970s were the deepest period of the Cold War for foreign policies of United States of America. USA was willing to limit the effect of SSCB on the region. In 1974, at the beginning of the operation, USA remain silent and abstain but in the second stage of operation, it criticise Türkiye for this operation. USA had warned Türkiye to limit the operation, Foreign Minister of that time, Henry Kissinger had tried to prevent crisis to grow but could not be successful due to issue in USA, Watergate Scandal. In February 1975, USA applied to Türkiye arms embargo to prevent argument between both sides because it was worried about this crisis could be beneficial for the SSCB.

Türkiye :

Between 1963-1974 Turkish people had been pushed out of the system in Cyprus. Greek's military junta in 1974 brought risk of being destroyed for the Turkish people in island. Therefore, in 1974 Türkiye had started the operation in Cyprus. This operation aimed to protect Turkish people in Cyprus and to use the rights of Türkiye according to the 1960 Guarantee Treaty. So that Türkiye's Military Forces have had the control almost %37 of the island. Türkiye has struggled to keep political relations with Western World. Then in 1983, North Cyprus Republic of Türkiye announced but only Türkiye recognised it as a country. In conclusion Türkiye has been successful to protect its citizens in Cyprus.

Canada :

Since 1964, Canadian soldiers has had duty to support help and protect civilians in Cyprus. During the operation Canada was worried about its soldiers in region because they were in danger. After the operation Canada had active role in protection of civilians and invitation both countries to the providing balance in island. Canada did not support the military forces since it has peaceful policies and wanted to keep its international statue in Cyprus.

Greece :

Binding Greeks in Cyprus to the Greece aim which is called 'Enosis Ideal' has been one of the most important things in Greece policies. In 1974 , with the operation junta administration has collapsed and transition to democracy period has started. With this new government , it has given up Enosis and argued independence. After that, Greece left NATO. Greece promoted Türkiye as a occupier in international platforms. Relations between two sides remained tense after this crisis.

Libya:

At that time, Libya's foreign policies are based on religion, Islam, so Libya defended Türkiye's rights and supported as a Muslim country.

South Africa :

South Africa's policies are close to the Western side but it did not pay attention directly to the crisis.

Pakistan :

In these type of international issues or crisis, Pakistan supported Muslim countries so it is in the side of Türkiye.

Yugoslavia

It has relations with Türkiye and also Greece. It defended liberty and sovereignty for Cyprus.

Mexico :

Mexico was not a member of NATO so in this kind of crisis it argued liberty and balance. And Mexico is against to military forces usage.

Argentina :

President Juan Domingo Perón died in June 1974 and was succeeded by his wife Isabel Perón. So it had not had an active role in foreign politics, but it defended independence and liberty in the crisis.

Cyprus :

Cyprus gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. The newly formed Republic of Cyprus was established on the basis of a joint constitution between Turks (about 18 per cent) and Greeks (about 78 per cent). Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom were the founding guarantor states, but in 1963, Greek leader President Makarios' demands for constitutional changes caused a crisis. After the operation of both sides Cyprus has been separated two parts. While the Greek Cypriot side defined Turkey as an occupier, the Turkish side saw the intervention as a vital security measure and 'salvation'.

India :

In 1974, India was under the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and adopted the principle of non-alignment in foreign policy. India was one of the founding and leading countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. India opposed military interventions and bloc politics in international relations and defended the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity. India had historical ties with Greece and sympathetic relations with the Turkish Cypriot people. India was against military usage and argued the peace and liberty.

11. Questions Needs to be Answered

- What historical events led to the division of Cyprus in 1974?
- What roles did Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom play in Cyprus before and after independence in 1960?
- Why did the 1974 coup d'état by Greek Cypriot nationalists lead to a Turkish military intervention?
- What is the significance of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, and how has it shaped the current political situation?
- What are the core issues preventing a political reunification of the island?
- How do the perspectives and demands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots differ regarding sovereignty and governance?
- What role has the United Nations played in managing peace and negotiations on the island?
- How has Cyprus's membership in the European Union affected the crisis and the prospects for resolution?
- What are the current efforts or proposals toward resolving the conflict, and what challenges do they face?
- What steps could lead to the gradual reintegration of the island economically, socially, and politically, even before a formal peace agreement?

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